Joseph Chamberlain and Foreign Policy, 1895-1903. by Bray, Dominic
 Joseph Chamberlain and Foreign Policy, 1895-1903. 
 
 
Dominic Michel Bray 
 
This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Phd) at 
The University of East Anglia. 
School of History. 
September 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©”This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who 
consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author 
and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance 
with current UK Copyright Law.  In addition, any quotation or extract must 
include full attribution.” 
  
2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates Joseph Chamberlain’s conceptualisations of foreign 
policy while colonial secretary, 1895 to 1903.  While Chamberlain’s 
influential position has been noted in the historiography it has not been 
central to any study.  Therefore Chamberlain’s motivation and aims are not 
clearly understood.  Most often his ideas are contrasted with Salisbury’s, 
who currently enjoys a very high reputation as a realpolitck Foreign 
Secretary, with a clear sense of perspective and direction.  This study will 
therefore reconsider how Chamberlain’s opinions interacted with Salisbury’s.  
The current debate also under-represents Balfour’s own dissention from 
Salisbury and his own bid to control or influence British foreign policy.  
Therefore, this study sits firmly within the debate on British Isolation while 
acknowledging the Decline debate.  Chamberlain was motivated to solve the 
problem of defending British interests, formal and informal, while Britain 
suffered from over-extension.  His interest in a German alliance was 
heightened by events in China but was not limited to them; hence he was 
not content with the security afforded by the Anglo-Japanese alliance.  An 
Anglo-German Alliance was to be the beginning of a new global Power bloc 
which would then order the world mainly for the benefit of its members.  
However, Chamberlain’s enthusiasm for an Anglo-German alliance began to 
decline much earlier than historians normally allow.  Likewise, although 
tense, Chamberlain’s working relationship with Salisbury was stronger than 
has been previously allowed.  Chamberlain’s Cabinet colleagues also made 
use of his assertive nature in order to ensure opposition to Salisbury’s policy 
was not dismissed without having to compromise their own relationships 
with the Prime Minister.  Chamberlain was unsuccessful in negotiating an 
Anglo-German alliance and so turned to Imperial Preference in order to 
strengthen the Empire as a solution to Britain’s stretched resources. 
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Introduction: Chamberlain and the Historians. 
 
Joseph Chamberlain remains a controversial figure; there appear to be 
almost as many opinions about him and his policies as there are authors 
writing on them.  This is perhaps perfectly natural; he was, after all, a man 
who failed to find home within the party political system of the late 
nineteenth century.  Contemporaries found it just as difficult to understand 
him as those who have tried to interpret him from the distance of years.  
Perhaps because of this, Chamberlain remains a perplexing figure of 
interest and one where the puzzle remains unsolved.  The overall aim of 
this current study is to contribute to a better understanding of how 
Chamberlain approached power and international relations.  For a man 
whose name is and was synonymous with the word ‘Imperialism’ it is 
curious that a search of the British Library’s catalogue does not return a 
single work with his name in the title and foreign relations as a subject.  
This is surprising considering that he was Colonial Secretary during the high 
tide of Imperialism, with all the Great Power rivalry that came with it.  This 
surely falls into the subject of foreign relations, yet no work currently exists 
which directly examines Chamberlain’s role in the formation of, or opinions 
on, foreign policy.  This is the deficiency that the current study primarily 
intends fill, at least with regards to his time served in the Unionist 
governments of 1895-1903. 
Even in the realm of biography, foreign affairs is often ignored or reduced to 
a case study.1  Biographers of Chamberlain have a particularly difficult task.  
There are many controversies, twists and turns to the story of 
Chamberlain’s life which leaves the seemingly small role played by foreign 
relations as unimportant.  Next to South Africa, Irish Home rule, Tariff 
Reform, Imperial Federation and the ‘unauthorised Radical Programmes’; 
the alliance talks with Germany, relations with France and friendly overtures 
to the United States all seem small and uninteresting.  This task was not 
                                       
1 Fraser P., Joseph Chamberlain. Radicalism and Empire, 1868-1914, (London, 
1966) 
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helped by the authorised biography of Garvin and Amery.2  The six volume 
work was authored by one of Chamberlain’s contemporaries and admirers, 
Garvin, and completed by the son of a Tariff Reformer, Amery.  Therefore, 
its claim to objectivity is subject to some scepticism.  This work embarked 
upon the unenviable task of portraying Chamberlain to posterity as a giant 
of the Victorian era, a man of vision, ahead of his time and as an archetype 
of the unheeded 'voice in the wilderness'.  To do this it had to attempt to 
dispel the most unsavoury accusations made against Chamberlain, namely 
the alleged betrayal of Dilke, the odium which stuck with him after the 
Jameson Raid, made worse by the final outbreak of war in South Africa and 
Lloyd George’s accusations that the Chamberlain family were profiteering 
from that war.  This would have been difficult enough even if it were a 
simple matter to interpret Chamberlain as a success and the very model of 
a statesman, which of course it is not:  The fact that Chamberlain failed to 
turn more than a handful of his ideas into either social legislation, alliances, 
tariffs, railways or even closer imperial ties, made Garvin’s task an 
unenviable one.  Very few of Chamberlain’s contemporaries can boast such 
a large biography, Salisbury certainly cannot compete but then neither can 
Gladstone.  Only Disraeli comes close.  This is perhaps a clue; the length of 
Chamberlain’s biography, and perhaps Disraeli’s, is proportional to the 
difficulty of understanding its subject.  It is remarkable that a man, who 
never held the office of Prime Minister, or even one of the senior cabinet 
posts, has a six volume biography.  Winston Churchill famously commented 
that “’Joe’ was the one who made the weather” and this is another clue.3  
Despite all of Chamberlain’s apparent failures, he was still, somehow, a man 
of extraordinary influence and force of personality.  Garvin’s hagiography 
essentially set up the framework for the historical debate on Chamberlain 
but failed to reconcile his influence with his failures.  The debate has ever 
since revolved around whether Chamberlain was a successful politician - a 
great statesman - or a tragic failure: whether he was motivated by deep 
                                       
2 Garvin, J.L. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, I, (London, 1932); Garvin, J.L. The 
Life of Joseph Chamberlain, II, (London, 1933); Garvin, J.L. The Life of Joseph 
Chamberlain, III, (London, 1934); Amery, J. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, IV, 
(London, 1951); Amery, J. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, V, (London, 1969); 
Amery, J. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, VI, (London, 1969) 
3 Churchill W.S., Great Contemporaries, (London, 1937) p. 52 
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conviction or a politician possessed of great ambition, few scruples and little 
integrity.  Garvin’s attempts to appropriate his subject from the odium of 
the South African war, other various scandals and apparent u-turns, if not 
of policy at least of party, has placed fettered the debate to these topics.  
Garvin also claimed for Chamberlain foresight.  As he was interpreting him 
in the light of the Great War, it was simple to portray Chamberlain’s 
German alliance talks as an attempt to avoid that terrible conflict and, with 
all his conversations with the French, he became the father of the entente 
cordiale.  The debate has thus revolved around these issues: Was he an 
ambitious opportunist, with an adaptability Machiavelli would have approved 
of, or, a politician driven by principle?  Did he lie and cheat with regards to 
South Africa, Dilke’s political suicide and over government contracts?  And 
whether he left any lasting legacy, or successes?   
Judd’s biography has a very solid and plain aim: to dispel the popular myth 
that Chamberlain started life as Radical and ended it as a Conservative.  He 
argued that Chamberlain’s apparent changes were merely in response to 
changing circumstances.  In this view Chamberlain did not change his 
opinions on property but merely adapted his rhetoric as Marxism and the 
agitation of the Independent Labour Party started to “amount to universal 
confiscation in order to create a Collectivist State.”4  Judd explains that 
Chamberlain’s 
doctrine of ‘Ransom’ had been designed to provoke the ‘Haves’ 
into a more responsible attitude towards ... society’s ‘Have-
nots’.  ‘Jake Cade’ Chamberlain had been, in fact, ... striving to 
avoid class warfare and to render a laissez-faire economy more 
equitable.5 
Judd concluded that Chamberlain never really changed his mind on the 
concepts that had him labelled as a Radical in his early career.  His war for 
a more equitable society had switched battleground.  The solution to these 
problems was increased prosperity, and that could not be gained by social 
reform alone.  His interest in Empire was essentially to solve these 
                                       
4 Memo. Chamberlain 13 Nov. 1894 quoted in Judd D., Radical Joe.  A Life of 
Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1977) p.177 
5 Ibid., p.177 
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problems and his position of Colonial Secretary would “provide him with an 
unrivalled chance to promote the material well-being of Britain through a 
business-like re-ordering of imperial trade”, while ”Tory sentiment for 
Queen and Empire would help to make smooth Chamberlain’s chosen 
path.”6   Therefore Judd can dismiss the apparent move from ‘socialist’ 
Radical to ‘imperialist’ as essentially attempting to find a different solution 
to the same problem.  He also comments on the Jameson raid suggesting 
that “it is beyond belief that Chamberlain ... could have remained perfectly 
unaware of the plans for the raid.”7  In this way Judd is still trying to answer 
those questions Garvin appeared to have spun into a pro-Chamberlain 
conclusion.  However, Judd does not attempt to explain Chamberlain’s 
opinions on foreign affairs.  Although he included more detail than previous 
biographies on many neglected colonial issues, such as West Africa, it is to 
demonstrate Chamberlain’s aggressive stance rather than as part of a wider 
explanation of Chamberlain’s conception of how the world should be 
ordered; the how of his interventions not the why.8   
In his bibliographical note Jay criticises every previous biography: Garvin is 
“unduly favourable”, Fraser is “unbalanced” and “misleading” and Judd 
“provides a full account” but is “insufficiently critical”. 9  However, Jay’s 
work still operates inside the basic bounds of debate created by Garvin.  Jay 
discusses Chamberlain’s lack of legislative achievement, inability to produce 
closer imperial ties and the failure of the Tariff Reform movement.  He 
follows Fraser’s idea that Chamberlain did in fact change his political 
perspective.  He suggests, however, that Chamberlain was not motivated by 
“the threat of social war” but that he was “driven into Unionism by the 
demands of political survival” and so “exploited the bogey of social war to 
create a national party moulded in the progressive image of Birmingham’s 
classless politics.”10  Essentially Jay argues that Chamberlain was motivated 
by ambition and the needs of his own survival rather than any underpinning 
                                       
6 Ibid., p.185 
7 Ibid., pp.193-201 for discussion of the raid and Chamberlain’s involvement.  
quote on pp.198-99 
8 Ibid., pp.203-4 
9 Jay R., Joseph Chamberlain. A Political Study, (Oxford, 1981), pp.369-71 
10 Ibid., p.181 
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ideology; Chamberlain’s choice of the Colonial Office is taken as proof that 
he had little real concern to see social legislation passed.11  Jay’s main 
charge against the previous biographers was that they were not critical 
enough, but in his attempts to avoid this same folly he seems to have 
forgotten the difficulties involved when trying to ‘prove’ a negative.  A lack 
of documentary evidence should not be used to imply guilt.  Jay’s 
conclusion is that Chamberlain was an opportunistic politician who placed 
himself at the forefront of almost every serious debate of his time, but that 
he did offer serious alternatives to the policies adopted.  He was also found 
to be a failure and guilty of most of the worst charges held against him.  
However, Jay does start to look in depth at the German Alliance talks and 
Chamberlain’s role in foreign affairs, starting to challenge Garvin’s 
implications that Chamberlain was father to the entente and that his 
diplomacy foundered on German duplicity and greed rather than his own 
inexperience.  Jay simply concluded that Chamberlain was “an innocent in 
international affairs” who “had to learn the hard way ... the skills of 
diplomacy and the complexities of foreign relations.”12  This is in direct 
contrast to the god-like prescience attributed to him by Garvin.  
Chamberlain's decisions are described merely as having been reactions to 
specific problems, such as China, Samoa, Niger or the Transvaal; there was 
no unifying purpose behind any of them.  This is consistent with Jay’s 
assertion that Chamberlain was merely opportunistic, in essence an 
"intellectual magpie", but the biography does not even try to identify a set 
of ideas which may have underpinned Chamberlain's actions, he rather 
assumes the absence he attempts to prove.13  Chamberlain’s supposed 
overarching ambition is used to explain these interventions; in China he had 
perceived “a chance to undermine Salisbury’s overall control of foreign 
policy”.14  Therefore Jay does not need to try to construct any overarching 
intellectual reasoning, or world view, behind Chamberlain’s actions.  
Ambition alone is enough reason for his intervention in foreign policy. 
                                       
11 Ibid., pp.184-5 
12 Ibid., p.323 
13 Ibid., p.324 
14 Ibid., p.217 
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Marsh’s biography continued the development of his subject, being much 
more thorough in its evaluation.  However, Marsh struggled to contain his 
work in a single volume.  He focuses mostly on the same questions which 
have been features of the debate on Chamberlain since Garvin though he 
introduces some new ideas about Chamberlain.  While the other biographers 
noted Chamberlain as one of the first industrialist to arrive in the very 
highest circles of power, they did so only as a note of interest and vague 
references to his business-like preference for straight talking and active 
policies.  Marsh’s is the first attempt to chart and map out how his business 
experience actually affected policy.  As an example Chamberlain was always 
more concerned about the areas of Empire where he had sold his screws 
than less familiar ones; his ignorance and lack of opinion on India is partly 
explained this way.  But it was also Chamberlain’s business experience that 
led him to view markets as vital British interests and it was the waning of 
the informal commercial empire that “increased the importance of the 
formal empire”, driving Chamberlain to extend its borders.15  Marsh explains 
Chamberlain’s excursions into foreign policy in this way: it was not ambition 
or desire to de-throne Salisbury but that the two men conceptualised British 
interests in different ways.  Chamberlain’s reasoning for pursuing the first 
set of German alliance talks was explained thus; it was an attempt to 
prevent Russia from enclosing more of the Chinese market behind her tariff 
barriers.  While this explanation goes further than previous biographies, 
Marsh neglects many other foreign policy issues.  The second set of ‘alliance 
talks’ in 1900 are all but missing from his account, which also says little on 
the Japanese alliance.  In fact after the 1898 Anglo-German convention, 
touching on Portugal’s African possessions, he mostly leaves foreign affairs 
alone.  Marsh still continues to argue about the same debates.  He presents 
evidence to exonerate Chamberlain from the charge of having ill used his 
friend, Dilke, but not from intriguing over the scandal.16  He discusses 
Chamberlain’s complicity in the Jameson raid in a neutral but exhaustive 
                                       
15 Marsh P.T., Joseph Chamberlain.  Entrepreneur in Politics (London, 1994) pp.433 
- 4 
16 Ibid., pp.225-7 
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manner.17  Deploying more evidence than the previous biographers he gives 
the impression that Chamberlain did no more than could be expected of any 
Cabinet member the upholding of British interests.  Marsh exposes the fact 
that the previous Liberal government had also known about Rhode’s plans, 
and had even replaced the Governor in order to aid them.  Jay ignored this 
evidence.  Marsh’s opinion is that Chamberlain entered politics mainly to 
“ensure those benefits” of good wages and excellent profits to future 
generations of British entrepreneurs and workers; “His essential purpose as 
a statesman was to meet the needs of Britain’s industrial economy”.18  
Policy drove Chamberlain not ambition.  However, where Marsh touches on 
foreign policy he does so only briefly, merely upholding his business model 
as an explanation for Chamberlain’s unorthodox behaviour rather than 
investigating any potential connections between foreign, imperial and 
economic policy that could reveal a how Chamberlain conceptualised 
Britain’s place in the world. 
Chamberlain’s latest scholarly biography takes up essentially where Jay left 
off.  Crosby seizes upon Jay’s conception of Chamberlain as an ‘intellectual 
Magpie’ and driven by ambition.  This Crosby paints into a picture which 
becomes almost a polemic; Chamberlain is regarded as a man driven by a 
need for power, who was unlovable and unhappy.  Every twist and turn of 
his career can be read through this lens.  The trauma of losing his first two 
wives is used as the starting point of this unhappy soul that ended up 
having to dominate all around him.  His personal relationship with Potter 
and then Mary Endicott is cherry picked to display Chamberlain in this light.  
The happiness that both he and Mary shared is never demonstrated.  
Chamberlain is further characterised as creative but unimaginative; unable 
to see other people’s point of view.  As Crosby has already found his 
overarching explanation for Chamberlain, he describes each intervention in 
foreign policy as merely being motivated by either ambition or petty 
obstruction.  This thesis ignores that Chamberlain could have challenged 
Balfour for the premiership in 1902 but chose not to.  This study will 
                                       
17 Ibid., pp.372-405 
18 Ibid., p.671 
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attempt to find a rationale behind his foreign policy rather than to dismiss it 
all as the action of a diseased mind.19 
Much work has been done on Chamberlain outside of the confines of 
biography.  However, most of this has been in works which do not hold 
Chamberlain as the main object of inquiry.  The works touching on Salisbury 
and British foreign policy at the turn of the century are striking examples of 
this.  Chamberlain’s interventions in foreign policy cannot be ignored by a 
scholar of this topic and so it is without attempting a full reconstruction of 
Chamberlain’s motivations, methods and outlook, that his actions with 
regards to foreign policy are assessed.  This is, therefore, most often done 
in the traditional view of politics as being the art of the possible.  This 
approach is perfectly reasonable, but while it may reveal whether 
Chamberlain was successful or conventionally wise, it will not help us 
understand why he was doing what he was, and why he failed to see what 
his colleagues thought was obvious.  Again Garvin is partly responsible for 
laying out the battleground, his portrayal of the Chamberlain-Hatzfeldt talks 
as a great, but missed, opportunity drew attention to what Grenville 
described latter as “[t]he mirage of a German alliance”.20  Early opinion 
agreed with Garvin that Germany was to blame for missing the opportunity.  
However, this was soon challenged by those who felt that an alliance was 
also unacceptable to Britain at the time.  This is the current predominant 
view:”[t]here was no commonality of interests; and therefore there could 
be no alliance”.21  There is no significant problem with this view except that 
this should raise the question of whether it is reasonable to attribute 
                                       
19 Crosby T.L., Joseph Chamberlain: a most radical imperialist, (London,2011) 
20 Grenville J.A.S, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy.  The Close of the Nineteenth 
Century Paperback Ed. with corrections. (London, 1970), p.148 
21 Grenville J.A.S., Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy.  The Close of the Nineteenth 
Century, Paperback Ed. with corrections. (London, 1970); Otte T.G., The China 
Question. Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905, (Oxford,2007), 
p.134; Langer W.L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, 2nd Ed. (New York, 
1968); Charmley, J. Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-
1914 (London, 1999); Kennedy P.M., “Germany World Policy and Alliance 
Negotiations with England, 1897-1900” Journal of Modern History, 45, 4 (1973), 
pp.605-25; Kennedy P.M., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914, 
(London, 1980); Koch H. W., “The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations: Missed 
Opportunity or Myth?”, History, 54, 3 (1969), pp.378-92; Lowe C.J., The Reluctant 
Imperialists, I, (London, 1967)  
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Chamberlain’s alternative opinion as being due to his being “too erratic, ... 
to impulsive; he was easily misled by others and rarely understood the 
outlook of colleagues and foreign diplomats.  Above all he often revealed a 
lack of ... good judgement.”22  This view of Grenville’s has since stuck and 
fits well with general explanations that Chamberlain was nothing more than 
an ambitious opportunist with no guiding principles.  Otte has revised this 
opinion by drawing attention to that fact that “Chamberlain’s talks ... can 
not be written off as amateur dramatics of no real significance.”23  In his 
account Chamberlain’s actions “were symptomatic of a growing discontent 
with Salisbury’s Fabian policy”.24  While this revises the position a little it 
does not go far in trying to explain why Chamberlain believed an agreement 
was possible.  Otte opts for an implied self-deception: “Whether Berlin 
would be so obliging and risk burning its fingers for the sake of 
Chamberlain’s Chinese chestnuts, was the question which the Colonial 
Secretary had avoided posing.”25 
Charmley describes Chamberlain as potentially attempting to walk in 
Disraeli’s footsteps.  In this view Chamberlain was essentially seeking to 
profit from popular jingoism: “the motives were the usual mixture of 
personal ambition and partisan advantage”.  Charmley did accept, however, 
that both Disraeli and Chamberlain considered the future of the British 
Empire as a vital interest and thus “there was also an important element of 
principle at stake.”26  This interpretation of Chamberlain is also 
unsatisfactory.  In it he is described as having been motivated by a fear 
that “Britain could not afford to lose face or her position in the imperial 
struggle”.  Essentially prestige was apparently his central concern.27  The 
Colonial Secretary was also criticised for not falling in with Salisbury’s 
“attempts to improve Anglo-French relations”, after all Chamberlain “had 
not gone to the Colonial Office to appease the French.”28  Later Charmley 
                                       
22 Grenville, Salisbury, pp.127-8 
23 Otte, China p.175 
24 Ibid., p.175 
25 Ibid., p.207 
26 Charmley, Splendid Isolation, p.245 
27 Ibid., p.253 
28 Ibid., p.247 
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also criticised Chamberlain for having got worked “up into a lather about the 
Samoan Islands” when tension between Britain and France, over Fashoda, 
could have erupted into war with very short notice.  The sense is that 
Chamberlain lacked judgement as to what was important, and lacked a skill, 
highly prized by Conservatives, for ‘masterly inactivity’.  This interpretation 
leaves the reader with the sense that Chamberlain was an ambitious jingo, 
singularly lacking in both judgement and understanding of the world.  
Charmley’s only answer, as to why and how Chamberlain viewed the world 
so differently, is essentially a comment on “Chamberlain’s nature”.29  
Monger’s work, on the Japanese alliance and the end of British isolation, 
gives only partial attention to the role played by Chamberlain.  The work 
noted that Chamberlain wanted to end isolation and that his preference was 
for “the natural alliance ... between ourselves and the great German 
Empire”.30  However, Monger does not mention Chamberlain’s lack of 
enthusiasm for the Japanese alliance.  This is difficult to explain if we are to 
believe that he was actuated by a desire to merely end isolation or find a 
regional solution to the China problem.  Monger does go onto draw closer 
attention to Chamberlain’s role in the early stages of the eventual entente 
with France.31  However, there is no attempt to explain Chamberlain’s 
motives or methods.  This is hardly surprising given that Monger's work 
focuses mostly on Lansdowne. 
These studies of foreign policy describe Chamberlain’s intrusions into this 
most aristocratic world as miss-guided and almost nonsensical.  While some 
reference to the wider geopolitical picture is often made, for example 
drawing attention to Chamberlain’s aggressive stance on minor colonial 
matters, this is done only to demonstrate Chamberlain’s lack of judgement.  
An alternative would be to use this evidence in an attempt to understand 
why a man who had a firm grasp of what was possible in the world of 
marketing, both in terms of screws and that of a political creed, and in 
municipal politics, appeared to lack judgement in terms of international 
                                       
29 Ibid., p.252 
30 Chamberlain quoted in Monger G., The End of Isolation. British Foreign Policy 
1900-1907 (Connecticut, 1963), p.14 
31 Ibid., p.40 
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relations?  A final question remains as to what Chamberlain actually hoped 
would be achieved by a German alliance.  Most of these works assume that 
Chamberlain, like other Cabinet members, was concerned over Britain’s 
international position and wished to see the Empire adhere to the Triple 
Alliance.  This assumption has diverted thought away from considering 
Chamberlain’s long-term goals.  It also fails to account for how profoundly 
Chamberlain eventually abandoned the idea of a German alliance.  He was 
not even its warmest advocate by the time Lansdowne was involved in own 
proposal for a secret agreement in 1901.32 
This study will naturally touch upon the ‘isolation’ debate in terms of 
Chamberlain’s perception of, and attitudes toward, British isolation.  Otte, 
argues that the, until recently, accepted opinion, that isolation ended with 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance, is inaccurate and that the effects and limited 
geographical nature of that alliance mark a continuation of Salisbury’s 
‘nuanced’ policy.  Charmley had previously argued that Salisbury’s was not 
a policy of isolation at all but that he followed an older ‘Country Party’ 
conservative tradition.  It is not the aim of the current study to resolve 
these questions, but a study of foreign policy so close to them will 
necessarily touch upon them and perhaps attempt to fit Chamberlain among 
these competing interpretations. 
Neilson’s Britain and the Last Tsar describes the Cabinet of the time as 
composed of two generations: a ‘Victorian’ one, of which Salisbury is 
considered the archetype; and an ‘Edwardian’ generation, to which it is 
implied that Chamberlain belonged.33  While there was certainly a grouping 
in that Cabinet that was increasingly concerned with Britain’s relative 
decline, and who also increasingly lost faith in Salisbury’s policy, it may not 
be satisfactory simply to drop Chamberlain into this group, or even to marry 
those two positions together.  Certainly Chamberlain’s opinion differed from 
many in this group once the Japanese alliance was on the table.  This 
concept of an ‘Edwardian’ generation is taken further in Searle’s The Quest 
                                       
32 Grenville J.A.S., “Lansdowne’s abortive project of 12 March 1901 for a secret 
agreement with Germany” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, (1954) 
33 Neilson K., Britain and the Last Tsar.  British Policy and Russia 1894-1917, 
(Oxford, 1995), pp.3-51 
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for National Efficiency.  Chamberlain was mentioned often in the work, but 
he was not included in the list of famous names to which a concern for 
efficiency was noted.  That list included the likes of Milner and Rosebery.34  
Sympathy for the concept of efficiency certainly cut across party lines, but 
those on the Liberal side of the house, being in opposition during 
Chamberlain’s time, were the loudest.  On the Unionist side, Otte identifies 
the likes of Curzon, Austen Chamberlain, Wyndham and Viscount Cranborne 
as desperate for a more active policy and by implication members of a new 
generation.35   
Friedberg’s The Weary Titan also features Chamberlain, at least in the two 
sections devoted to the economic and financial power of the United 
Kingdom.36  This work, focusing as it does, on the decline debate obviously 
discusses matters far from even the Colonial Secretary's roaming, self 
assigned remit.  The work focuses on the problems facing Britain and the 
constraints she found herself labouring under, some very real, others 
merely virtual but perceived to be immutable.37  Chamberlain’s role in those 
debates is portrayed in varying terms.  On the one hand he is credited with 
being “correct in at least half of his diagnosis of Britain’s condition.”38  He is 
also praised by the work for having realised that it was essential “that the 
greatness of a nation is not to be measured by a comparison with its own 
past, but by its relative position in the councils of the world”, a concept his 
Free Trade opponents did not care to admit.39  Chamberlain is portrayed as 
having essentially recognised the problems facing Britain despite the 
“absence of decisive evidence of relative decline”, which at the time simply 
did not, and possibly could not have existed, not because relative decline 
was a myth but due to the lack of relevant and sufficiently sophisticated 
measures.40  However, Freidberg goes on to conclude that Chamberlain’s 
                                       
34 Searle G.R. The Quest for National Efficiency.  A Study in British Politics and 
Political Thought, 1899-1914, Paperback Edition (London, 1990), p. 2 
35 Otte, China, p.133 
36 Friedberg A.L., The Weary Titan.  Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 
1895-1905, (Princeton, 1988) pp.21-134 
37 Ibid., pp.107-120 
38 Ibid., p.83 
39 Chamberlain, quoted in Ibid., p.72 
40 Ibid., p.82 and Ibid., p.80 
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proposals for tariff reform “would only have served to strengthen” the 
“blunting of the incentives for Britain to remain adaptive and thus 
competitive.”41  Essentially Chamberlain may have accurately identified the 
problem, relative decline, but he had failed to offer a workable policy and 
that seen “in this light, Chamberlain appears as a truly tragic figure.”42  
Again Chamberlain is judged by that old measure that politics is the art of 
the possible, and he was found lacking.  However, he does appear prophetic 
in regards to Britain’s position, even if his remedies and judgement were 
not as divinely inspired. 
While Freidburg gives an internally consistent description of Chamberlain he 
avoids most of his career, focusing only on the tariff reform campaign.  
Given the topic of enquiry this is to be expected and is indicative of a 
problem facing most of the works recently mentioned: they only call upon, 
or investigate, Chamberlain in piecemeal.  Looking at his different roles in 
different contexts, such as the alliance talks in a foreign policy context, and 
tariff reform in an economic one, any attempt to understand the Colonial 
Secretary's approach to politics and the world, his political mentalité, is left 
to his biographers.  These works are not even primarily concerned with 
Chamberlain, most being thematically based on decline, foreign policy or, as 
in Searle’s case, specific political movements or concepts.  One notable 
exception is Porter’s The origins of the South African War.  This work 
focuses more completely on Chamberlain and while remaining tightly within 
the South African context, it does demonstrate some of Chamberlain’s 
preferences and approaches to the conduct of policy.  Porter describes 
Chamberlain’s liberal use of publication, bluebooks, as an attempt to 
educate the British electorate as to the importance of Empire.  Porter places 
this engagement with the public as being in a tradition which included 
Canning and Palmerston.43  While most of the work is naturally focused on 
the South African War the conclusions are also useful in any attempt to 
understand Chamberlain’s conceptual make up: 
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43 Porter, A.  The Origins of the South African War Joseph Chamberlain and the 
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The education of public opinion which he[Chamberlain] had 
attempted was both a process of giving the public the ‘right’ 
views, and of helping people to formulate what he believed 
were their own often incoherent inclinations or beliefs.  Thus 
the ‘representative of the people’ had also to fulfil the functions 
of a leader.  Although in theory this might be a clear 
conception, its practical application, as has been seen, and as 
Chamberlain always acknowledged, was fraught with 
difficulties.44 
This concept of leading public opinion may well prove to be one of the keys 
to understanding Chamberlain.  The concept that “giving the public the 
‘right’ views” could win them over certainly helps explain why he thought 
the Tariff Reform campaign could have been successful.  It may also explain 
why he believed an unauthorised programme could be successful in the 
1880s and that the Conservatives could be persuaded to adopt social reform 
in the early 1890s.  While writing about the South African context Porter 
has provided some evidence pointing toward parts of Chamberlain’s 
conception of politics and democracy. 
What is lacking then is a study to link together the suggestions and partial 
work already completed upon Chamberlain while attempting to avoid some 
of the pitfalls or perhaps distractions with which the traditional 
historiography is almost obsessed.  For these reasons, this study will not 
revisit the origins of the South African War in any meaningful way.  The 
problems caused by the extended British engagement in South Africa will 
have to be considered but there is no need to revisit the controversies of 
the War or the Jameson Raid.  Hopefully then some of the apparent 
contradictions, lack of judgement and seeming unlimited ambition can be 
reconciled to reveal what Chamberlain was truly about. 
  
                                       
44 Ibid., p.259 
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1: Making a Stand: Chamberlain and West Africa. 
 
When Joseph Chamberlain arrived at the Colonial Office in 1895 he took 
over a department of state with a long but somewhat lowly history.  
Chamberlain inherited the department together with several existing issues.  
One of these was the long-standing dispute with both France and Germany 
for control over West Africa.  Hargreaves' West Africa Partitioned devotes 
two volumes to the telling of that story and is still unrivalled. 45  The British 
territories were under several departments jurisdiction.  The Colonial Office 
had responsibility for the crown colonies, Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold 
Coast and Lagos; The Royal Niger Company, a chartered company headed 
by Sir George Goldie, had responsibility to secure its territories from foreign 
penetration; and finally the Foreign Office had direct responsibility for the 
Niger River Protectorate. 46  Colonies, and Company, all had their own 
leaders and their own agendas, which were not always in accordance with 
their ultimate masters back in London.  
The situation in the French colonies was similar, in that the new colonial 
ministry and even the Quai d'Orsay could not always control colonial 
elements, while the exploits of overzealous colonels caused as much 
difficulty for the French as the reluctance of some British agents did for 
Britain.47  Although the French had attempted to centralise their West 
African colonies into a single unit, the difficulty of doing so - especially as 
large areas of as yet neutral, or even nominally British, territory were 
                                       
45 Hargreaves J.D., West Africa Partitioned Vol.I (London, 1974) Vol.II 
(Basingstoke,1985)  
46 George Dashwood Taubman Goldie Governor Royal Niger Company (Feb 1895- 
Jan 1900). 
47 As examples, Mizon joined a slave raiding party during his second expedition into 
Bornu, 1893.  Decoeur pushed further North in 1894 fearing a recall from Paris, and 
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the British sphere as established by the Treaties of 1889 and 1893.  For the British 
side Goldie's constant reluctance to defend the Royal Niger Company's claims in 
Borgu, Gurma and Mossi or extend the field of its operations, further from the river 
banks, was thought to contribute to losses.  
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interspersed between them - left them as much dependent on the 'Man on 
the Spot' as the British were.48 
Chamberlain originally left the complicated mess that was West Africa in the 
seemingly capable hands of Salisbury at the Foreign Office.49  He only 
involved himself once word reached him of what was taking place at the 
Niger Commission which had been created to resolve Anglo-French 
differences in West Africa  So it was not until the negotiations were already 
underway that Chamberlain turned his attention to the problem of 'effective 
occupation' of African hinterlands.  Chamberlain's solution was to instigate a 
policy which effectively mirrored the French.  As the situation developed it 
became apparent to him that the French would not admit Britain's rights 
without supporting evidence beyond the pre-existing treaties.  To do this he 
raised the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) to reinforce Britain's position 
by confronting French military installations and seizing territory to use as 
bargaining counters in a negotiated settlement.  This was a policy designed 
to meet what Chamberlain considered to be French bluffs and resulted in 
rival military forces being camped in very close proximity to one another.  
The Colonial Secretary did not intend to actually start fighting but he 
certainly believed Britain would be justified in defending her claims with 
force if necessary.  Part of the reasoning behind this aggressive or ‘forward’ 
policy (as Chamberlain described it) was that Britain needed to demonstrate 
to a world increasingly full of imperial rivals, that she was prepared to 
defend her claims and would not be deflected by the use of threats. 
Many of the leading works on foreign policy make reference to West Africa, 
even if only briefly.  Roberts barely mentions it, playing Salisbury's control 
of it up by suggesting that "Salisbury never allowed the situation to develop 
into one that threatened war."  Roberts also stresses the importance of the 
Nile Valley and the relative unimportance of West Africa, whose only 
                                       
48 In 1895 all the French colonies, excluding Dahomey, were joined together in the 
Afrique Occidentale francaise an administrative federation.  Hargreaves, West Africa 
II, p.219 
49 Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury Prime Minister 
(1886-1892;1895-1902); Foreign Secretary (1887-1892; 1895-1900)  
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usefulness was as potential currency in a wider exchange. 50   Grenville 
draws attention to the relative unimportance of the "malarious African 
desert", again stressing the essential nature of British interests in the Nile 
Valley.  The Niger negotiations significance are only derived as being the 
moment when Chamberlain started to lose faith in Salisbury; the apparent 
success of the Colonial Secretary's policy vindicated, in his own mind at 
least, his "apparently reckless diplomacy".51 Charmley argues that 
Chamberlain "was 'too warlike' by half".  And by describing the Colonial 
Secretary as "Jingo Joe" he pulls no punches, arguing that Chamberlain 
operated under a dangerous and "ludicrous inversion of priorities", 
appealing to public opinion for his own advantage.52  Langer again only 
touches on West Africa very briefly.  He aligned Chamberlain with "British 
public opinion" which "was astonishingly rabid."  In his opinion the final 
settlement was less the result of British resolve than of a French desire "to 
avoid trouble and come to some agreement."53   
Works on the subject of imperialism have more to say about West Africa.  
Hargreaves' analysis is astonishingly detailed and thorough.  Salisbury is 
again described as being sensible and having "never lost sight, as 
Chamberlain sometimes did, of the necessity of ultimately finding a 
diplomatic solution."  Salisbury is credited with having a sounder "economic 
view than the Birmingham businessman."  Chamberlain is described as 
wanting to accommodate popular jingoism and the interests of "the colonial 
lobbies".  Ultimately, Hargreaves argues that Salisbury got the settlement 
he wanted and that Chamberlain only made his task more difficult.54  
Obichere concluded that "the triumph of British policy was due more to 
Chamberlain's realism than to Salisbury's statesmanship."  The competition 
for territory in the hinterland resulted from the need to keep the coastal 
colonies viable as they "depended on the uninterrupted flow of trade."  The 
most important finding was that reports on the economic potential of these 
regions "were not ignored and that decisions were made on their evidence."  
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Chamberlain's role was essential to Britain's success in keeping foreign 
powers out of the navigable lower Niger, ensuring that most commerce 
would travel via British possessions.55 
As for Chamberlain's biographers, only Garvin talks of West Africa at length.  
Writing in the 1930s, when the British Empire was at its territorial height, 
he described the Colonial Secretary as standing firm:  "Against the Foreign 
Office and the Paris Embassy he had been right in his judgement of what 
discriminating firmness could maintain and obtain without war."  The 
resultant Anglo-French Convention "was worthy of two great nations ... 
honour and interest were satisfied on both sides."  Garvin describes the 
areas reserved to Britain as containing "the largest manufacturing and 
commercial centre in all that part of the Sudan."  Chamberlain is depicted 
as having successfully defended both the Empire's economic interests and 
British honour.56   
The currently accepted image of Chamberlain, created by historians, is one 
of an almost demagogic character, espousing doctrines of national honour 
to improve his own electoral prospects.  His opinions and actions in West 
Africa are therefore seen as a dangerous ramping-up of tensions over an 
area of little or no intrinsic value.  In one case Chamberlain is even 
described as not wanting "a diplomatic settlement", while others remark 
that he was "too warlike".57  Salisbury, on the other hand, is consistently 
described as holding a clear conception of what was truly important, 
acquiescing in Chamberlain's policies only from fear that a split would 
otherwise ensue.  Only Garvin and Obichere suggest that Chamberlain's 
policy was justifiable or a success.  Re-examining the competition over the 
Niger permits a reassessment of the Colonial Secretary’s motivations and 
policy; it acts as a case study in how Chamberlain believed foreign policy 
should be handled and his fears about Salisbury’s approach to the same 
question.  
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Before examining this it is worth discussing how the situation stood in West 
Africa, firstly in terms of treaty agreements with the French and, secondly, 
in terms of action taken on the ground.  The French envisioned an 
enormous African empire spreading from the west coast to the Red Sea, 
and from Tunis to French Equatorial Africa.58  As she attempted to extend 
these territories various collisions occurred between her and native powers 
who had signed treaties with the British.  A number of Anglo-French treaties 
were negotiated to resolve these early conflicts.59  The Niger Commission 
was originally created to survey and tie up the loose ends left by some 
agreements.  As French explorers entered an area already agreed as 
belonging to the Royal Niger Company they realised that the area was 
untouched by Europeans.  Concerned that too much had been given away in 
negotiation France sent further military expeditions into nominally British 
territory.60  In 1892 the Niger Commission briefly re-opened but Salisbury 
faced a difficult election and so rejected a proposal for settlement; he 
considered that the "French Commissioner seems disposed to consider that 
the Commission may reopen questions of principle instead of the 
comparatively mechanical work of a survey."61  The incoming Liberal 
administration continued on but all that was achieved was to settle the 
borders of the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone.62 
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When negotiation failed, action took place on the ground in Africa.  On the 
British side George Ferguson and Lugard where sent into the African 
hinterland to establish treaties with the natives 63  The treaties these men 
made with the natives powers in the region were considered as completing 
"the protection of the Middle Niger from the possibility of French 
interference".64  France also sent out expeditions, they concentrated their 
efforts on the Niger Bend.65  However, finding sparse evidence of the British 
French commanders adapted their arguments and decided that "[a] treaty 
has value ... Only so far as it results from and is justified by a de facto 
situation".66  Competition on the Niger thereafter entered its most 
dangerous phase, when military occupation was regarded as essential to 
defend treaty rights.  It was during this raising of the stakes that 
Chamberlain took control of the Colonial Office.  His approach to West Africa 
would prove more determined than any of his predecessors. The Colonial 
Secretary was not alone in his desire to see a forward policy in West Africa 
as well as elsewhere.  His subordinate, Lord Selborne, was perhaps even 
more aggressive. 67  In December 1895 he was exclaiming that he did "not 
understand how it is that the hinterland doctrine always works against us.  
If the French or Germans have a strip of coast they claim, and claim 
successfully, everything behind it to the North Pole.  But with us it is quite 
different."68  Salisbury had hoped that his son-in-law would be able to keep 
an eye on his Colonial Secretary.  At the formation of the government 
Salisbury warned that Chamberlain's "interest in the Colonies is entirely 
theoretical" and hoped "that ... he will leave the practical work entirely to 
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you[Selborne]".69  In reality the Prime Minister had brought two staunch 
imperialists together.   
In October 1895 Hanotaux decided to re-open the Niger Commission.70  To 
begin with, Chamberlain was hoping to settle the situation with a general 
exchange.  by December 1895 he was discussing exchanging "Dominica for 
Dahomey and hinterland" and "the French shore [in Newfoundland]".71  
Although Salisbury had to point out that the French were not yet ready for 
such an exchange, Chamberlain was certainly open to a negotiated 
settlement, and prepared to look broadly to find material upon which to 
base such an agreement.72  The general settlement would become a 
hallmark of Chamberlain's preferences.  The Commission reconvened in 
February 1896 and the French refused to continue as they had before.  
Ferguson's treaties were to be discounted and the French insisted that they 
were free to penetrate south of the Say-Barruwa line except in areas 
belonging to Sokoto.73  This made any progress in negotiations unlikely and 
the Commission closed again when the British announced their intention to 
re-conquer the Egyptian Sudan.74  Lebon hoped that more 'effective 
occupation' would help with British intransigence. 75   
The British were not quiet either; they had their own internal problems to 
solve.  The Emir of Ilorin, notionally under the protection of the Niger 
Company, started to threaten messengers from Lagos and once news 
reached the Colonial Office, Chamberlain immediately asked that the 
Company to compel the cooperation of the Emirate.76  Goldie asked for 
more time but when fighting broke out Chamberlain lost his patience and 
insisted that the Company either took immediate action or allow Lagos to do 
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so.77  The Colonial Secretary demanded that Lagos be allowed to move at 
once and the bill sent to the Company.78  This was refused by the Foreign 
Office but the overlapping of responsibilities for the area had certainly 
caused tension.  As news that the Company had eventually taken action 
reached the French they asked for assurances that the British forces would 
not enter disputed territory in Borgu.  These assurances were given and 
even the planned movements of the expedition were released to the French 
press. The French response was to send three expeditions into the area: 
Salisbury's well intentioned diplomacy had only revealed to the French an 
opportunity, because he had neglected to extract a reciprocal promise to 
refrain from entering the contested area. 79   
Goldie had subdued Illorin by Spring 1897, but Chamberlain was now aware 
that the French had occupied other areas and most importantly Bussa 
where the Niger became navigable to the sea.  In June Chamberlain sent 
orders initiating his policy of counter occupations.  Maxwell, the governor of 
the Gold Coast, was required to present the French with superior forces in 
order to encourage them to withdraw.80  If they did not then the Governor 
was "to consider whether there are any places which it would be practicable 
for us to seize and hold as a material guarantee for dealing with French 
seizures of Mossi and Boussa when negotiations are resumed with the 
French Government."  Maxwell was also warned "not to take the offensive 
against French troops", to avoid places south of the 9th parallel (agreed 
French territory), but to "occupy any places north of the 9th parallel to the 
west as well as to the east ... claimed by the French as theirs".  To carry out 
this policy extra forces would be raised: "The question of expense must not 
be allowed to stand in the way of dealing effectively with the present 
emergency."  This was the beginning of Chamberlain's WAFF.81 
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Chamberlains concerns over Salisbury’s response to French demands 
extended beyond West Africa.  When the Colonial Office was asked its 
opinion on Salisbury's proposed Tunis agreement, Chamberlain replied 
privately that he disliked "making these large concessions to France without 
securing any adequate quid pro quo.  My own view is that every change to 
the advantage of France in Tunis should be accompanied with a change to 
our benefit in Egypt."  He complained that Britain "had given a great deal to 
the French, in Siam, Madagascar and now Tunis."  This, he believed, 
encouraged them, in "Newfoundland, Egypt and West Africa" to be "more 
offensive than ever and ... that if we do not show that we will not be trifled 
with, we shall finally be driven into war with the disadvantage of having 
already surrendered much that is valuable."82  The Colonial Secretary 
viewed the world very differently from Salisbury, who attempted to smooth 
Chamberlain's ruffled feathers in his reply.  It revealed some of the 
differences between the two men.  He did not "admit that 'we have given a 
great deal', or 'anything' to France in Siam" there "we found France in full 
process of absorbing the country" and that "we had no treaty right 
whatever to interfere on behalf of Siam."83  He continued to explain that 
Britain had since gained that treaty right but only by agreeing to partition 
the territory.  Salisbury explained the reasons why he felt an aggressive 
policy had not been possible, not only with regard to Siam, but also to 
Newfoundland and Madagascar.  It was a very capable defence of 
Conservative foreign policy.84  In Chamberlain’s view, however, Britain had 
lost out by her long term policy of allowing commercial penetration to 
extend her informal empire, while neglecting to extend her formal empire in 
the hallowed name of retrenchment.85  By not extending official control 
Britain had missed opportunities to develop the infrastructure of these 
territories, leaving them in the condition of "Undeveloped Estates", while 
formal rule would also have acted as a guarantee against annexation by a 
tariff-raising rivals.  Chamberlain still considered the concessions given to 
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France as being too great even where they were not at the expense of 
Britain's formal possessions.  Wherever France had made a gain, whether 
from a third party or directly from the British a market closed to British 
trade; Britain's lead in terms of territory and trade was reduced each time 
her rivals made a gain and she did not.  Salisbury did join with Chamberlain 
in lamenting the effects of "the Gladstonian garrisons of the Treasury" but 
the two men had entirely different views on Britain's geo-political position. 86  
Salisbury's foreign policy was a classic defence of the status quo: 
attempting to maintain Britain's position and power without giving offence 
unless absolutely necessary.  Chamberlain saw a passive Britain almost as a 
declining power, and that if she did not act to head off the encroachments 
of her enemies she would eventually lose her position of dominance, as her 
rivals caught up. 
Chamberlain did not rest while the WAFF was in preparation.  He 
immediately started to address the public as to the situation and the 
apparently dishonest nature of French methods.  He hoped to engender an 
understanding of the need not only to defend vigorously and occasionally 
extend the Empire, but also to appreciate its value.87  In August 1897 he 
asked for a despatch to be drawn up, protesting against French behaviour in 
West Africa.  He did not think this would bring the French round "but it will 
be a useful preface to our new policy and will serve for reference".  
Salisbury agreed, although he thought the only effect would be "to prevent 
them[The French] from forgetting them[British grievances]".88  As the 
month progressed, and the Foreign Office made "purely verbal" changes to 
Chamberlain's despatch, Salisbury started to become alarmed.  Edmund 
Monson, an old and trusted diplomat, also started to become "rather 
anxious about our proceedings in Western Africa."  Salisbury found "it 
rather difficult to follow quite accurately what is taking place", because of 
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the overlapping departmental responsibilities for the area.89  He attempted 
to enlist Selborne's aid with a direct appeal to him for a copy of the "actual 
orders" Maxwell had received from the Colonial office.  Salisbury was 
motivated by the "many letters" making it "evident" that Monson was 
disquieted.90  Meanwhile, Goldie had been recalled to London, during late 
1897, to discuss what action should be taken to secure the Company's 
territories.  Maxwell's orders had been to secure the Gold Coast hinterland 
and so a forward policy, suitable for provinces further east, needed to be 
formulated. 
Chamberlain was on holiday at this point and so Selborne wrote to him 
concerning discussions.  The first letter discussed how Britain could 
establish effective occupation in areas where the French were already 
present.91  Goldie successfully argued against the suggestion that British 
forces should attempt to starve the French out of Bussa, even pointing out 
that it would be the natives who went without long before the French did.  
Needing an alternative, Selborne "asked Goldie if he would occupy all the 
remaining points in Borgu with detachments in the French style."  Goldie 
was reluctant, preferring the British posts to "be large enough to hold them 
against any probable attack".  Selborne admitted that this should be the 
case for any group sent into the French hinterland, but believed it did "not 
matter how small the detachments are" in the British sphere: "If the French 
attacked one of them & defeated it, it would be just the case we want."  He 
went on, pointing out that a "disaster to one of our posts in the French 
hinterland would not be the same thing as a disaster in our own hinterland, 
for public purposes at home." It is striking that Selborne would regard a 
"disaster" as an opportunity almost suggesting that such an occurrence 
would be desirable. 92 How far Chamberlain agreed with this is hard to 
discover.  A note in Selborne's letter suggests that they had discussed this 
before, but there are no details of the conversation.  Selborne's letter 
certainly implied that there was an opportunity to create conditions for such 
                                       
89 Edmund John Monson, British Ambassador to France (1896-1904); Salisbury to 
Selborne, 26/08/1897, Selborne MSS 5/49-50 
90 Salisbury to Selborne, 1/09/1897, Selborne MSS 5/53-54 
91 Selborne to Chamberlain, 8/09/1897, JC9/4/2d/3 
92 ibid., 
30 
 
a "disaster" to take place.  The suggestion was incendiary and Chamberlain 
sent it back by post, because he did "not like travelling with such 
compromising documents."93 
Thankfully, cooler heads prevailed and Selborne acted upon a suggestion 
made by Goldie to occupy two sites in strength, securing Salisbury's 
consent Goldie was encouraged to act as soon as possible.94  Salisbury also 
further approved a telegram issuing instructions "to occupy, at once, all the 
villages on their route[French communications] & especially all frontier 
posts" near any roads and "to refuse passage to the French."  Goldie had 
brought news that the French were moving supplies through territory south 
of the 9th parallel which belonged to Britain; Salisbury was hardly 
demurring in the face of these aggressive actions.  The Prime Minister felt 
that these orders could be safely sent as activity on the ground was about 
to give way to talk around the conference table.  Selborne's letter closed 
with the news that "Hanotaux had written ... asking to renew the Niger 
Negotiations" and Salisbury's opinion was "that we ought to go into the 
conference again".95  What is striking is that clearly Selborne was at least as 
'gung-ho' about the French as Chamberlain was, and is reputed to have 
been, but also Salisbury appeared to have been quite prepared to acquiesce 
in the brinksmanship, even if he believed it would naturally diminish once 
the Niger Commission was sitting again. 
Chamberlain's reply started by reminding Selborne that the whole issue was 
highly sensitive and "if badly treated" could" involve a European War".  His 
subordinate was reminded that "the Foreign Office, which knows better than 
we do the nature of our relations with France", and "the Prime Minister who 
is responsible in a peculiar sense for all questions of peace and war" had the 
ultimate responsibility to decide what to do and thus Chamberlain would "in 
any case yield to Lord Salisbury's wishes".  This news could not have 
reached Salisbury or else he would have realised that his Colonial Secretary 
could have been relied upon to toe the line.  However, Chamberlain was not 
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prepared for Salisbury to have it all his own way without recording his 
reasons for differing from him: 
You[Selborne] do not give me any definite reason for the 
suggested change of policy[Reopening of the Niger 
Commission], unless it be Monson's fears that the French will 
be nasty and may even be prepared for extremities.  But if this 
is the case are we, once more, to give way to them and to 
sacrifice the future of our West African possessions?  For 
myself I could not do this and, at all risks, I would insist on our 
rights and not allow this country to be bullied and defrauded. 
... My own idea was that the only hope of a peaceful 
arrangement was to convince the French, from the first, that 
they had tried our patience too far & that they must give way 
or take the consequences.96 
This was the crux of Chamberlain's position.  He was not prepared to see 
French brinkmanship prosper and he feared that if British policy was going 
to be influenced by opinions such as Monson's then the ultimate outcome 
would be what Salisbury called compromise and Chamberlain surrender.  
Chamberlain believed that Britain should not offer any further concessions 
and therefore the conference would be deadlocked again from the moment 
it reopened.  He considered "the aggressions of the French" to be "flagrant 
& almost dishonourable" but that his position would be "completely changed 
if I thought that our case would break down under further examinations".  
The strength of Britain's legal claims was important to the Colonial 
Secretary.  Relying on Monson to defend British claims in West Africa 
seemed dangerous, Chamberlain made further suggestions: firstly, that if 
the British position was strong enough they should offer to go to arbitration 
and, secondly, if that was refused maybe a "Congress ... of 
Plenipotentiaries" would " be in a position to arrange a compromise, if one 
was possible."  Chamberlain then offered himself as a potential appointee to 
this "Congress".  His intention was obvious: he wanted to avoid relying on 
the 'old hands'.  He believed it would require a properly empowered and 
energetic delegate to successfully combine the twin tasks of offering a 
compromise solution while convincing the French that Britain was serious 
about defending her claims.  However, the Colonial Secretary was not 
prepared to attempt to force his opinion on the Prime Minister or the 
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Cabinet and closed his letter confirming that he was "perfectly content to 
accept & support any decisions at which he[Salisbury] may arrive."97 
Salisbury laid out his case to Chamberlain and attempted to explain why the 
Colonial Secretary's proposals were not practicable.  With regard to 
Chamberlain negotiating directly with Hanotaux, the Foreign Secretary 
pointed out that as a Secretary of State Chamberlain would need to be 
invested "with the office of Special Ambassador" and as this "would seem so 
much in excess of the visible requirements of the case, that it would create 
a veritable panic."98  Chamberlain had his previous mission to "Washington 
about the Fisheries" in mind when he made the suggestion.99  He accepted 
Salisbury's statement as "conclusive against my personal representation in 
the Commission" but while he, again, agreed to be led by Salisbury it was 
unlikely he was convinced that precedent and protocol were more important 
than obtaining a satisfactory outcome.  Salisbury explained that Britain had 
"claimed a good deal more than we can establish a sound claim for, in order 
to furnish material for an exchange which will enable the French to recede 
from untenable positions without discredit."100  Rather than accepting the 
lesson in appeasement Chamberlain promised Salisbury only a reprieve until 
he had "time to master all the details of the question and the evidence on 
which our claim is supported."101 
Chamberlain was certainly as relieved as he must have been disappointed 
as the Prime Minister closed his letter encouraging his hasty subordinate to 
"lose no time in collecting Hausas and gunboats: there is still much that has 
not been contested yet  and which there is time to save."  Salisbury 
probably thought that this exhortation would result in little controversy 
given that "Hanotaux [did] not contemplate commencing negotiations for 
another ten days."102  If the Prime Minister hoped that this would count as a 
warning not to continue to press forward after negotiations had opened he 
was sorely mistaken.  What this interchange of letters does reveal is that 
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Chamberlain was not alone in his desire to see a ‘forward’ policy.  Certainly 
Selborne agreed.  In fact the comment that he looked on a potential 
'disaster' with some anticipation was more aggressive than anything 
Chamberlain had yet written.  Salisbury was also much more encouraging 
than his reputation would suggest.  Nevertheless, Chamberlain was easily 
capable of acting upon the Prime Minister's urgings while ignoring his 
subtler suggestions of caution.  Having worked with Chamberlain, officially 
or otherwise, for the best part of nine years Salisbury should have been a 
better judge of the man.   
Chamberlain certainly understood Salisbury's implied suggestions.  He 
regretted that the colonial office would not now "be allowed to give 
instructions to McCullam to repel any further aggressions of the kind 
recently reported by France".103   He also believed he detected a double 
standard by which France and Britain were playing this West African game 
of chess.  The Foreign Office had ordered Maxwell to withdraw his forces 
from a village within the agreed borders of France's Ivory Coast colony.  
Chamberlain accepted this as being "right as far as it goes" but he was 
confused as to why the Foreign Office had not answered the French 
complaint about the occupation by reminding them of the British complaint 
made against their occupation elsewhere.  Both France and Britain had 
justified these occupations, of territory recognised as belonging to the 
other, by claiming they were necessary for self-defence against native 
forces.  The Colonial Secretary insisted that "it is not too late to do this 
now" and he wanted to "press the F.O. to make remonstrations in this 
sense."104  If such misbehaviour were "good for the French", asked 
Chamberlain, "why sh[oul]d. it be bad for us?"105  However, Chamberlain 
had little freedom of action.  Until the Colonial Secretary returned from his 
holiday and examined British claims himself, he could not challenge the 
Foreign Office's handling of the matter.106  Even Monson- while urging 
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appeasement from Paris- had written to suggest that the British should "not 
relax in the slightest degree the preparations for vindicating our rights, I 
think if the French see that we mean business, they will be content to come 
to terms".107  Chamberlain would later lament that Monson's backbone 
vanished as quickly as it had appeared.   
A few days later, Selborne sent Chamberlain news which filled the Under 
Secretary "with anxiety if not dismay".  He was in the process of gaining 
Foreign Office approval for a telegram ordering McCallum to use force if 
necessary to oust French posts from territory south of the 9th Parallel in 
Lagos.108  He had also gained Salisbury's assent to complain about the 
French occupation of British territory in the same despatch, assuring 
Hanotaux that British forces would be vacating theirs.  The same letter 
contained details of the progress being made in raising the WAFF, but while 
assured that "South of the 9th Parallel we are ... in a position to repel all 
trespasses" the situation to the north had worsened: "M. Ballot, the 
Governor of Dahomey, has himself started ... with 500 men & many 
officers- The Niger Conference will be meeting very shortly & we shall be 
confronted with this position.  The French claim to have occupied the whole 
of our hinterland".  Also included was the Colonial Office response to 
Salisbury's concerns over the validity of British claims.109  Chamberlain 
appeared to have been rather buoyed up by the letter.  He felt able to 
extend his holiday knowing that Selborne was "doing everything that is 
necessary & I rest quite easy on this case."  The answers to Salisbury's 
concerns seemed "to be good answers ... quite good enough" to justify 
Britain "in taking a very strong line with the French."  He went on to explain 
how the French "must not be allowed to take advantage of their own 
misdoings.  We may -for the sake of peace - agree to a division but we 
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ought - even at the cost of war- to keep our adequate hinterland for the 
Gold Coast, Lagos & the Niger Territories."  The rest of the letter was full of 
advice for the upcoming Commission.  Chamberlain expected to have to 
compromise and was even willing to "sacrifice the Gambia" to get what he 
wanted further east.  Obviously more hopeful for the outcome than he was 
in his previous letter, Chamberlain pondered whom Salisbury would appoint 
to the Commission, suggesting that "we want very nice mannered but very 
determined men - the iron hand in the velvet glove".110   
Chamberlain continued to be troubled by the double standard he believed 
was being applied by unilateral withdrawal from areas previously agreed as 
belonging to France.  Salisbury once again attempted to educate the 
Colonial Secretary: "The fact the French are breaking international law 
elsewhere, will not excuse us here if we are breaking it also.  The whole 
question must be looked at from a Bluebook point of view."  Both men were 
thinking about the effect publication would have: Chamberlain, who was 
himself outraged by the French, expected that publication would vindicate 
the British occupation, because he anticipated public anger would equal his 
own.  Salisbury anticipated the moral objections of Conservatives and 
Gladstonian Liberals.  The Prime Minister added more legal arguments and 
also pointed out the area in question was only ten miles from the border 
and therefore "any security our encampment [...] would confer upon the 
colony of the Gold Coast, would be equally conferred by an encampment 
ten miles to the east".111   This effectively ended Chamberlain's bluff.  He 
had justified the occupation on the grounds that it was necessary for 
security against native forces and so it was vulnerable to Salisbury's 
suggestion that the safety of the Gold Coast could be equally assured by an 
encampment on the border.  Chamberlain actually wanted to retain the 
position as a bargaining counter in the forthcoming negotiations.  He would 
continue to argue that posts were needed in the areas already considered 
French, if some sort of fair agreement was to be arrived at.  He ordered 
Maxwell to withdraw, claiming he felt "the force of your[Salisbury's] 
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arguments, but I should have thought that we might be justified by the 
actions of the French which in four separate cases is a breach of agreement 
with us."  It was not the case, as Chamberlain felt it to be, that Salisbury 
was not allowing the British "to recriminate in any way" but only that they 
stay within the bounds of international law while doing so.  Chamberlain 
was still content to follow Salisbury's advice just so long as he had 
subjected the Foreign Secretary to his frustrations and protests.112  
Chamberlain finally ordered Maxwell to retire to the border on 26th October 
1897 noting only that this was "found necessary for political reasons."113 
As the Niger Commission reopened Chamberlain complained that "the 
commissioners are easily discouraged and are inclined at every check to fall 
back on their original inclination for what they call compromise - which 
means in every case giving up something which we believe to be ours and 
getting nothing in return".  Colonel Everett had complied a memorandum 
detailing many problems with the treaties, Chamberlain had hoped that 
they would still confer some kind of right, however doubtful, regardless.114  
It was the French insistence that the treaties, signed with the natives, were 
to be ignored and the British commissioners’ willingness to accept that 
which irritated him.  He was quite prepared for a creative geographical 
settlement but he was not prepared simply to let these treaties be cast 
aside without getting something in return.  He also pointed out that the 
"essential points are not touched" by the controversy over treaties.  He was 
referring to the need for control over Sokoto and both banks of the Niger as 
far up the river as possible.  With this in mind Britain could "allow all 
beyond these points to be matter of bargains- i.e. to be given away if we 
get something positive in return for them."115  Chamberlain did not believe 
that the French should receive anything in respect of Sokoto or the banks of 
the Niger at least to the Bussa Rapids.  Other claims could be bartered 
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against other areas but he would not give the French anything for areas he 
considered to be solidly British already. 
Concerned that a capitulation might take place in Paris, Chamberlain asked 
Salisbury "to delay the negotiations for a few days until we can exhaust the 
subject of Col. Everett's memorandum.  It is no use negotiating with 
Commissioners who are only too ready to give up our case on the slightest 
pretext."  Again he reiterated that apart from the "essential parts", which he 
believed Everett's memorandum had not damaged, he was "quite willing to 
barter away" the rest, "if we can get anything for them.  Our claims to them 
are at least as good as the French and ought to be worth something."  He 
also suggested changing the nature of the negotiations and asked after "the 
possibility of a general settlement".  He noted that in return for that he was 
prepared "for some extensive sacrifices".  He was prepared to look on the 
questions already under discussion from a different point of view if it were 
part of a proposal wider than just West Africa.116  Whatever historians or 
contemporaries thought of West Africa, or Chamberlain's estimation of its 
worth, he was quite prepared to make concessions there, but only as part of 
what he considered a fair exchange. 
Salisbury's reply could only have reassured Chamberlain: "I deplore the 
turn Monson's views have taken.  There is something fatal in the air of 
Paris. Everett goes in the same direction; and Phipps in the former 
Commission was just as bad."  The Prime Minister had several suggestions 
as to how to avoid Monson's anticipated breakdown of negotiations and 
subsequent French request for arbitration.  He would offer "arbitration on 
special questions of title ... because I feel no doubt that we should win on 
those points."  While he did not expect the French to agree, "discussion 
would take time, and would leave us a good record in the Blue Book if 
negotiations broke off."  This delay was necessary because once 
negotiations broke off the French would "occupy Borgu: and you 
[Chamberlain] are not yet in a position to occupy anything in return."  
Salisbury appears to be in full support of Chamberlain's policy of counter-
occupations, but within practical limits.  On Chamberlain's suggestion about 
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a general settlement Salisbury had a warning: "we must wait till such an 
offer comes from them.  Our proposals are taken as admission from which 
our adversaries start afresh."117  The next day Salisbury continued to 
distract Chamberlain by considering "the bargain that we would be prepared 
to accept", should the French offer a general settlement.  As regards the 
Niger he again advised delay in the negotiations.118  Chamberlain gave his 
assent "to the offer of a restricted arbitration" and also approved of 
delaying any formal reply until he had more detail on both Everett's and 
Lugard's memoranda as well as the Niger Company's comments upon 
them.119 
Monson decided to write again to Chamberlain in an attempt to move him 
towards a more conciliatory policy.  His position was clear: to settle before 
the French 'effectively occupy' other areas "where we cannot possibly 
permit them to show themselves".120  Chamberlain was hardly moved, but 
then he fully intended to take 'effective occupation' to the French just as 
soon as the WAFF was ready to move.  He believed that the French and 
Germans had only been able to settle their differences because the 
Germans "had taken places in the French hinterland which they were able to 
barter."121  Britain should therefore be prepared to do the same the moment 
negotiations failed.  Action was the way to escape the impasse; Britain 
should not have to give up her rights, as Chamberlain interpreted them, 
because she respected international law and the French did not. 
At this point Salisbury's approach diverged from Chamberlain's.  He could 
not see how the French could be convinced to evacuate their posts without 
negotiations or probably compromise.  He expected that if France had 
withdrawn it would have been "a grave humiliation, and would probably cost 
the Ministers their offices."122  He forwarded these arguments to convince 
Chamberlain of the necessity of re-opening negotiations, but if the French 
could only be moved by talk then that talk must contain something they 
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wanted.  It was apparent that Salisbury had anticipated giving the French 
more than Chamberlain had.  In early December 1897 he was considered 
offering the French a strip of land bordering on the Niger.123  Chamberlain 
was disappointed: "Lord Salisbury's memo ... is most discouraging.  I 
thought he was entirely with us". The Colonial Secretary went on: "I am 
more than sorry to differ from him, but I cannot stand it.  I would rather 
give up office than allow French methods to triumph in this way.  We shall 
pay for it sooner or later and I cannot be party to such a surrender."124  It 
seems unlikely that Chamberlain's threat to resign was sincere.  The area in 
question was not important enough, even to Chamberlain, and defending a 
resignation over it would have been difficult.  But he believed that such a 
precedent would have serious consequences elsewhere in the world and in 
the future.  His view was not unique; certainly Selborne agreed with him, 
against his father in law, and later even Francis Bertie in the Foreign Office 
would agree that Britain could not afford "to lose face with the natives 
generally; to give to France and other Powers the impression that we can 
always be squeezed."125 
Chamberlain wrote another lengthy memorandum.  He explained what he 
considered to be the stumbling block of the negotiations:  
that the French appear to contemplate as a compromise the 
exchange of incommensurable claims.  In any transaction the 
sacrifices made by both sides should be similar in character.  
Doubtful claims may be exchanged for doubtful claims, and 
rights for rights; but the French only propose to abandon 
doubtful claims in exchange for the surrender by us of 
undoubted rights.  In fact- as I have said before- they assume 
the position of a man who after stealing my purse should then 
ask for my watch in consideration of a promise that he will not 
strip me of my clothes. 
He described what he considered 'doubtful' and 'undoubted' claims, 
eventually offering to give all the ‘doubtful’ ones over to the French in 
return for recognition of Britain's ‘undoubted’ positions.  Given his feelings 
on the behaviour of the French this was indeed a concession on 
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Chamberlain's part.  This offer was only to be made once.  If the French 
refused then Britain should insist on arbitration of the selected points about 
which Chamberlain and Salisbury were both confident.   After that 
Chamberlain would no longer be prepared to offer anything without a 
corresponding concession of French territory.126  Selborne wrote to lend his 
support to his chief.127 By December 1897 Chamberlain rephrased his 
proposals in a memorandum detailing what the Colonial Office considered to 
be fair recompense for each of the contested areas.128  However, Salisbury 
was not yet ready for anything in the way of an ultimatum.  He thought it: 
so much to the good, so far as West Africa, at least, is 
concerned.  But I am sceptical- and inclined to think that the 
offer will not succeed: ... it would be a nuisance to have 
committed ourselves by language from which we cannot 
recede, to refuse altogether the only thing about which the 
French really care[an enclave on the navigable Niger].  I will 
send the despatch for your concurrence.129   
The Prime Minister was certainly not prepared to abandon the idea of some 
form of enclave, one of the concessions Chamberlain was most reluctant to 
make.   
Meanwhile, the work of the Commission went on. By mid January, however, 
Monson felt that the commissioners had "carried out as well as could be 
expected the wishes of the Colonial Office in regard to spinning out the 
negotiations" and that they "must either let the negotiations break down 
altogether or be empowered to offer conditionally some such scheme of 
general arrangement as may make the French Government agree to the 
limited access [to the Niger] which is I understand, all that the Cabinet is 
likely to accord."  Again Monson warned that more delay would put Britain 
at a disadvantage: the French would start penetrating south of the Say- 
Barruwa line as they had "no hesitation in working in laterally as they insist 
that they have the right to do."  Writing to Salisbury, Monson attempted to 
circumvent what he had accurately identified as the source of Chamberlain's 
intransigence, commenting "that our contention with the French is based far 
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more on the indication of principle and on the enforcement of right ... than 
on interested motives."  He was appealing to Salisbury's sense of 
perspective: British interests in West Africa were not sufficient to justify the 
danger even if the British were in the right.  In the same letter Monson 
promised a memorandum detailing a "scheme which in our humble opinion 
might be accepted by them[HMG] as the basis of an agreement which the 
French might also on their side find acceptable."Interestingly, marginalia on 
the copy of this letter in Chamberlain's papers reads "No our interests as 
well as our honour compel us to resist the French encroachments".130   
Many historians have suggested that Chamberlain wished to use the Empire 
to find a broad base of electoral support; he is accused of having attempted 
to attach British sentiment to certain places, invoking national honour and 
public opinion as reasons for his intransigence.  Few consider the simpler 
explanation that Chamberlain actually believed in concepts such as national 
honour.  Most of his records reveal a deep conviction that the British public 
should have been educated as to the importance of Empire.  A better 
informed electorate would act as a remedy for the malaise in British 
imperial policy caused by the 'Little Englanders'.  This would also ensure 
that the Empire remained as important as Chamberlain believed it to be.  In 
other words, Chamberlain was attempting to develop a broad base of 
electoral support but this effort was for the Empire itself rather than simply 
his own electoral fortunes.  If enthusiasm for Empire was more widespread 
then he could rest assured that even his political opponents could not ignore 
it.  Regarding charges that Chamberlain over-estimated the importance of 
British interests in West Africa, he felt that any settlement needed to 
demonstrate that Britain was prepared to defend her claims as a warning to 
any who hoped to squeeze the Empire in some other part of the world.  
Putting off new encroachments, in his view, was certainly in Britain's wider 
interest. 
When Monson's memorandum did arrive, Chamberlain described it as "an 
admirable document if it were written by French Officials as a brief for a 
French Minister who wished to justify the extraordinary demand that has 
                                       
130 Monson to Salisbury, 14/01/1898, JC9/4/2c 
42 
 
lately been put forward- I can hardly believe seriously- by the French 
Commissioner."  Chamberlain went on to complain about the "implied 
menace of war" that he felt was present throughout the memorandum.  He 
pointed out that if the risk of war was a good reason for giving ground in 
West Africa then it would also apply to other disputes such as Egypt: "If we 
have rights and interests in any quarter of the world and are unprepared to 
defend them, it is certain that foreign nations will know how to take 
advantage of our weakness."  Chamberlain never abandoned what he 
considered to be of the utmost importance, that the settlement could not be 
allowed to demonstrate that Britain was prepared to give up certain places 
to avoid war.131  It is not that Chamberlain lacked understanding of the 
relative importance of different places or that he wilfully chose to ignore 
them.  His concern was not that Salisbury might consider giving ground in 
West Africa and not Egypt, but that by giving too much ground in West 
Africa, or at least not mounting a serious defence of British claims, the 
French, and others, would be encouraged in their attempts in other parts of 
the world, including Egypt.   
By February 1898 Goldie had ordered his forces "to 'compel the French' to 
'recross the Niger'."132  Chamberlain informed Salisbury reminding him that 
"Goldie's action is in accordance with the decision of the Cabinet and should 
I think be approved."  The Prime Minister's reply was a single sentence 
which agreed with Goldie's actions.133  This short interchange demonstrates 
that Chamberlain had become distrustful of Salisbury and so reminded him 
that his 'forward' policy had Cabinet approval; their relations had started to 
become seriously strained.  The Colonial Office then prepared "to get rid of 
the French where they are established in close proximity ... by starving 
them out. ... If we cannot manage the matter this way we should expel 
them ... with an overwhelming force", should negotiations fail.  This was not 
to be quite as aggressive as it sounded: "orders not to provoke or to 
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commence an attack" were to be maintained.  Selborne was clear: "We 
must make the French the aggressors & let them be the first to fire."134 
Monson decided that his arguments would be better received if his masters 
back home knew exactly why the 'air in Paris was fatal'.  In late February he 
sent back a memorandum describing the end of Zola's case and the final 
closing of the Dreyfus affair.  The result was that "Europe" had "judged 
France and she stands condemned by the unanimous public opinion of every 
civilized people.”  Therefore "it might be a relief to France to pick a quarrel 
with the one Great European Power who cannot invade her."  He finished by 
suggesting that this situation could not be "overlooked by those ... engaged 
in conducting negotiations with France upon a subject ... which requires no 
little patience, tact and foresight."135  This warning had little effect on 
Chamberlain.  He continued his department’s preparations and in a 
memorandum written just two days after Monson's fears had been shared 
with the Cabinet, he continued to insist that concession must come with a 
quid pro quo.136   
While his department was preparing to plans to starve out the French 
Chamberlain presented the Cabinet with a memorandum detailing his 
response to the latest French counter proposals.  He again emphasised that 
his last suggestion represented an "irreducible minimum" to be retained in 
"regard to British interests and British Rights."  These included an enclave 
"so as to offer every possible trading facility to the French in the portion of 
the Niger."  There were restrictions on the use of the enclave which would 
still be subject to British jurisdiction.  At this point there was growing 
disquiet in the Cabinet over Salisbury’s handling of foreign policy, the Prime 
Minister was about to depart the country as he was ill, and Chamberlain and 
Balfour would embark on clandestine alliance talks with Germany.137 
The French response was to ask for a second enclave on the Niger delta and 
for a territorial concession without agreeing to Chamberlain’s stipulated quid 
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pro quo which focused on local tariff arrangements.  Chamberlain was 
frustrated that every proposal made to the French was immediately used as 
a basis upon which further demands were made: "we are really in a worse 
position than we were when we began since we have been induced to show 
our whole hand, and to put in evidence all the concessions we were able 
and willing to make."  He was only prepared to "sweeten the pill" by 
offering a province "which belong[ed] to Sokoto, but [was] north of the 
Say- Barruwa line".138  Chamberlain did not advise breaking-off of 
negotiations even though his WAFF was nearing readiness.  However, he 
had stuck to what he considered the most important parts of the 
settlement.  It seems unlikely that Chamberlain hoped for hostilities, even if 
his sub-ordinate appeared to.  By this stage Salisbury was struggling to 
understand Chamberlain's motives, writing to Balfour, that "the one object 
of the German Emperor since he has been on the throne has been to get us 
into a war with France. I never can make up my mind whether this is part of 
Chamberlain's objects or not.  The indications differ from month to 
month".139  The reasons the indications differed was because Chamberlain 
was occasionally prone to allowing his temper to get the better of him.  In 
some moments he appeared willing to risk war.  Hargreaves uses an entry 
in Lugard's diary to suggest that Chamberlain sometimes lost sight of the 
need for a negotiated settlement.   
JC scouted the idea vehemently and angrily, said he would 
never be party to giving up our country in order to get what is 
already ours ... we could always have more money behind us 
than the French and hence spend double and have a larger 
force till they gave in- the Birmingham 'Screw Policy'! 
Chamberlain was certainly bellicose, but he was trying to send a message to 
Britain's rivals that she was prepared to defend her claims.  In this angry 
tirade, Chamberlain also discussed having a larger force and effectively 
coercing the French through intimidation.  There is no indication that he 
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looked toward a shooting war with them.140  He was aware that "nothing in 
these territories is worth a war".141 
A firmer policy on the ground began to pay dividends.  One French post had 
been abandoned because the natives, protected by Lugard’s men, refused 
to co-operate any longer. Finally faced with British action, the negotiations 
in Paris started to move forward.142  Pretty soon, a settlement, mostly along 
the lines suggested by Chamberlain back in December 1897, seemed 
imminent.143  However, at the last moment Monson reported that the "fate 
of the negotiations hangs on Ilo."  While the Commission was concluding 
their final discussions, concerning the regulations for navigation on the 
Niger, Hanotaux had added a demand that Ilo, a small town, remain in 
French hands, as a French officer had died there.144  Hanotaux "had become 
decided about its retention- if he did not support this feeling the convention 
would be rejected by the Chambers."145  Salisbury attempted to head off 
any anticipated objection from Chamberlain.  He pointed out that in return 
for Ilo the French would give Britain "Bona, and the Niger arrangements in 
essentials according to our latest demands."  This was a rather clever 
manoeuvre.  By connecting Ilo with Bona Salisbury gave Chamberlain to 
consider the deal an exchange.  The Prime Minister went on to suggest that 
the British claim to Ilo was slim and that it was only ten miles from where 
the line would have passed.  Worried about Chamberlain's concern over 
trade routes, Salisbury pointed out that the trade route could be moved, 
especially as "a railway between Gando and Jebba cannot lie in the very far 
future after the country is settled."  Salisbury was trying to appeal to 
Chamberlain's sensibilities and encouraging hope of colonial development.  
He closed with a warning that Lugard did not expect to be able to meet the 
French at Ilo and that if he attempted to it could provoke a war with local 
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natives.  Salisbury felt that the cost of such a war would "certainly buy out 
the value of Ilo a hundred times over."146 
Chamberlain's response was extensive and along expected lines.  Firstly, 
either the French felt they had a good deal or they did not; Ilo could not 
add much value to it, "especially as we are ready to be conciliatory about 
Bona."  He listed out all the concessions he felt had been made to the 
French and wondered why "not one word was said about Ilo which is now 
represented as the critical point in the negotiations."  The Colonial Secretary 
also put forward an argument that if the French did insist upon Ilo it could 
only be "due to some information received as to the value of the position- 
either for trade, or as a good starting point for intrigues with the Chiefs or 
Sultans of Gando and Sokoto.  Lugard's telegram points to something of 
this kind".  Chamberlain had become so cynical about French policy that he 
viewed this last twist as an attempt to secure an area from which further 
mischief could be carried out.  One advantage of the agreement was that it 
would leave the British a free hand in Sokoto but the proposed cession of 
Ilo represented a potential threat to that freedom of action.  Chamberlain 
went on to suggest that the "so-called Empire of Sokoto is in a state of 
dissolution like that of the Great Mogul in the time of Clive.  I imagine that 
in accordance with that precedent a small European force ... will be able to 
establish our authority".  Chamberlain's concern was always with the distant 
future: whatever the result of the negotiations, 
the French by acting in an unfriendly way- by risking a war 
which they rightly believe we are anxious to avoid- and by 
pursuing to the end a policy of bluff - will have secured at our 
expense an immense tract of African country which 
geographically belongs to our hinterland & which we first 
discovered by our explorers and which we alone can ever make 
valuable. 
Aware that the territories' value lay in their future development, 
Chamberlain felt that "fifty years hence our descendants will talk of our 
pusillanimous surrender."  He concluded by commenting that he did not 
think it a great loss if the negotiations fell through.  This did not mean he 
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anticipated, or looked toward, hostilities but only an opportunity to "follow 
the example of the French, and occupy places in their Hinterland which 
would give us something to exchange when they are tired of the expense 
and danger of the situation."147  Chamberlain simply did not share Monson's 
and probably even Salisbury's fears that France was capable of sudden 
assault precipitated by domestic political problems and he certainly did not 
feel that British imperial policy should be concerned by another power’s 
domestic difficulties.148  
Much has been made of Chamberlain's comparison between nineteenth 
century Sokoto and eighteenth century Bengal.  Hargreaves considers that 
"Salisbury delicately corrected Chamberlain's perspective."149   
It will be a pity if we break off negotiations, for it will add to 
our difficulties in the Nile Valley. ... If we are to send British or 
Indian troops in the hope of fighting another Plassey with 
Lugard as our Clive and Sokoto as our Bengal, the prospect 
becomes very much more serious.  Our Clive will be in no 
danger of being astonished at his own moderation.  There is no 
loot to get except in Goldie's dreams.150 
Charmley describes Chamberlain's position as "a ludicrous inversion of 
priorities" and Grenville drew attention to Salisbury's lamentation "that a 
'malarious African desert' was not worth a war." The existing historiography 
agrees with Salisbury's view of what was at stake.151  However, the 
comparison between West Africa and eighteenth century India was not 
Chamberlain's invention.  In September 1897, Monson had commented that 
"it looks like the struggles of the last century in India transferred to Africa, 
with all the chances in favour of the French."152  Even earlier articles in The 
Times had been drawing comparisons between Goldie's wars against the 
Natives and Clive's with Bengal.153  Chamberlain was merely using the 
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language of an existing discourse.  No analogy is perfect and while the 
military aspects of this one were analogous (the Europeans were massively 
outnumbered), the economic one was not.  However this discourse, even in 
The Times, was merely romanticising the military engagements in Africa.  
Only Garvin offered any defence of this comparison, in which he implied 
that Chamberlain was referring only to the military aspect.154  As we have 
seen, the Colonial Secretary was aware that these provinces were 
"undeveloped estates" and that they needed to be made valuable. 155  
Allowing for this, it seems unlikely that Chamberlain expected any more 
'loot' to be found than Salisbury did.  Furthermore, only Garvin, 
Chamberlain's great apologist, goes on to quote Chamberlain's reply in 
which he sticks to his desire to retain Ilo, again repeats his reluctance to 
give up either Bona or Ilo but acquiesces in giving up Bona, with which the 
French "ought to be content.  It is more than I am - except that I am glad 
to meet your wishes."156  When this is recalled along with Chamberlain's 
earlier comments to Selborne, detailing how matters of war needed to 
reside with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister, it appears that an 
actual breach in the Cabinet was unlikely.  Chamberlain often appeared to 
have been "perfectly content to accept & support any decisions" Salisbury 
arrived at, once the Prime Minster had seen the "full position of my 
views".157  Also given that he gradually acquiesced in meeting certain 
French demands, it appears that he was prepared to let certain positions go 
once an attempt had been made to secure them via negotiation.   
Presented here is evidence to suggest that Chamberlain's reputation as a 
warmonger is exaggerated.  At several points Selborne appeared to be 
much more excited about the possibility of hostilities than his ministerial 
chief.  Chamberlain was not alone in his opinions regarding national honour 
and irritation with French methods.  Neither was he alone in having 
concerns for how any settlement might be regarded as a precedent for the 
future.  In fact, concern for how decisions made then might have affected 
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the future of the British Empire underpinned his entire position.  Often he 
reflected on how Britain would stand "fifty years hence" rather than simply 
after the signing of the convention.158  West Africa would be more valuable 
in the future, and so must be reserved to the British, and if "the tendency of 
the time" was "to throw all power into the hands of great Empires" then a 
"non-progressive" policy could leave any power in a "secondary and 
subordinate place."159  Hargreaves suggested that Salisbury "knew that the 
disputed areas in Borgu would never be of intrinsic economic value" and, 
indeed, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone never did become the kind of 
market Chamberlain hoped.160  Chamberlain's hopes for the future were 
dependent on how well Britain could retain and then develop her 'estates'.  
Chamberlain was more successful at the former than the latter, but at the 
time he was promoting his aggressive policy in West Africa he could not 
have known that the necessary development would never materialise.  
Similarly it is not possible to predict what might have happened had 
Salisbury and Monson been permitted to get on with appeasing the French 
in West Africa.  The Fashoda crisis erupted into Anglo-French relations just 
a few months later and, the similarities are striking: small French posts 
placed in territory which the British claimed.  The French were not prepared 
to go to war at that time either, despite this being their last real opportunity 
to lever the British out of Egypt.  It is impossible to say whether they would 
have been more or less intransigent had they got their way in West Africa.  
However, if they were not prepared to fight for the Nile valley, then it is 
difficult to imagine that they would have fought for the less important Niger.  
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2: The Storm Clouds. Chamberlain and the Climate of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Chamberlain’s policies in Africa were anything but diplomatic.  There he met 
perceived French aggression in kind.  The object was not a war over trifles 
but the defence of an area Chamberlain believed could become valuable and 
which he believed belonged Britain.  However, even before the closing of 
the West African fiasco, Chamberlain had again launched himself into the 
midst of great power diplomacy.  His failures to form an alliance with 
Germany are well known and almost every historian of the period has had 
their say on them; however these histories all have their distinct focuses.  
Kennedy on the relationship with Germany, Nish with the Japanese 
perspective, Otte on the Chinese context, Garvin on Chamberlain as the 
foresighted prophet, Crosby as the manoeuvre of a power addicted mind 
and various others including Charmley, Roberts and Grenville who interpret 
Chamberlain’s actions as those of an ambitious and dangerous amateur.161  
Most of these historians also treat Salisbury as a genius, rarely moved from 
his tight, pragmatic Realpolitik approach to foreign policy.  Most of these 
histories isolate events into specific contexts.  While much is debated about 
what these contexts are and which are more important the sheer scale of 
Britain’s diplomatic and geopolitical situation gets lost.  While reading Otte’s 
incredibly detailed and rich history one could almost forget that 
Chamberlain was simultaneously involved in a confrontation with France; 
that Salisbury was preparing for another; that the Venezuela boundary 
dispute, with the US, was rumbling on and that South Africa was never 
quiet for long.  The Near Eastern question/crisis had also exploded again 
with the Armenian atrocities.  These were some of the most important 
global issues that British policy makers had to face almost simultaneously.  
It is no easy task to try to summarise them and how they intersected but 
while a thematic organisation is tidier, it belies the reality faced by 
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politicians.  Crises and concerns were not all separated out into neat self 
contained narratives; they overlapped and left their marks in the minds of 
those who had tried to solve them.  Separate chapters on the Near Eastern 
and Far Eastern questions would make for an easier read and perhaps 
would be easier to write but it would create, or imply, a 
compartmentalisation of issues which did not exist at the time.  The 
Venezuelan Crisis, the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war, the Jameson 
Raid and Kruger telegram, the Armenian massacres, the confrontation with 
France in Africa, the potential fiscal collapse of Portugal, the re-conquest of 
the Sudan, were all concurrent in the minds of British policy makers.  To 
understand the parts played by these historical actors it must be 
understood what their setting and stage was.  It is therefore worth 
reviewing some of these issues in an attempt to understand how they 
affected decision making at other junctures.  It also exposes how and why 
Salisbury’s supposedly pragmatic approach to policy was vulnerable to 
attack and distrust; his almost stubborn refusal to see the reality of Anglo-
Russian exchanges and his refusal to accept the advice of professionals calls 
his reputation for judgement into question.  His often too easily seen 
irritation with having to satisfy the Public, and sometimes his own Cabinet, 
demonstrated that he had not adjusted to the new reality of making foreign 
policy in an emerging democracy. 
China, or the Far Eastern question, is the context into which the more 
recent studies of British Foreign policy have been set.  China most certainly 
deserves to be centre stage, but it is only one of many issues that were 
upon the minds of the individual Cabinet Ministers who would go on to 
support a radical diplomatic solution to what they perceived to be Britain’s 
problems.  However, the Far East is a good place to start to build up a 
sense of the patch work of problems the Unionist Cabinet would face and to 
start to follow the twisted path of Anglo-Russian relations.  By 1895 the 
Liberal government, had avoided joining Germany, France and Russia in 
forcing Japan to give up what she had won in the Sino-Japanese war.162  
They were also happy to trust private interests to make the arrangements 
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for the loans China would need to pay the huge Japanese indemnity.  The 
nature of those loans was of little concern until it became apparent the 
Russians were attempting to become China’s sole creditor.  In May 1895 the 
British became aware of this attempt and tried to convince the Chinese, 
through the Ambassador, Nicholas O’Conor, that it “would be unwise to 
entertain Russian offer of direct assistance which would place [them] in [an] 
embarrassing position of subserviency and expose them possibly to 
territorial demands later on”. O’Conor was convinced that the Chinese were 
well aware of the “danger but they may not be able to resist pressure of 
Powers unless they can borrow in open market.”163  Shortly afterwards the 
Russian’s were warned that Britain wanted “to be consulted” over the terms 
of any such loan.164  When rumours of such a loan were confirmed by 
Rothschild, Frank Lascelles was sent to speak again to Lobanov, the Russian 
foreign minister, he asked whether Russia would work jointly with Britain, 
the Russian minister evaded.  Lobanov feigned a lack of interest to both the 
British and the Germans but the Russian loan did become a reality on 6th 
July 1895.165  Otte describes the nature of the loan as being “little more 
than another French loan to Russia [...] French misgivings about the details 
of the loan counted for nothing; alliance considerations overrode financial 
concerns.”  The Dual Alliance seemed to working in concert in China, not 
only with the French supporting Russia’s fiscal hold on the Chinese but also 
by gaining concessions in the Chinese provinces which were contiguous with 
French Indo-China.166  By this time Salisbury had taken the helm of both 
the Foreign Office and the British Government.  While the Liberal 
government had opposed the Russian loan, albeit without finding a way to 
apply much pressure, Salisbury was even less concerned about it, especially 
while he was trying to reach an agreement with Russia over the Armenian 
crisis. 
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In October 1895 the British press reported that China was preparing to 
grant Russia railway concessions.  These would shorten the planed Trans-
Siberian rail route to Vladivostok and allow a spur line to Port Arthur, a 
warm water port on the Chinese Coast.  Salisbury remained unmoved; he 
accepted Russian assurances that “there was not a word of truth” in the 
report.167  This was not because he necessarily believed these assurances 
but because, given the seriousness of the Armenian massacres, he wanted 
to call “a truce to all discussions with Russia” “in other matters –Pamir 
boundaries & Chinese loans [...] & we may assume, I suppose, that even 
her more fiery spirits will not wish to ‘set the heather alight’.”168  W. E. 
Goschen, British chargé d’affaires at the St. Petersburg embassy, was 
concerned concluding that it was not “so certain that the Russian 
Government does not contemplate” building the proposed railways.169  
Salisbury responded in his Guildhall speech of 9th November 1895.170  The 
speech made reference to the rumours of Russian rail concessions and 
Salisbury’s lack of concern; “Depend upon it, whatever may happen in that 
region we are equal to any competition [...] We may look on with absolute 
equanimity at the action of any [...] who think that they can exclude us 
from any part of the world [...] in Asia there is room for us all.”  This 
attitude was born out in diplomacy; Salisbury barely responded to the 
creation of the Russo-Chinese Bank, which had blatant political aims.  
Perhaps the formation of an Anglo-German banking consortium, back in 
July, had reassured the Foreign Secretary that private means could check 
Russia’s aggression.  By the close of 1896 that consortium had secured the 
second £16 million indemnity loan.  Otte suggests that this indicated that 
“Germany had ranged herself alongside Britain in Chinese affairs, and that 
there now was a firm basis of common interests which made for closer 
cooperation between the two countries.”171  However, ultimately Salisbury 
believed that better Anglo-Russian relations were more important than 
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ruining the rumoured intentions of Russia’s Chinese railway policy even if it 
appeared that Germany could be induced to help.  It is not hard to see why 
Salisbury was prepared to treat the Russians in Asia with “equanimity”.  In 
the same Guildhall speech the Foreign Secretary discussed the situation in 
Armenia.  He gave the Near Eastern Question about eight times the space 
he made for China.  It is clear that, to the Prime Minister, China was the 
marginal issue, prepared to be sacrificed if necessary, but certainly content 
to be shared, if the Sultan could be dealt with.172  Salisbury also approached 
Africa with the same attitude; being prepared to sacrifice the economically 
important or potentially useful west, for the supposedly strategically 
important east.  This attitude was revealed when he spoke with Hatzfeldt, 
commenting that “if Russia is committed in China [she] would be distracted 
from [the] Orient,” spreading her military capabilities thinly around the 
world.173 
Salisbury also moved to reduce friction with France in South East Asia.  
France tried to move both northwards and westwards from her Indo-China 
colonies, to the west lay Siam and Burma, bordering on India.  This posed a 
serious threat, if Russia could threaten India from the north, while France 
did so from the east, then the jewel in the Imperial crown was in serious 
danger.  Sailsbury explained to Chamberlain that “the ruling spirits in 
France mean to have it[Siam] if they can.  England [...] will not fight for 
Siam [...] if we play the base role, we may be able to partition Siam before 
the last stage is reached.”174  By January 1896 a convention was signed that 
neutralized the Mekong valley.  This maintained a buffer between British 
and French interests in South East Asia.  This may have loosened the 
Franco-Russian alliance by giving France a stake in maintaining the Far 
Eastern status quo.175  France was happy to sign a deal on Siam, while this 
was in her immediate interests, it meant sacrificing the hope of bringing 
further pressure to bear on British India’s eastern most borders, an interest 
of utmost importance if the Franco-Russian alliance was aligned against 
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Britain.  France did not come to Russia’s aid when there were threats in the 
Far East.  Likewise, Russia did nothing to ease French troubles at Fashoda.  
As the years rolled by it became apparent that the Dual Alliance was a 
defensive counterweight to the Triple Alliance in Europe and barely operated 
elsewhere.  Therefore attempts to dismantle it would have been unlikely to 
succeed so long as both Russia and France could imagine a European threat 
emanating from the allied Central Powers.   
The New Year ushered in evidence of Russian mendacity in the Far East.  By 
February 1896 W.E. Goschen was reporting that Russian engineers had 
completed surveying rail lines in China and Manchuria.  These proposed 
lines were the basis of the rumours published in The Times back in October: 
rumours which Russia had already emphatically decried as being false.176  
Russia’s actions and plans for China were not the only area of concern.  In 
February 1896, from “the safety of their[Russian] legation” the Korean king 
“passed sentences on a large number of Japanese for their misdeeds.”  This 
suggested that Russia was also attempting to bring Korea under her 
protection.177  Coupled with a report from W.E. Goschen that Russia 
favoured taking a warm water port in Korea this became worrisome for the 
British but a very serious problem for the Japanese who wished for Korea to 
remain neutral, at least until Japan was ready to absorb the country 
herself.178  The status of Korea had been the cause of the recent Sino-
Japanese war, of which Japan had been divested of the spoils.  Japan faced 
a choice, whether to attempt to improve relations with Russia or find some 
European counter weight, such a Britain.  However, Salisbury was unlikely 
to help the Japanese contain Russia, In Satow’s instructions he claimed: 
Our strategic or military interest in Japan can easily be 
overestimated.  She may no doubt be of use in hindering 
Russia [...] [b]ut how long would her obstruction be effective? 
... Britain cannot rely on Japan’s interest to oppose Russia. 
[...] What you tell me about the apparent disinclination of the 
Japanese Government to generally cultivate our exclusive 
friendship, rather confirms the suspicion that in the end they 
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will be convinced that it is rather their interest to join with 
Russia, and perhaps with France in cutting up China.179 
Balfour in 1896 also poured cold water on any Anglo-Japanese 
rapprochement in a speech at Bristol he claimed that he could “frankly state 
that, so far, for example, from regarding with fear and jealousy a 
commercial outlet for Russia in the Pacific Ocean which should not be ice-
bound half the year, I should welcome such a result as a distinct advance in 
this far distant region.”180  Balfour would maintain this sentiment even into 
1898 claiming that he “had always looked with favour upon the idea of 
Russia obtaining an ice-free port on the Pacific”.181  However, when news 
reached Salisbury that Japan and Russia were coming to an agreement on 
Korea, he attempted to interfere.  Japan’s reply was blunt; she had already 
enquired about this and had received a British refusal.  Japan had therefore 
been forced to find a modus vivendi with Russia.  Salisbury was unprepared 
to sponsor any scheme, as Britain was not directly involved in Korea, and so 
Japan signed an agreement acknowledging equal preponderance in Korea 
between Russia and Japan.182   
While this was taking place the British were receiving more news about 
Russian designs in China.  O’Conor sent back the text of a Sino-Russian 
treaty granting Russia the right to terminate the Trans-Siberian railway on 
Chinese soil.183  Neilson notes that the Foreign Office did not think the 
treaty was serious or even genuine.  O’Conor thought it was “in the main 
apocryphal” but he felt he could not take it up with the Russian Foreign 
Minister as its existence had already been denied.184  However, the 
Ambassador, in St. Petersburg, believed “that the Russian Government will 
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in one way or another wring this concession from the Chinese”.185  The 
Chinese duly signed a treaty on 3rd June 1896, which granted the railway 
concession but not an ice free port.  Anglo-Russian relations then entered a 
lull but only in the Far Eastern context.  Armenia and the Greco-Turkish war 
certainly kept Russia on Salisbury’s mind. 
The situation in Turkey, surrounding the Armenian massacres, still appeared 
to be insoluble.  The Russians were unhappy to push any programme of 
reforms, not least because they could “scarcely be expected to wish that the 
Armenians in Turkish territory should enjoy greater liberty than the 
Armenians in Russian territory”.186  While the beleaguered Liberal 
government had been happy to temporise, Salisbury desperately wanted to 
find a solution to this issue so inextricably linked to his career.  Believing 
the Sultan would not yield before diplomatic pressure and in the absence of 
the possibility of joint action, Salisbury tried to take unilateral military 
action to intimidate him.  The fleet was moved nearer to Constantinople, 
but suggestions of putting gunboats on the Tigris and a naval 
demonstration in the Red Sea failed to materialise.  The Tigris suggestion 
was rebuffed by Sir Philip Currie in Constantinople who suggested that 
Turkish resistance would be too strong to overcome and the Red Sea 
demonstration fell apart on the practicalities.187  Certainly Turkey was high 
up in his mind when he discussed the creation of the Committee for 
Defence.  In an October 1895 minute he discussed the questions such a 
committee would be involved with.  Suggesting the committee should 
answer whether “the functions of the Mediterranean Fleet” were “merely to 
watch & mask Toulon, or” whether it could or should have been fit to also 
be used “to reinforce diplomatic operations in the Turkish Empire, in 
Greece, in Morocco, or in Egypt?” Salisbury revealed that his frustration 
with the Near Eastern Question heavily informed his decision to create the 
committee.  With regard to the “distribution of the fleet on the shores of the 
Indian Ocean, of Africa, & South America” he charged that the committee 
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should consider “the question of the size of the vessels & their capacity for 
acting in shallow water” as “a matter of the first consideration”.  While 
these references are not exclusively concerned with forcing the Straights, 
the Tigris or a Red Sea demonstration they are all objections which were 
raised against them.188  Back in 1892 Salisbury had ruminated that if the 
fleet could not hold Constantinople against Russia, and if she must anyway 
destroy the French fleet in Toulon first then it may as well be withdrawn to 
Portsmouth.  It “would surely be wise, in the interest of our own reputation, 
to let it be known as quickly as possible that we do not intend to defend 
Constantinople, and that protection of it from Russian attack is not ... 
worthy of the sacrifices or the risks which such an effort would involve” or 
“our policy is a policy of false pretences.”189  Salisbury was not prepared to 
try to use diplomacy to try to cover Britain’s weakness; British policy should 
be conducted in accordance with her strength, actual as opposed to 
estimated by the Admiralty, or Britain’s strength must be amended to better 
protect her interests.  Salisbury was grappling against the realisation that 
Britain’s interests were already too large to be adequately defended by the 
Victorian Navy in an increasingly competitive and unfriendly world.  The 
Prime Minister’s refusal to accept the Admiralty’s advice, that they could no 
longer force the Straights, demonstrated that his Mid-Victorian mind could 
not easily reconcile itself to this predicament.  The Committee of Defence 
was Salisbury’s solution to this problem, which he assumed was one of bad 
management rather than an issue with the sheer diversity and scale of 
Britain’s commitments.  The people put on the Committee were not likely to 
make decisions very differently in the future though.190   
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Salisbury first tried to find some way to work with Russia with regards to 
Turkey.  In July 1895 he explained to Lascelles, in St. Petersburg, that 
Britain need two things of Russia, firstly “that she will believe us, that we 
have no intention whatever of setting up any form of Armenian autonomy”, 
secondly “Is she prepared for any form of coercion?” and “If Russia is 
adverse to any form of coercion in any case – will she object to the exercise 
of it by her allies – or even ally?”191   
While waiting on Russia, Salisbury naturally sounded out the other Powers, 
including Germany.192  In an interview with the German ambassador, Count 
Hatzfeldt, Salisbury explained that he aimed for joint action with Russia, 
which would probably end the Sultan’s rule.193  Hatzfeldt pointed out that 
Russia would not want to see an autonomous Armenia on her borders, to 
which Salisbury replied “certainly not, but that the changes that were to 
come” would be entirely different and desirable to Russia.  Hatzfeldt 
suggested this meant a partition of the Ottoman Empire, with substantial 
gains for Russia, but he suggested this would probably include the “Turkish 
provinces” on the Russian border.  This was Hatzfeldt’s own conjecture, 
Salisbury almost certainly meant to offer the Russians Constantinople, and 
hoped that this might make the Russians more friendly towards what might 
happen with the rest of the Turkish Empire.  This worried the German 
diplomat; if Britain could get a settlement with Russia then she would not 
need to maintain a strong connection with Germany.194  Salisbury was not 
unaware of Hatzfeldt’s feelings: “I find Hatzfeldt in a very nervous condition 
as to the possibility of an Anglo-Russian entente.”195  Over the next few 
days Salisbury’s hints at the possibility of Ottoman partition caused quite a 
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stir in Germany.196  Salisbury demurred when approached by Hatzfeldt 
about potentially saving the Italians by handing over a seaport in British 
Somalia, instead he suggested compensation could be found in Ottoman 
territory, convinced that the “division must come in the foreseeable 
future”.197  The Germans feared this would cause a stir between Austria and 
Italy.  Salisbury decried any such intention and asked the Germans if they 
had any suggestions on how to divide up the Sultan’s lands.198  Holstein 
back in Germany was suspicious; he feared any suggestions could be leaked 
to the Russians and in that case Germany would lose whatever freedom of 
action she believed she had.  This freedom was essential if Germany was to 
demand her due when the “psychological moment” arrived.199  Hatzfeldt 
replied as quickly as he could drawing attention to the fact that Salisbury 
had offered Russia “the most abundant satisfaction ... Constantinople with 
all that follows.”200  Hatzfeldt also pointed out that with Russia satisfied in 
the East she would no longer need to cultivate her friendship with France.  
This presupposes that having gained Constantinople Russia would be happy 
to leave Austria with whatever she desired in the Balkans.  If Russian 
ministers could imagine continued problems with Austria, even after a 
partition of Turkey, then her French connection would remain useful for so 
long as the Triple Alliance remained intact.  However, if Russia was satisfied 
with Constantinople, and allowed Austria to satisfy herself in the Balkans, 
then the raison d’être for both alliance systems would have been weakened. 
While Hatzfeldt was furiously telegraphing information to his near sighted 
superiors, Salisbury met with the Kaiser in the now infamous Cowes 
interview.  Neither party really gave much away.201  Holstein, upon 
receiving Hatzfeldt’s telegram wired for the Emperor to meet with the Prime 
Minister again, but this interview never took place.  Langer accepts this as a 
simple mistake but it seems odd that Salisbury would be prepared to risk 
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offending royalty simply because he was running late.  Salisbury’s distrust 
of Wilhelm is well known, even before the German Emperor’s coronation he 
was warning the Queen that “it appears that his head is turned by his 
position”, later that same year he noted that he thought “that the Emperor 
William must be a little off his head.”202  Back in 1888, while Wilhelm was 
still merely a crown Prince, Salisbury had warned the Queen of the need to 
avoid offence when she met him.203  If the Foreign Secretary was concerned 
in 1888 about how easily Wilhelm could have been permanently offended it 
is hard to imagine that he was more sanguine about such risks in 1895.  
Regardless of whether Salisbury wished to snub the Emperor or not, the 
whole situation need not have arisen if Holstein could have brought himself 
to read Hatzfeldt’s dispatches in the cold light of day rather than bathed in 
the malevolent rays emanating from his paranoid imagination.  Hatzfeldt 
had already made it clear that Salisbury intended “to assist Russia, so the 
latter[autonomous Armenian provinces] be desirable.”204  This could only 
have meant Constantinople which Hatzfeldt was well aware of, hence his 
clearer telegram on the 5th August while the Emperor was at Cowes. 
Eventually the Russians replied to Salisbury’s questions over the use of 
force.  The Tsar found the idea of armed coercion as “personally 
repugnant”, and action by a single Power was considered “equally 
distasteful” to that of a group.205  By the end of August the Sultan had 
hinted that he was prepared to enact the reforms pressed upon him and 
Russia was moving toward the idea of setting up some form of international 
surveillance albeit without a mechanism for coercion.206  The Kaiser then 
decided to try to make good some the missed opportunity at Cowes.  
Without consulting his ministers Wilhelm put a plan to Salisbury via Leopold 
Swaine, British Military Attaché in Berlin.  This personal, informal, diplomacy 
of the Kaiser’s embarrassed Salisbury.  While the Foreign Secretary had 
been prepared to discuss possible suggestions on certain outcomes earlier, 
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they were always supposing Russia would be willing to consider them.  In 
the time that lapsed this had become unlikely.  The Kaiser however urged 
Britain to use force against the Sultan, he would “warmly support this 
action” but “under one condition, namely that you do not spring this upon 
us like a thunder-clap out of a blue sky. [...] If you intend to [...] give Asia 
Minor and Constantinople to Russia, you must indemnify Austria [...] and 
satisfy Italy [...] As regards Syria, offer it to Russia [...] and disturb the 
entente.”  He went on to explain that in the Far East “the next great war 
[...] will be between the Russians and the Japanese [...] my interests are to 
drive the Russians into Asia, and I am quite prepared to encourage them to 
entangle themselves with China and Japan.”207  This memorandum was set 
before the Cabinet and therefore Chamberlain would have been well aware 
of both the contents and nature of Wilhelm’s, personal, private and 
unofficial diplomacy.  When Hatzfeldt convinced Swaine to send further 
information, Salisbury was forced to reply.  It is important to note the 
differences between Salisbury’s vague suggestions and the more specific 
ideas formed by the Kaiser.  Salisbury’s suggestions always relied upon 
working with Russia, the German suggestions encouraged Britain to take 
unilateral action which the Royal Navy was unprepared to risk.  Any action 
was to be used as a demonstration to show the Sultan that they were in 
earnest about the required reforms, and only if that should fail would actual 
force be used.  The German note rather assumes that the British wished to 
end the Ottoman Empire immediately.  Salisbury’s reply was evasive; he 
barely touched on Turkey except to suggest that his policy had not 
changed.208  In reality it could not be changed, not without a stronger fleet 
or powerful military ally; in other words, not without Russian assistance. 
Salisbury was thus left with no policy but to wait.  This reply was somewhat 
unfair to the Germans, if Hatzfeldt’s report back home on the 3rd August 
was accurate then Salisbury had asked for suggestions on the distribution of 
the Ottoman Territories.  Therefore “it would be very useful that they 
[Germany] formed a plan [...] and that we would discuss” it in strict 
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confidence; Salisbury had suggested the Germans do this himself.209  The 
British reply angered the Kaiser who complained that “England’s policy was 
completely incomprehensible” and that all of Europe was now moved by “a 
tangible distrust of England”.210  Salisbury was well aware that the Kaiser 
would not take the rebuff lightly but feared the real breach would come with 
Russia: “[w]e may, & I hope shall, retain the friendship of Germany: but I 
see very little hope of regaining the friendship of Russia.”211 
Salisbury had started to suspect the Russians were negotiating in bad faith, 
however, when news of fresh massacres reached Britain he again attempted 
to make a naval demonstration.  This time specifically in the Red Sea to 
avoid threatening Russian interests at Constantinople.  It is worth noting 
that the Germans had also taken offense at what the Kaiser had described 
as “the Mediterranean Fleet” taking “a week long stroll [...] before the 
Dardanelles”.212  G.J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, implored 
Salisbury not to think of the navy as a geisha who was always reluctant but 
pointed out practical problems with a demonstration: “There is no Turkish 
military establishment which these vessels could approach, & no Turkish 
town that they could anchor near except [a] small village”.  Goschen 
thought it “questionable whether [...] the demonstration would have the 
desired effect.”213  The First Lord did offer to send the largest ship on hand 
into the Persian Gulf but this was unlikely to terrify the Sultan; again 
nothing adequate to the task was possible.  Salisbury fell back on the use of 
words; in his Guildhall speech, the same mentioned above in respect of 
China, he threatened the Sultan and urged the Concert of Europe to take 
action.  Believing “that they[the Powers] were never more disposed than 
they are now to stand together, by the European system[. ...] I believe the 
Powers are thoroughly resolved to act together upon everything that 
concerns the Ottoman Empire.”214  Austria responded with a suggestion that 
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she, Russia and Britain should combine to force the Straights.215  Salisbury 
seized upon this suggestion.216  However, the Russians predictably 
responded negatively and were inclined to believe the Armenians would 
knuckle down and suffer their lot if only they were no longer being “stirred 
up to continued activity by some Power for her own political interests”.217  
The veiled accusation exposed the deep Russian distrust of British policy.  It 
was probably just as well that this proposal came to nothing, as Salisbury 
had earlier sidestepped the suggestions of the Kaiser.218  However, the 
proposal did make it to the Cabinet, which refused to contemplate forcing 
the Straights alone. 
The Goschen and a few others refused to take the risks of trying to force 
the Straights singlehandedly, which rather saved Salisbury and the Navy 
from a nineteenth century version of the Dardanelles Campaign.219  
Chamberlain was among those unwilling to ignore the Admiralty’s warnings 
and go it alone however, he was much more sanguine about how much help 
Britain needed.  Having been present when Swaine’s memoranda had been 
presented to the Cabinet he knew Germany was uninterested in sending a 
squadron herself, but Austria’s offer had not yet been withdrawn.  The 
Colonial Secretary put his thoughts to Salisbury: 
I think public opinion is moving steadily in favour of strong 
measures with Turkey & if it was possible to come to some 
arrangement with Russia the course would be easy. 
If not – and if we could get Austria & Italy to join us – I think 
we might safely ask Russia & France to send battle ships to 
                                       
215 Neilson, p.168 
216 Memo., Salisbury, 4/06/1892, in comment on Joint Report of the D.M.I and 
D.N.I., of 18/03/1892, CAB 37/31/10, also printed in Lowe, II, pp.85-91; Memo., 
John Ardagh (future director of military intelligence D.M.I) Oct. 1894, with a 
covering note, Chapman E.F., (the incumbent DMI), 20/11/1894, Rosebery MSS, 
10135 referenced in Neilson, p.167 
217 Goschen W.E. to Salisbury, 20/11/1895, FO65/1492 
218 Grenville, pp31-43 
219 Neilson, p 168, references K Wilson, “Constantinople or Cairo: Lord Salisbury 
and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire 1886-97”, in Neilson K., (Ed.) Empire and 
Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880s to the First World War 
(London, 1987), p.16-17. 
65 
 
Constantinople, with an instruction that, if they refuse, we 
shall go with our two allies at all risks.220 
While Salisbury was unprepared to risk a potential European War, this 
combination could have applied the force required to motivate the Sultan to 
reform.  It could also have pushed the Russians, who felt themselves 
unready for a European war, to join the demonstration rather than stand 
aside or fight.221  However, Salisbury was unlikely to take such chances or 
play a game of chicken with the Franco-Russian Alliance, at least not unless 
what he considered a vital British interest was at stake.  Chamberlain 
simply did not believe that those Powers were really prepared to disturb the 
peace any more readily than Britain was.  He was prepared to run the risk 
of war, not because he thought war an idle issue, but because he believed 
that other nations stood to lose as much by war as Britain.  Meanwhile, 
Salisbury described Goschen’s acceptance of the Admiralty’s fears as almost 
“theological” he then explained where this left the Eastern question: “It is 
impossible to mend the lot of the Armenians without coercing or deposing 
the Sultan. It is impossible to get at the Sultan without quarrelling with 
Russia, Turkey, France and (now) Austria[Austria had withdrawn her 
suggestion under Russian pressure]. So there is no practical course open at 
present.”222  Salisbury’s persistence in the face of all this was somewhat 
reminiscent of Alice and her belief in ‘as many as six impossible things 
before breakfast’.  Salisbury did not list the lack of British power as one of 
the impossible obstacles to solving the crisis.  The Armenian crisis was a 
trying time for the Prime Minster and his conduct is not easily understood.  
Normally Salisbury’s response to situations which did not present a possible 
solution was to wait.223  In the Eastern question he could do no such thing.  
This was not because of the importance to British interests.  The main 
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threat there would be if the Ottoman Empire collapsed quickly and Britain 
was not ready to act when it did so.  However, Russian attitudes suggested 
that the most likely cause of that collapse, a Russian descent on 
Constantinople, was extremely unlikely.  Austria was not prepared to move 
either, not even in tandem with Britain unless Russia approved.  Only 
Germany seemed eager to see the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ euthanized.  This 
German attitude reappeared later when dealing with Portugal.   
Salisbury clearly saw more danger here than most, he was positively fuming 
about the Navy, which implies that the he was more than ready to risk the 
fleet in an action that could not have been advised against any more 
strongly.  Salisbury has a reputation as a pragmatic man with practical 
Realpolitik principles underpinning his policies.224  His attitude to forcing the 
Straights was at odds with that reputation.  Salisbury’s early political career 
had been served in opposition to the governments of John Russell, and 
Palmerston.  Russell’s policies he summed up as following a “sequence of 
snarling remonstrance, officious advice, treacherous encouragement, and 
shameless abandonment”.225  Roberts believes that Salisbury was angered 
that Russell was not prepared to stand up to stronger Powers.  He also 
abhorred public opinion describing his opponents as being “a set of 
weathercocks, delicately poised, warranted to indicate with unnerving 
accuracy every variation in public feeling.”  This was combined with a 
principal of respecting foreign sovereignty: “The assemblies that meet in 
Westminster have no jurisdiction over the affairs of other nations. Neither 
they nor the Executive, except in defence of international law, can interfere 
with [...] Italy, or [...] Spain, or [...] Schleswig.  What is said in either 
House about them is simply impertinence.” Salisbury also believed that a 
“willingness to fight is the point d’appui of diplomacy, just as much as a 
readiness to go to court is the starting-point of a lawyer’s letter.”226  Taking 
these principles together, makes evaluating the Eastern question 
particularly interesting.  Firstly, the Armenian Crisis was not a case of a 
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breach of international law, even if the massacres were clearly a breach of 
moral behaviour.  By his own definitions, Salisbury was interfering where he 
had no right.  Secondly, he also did not back away from the threat of force, 
even though he was told, emphatically, that the Fleet could not apply such 
force.  One could argue that he was sensitive to the enormous pressure 
being applied on the Government by the public, but Salisbury did not trust 
public opinion on any matter.  Perhaps, in the Eastern question, he found 
himself trapped by his belief that the British Government should not 
remonstrate unless it was prepared to back its case with force; Salisbury 
was unprepared to bluff.  While the 14th Earl of Derby was famous for 
describing Russell’s foreign policy as one of “meddle and muddle” 
Salisbury’s criticism had included the lack of preparedness to back such 
meddling with force.227  Salisbury was trapped, he could either do nothing 
or he would have to back up any of his own ‘meddling’ with a real threat of 
force.  It was perhaps his own feeling, that the Admiralty were mistaken 
about the capabilities of their own fleet, which should have been described 
as “theological”.  Why then, if the Russians were unlikely to capsize the 
Sultan’s boat in a coup de main, could Salisbury, having done all that he 
could, not leave the Eastern question very much alone?  It is often 
forgotten, in the hustle and bustle of an ordinarily pragmatic approach to 
politics and foreign policy, how deeply religious Salisbury was and perhaps 
this helps to explain his unceasing efforts.228  Salisbury still continued to 
search for a solution even as the grave risk, of the collapse of Ottoman rule, 
receded.  It appeared that he genuinely wanted to see an end to the 
atrocities for reasons other than their affect on British popular opinion, or 
the equilibrium and peace of Europe.  Salisbury was prepared to risk the 
collapse of Ottoman rule, in a controlled fashion, if it would end the 
Armenian suffering.  However, as it seemed to him that Austria “would [not] 
acquiesce in any portion of the Straits being surrendered to Russia” this 
collapse could not be allowed to be precipitated by a Russian capture of 
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Constantinople.229  Back in 1892, as we have seen, Salisbury concluded that 
if the Straights could not be held against Russia then the Fleet should be 
withdrawn to the Channel.  While Salisbury positively fulminated against the 
reality that neither the Cabinet nor the department Chiefs were prepared to 
use force in the Ottoman Empire, he was still unprepared to remove the 
fleet or “to let it be known [...] that we do not pretend to defend 
Constantinople”.230  Ultimately his pragmatism won out he was prepared to 
allow the fleet to remain as it at least implied the possible use of force and 
therefore may have acted as a deterrent on Russia.  Salisbury was prepared 
to allow some measure of bluff to enter his policy.  Neilson summed up the 
situation succinctly:  
While an Anglo-Russia initiative was thus unlikely [...] this 
does not rule out the possibility that Salisbury would have 
preferred a general, pan-European solution involving partition. 
However, opposed by his Cabinet, faced with rejection from 
the Russians, abandoned by the Austrians, and faced with 
other difficult foreign policy issues [...] Salisbury saw that the 
Armenian question had no quick solution.231 
Chamberlain was well aware of the issues facing the Prime Minister.  He had 
been in support of using force, albeit with Austria and Italy, when the 
matter had come before Cabinet, he still had ideas to offer.  On Christmas 
Eve he wrote to the Prime Minister, his letter focused mostly on how much 
Britain had in common with the US.  At that time the Venezuelan crisis was 
in full force and it perplexed Chamberlain as to why the Americans were 
seemingly so hostile.  He suggested to Salisbury that perhaps the two 
nations could make a joint naval demonstration to force the Sultan to end 
the massacres.232  Dismayed, Salisbury forwarded the letter to Balfour, 
commenting that “Randolph at his wildest could not have made a madder 
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suggestion.  I am afraid that J. is trying his hand at programme making.”233  
Balfour was somewhat kinder with Chamberlain’s ideas:  
His[Chamberlain’s] Scheme does not seem very practicable! 
But the failure of our policy and the victory of the Sultan over 
Europe are so complete that I am not surprised at him looking 
rather far afield to find an escape from the existing impass[e].  
He purports however, that in addition to other difficulties, if 
U.S.A even is willing to work with us, have no treaty rights 
over Turkey; and” if they did “work with us, their doing so 
might, and possibly would bring down the Turkish Empire with 
a bump.234 
Balfour also suggested that it was a shame that sentiment over Armenia 
could not be used to draw the US into the Mediterranean as they were not 
subject to “the insane suspicion which stupefies Europe where England is 
concerned.”  Balfour was attempting to demonstrate that while the scheme 
was almost certainly impractical it could have given Salisbury exactly what 
he wanted.  It is curious to note that Balfour defended the theoretical merits 
of the scheme.  He therefore gave a check to Salisbury, the subtext is 
simple, there was no practical solution and so Chamberlain’s fanciful one 
was no less useful than Salisbury’s hopes that something could be expected 
from the Russians.  After sharing Chamberlain’s suggestion with Balfour, 
Salisbury replied.  He pointed out the practical problems with the 
suggestion, firstly that until the Venezuelan confrontation had “somewhat 
cooled” nothing could be done jointly and secondly that the US could only 
provide more ships as material aid.235  The Foreign Secretary also reminded 
Chamberlain “that the Straights cannot be forced by ships alone” and that 
while anything that a purely naval force could achieve would be “painful to 
him[the Sultan] [...] it would not induce him to lay aside his [...] personal 
power: & without either deposing him or very much curtailing his authority, 
you can do nothing for the terrible suffering of his subjects.”  This is a little 
more interesting than it first appears, while all of Salisbury’s issues with 
Chamberlain’s proposed Anglo-America alliance are practical, pragmatic and 
perfectly sensible, we also know that Salisbury struggled to accept the 
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Admiralty’s position that naval action alone could not force the Straights.  
Both men still conceptualised naval power along lines they were familiar 
with.  In the past the Navy had been able to deliver force anywhere around 
the world, and while it had always been difficult to hold territory without a 
military presence, the Royal Navy had a history of engagements where the 
crews of ships had taken and held costal fortresses and cities.  While the 
nature of costal defences and naval operations had changed, it appears that 
both men still operated under the assumption that some of the crew of each 
ship could get off.  Salisbury had already considered what this actually 
meant, if the navy could no longer project real power, on short notice and 
anywhere in the world: then it should retire to the Home Islands.  British 
strategy still depended on a strong navy which historically could project 
force when and wherever it was needed, but if this was no longer possible 
then either the armed forces or general British strategy needed to be 
adapted.  Salisbury’s Committee of Defence was created to grapple with 
these issues.  For a nation that depended on projecting power from the sea 
it is surprising that nothing like a large standing Marine Corps existed.  This 
worrying constraint on British power exercised both men’s minds.  While 
Salisbury’s criticism of Chamberlain’s ideas was perfectly reasonable, it also 
rested on an assumption that the Sultan would not capitulate in the face of 
a threat of real force.  Chamberlain, probably never imagined that an Anglo-
American alliance would actually need to fight Turkey but that the Sultan 
would reform or abdicate rather than face potentially absolute and 
overwhelming force.  Chamberlain replied:”I did not expect an answer & I 
beg you not to reply to any similar suggestions unless you wish for further 
information.  Otherwise I should be [...] adding to your burdens.”236  It 
seems the Colonial Secretary was merely throwing ideas out to Salisbury 
which he thought were perhaps too “far afield”, as Balfour put it, to have 
crossed Salisbury’s conservative mind. 
Regardless Salisbury was not prepared to sit idle and so he continued to 
push both the Russians and the Turks.  He proposed that the ambassadors 
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in Constantinople should “cooperate in devising some remedy” to try to 
make even this limited suggestion palatable to the Russians it was 
underlined that the suggestion would only authorise the ambassadors to 
discuss the situation.237  The Russians remained polite but continued to 
refuse.  Salisbury finally capitulated noting that he “was fully convinced that 
the evils which would result from any interruption in the harmonious 
relations of the Powers, would far outweigh any advantage that could 
possibly be expected from isolated action”.238  The Armenian crisis thus 
trundled along quietly until a renewal of atrocities in August 1896.  
Diplomacy was stalled as the Tsar was away from court and the Russian 
foreign minister had died.  Until someone was able to speak definitively for 
Russia, Salisbury could do nothing.  Curiously it was the Russian 
Ambassador in Constantinople who managed to end this round of 
massacres, by threatening to have the city bombarded.239  Firstly this rather 
demonstrated that the Sultan could be bullied and secondly it exposed that 
there were Russians happy to provide that coercion.  Eventually a central 
Russian response was forth coming, the acting Foreign Minister, Shishkin, 
announced that the “existing Regime” must be maintained as any other 
solution may lead “even to a European war”.240  Little seemed to have 
changed, despite a fairly upfront conversation with the Tsar, on his visit to 
Balmoral, there still appeared to be little hope that Salisbury could find a 
policy.241 
Salisbury was still unable to do nothing and so he put together a circular to 
all the Powers.242  In this he offered his opinion that without action the 
Ottoman Empire would eventually collapse from within, and thus spark a 
crisis of enormous magnitude as it was assumed that interested Powers 
would attempt to further their aims in the chaos.  The Ambassadors at 
Constantinople should come up with a programme of reform and should be 
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given “up to the measure of such force as the Powers have at their 
command”.  Shishkin’s initial response was that he did “not anticipate any 
objections”.243  Just a week later Russia had changed her mind, preferring 
to deal with the problem by putting controls on the Sultan’s finances.244  
W.E. Goschen noted that this conversation “was not friendly” because 
Russia still harboured suspicions about Salisbury’s intentions given the 
movements of the Mediterranean fleet.  The British annexation of Egypt was 
even put up as evidence of Albion’s perfidious nature.  While Neilson notes 
that Salisbury probably had been prepared to use unilateral force, had the 
Navy and Cabinet felt capable, he waves away the uncannily accurate fears 
that had occupied the Russian government: “Salisbury’s policy was purely 
defensive, and, unless Russia had designs upon Constantinople, her fears 
were groundless.”245  Russian foreign policy was more complex than a 
simple desire for aggrandisement.  To her mind, permitting a rival to occupy 
Constantinople or control the Straights would be akin to the British allowing 
a rival to occupy the Low Countries, and thus open the Home Isles to 
potential invasion.  Had Britain gained control of or access through the 
Straights then they would have been able to hurt Russia in a war.246  The 
same naval advisors that claimed Britain could not force the Straights, nor 
prevent Russia doing so, did comment that they would welcome the Black 
Sea being opened as a theatre of potential operations.247  In the analysis 
undertaken in 1896, the Director of Military Intelligence considered 
Salisbury’s plan of a joint venture to open the Straights as the best option.  
This would also make a Russian descent riskier, as Russia would 
immediately face the combined forces of any interested parties having gone 
unmolested by Turkish held fortifications.  Russia was not to be allowed to 
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navigate the Straights alone, this would have effectively place the Sultan 
under total Russian domination. 
The British military attaché, in St. Petersburg, believed that Russia would 
“not permit, if at any cost she can prevent it, the Sea of Marmara falling 
under the domination of any European Power except herself”.248  In a crisis 
he expected that Russia would favour annexing Constantinople and her 
immediate surroundings into their empire.  There were two reasons he was 
unperturbed, firstly he believe the Black Sea fleet was too weak, and 
secondly that the Russians thought a descent was only possible in the 
context of a European war, an event Russia felt she as yet too weak to face.  
Salisbury pressed on and in the Guildhall speech he again reiterated that 
there was no “necessary antagonism” between Britain and Russia and that 
the two Powers should be able to find common ground to solve the crisis.249  
Shishkin received the speech warmly but still continued to reject the 
suggestions made in the British circular.  This left Salisbury believing that 
without a commitment to coercion, there was probably no use “in combined 
further representations on the part of the Ambassadors”.250  However, 
O’Conor attempted to explain why this may not have been Russia’s last 
word, the Tsar who was “influenced by the arguments of his last adviser” 
also had “not much confidence in his own judgement”.251  O’Conor was 
convinced that Nicolas currently favoured de Witte’s policy of opposing 
reforms dictated by joint pressure but also noted that Shishkin and Nelidov, 
who had returned to St. Petersburg from Constantinople, were for accepting 
Salisbury’s policy but that they probably counted for little in the Tsars 
estimation.252  This left Salisbury in his customary pessimistic view, he 
started to think that the Russians could not be kept from the Straights and 
that the best Austria and Britain could hope for would be compensation.253 
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Later in November 1896 all this was turned on its head as the Russians had 
accepted the British circular.254  The reply was vague and Salisbury had to 
try to stiffen it.  By mid December the Russian reply indicated that they 
were willing to take coercive measures.255   By February 1897 the 
Ambassadors had worked out a plan of reform, but this was forestalled by 
the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish war.  The reason for the Russian change 
of heart was due to Nelidov’s success in St. Petersburg: he had convinced 
the Russians that the Ottoman Empire would fall and that Britain would try 
to take the Straights first.256  As we have seen Shishkin, at least, was 
unwilling to accept British assurances that the Mediterranean fleet was not 
poised ready to take Constantinople.  Therefore, Russia had to force the 
Straights by force of arms.  That she could do so was in no doubt.257  As 
Russia believed she could take Constantinople, then she had to assume that 
the British, the strongest navy in the world, could do similar.  What 
remained then, was for Russian diplomacy to allay British suspicions and 
hence the need to agree to joint action.  In December 1896 the Tsar 
approved to a Russian descent on Constantinople.  This would only become 
apparent to British statesmen later in 1898.258  Salisbury’s unceasing efforts 
appeared to have paid off, but had in fact had backfired.  While Russia was 
previously prepared to maintain the status quo in Turkey, she was now 
actively working towards a unilateral coup de force to settle the Straights 
question in her favour: the exact circumstances Salisbury had wished to 
avoid; the exact circumstances the Fleet had advised they could do nothing 
about.  While the Foreign Secretary had finally got Russian support for his 
circular and a policy of reform imposed by the Ambassadors he had also 
prompted this drastic change of direction, due to the incessant nature of his 
diplomacy coupled with Russia’s fear of British intentions which he could 
never allay.  Throughout this exchange the Cabinet had been consulted and 
informed, in fact this body had constrained Salisbury’s freedom of action as 
much as Russia or the professional advisors at the Admiralty.  However, it 
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was clear to all including Chamberlain, that Britain was no longer capable of 
using unilateral force to defend some of her interests; a repeat of anything 
like the occupation of Egypt was now impossible or at the very least far 
more dangerous.  This realisation and the tortured nature of Anglo-Russian 
relations left a mark on the Cabinet and Chamberlain, only Salisbury 
remained optimistic that Russia could be worked with.  While Balfour would 
never openly say that he thought differently, when he became acting 
Foreign Secretary his focus was in an entirely different direction. 
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3: Seeking a Safe Harbour: Chamberlain and the Port Arthur Crisis. 
 
Matters in China remained relatively calm for most of 1897.  The Russians 
contented themselves with surveying their rail routes and the building of 
winter births for the Russian Far Eastern Squadron at Port Arthur.  In the 
Near East the Greco-Turkish war remained a thorn in Salisbury’s plans to 
bring the Sultan to heel.  In Africa, Chamberlain’s Hausas were still playing 
draughts with the French, while Kitchener and the Anglo-Egyptian army 
slowly made their way south into the Sudan and towards Fashoda.  At the 
opposite end of that continent, the fallout from the Jameson Raid continued 
in the form of further defiance from the Transvaal; South Africa would not 
simmer down.  This also embroiled Chamberlain back home as he fought to 
contain the potential fallout from the inquiry into Jameson’s failed filibuster.  
While historians have pointed out “Anglo-Russian relations in the Far East 
were quiet” during this time, the British had plenty to be concerned with 
elsewhere.259  However, on 14th November the Far East would be catapulted 
to centre stage as the Kaiser’s orders for the German seizure of Kiaochow 
Bay in the Shantung province of China came to a head.  Throughout the 
crisis, Salisbury would remain obstinately wedded to the idea of Russian co-
operation despite his experience in the Near East.  He also opposed all other 
attempts to negotiate other international arrangements and ultimately only 
caved into a territorial acquisition when it became apparent that while his 
Cabinet was unsure what should be done something had to happen in order 
to face the public. 
The Kaiser believed that another round of his personal diplomacy had 
cleared his Kiaochow action with the Russians.  However, Muravev claimed 
that Russia had the right of first anchorage and a Russian squadron was 
ordered to safeguard it.260  This was quite a serious problem: Anglo-German 
relations had still not recovered from the damage inflicted by the “Kruger 
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Telegram” and the constant agitation against Britain in the German press, 
maintained in order to support the Kaiser’s fleet building.261  This left 
Bülow’s ‘Free Hand’ looking, at least momentarily, like simply flailing about.  
In fact St. Petersburg had only given the Germans permission to merely 
winter in the bay and required them to seek permission of the local Russian 
Admiral; it is hardly surprising that the seizure of the bay caused a serious 
problem.262  Russia also revealed that she was considering taking a port in 
Korea or in the Gulf of “Petchili[sic]”.  Otte was certainly right that Germany 
was not ready for the crisis she had created.263  Fearing a permanent 
souring of Russo-German relations, Holstein naturally swung toward a 
closer Anglo-German connection.  This was to be achieved by Britain 
granting a concession to Germany, therefore, even when the Germans felt 
their ‘chestnuts’ were getting rather warm, they still wanted a concession 
before allowing Britain to rescue them.264 Holstein was convinced that 
Britain would act anyway, to prevent Germany and Russia having to come 
to an agreement.265  Hatzfeldt, with his superior understanding of British 
methodology, wired back for further instructions; to leave Kiaochow as 
Russia asked would have re-orientated German foreign policy.  He 
suggested taking Amoy instead, but also suggested that some British 
support could be had if Germany offered something to Britain with regard to 
the Transvaal, and even mentioned the possibility of a secret agreement 
about Mozambique.266  It seemed he expected little from Salisbury without 
being able to offer an inducement. 
The British were taken by surprise and Salisbury’s initial response was 
hampered by uncertainty.  The German occupation of Kiaochow could easily 
have been both temporary and genuinely in order to ensure compensation 
for the murder of German missionaries, or it could have been the beginning 
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of a new ‘scramble’ for China.267  However, Lascelles, then ambassador to 
Germany, had reported a week earlier that he suspected that attempts to 
gain a Far Eastern coaling station were underway.268  Germany’s intentions 
were shrouded in both uncertainty and suspicion but the possibility that the 
occupation had been approved of by other Powers also gave rise to fears of 
renewed joint European action against China; a Russian counterpoise was 
expected.269  When Hatzfeldt met with Salisbury he warned that domestic 
opinion may require Germany to remain at Kiaochow.  Hatzfeldt also 
discussed the option of acquiring some other point in China.  Salisbury 
made it clear that “the more to the north” this point was, “the less dubious 
or undesirable this would be for England.”270  To begin with Salisbury was 
certainly unconcerned with what happened in North China.  Hatzfeldt 
certainly had it in mind to link the Far Eastern situation to that in South 
Africa, hoping to buy British approval or at least apply leverage.271  
Salisbury was prepared to discuss other Chinese ports as Hatzfeldt tried to 
find somewhere for Germany to go, and thus escape from the tense 
situation with Russia, but Germany remaining at Kiaochow created the 
fewest problems for Britain.272  Salisbury was shrewd enough to realise that 
the Germans must have been under pressure to exchange the port.  On 
22nd November, Germany informed St Petersburg that they could not leave 
the bay, shortly thereafter, unprepared to risk war, the Russians climbed 
down.273 
Salisbury received reports that the Russians seemed indifferent to the 
German occupation.274  However, this was not the case.  Russia, like Britain, 
feared that a general race for territory was starting to take place in China.  
One of the conditions that the Germans demanded, in their lease of 
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Kiaochow, included some exclusive mining rights.  The British protested that 
this was an abrogation of their ‘most favoured nation’ status.  MacDonald 
was ordered to warn China that this would lead to a British claim for 
compensation.275  Salisbury was thinking of commercial concessions, such 
as ensuring a British successor as the head of Chinese customs.  The 
rumours concerning the nature of this compensation added to the utter 
distrust of Britain, which was actually starting to drive Russian foreign 
policy.  Driven by their fears of Britain in the Near East, Russia had started 
to plan for a coup de Main at Constantinople and in the Far East, Russia was 
again forced to act before she was ready and sent her fleet, to winter, at 
Port Arthur in mid December 1897, fearing delay could mean finding Britain 
already installed somewhere on the North Chinese coast.276 
Salisbury had been inundated with advice even before the Russian squadron 
moved into the port she had forced Japan from three years earlier.  Britain’s 
primary concerns were along the Yangtze-Kiang River, a good distance 
away from the German and Russian occupations.  However, as the Chinese 
government was based in the north it was subject to feel the pressure of 
those occupations more strenuously than the remote British presence.  Even 
as early as November, MacDonald was suggesting Britain should acquire a 
fortified coaling station in northern China, but Salisbury was unconvinced, 
“[t]hat means a charge of some £40,000 again”.277  While O’Conor, now in 
St Petersburg, believed that Britain could not stop Russia and Germany and 
so she should “define a sphere of influence”.278  Advice external to the 
government was varied but strong; it ranged from securing the Yangtze 
Kiang River area, to aligning Britain with Japan.279  Bertie took a different 
view, believing that spheres of influence should not be defined until it was 
apparent that the British were “at a disadvantage in other parts of China”.  
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He also suggested that the British should not send their squadron north for 
fear of encouraging the French to increase their presence in the south.  To 
avoid weakening the British presence in the south, Bertie advised that a 
Chinese guarantee not to grant concessions or leases in the area around 
Hong Kong was sufficient, and that no further territorial demands should be 
made, such as a fortified coaling station.  He concluded that the Far Eastern 
Squadron should have been brought up to a level capable “to deal with a 
Russian-German-French combination” as Britain’s “best security”.280  Otte 
points out that this implies a need for a Britain to acquire a naval base in 
north China, as maintaining a flying squadron almost a thousand miles 
north of Hong Kong was “fraught with logistical difficulties”281.  However, if, 
as Bertie suggested, Britain should not send ships to winter in a north China 
port, due to fears that France would be able to strengthen her squadron in 
the south, then this implied that Bertie did not think the ships should be 
‘flying’ anywhere: they were needed to project power around Hong Kong 
where Britain’s hard interests lay.  The Navy itself had no difficulty in 
concentrating force in the Gulf of Petchilli without a naval station of its own.  
In December 1897 a force of nine cruisers were gathered to apply pressure 
over Korea.  When the British would eventually demand the lease of 
Weihaiwei, the Navy would concentrate a force at the treaty port of Chifu 
that was larger than the Russian and German fleets combined, and did so in 
very short order.  Operating out of Hong Kong, while also being able to 
make use of the Chinese Treaty ports, the navy believed they would have 
no serious problems blockading the Russians at Port Arthur.  A north China 
Naval Base would be a different matter, but a mere Naval Station, while 
useful, would not make much material difference to the Navy’s ability to 
project sea power in the Gulf of Petchilli.282  Bertie also advised that the 
British Squadron should be strong enough to deal with all three European 
Powers combined.  While Otte is correct that this implied the need to 
acquire a local coaling station, this ignores the implication of Bertie’s explicit 
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suggestion that territorial compensation should be avoided.  That 
implication was that Britain needed to continue to project power from 
foreign held ports, such as the Chinese treaty ports, or by moving closer to 
Japan.  However, Bertie also discussed that the Far East Squadron would 
need to be able to deal with the three other European Powers combined.  
Whatever reason brought those three Powers into a combination which 
required that the British squadron ‘deal’ with them would likely have left 
China as a rather low priority.  It is hard to imagine that any such 
confrontation, let alone shots being fired, in East Asia or anywhere, would 
not have escalated quickly into a global conflict.  It is not hard to see why 
Salisbury did not wish to rush to any conclusions.  Professional advice did 
not illuminate the Foreign Secretary’s way either.  North Chinese ports were 
to be considered ‘White Elephants’.  They would become a source of 
weakness to their owners at a time of war, at least with a European Power, 
and would not affect British commercial interests mostly concentrated in the 
south.283   
In late December Salisbury considered three crucial questions: 
1. As to whether this would modify the strategical[sic] 
situation so as to make it necessary for us to occupy some 
new portion and if so where? 
2. Whether such a step on our part would be required to 
maintain what is vaguely called our prestige - that is to say 
our position as a first-rate Power interested above others in 
the commerce of those seas? 
3. Whether the position held by Russia and Germany would 
give them such means of exercising political pressure at 
Peking as to render some counter-move on our part 
necessary for preservation of our influence in matters which 
are important for the protection of our commerce, such as 
the selection of the Inspector General of Customs etc? 
Thinking upon these questions, Salisbury thought the establishment of a 
port for a British squadron to winter at near “or the constant presence of 
our vessels there”, could be necessary.284  He considered the East Asia 
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situation as being one of the many terrible inheritances which Roseberry 
and Kimberley had bequeathed him.  Salisbury’s criticism was sensible: 
what had Britain gained by turning her back on her long-term ally, China, 
during the Sino-Japanese war?  The Foreign Secretary believed that Britain 
had lost the trust of the Chinese who could not overcome their “indignation 
[...] at our support of Japan” and thus believed the British to be “a people 
that cannot be trusted”.  The result being that every new British action had 
“to make way against all the prejudice & all the distrust caused by the 
gratuitous abandonment of our previous political attitude”.285  Salisbury’s 
view was too simplistic, it is doubtful that the Tsungli Yamen really ever 
trusted the British; it was after all the British which had forced open the 
treaty ports and shot Opium into the veins of Chinese culture via the 
gratuitous use of cannon fire.  The Chinese were not uncanny foreigners: 
while in negotiations with the Germans over the Kiaochow concession they 
attempted to play the Europeans against each other.  If the Chinese 
harboured any ill will towards the British it would evaporate once Russian 
intentions to take those territories herself became evident.  The Tsungli 
Yamen may have momentarily felt that working with Russia would protect 
their interests better; overall subordination to the Tsar was perhaps 
preferable to the Celestial Empire being torn to shreds between many 
European masters, but at heart, China wished to use any means possible to 
set the Europeans against each other and hopefully avoid having to concede 
them anything at all.  Salisbury and his policy was contending with the 
Chinese feeling that they could make some wriggle room, some freedom of 
action, by playing Russia against Britain.  In the end, China continued to 
placate all the European Powers not least of all, Britain.  Salisbury was not 
struggling with the loss of as much soft power as he imagined. 
During the earlier stages of this crisis, Chamberlain had kept mostly out of 
Salisbury’s way.  The confrontation with France in West Africa was in its 
most intense phase but on the 29th December he wrote to Salisbury:  
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I see that there is very little in the telegrams about recent 
events in China, although public opinion has been expecting 
some sensational action on our part.  Public opinion is a very 
bad guide but I suppose we should be sharply questioned when 
parliament meets & if we do absolutely nothing before then I 
fear the effect of our self-effacement bills both on our own 
friends & on foreign governments. 
I have no doubt however that you have all this already under 
consideration.286 
Chamberlain did not think that Public Opinion was a good guide, but he was 
much more sensitive to the fact that in an increasingly democratic electoral 
system it needed to be heeded or dealt with.  The letter is a barely veiled 
warning as to the affects of inaction; it was not that Chamberlain demanded 
that policy follow press opinion, but that something needed to be done, 
firstly in order to placate the public and secondly to meet the actual threat 
which the Colonial Secretary agreed existed.  Foreign policy could no longer 
be made in an aristocratic realpolitick bubble insulted from electoral 
pressure, if indeed it ever had been.  Therefore, inaction was Chamberlain’s 
main concern; he had a few ideas as what may be possible but the 
perception of doing nothing was in his view worse than making a bad move.  
As ever, for Chamberlain, time was of the essence. 
It is worthwhile to recall what had been going on in West Africa during 
November and December.  Salisbury had recently had to instruct 
Chamberlain to withdraw troops from Bonduku as they were in breach of 
international law.287  The Colonial Secretary had complied, under protest; he 
thought the French breaches of the rules should have entitled the British to 
push back in a similar fashion.  At the same time, the two men were playing 
a little push and pull game over how to conduct the Niger negotiations, 
Chamberlain had even threatened resignation: “I am more than sorry to 
differ from him, but I cannot stand it.  I would rather give up office than 
allow French methods to triumph in this way.”288  By December 1897 the 
relationship between these two men had become strained and Chamberlain 
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had become particularly suspicious that Salisbury was not prepared to 
defend British interests with sufficient force.  Salisbury replied to 
Chamberlain’s concerns about inaction in China: “I agree with you that ‘The 
public’ will require some territorial or cartographic consolation in China.  It 
will not be useful, & will be expensive but as a matter of pure sentiment we 
shall have to do it. I think it will be Chusan.”  He went on to point out that it 
was “more important” to “give enough assistance to the new indemnity loan 
to secure our obtaining a British successor to Hart[Head of China’s 
Customs].” 289  Salisbury was focusing on pragmatically maintaining Britain’s 
position in China.  If Britain could still get what was truly important, her lion 
share of the trade, then all was well; he was impervious to arguments that 
the perceived loss of influence could cause real problems either in China or 
at home. 
Chamberlain was not entirely satisfied with this reply; while he was “very 
glad” to hear of Salisbury’s plans and agree that the “explosiveness of the 
Celestial Empire” was “premature”, he also felt Britain could not “afford to 
be left behind”.  Therefore, he feared something more than a slow start in a 
new ‘scramble’: “I feel that if we make no move it will be a great 
encouragement to further tail-twisting on the part of our dear friends & 
allies of the Concert of Europe.”290  Chamberlain never lost his deep concern 
about this; in Africa, Venezuela and now China he was perpetually in fear of 
what may happen should Britain’s competitors come to believe that she 
would not defend her interests.  However, Chamberlain was also not as 
wedded to territorial aggrandisement as his reputation suggests.  He never 
wanted Britain to be left behind, but in the Far East he thought other 
actions would have met the public’s desire for action: “[t]alking of allies 
have you considered whether we might not draw closer to Japan?”  To 
Chamberlain’s mind, Japan had already demonstrated her ability to fight 
and he noted “that they[Japan] are rapidly increasing their means of 
offence & defence [...].  If we decided to take anything [...] I imagine that 
we should be sure of their support. [...] In any case they are worth looking 
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after for it is clear that they do not mean to be a quantité négligeable in the 
East.”291  Chamberlain’s view was more positive about the value of 
Salisbury’s inheritances and the usefulness of the Japanese.   
Salisbury consistently denigrated the usefulness of the Japanese, expecting 
any connection with them to make discussions with the Chinese more 
difficult and potentially place Britain under obligations that would, at best, 
make any rapprochement with Russia harder and, at worse, possibly draw 
Britain into a war with the Dual-Alliance.  However, almost at the same 
moment, Satow in Tokyo reported “that Japan would do anything England 
asked of her [...] to gain her friendship” though she was not yet ready to 
take any kind of assertive action in East Asia. 292  Throughout the 
Kiaochow/Port Arthur Crisis she made several enquires which suggested 
that she perhaps would have followed Britain in making a strong protest.  
However, the new Ministry in Tokyo was tempted to pursue their 
negotiations with Russia over Korea, while Britain attempted to find their 
own modus Vivendi with the Tsardom.  As neither was prepared to give up 
these initiatives there was little chance that much could be made of 
Chamberlain’s suggestion; at least until Japan felt her military and naval 
preparations were complete.293  Chamberlain was not naive about Japanese 
capabilities; his was a suggestion which had a characteristic long term view.  
Otte uses this exchange between Chamberlain and Salisbury to support his 
argument that the decision to take some part of China was taken in early 
January 1898.  Otte also provides evidence from a wide array of sources 
including MacDonald’s instruction to inform the Chinese that if they ceded 
territory to Germany, then Britain would require “some corresponding 
concession” and subsequently seeking advice as to which port to take.294  
While Otte may be right that Salisbury had made “the decision to acquire 
some part of China as a response to the German action at Kiaochow” by 
January 1898, the final decision would ultimately rest with the Cabinet and 
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that decision was not so easily made.295  His interpretation also gently 
sidesteps Salisbury’s pragmatism; if Russia followed the German example it 
would then become necessary for Britain to follow suit, then it was only 
sensible to consider the comparative benefits of each site as soon as 
possible.  It also ignores his seeming preference, even as late as the 22nd 
March, to avoid any territorial acquisition if possible.296   
Just before the Cabinet meeting in January, Salisbury outlined what he 
believed was at stake to Balfour.  He hoped to avoid being overruled by his 
Cabinet, as he had been over Armenia, by building a consensus ahead of 
time.  Russia was at the heart of Britain’s problems; she was the Power who 
appeared to be in a position, especially with her ally France, to apply 
pressure to several of the British Empire’s sensitive points simultaneously.  
In the Near East she could snatch up Constantinople and thus upset the 
naval balance of power in the Mediterranean and threaten Egypt while 
dominating land communications between Europe and Asia.  She could also 
challenge the British in India via Afghanistan.  Whilst Britain believed she 
had no means of hurting the Tsar’s colossus, whose vital organs all lay a fair 
way in land, away from the seas which Britain would be able to dominate 
and strike from.  This was not the only reason why Russia was central to 
solving Britain’s security problems.  Not many in British Government circles 
were yet aware of the full implications of the Kaiser’s naval policy, but 
influential Times writers were not so docile.  George Saunders, The Times 
Berlin correspondent, commented that he believed “that we shall have to 
reckon with this people[Germans] long before anything like a decisive 
reckoning with Russia comes; and further that a modus Vivendi with Russia 
is more easily attainable than with Germany both now and in the future.”297  
This is not to say that Germany had already become the ultimate enemy or 
that there was anything inevitable about such an enmity, but it merely 
demonstrated that Britain’s options were few.  Salisbury’s distrust of 
Germany was not new, nor based upon a sound evaluation of the German 
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Naval Law, but if Russia was the Power currently able to make the most 
trouble for Britain, then there were only two possible solutions; come to 
terms with her, or find someone to stand with you to contain her.  This was 
the central problem; Salisbury would have agreed with Saunders about 
Russia, he too believed an Anglo-Russian agreement was easier to achieve.  
He thus hoped to use the negotiations of the third Chinese indemnity loan 
to draw Russia and Britain much closer together, enough to realign the 
Powers in Europe.298  Salisbury had decided he preferred to lean towards 
Russia and the Dual-Alliance, now that in his mind Britain was freed from 
having to defend Constantinople.   
The Cabinet meeting did not go as Salisbury had hoped.  Salisbury’s desire 
to attempt to negotiations over the loan to improve Anglo-Russian relations 
met with problems.  Chamberlain rejected all suggestions at conciliating 
Russia or admitting her to the loan negotiations.  He was not unaware of 
the same issues; he too was trying to find some diplomatic arrangement 
that would ease Britain’s place in the world, but he believed Russia could 
not be trusted.  He again suggested working with the US and Japan, as a 
new Far Eastern Triplice, and thus insist “that all concessions taken by or 
made to any other Power shall be shared with all other Powers, i.e. no 
exclusive rights to be allowed”, and if that failed then “we shall ask for 
something for ourselves to balance Kiao-Chow”.299  Chamberlain was again 
thinking further afield to find alternatives and thus avoid having to come to 
terms with Russia.  To understand his aversion it is important to recall what 
Chamberlain knows of previous dealings with the Tsardom.  He was fully 
aware of how negotiations over Armenia and over previous Chinese loans 
had gone.  The Russians had lied, temporised, and had been insincere in 
both cases and over many months.  Chamberlain did not believe they could 
be trusted to hold to any agreement.  Furthermore, the demand he made 
was against any Power gaining exclusive rights in China.  It was the 
exclusion of the British that made such concessions objectionable.  Otte 
believes Chamberlain “doubted the much vaunted potential of the China 
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market”; yet here the Colonial Secretary was doing all he could to keep as 
much of that market open as possible.300  Chamberlain wrote to Salisbury, 
touching on some of these concerns: could successful joint action over the 
loan become “the basis of a [Russian] claim for alternate – or –joint – 
management of the Chinese customs?”  Having hinted that working too 
closely with Russia could have created a more serious problem by inviting 
them to ask after the one thing the British were most determined to 
maintain in China, he went on to suggest that Russia had: 
behaved very badly to us in Corea[sic] & is taking Port Arthur; 
& she has shown special unfriendliness in preparing to exclude 
& dismiss English engineers, & in claiming consideration in the 
appointment of Director to Customs.  Perhaps it may be right 
to keep coals of fire on her head, but I should have preferred 
to issue the loan singly, leaving power to share it afterwards if 
we thought fit.  This would leave a weapon in our hands which 
we might use to make terms with Russia later on.301 
The Colonial Sectary signed off, asking Salisbury not to bother to.  If 
Salisbury was hoping to create a new relationship with Russia, one that 
would meaningfully affect the situation in Europe, then he was probably 
quite prepared to offer major concessions.  There is, however, no indication 
that the administration of Chinese customs would have been one of them.  
In addition Otte discovered that Chamberlain had told Staal that he 
favoured “an agreement with Russia and by ricochet with France”.302  
Although this seems disingenuous, as outlined over West Africa, 
Chamberlain only really wished to consider agreements where there was a 
clear quid pro quo, or the trading of congruent claims.  He did not believe 
that Russia would stick to any deal, or that Britain could well afford to offer 
them the kind of compensation they were likely to find inviting.  In 
Chamberlain’s mind, an agreement with Russia would be unreliable and too 
expensive. 
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The Cabinet did not accept Salisbury’s policy and agreed to consider other 
options, such as diplomatic approaches to the US, thus avoiding having to 
commit to a policy of their own.  However, the Foreign Minister continued to 
push ahead with his Russian project, thinking that the time was not 
adverse; Russia was, after all, aggrieved with Germany over Kiaochow.  
Otte again suggests that at least Staal was in favour of some form of Anglo-
Russian détente, noting that two powers only had one thing in common in 
Asia: “their mutual distrust”.303  However, this was the biggest stumbling 
block to previous attempts to work together.  Distrust of Britain had already 
caused serious reactions in St. Petersburg.  Having failed to interest Russia 
in working jointly on the earlier Chinese loan, Salisbury would try to use 
similar currency in an attempt to buy the same horse.  He could not have 
been naive enough to think that the negotiations for a detente could 
continue simultaneously as the loan negotiations without Russia connecting 
the two. 
When Salisbury finally instructed O’Conor to begin talks on an Anglo-
Russian detente, he suggested he should do so with Witte, Russia’s finance 
minister.  Witte was the one Russian minister who seemed to have been 
consistently opposed to territorial acquisitions in China, hoping to gain 
concessions, and a preponderance of power over Peking, through peaceful 
means.  Muravev, the Russian Foreign Minister, was reportedly annoyed 
with this policy.304  Even as O’Conor started talks in St. Petersburg problems 
were already brewing.  In Peking, the Chinese were under Russian pressure 
to refuse an Anglo-German loan to cover the third indemnity payment; 
China had herself asked for the loan and it was being offered on favourable 
terms.  O’Conor was happy to report that Muravev (he was unable to talk to 
Witte first) was “more favourable even than I expected.”  Muravev 
appeared happy to look toward a general entente, which would include 
recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in Northern China.  However, 
O’Conor noted something in his reply which historian’s have laid little 
influence on:  
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The information I have received since my return leads to the 
opinion that (? Russian Government) and particularly the 
Emperor are greatly afraid of complications arising before the 
Siberian railway is completed, and that in so far [as?] the 
moment is opportune for an amicable arrangement in regard to 
our respective interest in China and elsewhere.  At the same 
time it becomes the more important to take care that any 
understanding we may came to gives no such headway that it 
cannot be set aside when it may seem to Russia to have 
served its temporary purpose.305 
O’Conor, one of the strongest advocates of an Anglo-Russian agreement, 
clearly believed it possible that Russia would simply drop it once she felt 
secure enough to do so.  While Salisbury was prepared to hope for better 
conduct from the Russians, detractors like Chamberlain could not.  O’Conor 
eventually had his meeting with Witte, during which the Russian finance 
minister again expounded his vision of peaceful penetration: “Russia’s 
geographical position must sooner or later secure her political predominance 
in the north of China and her true policy is to keep China intact.”  However, 
he still asked what “would England say if Russia’s occupation of Port Arthur 
became permanent?”  O’Conor was also pushed into giving some idea of 
what Britain’s aims were: “to keep China open to foreign trade, to oppose 
prohibitive tariffs and not allow our commercial interests and our 
consequent political position to be set aside by the action of other 
Powers.”306  Things were already not looking very good, when the Russians 
talked about a sphere of influence in the North they were actually 
requesting a carte blanche to do as they pleased there, including the 
occupation of Port Arthur.  Salisbury replied that he was not contemplating 
a partition of territory, or anything that would “admit the violation of any 
existing treaties, or impair the integrity of the present empires of either 
China or Turkey.”  The Prime Minister hoped instead for what he termed, 
“only a partition of preponderance”.307  This was incompatible with ultimate 
Russian aims, regardless of whether Witte or Muravev would manage to 
direct Russian Far Eastern policy.  In his discussion with Witte, O’Conor 
described how the Russian Finance Minister had drawn his hand over four 
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North China provinces, stating that “sooner or later Russia would probably 
absorb all this territory”.308  At the very outset, it seemed Russia would 
require a high price for her friendship.  Salisbury was not prepared to allow 
Russia the right to take unilateral action resulting in territorial acquisitions 
in Northern China.  In his description of what he could offer:  a “partition of 
preponderance” based upon the watersheds of the Yangtze and Hoango in 
China and the Black Sea and Euphrates in Turkey, he had also made clear 
that the violation of existing treaties, the partition of territory and the 
infraction of rights was unacceptable.  In other words, he would not, or 
perhaps could not, agree to a deal that could allow Russia to close a treaty 
port such as Tientsin, take territory for herself or close parts of China to the 
trade of others.309  It should have been clearly apparent that this hope of a 
wide-ranging agreement with Russia would cost far more than Britain was 
prepared to pay. 
Salisbury continued undaunted, he warned Staal in London that spheres of 
influence would accelerate China’s disintegration and the Russian 
ambassador simply replied this was “a geographical fact.”310  These were 
serious problems it seemed Britain was unable to offer Russia what she 
really wanted; and despite Russian desires being confined to areas in which 
Britain lacked vital interests.  Maintaining the integrity of international law 
was even more important to Salisbury than that of the Chinese and 
Ottoman Empires.  Even in the midst of these discussions Witte had causally 
referred to Russia’s antagonistic position with regards to the Chinese 
indemnity, he had “not yet lost all hope of the Chinese refusing the 
conditions of the loan and turning again to Russia”; the situation had 
become serious. 311  Salisbury was quite right when he explained himself to 
Beach.  With Germany in Kiaochow and Russia in Port Arthur, if the Chinese 
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refused the British loan then the British “position in regard to Russia in 
China will be one of absolute effacement.”312 
Chamberlain also believed the situation had become dire, but was losing 
patience with Salisbury who was, yet again, chasing the Russians regardless 
of a long list of Russian slights, some serious and some imaginary: 
grave trouble is impending upon the government if we do not 
adopt a more decided attitude in regard to China. 
What are the facts? We have a paramount interest in the 
Trade, and have gained much credit both at home and in 
America, by insisting that while we do not intend to oppose the 
occupation of Germany and Russia, we are determined that 
their Ports shall be Treaty Ports [...] and that our influence 
shall be maintained. 
The Germans appear to have accepted our terms [...] But the 
Russians have done us at every point. 
They have induced us to let our ships leave Port Arthur, while 
they have reciprocated our friendly attitude by opposing our 
loan proposals. 
They have forced us to withdraw our own proposal to make 
Talienwan a Free Port 
They are placing Russian officers in control of Railways & to the 
exclusion of English 
They are ousting us from influence in Corea. 
They pretend that their occupation is temporary and not in 
restraint of our Trade.  We all believe that this is false and that 
they will transform the occupation into a permanent one and 
will exclude us altogether from the Liaotang peninsula.  [...] 
All this is known to our friends and to our enemies.  If matters 
remain as they are our prestige will be gone and our trade will 
follow.  I would not give a years’ life to the Government under 
such conditions. 
Suffice to say Chamberlain was extremely concerned.  His solution was to 
make a clear proposal to the US and the Germans to join Britain in 
enforcing a policy that all ports held by foreigners, now or in the future, 
should be Treaty Ports and “That if Russia refuses these terms we should 
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summon her fleet to leave Port Arthur and make her go if necessary.”313  He 
also thought this would be an effective combination with which to force 
China to open more treaty ports and allow internal navigation.  He opposed 
territorial concessions all the way through the crisis.  Chamberlain was 
certainly prepared, as long as Britain was not acting alone, for some pretty 
serious measures and the possibility of a military confrontation.  He had 
also warned the Cabinet that chasing after Russia played into the Tsar’s 
hands.  His concern over prestige was consistent and here he saw more 
dangerous ‘tail-twisting’.  Chamberlain felt that in the Niger negotiations 
there was a feeling that Britain would always give way in the face of the 
threat of force.  It was this self-debasement which he feared had become a 
standard motif of Salisbury’s policy.  In Chamberlain’s mind, Britain could 
not afford for her rivals to become convinced that she would never defend 
her interests with force. 
The next round of ‘talks’ in St. Petersburg revealed how far the Russians 
were really prepared to try to come to a worldwide arrangement.  Talks with 
Muravev demonstrated how very little he was prepared to move on: he 
pretended to care a little and to be ignorant of the situation with the loan 
and while O’Conor tried to remind him that Salisbury was looking for a 
general settlement, the Russian wanted to “proceed in the first instance to 
treat Chinese affairs”.  At the end of the interview Muravev “added that 
later on we would take up the question of our respective spheres of 
influence in Turkey”.314  And again later while reporting on his meeting with 
Lamsdorff, O’Conor noted that he had “observed that Count Muraview[sic] 
has rather avoided referring to Asia Minor, Africa, Persian Gulf, &c.  Now is 
the time, I think, to make it clearly understood that the arrangement 
between the two countries shall extend not only to China but to all the other 
regions where we have conflicting interests.”315  This had been made clear 
from the start; it should all ready be noted that the Russians were not 
prepared to discuss the general situation.  If negotiations were to proceed 
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with each theatre taken separately, then it was certain that Salisbury would 
not get a deal the British would believe was fair.  After all Salisbury could 
not even offer complete freedom of action in Manchuria and with the 
vagueness of Russian suggestions, it was apparent that no deal would be 
forthcoming.316  It is hard to imagine how Salisbury hoped that agreeing to 
what Neilson calls a “balance of influence” in China, could ever have been 
attractive enough to the Russians.317  If he was not truly prepared to accept 
delimitation of China into spheres of influence, what inducement did he 
actually have to offer the Russians?  The Russians were full of distrust of 
Britain and so any informal arrangement, such as Salisbury’s watershed 
proposals, were unacceptable. 
As Muravev was feigning disinterest in the loan, the Russians were doing all 
that they could in Peking to prevent the Anglo-German loan from being 
accepted.  Salisbury noted that this was “very hostile and insulting”, despite 
the Tsar’s hopes that the current talks should succeed.  However, “this 
affront is not due to any order of the Emperor[Tsar]”.  Believing the Russian 
suggestion of sharing the loan was unworkable, Salisbury instructed 
O’Conor to discover what Russians objection actually were.318  The chances 
of finding the currency for any agreement, let alone a general one, 
appeared to have already shrunk to the level of wishful thinking.  
MacDonald in China continued to pressure the Chinese for the concessions 
which were most important to the British.  These included that China 
undertake not to alienate any part of the Yangtze valley and secondly, to 
reserve the superintendence of China’s customs for a British subject.319  
O’Conor in Russia continued to pursue the Anglo-Russian entente.  He 
offered the Russians a memorandum of Salisbury’s ideas based upon “a 
partition of preponderating political influence and not a partition of territory” 
in an attempt to clarify where negotiations had arrived and to ensure that 
there had been no strong words of opposition to Salisbury’s suggestions.  
O’Conor had hoped that such a note would help facilitate the next stage of 
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discussions, which would mean resolving “to the mutual advantage of each 
country,” some “of the more definite issues at stake”.320  Before hearing any 
official reply, O’Conor continued to press the Russians on their counter-
demands should the Anglo-German loan be accepted.  This was the point 
reached when the British learnt that the occupation of Port Arthur was 
permanent in nature.  The demand was for “merely a lease for, say, twenty 
years of Talienwan and Port Arthur”.  As noted this was in direct conflict 
with Salisbury’s hopes to avoid a partition of territory.  O’Conor noted that 
the Russians “intended to hold to these ports at any cost” whilst claiming 
that such a lease “would not destroy Chinese sovereignty”.  Informing 
Lamsdorff that the British did not see things in the same way, and that this 
would almost certainly necessitate Britain making similar demands in their 
own sphere, he broke off discussing “these demands without referring” to 
Salisbury for instructions.  Lamsdorff continued to assert that Russia had 
given up “her prior claim to the loan with all its political importance” 
implying that the British should perhaps accept the Russian leases as a quid 
quo pro.321  Chamberlain would have noted this as yet another example of a 
European Power offering incomparable objects as part of a transaction.   
The Cabinet meeting of 23rd February attempted to formulate a response.  
Most of those present accepted that they were powerless to prevent Russia 
obtaining the two ports; this should have been good news as it could have 
enabled Salisbury to concur in Russia’s actions and thus use it as part of the 
currency for a wider agreement.  However, Salisbury, so often described as 
a realpolitick politician, felt unable to do so.  Balfour felt even more strongly 
he “looked with no disfavour upon such course, for it opens ports which are 
now closed, and it makes it practically impossible for the French, if they 
have any aggressive designs on Hainan, to do more than adopt a similar 
policy of leasing, combined with Free Trade”.322  Balfour’s trust, that the 
Russians would indeed keep the ports open to the trade of others was 
poorly placed unless he saw it as one of the conditions that could be 
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negotiated in further discussions.  The Cabinet also decided to pursue 
Chamberlain’s idea of approaching the US in an attempt to support the 
‘open door’ policy in China.  Chamberlain’s original suggestion had wished 
to include Germany but this was not to be acted upon.  In discussing this 
Cabinet meeting Otte corrects Neilson’s comment that Salisbury was 
already in France recovering from illness.  The Prime Minister did not leave 
for France until 26th March but how far he was able to direct Cabinet 
discussion, or even how often he was present, is difficult to discern.  As 
Balfour increasingly deputised both as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister 
it becomes harder for the historian to distinguish Balfour’s and Salisbury’s 
preferred policies; it should not be assumed that they were one and the 
same.  Most evidence for the content of this meeting is in Balfour’s letter to 
Goschen in which Balfour extensively defends the decisions the Cabinet 
made.  This implied that Balfour approved of them and was instrumental in 
the debate around them, and that Goschen was unconvinced.  However, it 
is also very difficult to imagine that Salisbury would have been unable to at 
least postpone the US initiative, as he had in January, if he had been 
present or in full form. 
There is little evidence for exactly when and for how long Salisbury’s illness 
affected British decision making.  Otte quotes two notes from Sanderson, 
the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, to O’Conor.  They 
suggested that British diplomacy would “have for the moment to get on as 
we can under Balfour’s superintendence” and that Salisbury “was nursed up 
and kept quiet”.  While, as Otte suggests, this may have allowed the Prime 
Minister to “preside over the now very brief Cabinet meetings in March”, it 
also plainly states that he was to be “kept quiet”.  It is still very difficult to 
state with any precision when it was that Salisbury started to lose his 
control of foreign policy due to illness, however, the resultant decisions of 
the Cabinet of 23rd February suggests that he was not in control even 
then.323 
While the Cabinet battled with how to proceed, O’Conor was still hopeful of 
progress with Russia.  On the 22nd February he had finally received an 
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official response to his memorandum on how the talks had progressed so 
far.  He was told that the Tsar had been “pleased” to read of British desires 
to improve relations via an entente, and that he welcomed “these overtures 
and thinks that the affairs of China and more especially the loan offer a 
good opportunity of putting them into immediate application which would 
ultimately lead to an exchange of views on the larger question.”  The note 
went on to acknowledge Britain’s conditions for the loan and Russian 
counter-demands, and that the “Russian Government now awaits further 
communications.”324  O’Conor also wrote to Lascelles, in Berlin, telling him 
that Salisbury had wanted “an alliance with Russia (& this he told me 
himself) thereby ending our isolation in Europe”, and that negotiations 
should not have started “unless we are resolved to go till we at all events 
came to an irremovable obstacle”.325  It is clear that the ambassador did not 
see the loan as just such an obstacle.  Otte asks that some “allowance 
ought to be made for O’Conor’s loose usage of the term ‘alliance’.” That is 
quite correct; it is difficult to imagine that Salisbury had meant to form any 
kind of formal Anglo-Russian alliance, while the evidence does support that 
“Salisbury’s plans were more far-reaching than previous historians have 
allowed,” it is still important to remember what it was he was actually 
prepared to discuss and with whom.326  As has been previously emphasised, 
Russia had proved to be unreliable and insincere in almost all her diplomatic 
arrangements and talks with Britain over the last three years.  It is doubtful 
that an informal agreement could have been relied upon, and even if it 
could, it is even more doubtful that the Cabinet would have been prepared 
to take such a risk even if Salisbury had been.  There was also an element 
of blackmail in even this last, seemingly optimistic, message from Russia.  
The inference was clear, let us have what we want with regards to the 
Chinese Loan and this “would ultimately lead to an exchange of views on 
the larger question.”327  O’Conor may have thought this was not too higher 
a price to pay, but considering all that was being promised was ‘an 
exchange of views’, it would have been too high for a Cabinet that had no 
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clear idea of where to take British policy.  While Russia would probably have 
been happy to agree to Britain taking a port in her area of interest, such as 
Chusan, this would not have mollified everyone in the Cabinet and would 
require serious effort to sell to the British public.  It would certainly have 
seemed to encourage the piecemeal territorial disintegration of China, which 
the British wanted to prevent, and Chusan, while useful for safeguarding 
and strengthening British position in the Yangtze region could hardly have 
been considered a counter stroke designed to maintain a balance of both 
influence at Peking and naval power in the Gulf of Pechili, far in the north.  
Even though objective strategic opinion preferred Chusan to Weihaiwei, it 
would have been a much harder sell to an angry and almost bellicose 
public.  Salisbury was concerned that China accepting the Russian loan 
would leave Britain in a humiliated position but this did not mean the loan 
could not form part of a general agreement.  However, it would have been 
politically suicidal to offer the loan before talks had even got serious.328  On 
the 1st March the Chinese signed the British Loan agreement and just two 
days later O’Conor was reporting Russia’s response.  The signing of the loan 
and the other “commercial advantages”, which Britain had obtained, “had 
made an unfavourable impression upon the Emperor[Tsar] ... under the 
feeling created by these events, His Majesty[the Tsar] did not seem inclined 
to pursue [...] the discussion of the broader question.”  The note went on to 
say that with regards to keeping Talienwan open under existing treaty 
rights, the Russians would be guided “by what the Germans do at Kiao-
chau.”329  In reply, Sanderson noted that “the prospects of the entente 
making progress are checked for the moment”.  O’Conor was also not 
convinced that the entente was dead, commenting that he did not think 
“that our negotiations have actually broken down, but they have certainly 
had a severe check”.  In reality it seems that the entente had little prospect 
at any point.  Russian desires, once Witte’s policy had lost out in St. 
Petersburg - the event of which the Russian Finance Minister had tried to 
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hint at to O’Conor - were simply not compatible with Britain’s.330  It is hard 
to imagine how Britain could have acquiesced in the leasing of Port Arthur, 
without taking action of her own in recompense, and Britain could not have 
given up the loan either, as Sanderson put it “[t]here will be a regular row 
here ... [for] the public have set their minds on it.”331  Salisbury’s balance of 
preponderating political power was not something Russia could agree to. 
With the Russian entente now seemingly dead or at least in a deep coma, 
Balfour acted upon the Cabinet’s decision to approach the US.  Otte notes 
the delay between that decision and instructions being sent to Pauncefote 
on 7th March.332  He claims that Salisbury’s preference for a Russian 
agreement ensured that “nearly two months were allowed to lapse before 
the approach to the United States was made”.333  It is hardly to be doubted 
that Salisbury preferred his own policy to Chamberlain’s.  Chamberlain first 
suggested that Britain approach the US over China in Cabinet on 11th 
January; however it was not until the Cabinet of 23rd February that the 
suggestion was accepted.334  Only twelve days were actually “allowed to 
lapse” between deciding to approach the US and actually doing so.  While it 
seems certain that Balfour waited on the Russians before approaching the 
US, it also seems unnecessary to exaggerate the length of the delay.  While 
the proposed agreement with the US would have made working with Russia 
difficult, it should not have made it impossible as Salisbury hoped to 
prevent a partition of territory.  It seems unlikely that Salisbury was 
prepared to see Port Arthur and Talienwan become closed Russian territory 
even in return for a wider agreement.  Certainly Balfour, as late as 23rd 
February, was talking as though it was assured that these ports would 
remain open.  The agreement with the US would have made it much harder 
for Britain to have acquired new territory, but the agreement would have 
made such actions less necessary, as it was designed to prevent other 
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Powers gaining exclusive advantages.  The plan had further problems 
however, back when Chamberlain had first suggested it he had hoped to 
include Germany.  While it was true that Germany had, at that time, 
already seized Kiaochow, it had not yet become apparent that they intended 
to close the area to foreign trade and dominate the province of Shantung.  
By March Germany had revealed these aims.  If the US did agree to attempt 
to enforce the ‘open door’ then this new alliance would have had to deal 
with both Germany and Russia, or at least run the very serious risk of 
pushing the two Powers together.  Given that France would almost certainly 
have been dragged along by her alliance partner, this was likely to have 
revived the Far Eastern Triplice which had divested Japan of her spoils just 
three short years earlier.  Bertie in the Foreign Office lamented the situation 
while commenting to Lascelles that the Germans had “lied with their 
customary awkwardness” but that more importantly: 
I am convinced that if we show that we mean business we 
shall have very little trouble with our big European friends. 
Unfortunately France, Russia & Germany have got it into their 
heads that we shall never stand up to one First Class Power 
much less to two or three even if we had with us little Japan.  
It is difficult to remove this idea especially when we do our 
best to encourage it.335 
This opinion was shared fully by Chamberlain, who was so often 
complaining that the British conducted themselves with far too much 
restraint and that the other Powers had learnt to rely upon it.336 
With all other options exhausted Cabinet discussion fell back upon thoughts 
of territorial compensation.  In late February, the Chinese had offered 
Britain the lease of Weihaiwei.337  The Chinese were trying to ‘tempt’ the 
British north; this would have prevented a demand for an alternative, more 
lucrative site further south or along the Yangtze and would help balance the 
influence of European Powers near to the Chinese capital.  At the time, the 
                                       
335 Bertie to Lascelles, 16/03/1898, FO64/1437 quoted in Otte China p.113 
336 For some examples across the period in question see: Chamberlain to Salisbury, 
4/01/1896, JC5/67/39; Chamberlain to Salisbury, 6/06/1897, Salisbury papers 
3M/E/Chamberlain/1896-97/93; Chamberlain to Salisbury, 31/12/1897 Ibid., 117; 
Chamberlain to Balfour, 3/02/1898, JC5/5/70 
337 Macdonald to Salisbury, 25/02/1898, BD, I, No.25, p.18 
101 
 
port was occupied by Japan but she was due to retire with China’s final 
payment of the war indemnity; the payment had been facilitated by the 
final Anglo-German Loan.  If Japan withdrew it was widely considered that 
Germany would take the port or at the very least the final check on German 
domination of Shantung would have ended.338  Salisbury was concerned 
thinking that a “German takeover [...] would be very bad” but still argued 
that Chusan would be preferable.  As if her intentions were not already 
apparent, Salisbury claimed all would depend upon Russia.339  The situation 
was discussed in Cabinet on 14th March, in Salisbury’s absence.340  
Immediately after this meeting, Bertie and Curzon worked together to write 
separate memoranda.341  Bertie began by suggesting that none of the 
concessions Britain had gained were detrimental to Russia or unreasonable.  
Any objection to the opening of China’s waterways could only be “on the 
ground that she [Russia] desires to keep the north of China more or less 
difficult of access by sea and rivers in order to pour over the land frontier 
Russian goods at preferential rates.”  Germany was also accused of playing 
a sly game with Chinese trade as they were “bent on monopolising 
everything in Shantung, and by preventing a trunk line of railway from 
Tien-tsin to Chin-kiang, on the Yang-tsze River, hoped to draw the trade of 
Pechili, Shansi, and Shensi to the triangle of railways in Shantung and to 
Kiao-chau.”  These concerns could be checked or at least watched if Britain 
established herself at Weihaiwei. “Chusan and Silver Island” could be taken 
“whenever some other Power moves that way, [...] but the occupation of 
Wei-hai Wei requires a preliminary arrangement”.  Bertie continued, 
convinced that if Japan left, Germany would move in, resulting in Britain 
having to do what she could in the Yangtze region while her “trade” was 
“gradually squeezed out of North and South China.”  He finished with the 
suggestion that if Britain did not take the port, then she should offer Japan 
such assurances that she would remain in occupation, in defiance of 
probable Russian, Germany and French anger.342  His memo should have 
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also rendered a decision on Weihaiwei an imperative but no decision was 
yet made.  In Salisbury’s absence the two most influential Cabinet Ministers 
were Balfour and Chamberlain.  Chamberlain would remain opposed to any 
territorial acquisition, even after the decision was finally taken.  He firmly 
believed that British interests would be best protected by ensuring her 
access to the areas Germany and Russia were likely to dominate.  Balfour 
was not likely to make any definite decision lightly.  Despite believing that 
any “policy should be initiated before the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese 
arrangement”, thus making “an immediate decision absolutely necessary”, 
he allowed the Cabinet to postpone making it.343  This was hardly surprising 
as Bertie had just described how Britain taking Weihaiwei would ruin 
Germany’s plans, MacDonald had earlier described that it would “strike a 
death blow” upon them and would thus “incur her hostility.”344  Balfour was 
plagued with unanswerable questions: 
What will be the effect of the new policy on Germany? Will it 
provoke a Triple Alliance against us in the Far East? Could we 
resist the power of such a combination (a) without Japan, (b) 
with Japan? Could the contest be confined to the Far East? Or 
would it mean a general war?... What will be the cost and what 
the military value of Wei-hai-Wei to us? 
Balfour was in a position where he needed to provide leadership but saw 
nothing but danger.  The wrong step could permanently alienate Powers he 
would prefer to work with, or even provoke a general war.  Some of these 
questions could be answered with time but time was pressed.  Firstly, Japan 
was asked if she would stay on.  This she could not do; the Ito ministry in 
Tokyo was opposed to taking the risks this would represent, even being 
accused of a ‘peace at any price’ policy.345  Secondly, Balfour asked how 
Japan would respond to Britain taking possession of the base.  Japan 
preferred that China to take back control, but that “Japan has no objection 
to its possession by a Power disposed to assist in maintaining the 
independence of China”.346    The next effort was to try to prod along the 
slow pace of US diplomacy.  Pauncefote was requested to ask after his 
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earlier inquiries.  However, the American scheme fell apart; McKinley was 
not prepared to enter into any agreement in advance of any Power actually 
closing ports and did not wish to steer the US away from her isolationist 
position.347  The Cabinet was rapidly running out of options. 
The Cabinet met and discussed the situation over the next few days.  News 
that the Russians had now officially made her demands on China had also 
filtered in meaning that a decision really had to be made.348  However, a 
serious division had opened.  In the meeting on 18th March the Cabinet was 
therefore stuck with two options.  Firstly, “one allowing Russia to lease Port 
Arthur subject to engagements to preserve existing treaty rights and 
possibly [...] to refrain from fortifying Port Arthur – we taking as a 
makeweight a lease of Wei-hai Wei” and secondly, “[t]he other requiring the 
Russians to abstain from leasing Port Arthur – we engaging to take no port 
in Gulf of Pechili and not to intervene in Manchuria.”  In summing up the 
possible pros and cons of these two options, Balfour noted that the first 
would make no difference to the ultimate future of Northern China on 
account of the long Russian border, which Russia would still manage to 
dominate, and that Britain could maintain her naval superiority “with or 
without Port Arthur”.  The first also had the notable benefit of being unlikely 
to result in a general war.349  O’Conor had also suggested that there was 
little chance of a Russian or German occupation of Weihaiwei; hence 
Balfour’s newly found lack of concern that acquiring the port would 
dangerously ruin Anglo-German relations.350  The second of the two options 
ran the risk of a general war with Russia and thus perhaps France.  
However, it was also considered the only way to prevent the Russian 
advance and the “imminent partition of the Chinese Empire; that Wai-hai 
Wei if obtained would require too large military force for its defence, and 
except for appearances would be worth little to us if fortified and still less 
if unfortified”.  It would therefore be no makeweight for Port Arthur, which 
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was considered so strong that further fortification could make the place 
“impregnable [...]; that the influence at Pekin of the Power which had such 
a base at Port Arthur must be overwhelming.”351  This reflected the differing 
opinions between the two groupings within the Cabinet.   
As has already been noted, Chamberlain opposed taking Weihaiwei and was 
never convinced otherwise.  At this stage, he was joined by the two service 
chiefs, Goschen and Lansdowne, and also by Hicks Beach, Balfour, 
Devonshire and Chaplin.  This group was not cohesive; they were not 
unified by an agreed foreign policy outlook, Otte describes them as “a 
motley crew” that “was by no means a natural formation”.352  Chamberlain 
appeared to advocate conflict; it was hardly imagined that Britain could 
attempt to “summon her[Russian] fleet to leave Port Arthur”, let alone 
“make her go if necessary”, without causing a conflict.353  However, if 
Russia was “[a]t heart” “in a mortal funk of our Fleet” then conflict was not 
certain.354  Russia had changed her policy in both Armenia and China due to 
fear of British power.355  It would also be unnecessary to fight for Port 
Arthur if Russia’s decent into Northern China was inevitable, on account of 
her railway building and land frontier, then all she needed was patience just 
as Witte had argued.  O’Conor also feared what would happen if he 
“succeed too well” and convinced Russia not to hold on to Port Arthur; 
Russia would “pose again as the friend & protector of China” and use that 
position to block British initiatives at Peking.356  However, it is hard to see 
how allowing Russia to retain Port Arthur would have diminished these 
risks.  While convincing her to withdraw would have soured Anglo-Russian 
relations, the reality was that Russia had continued to obstruct British 
initiatives even while negotiating for an entente.  Salisbury had hoped that 
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agreement would have represented a seismic shift in geopolitical 
alignments.  Chamberlain’s policy was not pro-war; it just did not shrink 
from the risk of it. His opinion was based on the assumption that Russia 
could not be trusted and there is little evidence to suggest that he was 
wrong.  It should also be remembered that Chamberlain had never intended 
to unilaterally confront Russia, he hoped for Britain to find a different 
alignment, one that checked Russian plans, rather than having to acquiesce 
in them, namely a German alliance which preferable also included the US. 
Otte notes that both Balfour and Lansdowne were unprepared to risk a 
confrontation with either Russia or Salisbury.357  Balfour was, of course, 
Salisbury’s nephew and although he believed that Britain needed to find a 
first rate ally, he would go about such a policy with a more nuanced 
approach than ‘Brummagen Joe’.  He was unprepared to confront the Prime 
Minister, let alone actively undermine him.358  Lansdowne had been 
consistently opposed to any policy in which his department may end up 
required to do its job.  He had been reluctant over West Africa, or even the 
Sudan, and thus a potential confrontation with Russia, at best confined to 
the Far East, at worst all over the globe, was hardly attractive to him.  
Lansdowne was also indebted to the Prime Minister, who had convinced him 
not to resign after his failure to reform the war office.359 
Goschen was altogether a different kettle of fish.  He had first-hand 
experience of both French and Russian intrigues having had assignments to 
Egypt.  As First Lord of the Admiralty, he was mainly concerned with trying 
to check any possible Franco-Russian naval combination in the 
Mediterranean but also believed there were no serious conflicts of interest 
between Germany and Britain.360  Unlike Lansdowne and Balfour, he had no 
problem with potentially opposing Salisbury; it was Goschen who had led 
dissent against the Prime Ministers plans to force the Straits back in 1895.  
He believed that Weihaiwei would prove nothing but a drain on the 
Admiralty, while providing no real counterpoise to Port Arthur.  He also 
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believed this would represent a defeat for British diplomacy having been 
forced to abandon the ‘traditional policy’ of maintaining Chinese territorial 
integrity.361  However, failure to convince both Russia and Germany to 
withdraw from their respective bases would have represented a defeat for 
that policy anyway.  Goschen disagreed with Chamberlain’s position in two 
important respects; firstly he was much more cautious about potential 
conflict and secondly did not think that events in the Far East were as 
important. 
Hicks Beach initially opposed the acquisition of Weihaiwei on the grounds of 
fiscal restraint.  All professional opinion had rated the base as being second 
rate, and the cost of fortification and maintenance alarmed the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer.  Given the choice between paying for Weihaiwei or a 
potential Anglo-Russian war, Beach soon let his opposition drop.  His 
concern for Britain’s finances were not the usual penny pinching which was, 
and is, part and parcel of his job, but because the Victorian fiscal system 
was already starting to show signs of cracking even before the enormous 
strain of the South African War.362 
Devonshire was technically the second most senior minister after Salisbury.  
Trying to summarise Devonshire’s position is not a simple task.  Often 
Balfour and Chamberlain were both able to wield more influence than ‘the 
Duke’ but Devonshire’s opinions were important and carried great weight.  
If he had been prepared to take more of a lead he would certainly have 
undermined Chamberlain’s position as the principal Liberal Unionist.  He had 
also refused the Foreign Office in 1895.  Otte notes that having refused; he 
“scrupulously avoided trespassing on that department’s territory and 
refrained from challenging Salisbury’s lead in foreign policy.”  He was 
concerned that events in China portended badly for Britain, he was perhaps 
the most influential Cabinet minister with regards to military matters, 
especially as Lansdowne’s credit in that department was at low ebb.  
Devonshire also presided over the nascent and ineffective Committee of 
Defence.  Again, if he had be more inclined to exert himself, he could have 
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done much in that position, but instead the committee trundled along with 
the majority of strategic decisions still being made by the service heads, the 
full Cabinet or not being made at all.  He had some personal ties to 
Germany, and thus wished to maintain Anglo-German relations. 363 
Chaplin was the final member of the anti Weihaiwei group and the least 
influential member of Cabinet.  Otte again notes that “Salisbury later deeply 
regretted” Chaplin’s elevation to the Cabinet.  That is partly due to his 
strong support for Chamberlain, not only over Weihaiwei but in other areas 
too.  His popularity amongst the Conservative parliamentary party may 
have partly explained his initial appointment, especially in a Ministry in 
which the Liberal Unionists were over represented.  However, his ministerial 
career would not survive the Cabinet reshuffle of 1900 and he had little 
influence.  
Despite this grouping containing the most senior members of Cabinet, it 
was clear that it could not offer effective opposition to Salisbury.  Seeing 
that the options were perceived as being Weihaiwei or probable war over 
Port Arthur, the cautious and those with personal or political ties to 
Salisbury were not likely to force British policy to take note of their 
concerns.  The one member who could have effectively led such a revolt, 
Goschen, simply did not believe the events in China were serious enough to 
warrant such risks.  While their opposition to taking Weihaiwei faltered, this 
group would later find common cause as, to one extent or another, they all 
felt that Britain’s position would be stronger with a reliable ally.  It is this 
group that would use, or encourage Chamberlain to attempt to force such a 
change on Salisbury.  Otte presents the Cabinet at this time as being simply 
split into the ‘anti-Weihaiwei’ constellation and a Weihaiwei group led by 
Salisbury and assisted by Curzon.364  This group regarded Russia’s 
acquisition of Port Arthur as inevitable.  While Britain could not prevent it, 
Weihaiwei would act as a check on it.  They also believed that the 
experience of leasing Port Arthur would drive home to Russia the usefulness 
of an Anglo-Russian agreement and revive the failed entente.  There are 
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some problems with the reasoning here, firstly, Britain’s own advisors had 
warned that Weihaiwei would be a ‘white elephant’, expensive to fortify and 
a point of only weakness in a war.  How this second-rate harbour would 
compete with Port Arthur, feared as being possible to render impregnable, 
is not clear.  It would be foolish to assume that either Germany or Russia 
lacked a deep enough understanding to not come to the same conclusions.    
If the British believed that merely having the power to blockage Port Arthur 
was all that could ever be required, then Weihaiwei would be of some 
limited use but not essential.  Overwhelmingly the Cabinet opted for the 
option which limited the risk of war.  If there was a risk involved in taking 
Weihaiwei it was in regards to Germany and not Russia. 
On 22nd March a committee of the Cabinet met at the Admiralty and 
prevailed over the ‘anti- Weihaiwei’ group.  Chamberlain continued to 
dissent.  The meeting consisted of Balfour, Chamberlain, Goschen, 
Devonshire, Hicks Beach and Lansdowne.  A meeting consisting entirely of 
members of the supposed ‘anti- Weihaiwei’ group somehow prevailed 
against themselves.  Salisbury was not present but had penned a short note 
on the subject; the committee also had the memorandums by Bertie and 
Curzon before them.  It is important to stress what this committee decided.  
Balfour informed the Queen that “[c]onfidential instructions to her Majesty’s 
Minister at Pekin were also determined on. The Yamen are to be requested 
not to alienate Wei-hai-wei and, if it is to be alienated, to give Great Britain 
the refusal of the place.”365  This was completely in agreement with 
Salisbury’s suggestion in his short note: “the best course [...] to pursue as 
to Wei-hai-wei is to make a Chusan agreement, either binding China singly 
not to alienate or binding her to give us the first refusal.”366  Given that 
Germany had simply steamed into Kiaochow and then made demands on 
China, it is hard to see how this guarantee and promise of first refusal could 
be enforced.  Certainly China could not enforce it, and, of course, if Britain 
had a right of first refusal and Russia or Germany occupied the port, this 
could give rise to a casus belli.  However, if Britain had determined not to 
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fight to keep the powerful Port Arthur from Russian hands, it seems unlikely 
that she would have wished to fight to keep the much weaker Weihaiwei 
from either Russia or Germany.   
Both Bertie and Curzon had advised urgent and immediate action.  Their 
writings differ from Salisbury’s note in tone and content; both are filled with 
a sense of urgency, Salisbury’s still had the air of masterly inactivity.  His 
advice was to do as little as possible, move as slowly as possible and having 
secured first refusal on Weihaiwei, merely “to object to the military 
occupation of Port Arthur in language sufficiently measured to allow Russia 
to find a way out.”  The real difficulty here is to understand how it can be 
that, having refused to allow Russia a free hand in Port Arthur while 
negotiating for an entente, her possession of the place became to be 
considered “insignificant compared to the effect of the long land frontier 
behind which no doubt in due time a Russian Corps d’armee will be 
quartered.” 367  Salisbury appeared to be highly nonchalant about the effects 
of a Russian occupation and fortification of Port Arthur on the Chinese 
government.  This was one of the main thrusts of Curzon and Bertie’s 
argument.  Curzon argued that British prestige and influence at Peking 
would have evaporated unless Britain demonstrated “that we have not 
abandoned the field in North China”.368  Bertie concurred “[i]f we desire to 
have some counterpoise to the preponderance of Russian and German 
influences at Peking we must have some point of advantage in the north.”369  
However, Salisbury’s idea of a ‘partition of preponderance’ was based upon 
the assurance that both parties could count on the support of the other with 
regard to concessions within their own area of influence.  Salisbury 
expected Russia to back Britain up with any demands she made on Peking, 
which were based in the south, and he would do the same for Russia in 
regards to the north.  The need for a base was not considered until Russia 
had occupied Port Arthur and it had become apparent that the occupation 
would be permanent.  As the Weihaiwei group considered that the 
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occupation was an insignificant factor, in terms of influence over Peking, 
next to that of the long Russian land frontier, then Britain should have 
needed to find some way to secure her influence even before the Russian 
squadron ever ‘wintered’ at Port Arthur.  British policy was reactive and 
floundering. 
The Chinese themselves had offered Weihaiwei to the British and they had 
not done so to ensure that Britain would still wield sufficient influence at 
Peking to demand whatever they wanted in the future.  The Yamen had 
anticipated a British demand for ‘compensation’ and hoped to avoid having 
to hand over strategic positions along the Yangtze.  They also hoped that 
tempting Britain north would act as a check on the other Europeans.  In the 
eventual lease the Chinese would retain the right to harbour their ships in 
the Port whenever they needed to, and hoped that the British could be 
convinced to help drill their crews.  They were trying to maintain good 
relations with Britain and even to develop friendlier ones.370  While China 
wished to improve relations with Britain and Japan in response to the hostile 
actions of Russia and Germany, it is clear Britain would retain great 
influence at Peking. 
Curzon went on to stress that the overall effect of the combined Russian 
concessions, those of her Manchuria railways and the possession of Port 
Arthur, would “involve the ultimate domination of Manchuria and Shinking 
by Russia, and place her in ... possession of the most powerful naval port in 
those waters”.  He also believed that if Russia was permitted to become the 
“mistress of the approach to Peking by sea, and of the territorial frontier of 
China by land”, then eventually she could have extended her influence with 
the result of dominating north China, at least as far as the area Salisbury 
and O’Conor envisioned as falling to Russia when they had discussed the 
failed entente.371  In Curzon’s mind, Britain was compelled “to acquire a 
corresponding position” or to accept Russian influence over “the maximum 
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sphere of influence ever hitherto claimed in North China”.  He also stressed 
that the German position in Shantung made for blocking Britain out of the 
north completely.372   
Bertie stressed the effect of German railway building in Shantung, and her 
efforts to block a railway concession, which hoped to connect “Tein-tsin to 
Chin-kiang, on the Yang-tsze River”.  In this way, Germany hoped “to draw 
the trade of Pechili, Shansi, and Shensi to [...] Shantung and to Kiao-chau.”  
Bertie therefore argued that “[a]t Wei-hai-Wei we should face Russia, and 
have some control over the proceedings of the Germans, who are evidently 
bent on monopolising everything in Shantung”.373  While these arguments 
appear cogent, everything would depend upon what Britain would choose to 
do when she did take the port.  As it stood when being discussed, Weihaiwei 
was no counterweight to Port Arthur in naval or military terms and it was 
also no counterweight to Germany, who had already extracted exclusive 
concessions in Shantung.  In most confrontations around the world, 
Salisbury’s policy had been to avoid proximity; he focused on creating 
buffer zones or states between British territories and her imperial rivals.  It 
is a measure of how much the Prime Minister was not in control that a 
decision appears to have revolved around acquiring a territory in as close 
proximity to two imperial rivals as possible.  Curzon also argued that a 
policy designed to check Russia at Port Arthur specifically and in the north 
more generally would not offend her.  He noted how far Weihaiwei was from 
Port Arthur, and that it did “not touch or threaten Manchuria; nor does it in 
any way interfere with legitimate Russian expansion”.374  It should be 
considered that Muravev and Curzon probably had very different ideas 
about what they considered ‘legitimate’ Russian expansion, after all the 
rationale for acquiring the base was to prevent Russian domination of 
Northern China.  Also here it was again argued that the balance of naval 
power could be somehow maintained by the acquisition of a base 
considered to be so far removed from the port, whose power it was hoped it 
would check that the owners of said port would not find it objectionable.  
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With regard to Germany there could be no “legitimate offence”.  Germany 
had risked a permanent souring of Russo-German relations in order to 
acquire Kiaochow and it seemed rather naive to hope they would react 
calmly to suddenly finding they had unexpected British neighbours.  Curzon 
did highlight the likelihood that Weihaiwei could be “a source of irritation” in 
Anglo-German relations, but he hoped that this would “provide us with the 
very means we desire of coming to terms with her, [...] and of compelling 
her to respect Treaty rights in Shantung”375.  How exactly, or which part of, 
Britain’s occupation of the place Curzon thought could be bartered away is 
hard to discern.  The eventual acquisition of Weihaiwei actually reduced 
British freedom of action.  In Anglo-Russian terms, if the conclusion of the 
third indemnity loan allowed Russia to break off talks for a rapprochement, 
the taking of Weihaiwei nailed the concept in its coffin.376  In the German 
direction possession of the port acquired no leverage at all.  Hatzfeldt was 
instructed to demand a British declaration accepting Germany’s domination 
of Shantung, promising that no railways would be constructed by the 
British.  Balfour quibbled but only managed to exempt the proposed line 
from Tientsin[Tianjin] to Hankow[Wuhan].  This cannot be considered to 
have picked up any real influence on how the Germans would use their 
rights in Shantung, if Curzon was hoping that maybe Weihaiwei would 
provide leverage to allow the British some rights to the provinces resources 
and/or any delineation of spheres of influence, then Balfour dashed them 
quickly by giving the Germans what they wanted.377  The taking of 
Weihaiwei would also spell the end of the informal talks Balfour and 
Chamberlain were conducting with Hatzfeldt on the possibility of closer 
Anglo-German relations.378  What the British could do with their new naval 
station and surrounding environs was extremely proscribed, whilst Germany 
could continue to develop the province as they saw fit.  However, 
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ultimately, the Cabinet committee did not decide on 22nd March to acquire 
the port.  Despite Bertie and Curzon both pressing that the issue was 
urgent, the Cabinet relied upon Salisbury’s formula to essentially delay a 
final decision, which, at his suggestion, needed to be put to the whole 
Cabinet.   
While waiting for the Cabinet to assemble Salisbury attempted to convince 
Russia not to lease Port Arthur.  The British Government “would not regard 
with any dissatisfaction the lease by Russia of an ice free commercial 
harbour and its connection by rail with the Siberian Railway now under 
construction”, however, “Port Arthur [...] whose whole importance is 
derived solely from its military strength and strategic position, would 
inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and a 
commencement of the Partition of China.”  The Foreign Secretary reassured 
Russia that the British had no desire to have the place themselves, and that 
if Russia would agree not to take it or any other military port in Pechili, then 
Britain would do the same.  If Russian policy had not been partly driven by 
extreme distrust of Britain this may have been acceptable.  “Maintenance of 
existing Treaty Rights” was Britain’s only interest.379   O’Conor had to reply 
that Muravev did not admit that leasing Port Arthur constituted the 
dismemberment of China or even affected Chinese sovereignty.  He did give 
assurances that “Port Arthur and Talienwan will be opened to commerce 
and ships of war.”380  In the few days between the hesitant Cabinet 
Committee agreeing to Curzon and Bertie’s suggestions, and a meeting of 
the full Cabinet to ratify that decision, Salisbury tried to push once more 
and convince Russia not to hold Port Arthur.  Balfour, acting in his Uncle’s 
place, met with the Russian Ambassador on the 24th March and again tried 
to convince the Russians not to take the military port.381  This brief 
exchange demonstrates that Salisbury and Balfour were both still willing to 
try to find some other way out.  This suggests that the splinters in the 
Cabinet were more complex than simply an anti- Weihaiwei and pro- 
Weihaiwei grouping.  Salisbury was still trying to maintain the territorial 
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status quo.  Curzon believed that the Ministers in the Cabinet Committee on 
22nd “hesitated on strategical[sic] grounds, but were clear on the 
advisability of occupation on political grounds”.  There can be no mistake 
that they thought Weihaiwei would act as any practical check on Russia or 
perhaps even on Germany.  Chamberlain still dissented.382  To his mind, 
Weihaiwei was no safe harbour and it would do nothing to protect British 
trade and influence from being eroded by Russia and Germany combined.  
Russia was still the biggest problem; having demonstrated so many times 
that she could not be trusted.  All of Muravev’s promises about the ports 
remaining open were meaningless because regardless of whether the ports 
did remain open “they[the Russians] will know how to make the position 
intolerable for our[British] merchants.”  Chamberlain was convinced that 
“[t]he Germans appear to have accepted our terms” and was more inclined, 
at this point, to treat the Germans as trustworthy.383  Chamberlain was 
convinced that given fair access Britain could maintain her position as 
controlling China’s trade.  Both Chamberlain and Salisbury were essentially 
on the same page with regards to desired outcomes, they both wished to 
prevent Britain and Russia from taking Weihaiwei and Port Arthur 
respectively.  However, Salisbury was not prepared to run the risk of an 
armed confrontation in order to achieve it.  As Weihaiwei could not provide 
the safety Chamberlain felt was needed, he remained convinced of the need 
to try to find some other mechanism to help safeguard British interests.  
At the Cabinet meeting on 25th March 1898 “the government took their 
courage in both hands and (Joe dissenting) agreed on the Wei-hai-wei 
policy.”384  Balfour’s description is revealing; the Cabinet was clearly still 
reluctant to demand the lease and remained concerned over the outcome.  
MacDonald was ordered to demand the lease and the next day a naval 
demonstration, larger than the Russian Squadron at Port Arthur, was 
ordered up to Pechili in order to strengthen Chinese resolve in the face of 
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presumed Russian pressure not to grant the lease.385  The Chinese agreed 
to the lease on 2nd April, attaching their hopes that Britain would permit 
China to use the port for her new ships, and also agreed to help train their 
crews and promised that further concessions would not be demanded.  
MacDonald offered to present these requests but made it clear that if other 
Powers took more territory, Britain could not promise it would not follow 
suit.  The Chinese were certainly concerned that Port Arthur and the 
subsequent demand for Weihaiwei were indeed the beginning of “an endless 
chain of demands each founded on its predecessor” or in other words, the 
‘scramble’ for China.386   
Informing the other Powers proved an interesting exercise.  Russia was to 
be informed that Britain had grave objections to the occupation of the 
military Port Arthur only.  In this objection Britain also hinted at what was 
to come: 
Her Majesty’s Government regard it as most unfortunate that it 
has been thought necessary in addition to obtain control of a 
port, which, if the rest of the Gulf of Pechili remains in hands 
so helpless as those of the Sovereign Power [China], will 
command the maritime approaches to its capital, and give to 
Russia the same strategic advantage by sea which she already 
possesses in so ample measure by land. 
This missive was coupled with regret that Russia had not heeded Salisbury’s 
last suggestion and that the British Government would thus retain their 
“entire liberty of action to take what steps they think best to protect their 
own interests and to diminish the evil consequences which they 
anticipate.”387  Unsurprisingly Anglo-Russian relations became tense, 
regardless that the Russians had been adequately warned of Britain’s 
attitude.  Muravev went ahead and announced the Russian leases the next 
day and a few days later he gave the British another shock.  His earlier 
reassurances that Talienwan would remain an open port were only 
hypothetical in nature.  This further act of Russian mendacity would not 
have surprised Chamberlain, who, as we have already seen, expected them 
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to find some way to nullify Britain’s treaty rights.  O’Conor was furious that 
he had been “obliged to send home such a history of Chincanery [sic] as is 
disclosed in Mouraveieff’s Notes”, even describing the Russian foreign 
Minister as that “slippery Minister with whom I have to deal daily.”388  
Sanderson at the Foreign Office was more optimistic and hoped “that after 
the first irritation has subsided we shall settle down to fairly friendly terms 
again.”  The experienced Permanent Under-Secretary believed that Russia 
would not allow their anger to push Britain too far, as they feared that such 
action could make an Anglo-Japanese arrangement more likely.389   
Germany was to be informed just before Balfour would announce the lease 
as part of the Commons foreign policy debate on 5 April.  In Lascelles’ 
instructions, Balfour asked him to point out that the lease of Weihaiwei was 
in response to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in an attempt to 
maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Perchili.  He also wished to 
reassure Germany that Britain had no desire to interfere with Shantung: 
“Wei-hai-wei cannot be made a commercial port, and it could never be 
worth while to connect it by Railway with the peninsula.” He even 
volunteered that “[a] formal undertaking on this subject would be given if 
desired”390, given that Curzon’s rationale for demanding the lease was 
partly based on the idea that the port would grant Britain “some control 
over the proceeding of the Germans”.391  Balfour was happy to proactively 
give the Germans an assurance of a free hand in Shantung. This formal 
pledge was given on 20th April.  It has already been stated that this was not 
really compatible with many of the arguments made for acquiring the base, 
however it fell to Balfour, who wanted to cultivate Anglo-German relations, 
to handle the situation and so he was only too happy to appease German 
opinion.392  Otte insists that “British policy during the Far Eastern crisis was 
motivated by the perceived need to counterbalance the arrival of Germany 
in China as well as the gains made by Russia.”393  However, while it was 
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certainly true that the actions of Germany precipitated the crisis and that 
the discussion of acquiring some form of territorial concession predated the 
Russian occupation of Port Arthur, it seems hard ignore that the vital 
memoranda written by Bertie and Curzon focused on Russia.  Their 
language was one of domination and preponderance of influence caused due 
to controlling both a long land frontier and the approaches to Peking by sea.  
Balfour’s easily given assurances that the British would not interfere in 
Shantung nullifies much of the places usefulness in constraining Germany.  
Curzon hoped that these assurances could be bartered in return for the 
respecting of treaty rights in Shantung.  Balfour’s eagerness not to offend 
the Germans cost the British whatever leverage they may have gained from 
taking Weihaiwei.   
The strategic reality of Weihaiwei was not lost on anyone.  The Navy had 
considered it just as viable to blockade Port Arthur from Hong Kong as from 
Weihaiwei, especially as they had the right to use Chinese held ports for 
resupply.394  Eventually the plans to fortify the port were dropped.  It was 
considered of no use in a confrontation with a naval Power and that its 
possession could not stop Russia from pressing down further towards 
Peking.  Curzon admitted that the Cabinet Committee of 22nd March had not 
been convinced for strategic reasons but on “political grounds”.395  Whether 
these political grounds were related to the Far East or the domestic 
situation is harder to discern.  It certainly may have helped prop up British 
influence in Peking, but the Chinese government appeared to have already 
desired to court Britain’s friendship regardless of the lease and would 
certainly have looked to other Europeans to come to their aid when or if 
further Russian and German demands were made.  As for political effects on 
Germany and Russia, it is hard to see any.  Certainly the lease remained a 
superficial reason for a cooling of Anglo-Russian relations, but that was 
certain to happen the moment Russia could not be convinced to give up on 
Port Arthur.  Germany had been worried about the effect of the lease on 
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their plans for Shantung, but Balfour moved quickly and decisively to 
ensure they were reassured in that regard.   
These ‘political grounds’ were more domestic in nature than to do with 
China.  Curzon noted that “I think everyone on our bench (including the 
anti-Wei-hai-Wei party such as Chamberlain & Goschen etc.) realized that 
but for Wei-hai-Wei we would have fared badly”.396  Chamberlain had been 
warning that “grave trouble [was] impending upon the Government” unless 
a “more decided attitude” was adopted since December 1897.397  Press and 
Public Opinion absolutely slammed the Government.  Foreign policy had 
even played a large part in the Government’s by election performances, 
even losing Curzon’s seat when he left for India.398  After having announced 
the lease of Weihaiwei the Government still had rough debates on both 5th 
and 29th April.399  Various anonymous writers had also offered prolonged 
and substantial criticisms of the Government in several periodicals, and H. 
Wilson was happy to be on record in the National Review, calling the 
Government “Frontbench Invertebrates”.400  As a By-election for a safe Tory 
seat got underway the Liberal candidate would substantially reduce the 
Unionist majority by focusing on foreign affairs: “could they find a spot in 
the habitable globe where we had not some foreign difficulty which had 
grown since Lord Salisbury taken command of the Foreign Office?” The 
same issue of The Times also carried news of the formal Russian demand 
for the lease of Port Arthur and extensive coverage of concerns about 
French manoeuvres in Southern China.401  .  While all this concern was 
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boiling in the public’s mind, and aiding the opposition by handing them a 
patriotic stick with which to beat the government, Salisbury continued to 
pursue a policy which only safeguarded the first refusal of Weihaiwei, or 
more succinctly to do very little indeed.  Otte suggests that even the 
lethargic Devonshire started to worry that “Salisbury's cautious foreign 
policy was bound to attract adverse criticism; and that in consequence the 
administration was in danger of appearing to be out of step with public 
opinion.”402  Salisbury’s preference was that public opinion should leave 
foreign policy entirely in his own aristocratic hands, agreeing with 
Chamberlain back in December that “[p]ublic opinion is a very bad guide” 
and thought “that ‘the public’ will require some territorial or cartographic 
consolation in China.”403  Salisbury was not entirely blind to the importance 
of acknowledging the desires of the electorate but he was certainly 
disdainful of them, his instinct was to respond to issues in a manner that he 
thought did the least damage to his own policy preferences.  In the case of 
Weihaiwei even the Conservative press started to think that the 
Government’s “idea now was hurriedly to do something which may enable it 
to face the House of Commons”.404  To the Cabinet’s mind the acquisition of 
the North China naval station was almost entirely upon ‘political grounds’.  
While some influence at Peking may have been preserved by this action, in 
reality domestic public, electoral and parliamentary pressures had won out.  
Salisbury had relinquished in giving the British people the “cartographic 
consolation” he always believed they would require but had done all he 
could to have avoided doing so.  The acquisition of Weihaiwei represented 
doing the least possible.  While it did not materially alter the strategic 
reality of what was taking place in the Far East, it did give the government 
a defence before the country.  Therefore, Salisbury preferred it as both the 
least unfavourable and least substantive option; a mask for doing nothing 
at all.  
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In fact what took place cannot be considered Salisbury’s policy; his illness 
had prevented him from being able to control his department, the Cabinet 
or forcibly put his own ideas forward.  The Cabinet choose to go ahead 
despite being unconvinced of the strategic merits of the acquisition, what 
they did know was that they needed something to present to the public and 
parliament.  As even the somewhat irritated German Emperor noted to 
Lascelles “Wei-hai-Wei would, he thought, be a useless expense, and 
indicated a departure from that practical common sense with which 
Englishmen were usually credited.” 405  
Chamberlain is often accused of being too sensitive to public opinion but in 
this sense there was a difference.  He clearly did not believe that the Public 
held the answers, but he did believe that they should be heeded, and that 
continuing to pursue policies that were unpopular would eventually become 
untenable in an increasingly democratic polity.  To Salisbury this heralded 
the end of sound foreign policy whereas to Chamberlain this presented an 
opportunity to educate and lead public opinion in order to secure control 
over foreign policy.  If the public was worried, Chamberlain believed this 
could and should have been addressed proactively, not merely responded 
to.  While he did not think the public held the answers, he did think their 
fears were justified and needed responding to rather than being waved 
away as the unfounded concerns of the poorly educated and poorly washed.  
This he had already started to do with regards to his own field.  The Times 
on 21st Jan also covered a speech by Campbell-Bannerman to his 
constituents.  In it “[h]e agreed” with Chamberlain “that there were 
sacrifices which could not be made even for so good a purpose as 
maintaining a good understating with Europe. [...] [His constituents] were 
all glad to hear” Chamberlain admit ”that we must contemplate [...] a time 
arising when it would no longer be possible for us to avoid isolated action 
with regard to the East.”406  And in the opinion of one independently minded 
Liberal, Chamberlain’s strong line in West Africa had already captured a 
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“good section of the press”.407  Chamberlain had shown that France would 
back down in response to an aggressive defensive of British interests.408  He 
was in affect giving lead to some sections of public opinion rather than 
being led by it or trying to ignore it.  To his mind, the logical way forward 
was an alliance with Germany.  It was Britain’s isolation that ensured she 
could not risk standing up to one of the other Powers, as this would almost 
certainly run the risk of activating their alliances.  To his, and to Goschen’s 
mind, Germany had little or no current conflicts of interest with Britain.  
Whereas the Anglo-French relationship would always have Egypt and 
traditional colonial rivalries to irritate it, and the Anglo-Russian relationship 
was mired in mutual distrust, while Russia also appeared to threaten 
Britain’s vital interests, meant that the German relationship gave the 
impression that it could be easily improved.  On 26th March, as the Far East 
Squadron prepared to assemble in the Gulf of Pechili demonstrating that 
they could indeed concentrate naval power exactly where it would be 
needed in the event of a conflict with Russia, at short notice and without a 
north Chinese naval station, Salisbury would also leave the country for his 
‘second’ home in France to recuperate from his illness.  This would give all 
those in Cabinet, who had lost faith in his foreign policy, an opportunity to 
explore their own ideas. 
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4: He who dares: Chamberlain and Alliance talks. 
 
Regardless of whether “everyone on our bench (including the anti-Wei-hai-
Wei party such as Chamberlain & Goschen etc.) realized that but for Wei-
hai-Wei we would have fared badly” in Parliament, Chamberlain was far 
from content with the outcome of the Far Eastern Crisis.409  Britain had been 
forced to abandon her policy of maintaining the integrity of China, had failed 
to keep the whole of the Chinese market open and had gained an expensive 
and unnecessary naval station.  He was not alone in his disappointment.  
Popular opinion, voiced in various journals, often noticed the exact same 
points.  Britain’s policy of upholding China’s integrity and maintaining the 
‘open door’ had failed.  She had gained a naval station for the purposes of 
“C’est pour amuser les badauds[for the amusement of the onlookers]” and 
that she should have foreseen the problem arising and acted more 
strenuously to prevent it.  This criticism was not confined merely to the 
handling of the Far East indeed many of Chamberlain’s private criticisms 
and frustrations with Salisbury’s policy were shared by many of these 
writers.  From Siam, to West Africa, to China, to Madagascar the arguments 
were made that ‘graceful concessions’ had followed ‘graceful concessions’ 
and that the results, taken cumulatively added up: “Great Britain, the very 
essence of whose existence is foreign commerce, is being gradually ousted 
out of the neutral markets of the world”.410  The criticism also implied 
further problems, Britain should not expect Russia and France to leave their 
new territories open to free trade, free trade, it was argued, was not a 
matter of moral right and wrong it was a policy which Britain only adhered 
to because it suited her interests.  What the British really needed was a 
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government as prepared to deploy the resources of the state in a manner to 
defend and support the activities of her merchants, industrialists and 
capitalists, as it was perceived her rivals.411 
Britain was struggling with a geo-political world which was not ready to 
stand still.  Much of her trade was conducted in parts of the world which 
had never fallen under the British flag.  Such was the case in China, South 
America and even in Africa, despite several treaties implying formal rule.  
The benefits of this informal empire were at risk as other Powers became 
able to compete.  Germany and the US were quite capable of competing for 
that trade but Britain still retained a huge advantage due to her network of 
naval stations and the protection the Royal Navy could afford to her 
merchants.  France and Russia could not compete so well in the open 
market.  Therefore they needed to bring such areas under their control and 
use imposed mechanisms to keep out foreign competition.  In other words, 
France and Russia were inescapably expansionist and protectionist powers.  
It is not hard to see why.  Their alliance was based on the shocking 
realisation of how powerful the German threat had come.  If Prussia had 
managed to win a difficult victory over France in 1871, it was clear that she 
could win a crushing one later as Imperial Germany.  Russian resources and 
manpower should enable her to compete with Germany, but she required 
time to industrialise, build a fully working rail network and reform internally 
to better exploit those resources.  She also needed a supply of ready capital 
to fund these reforms, as she also recognised that the Triple Alliance posed 
a serious threat, should the Eastern question finally explode, an Alliance 
with France and thus access to French capital could have answered both 
situations.412  Their alliance was born out of fear of the German menace and 
the hope that with each other’s support they could remedy their short 
comings through expansion.  Germany was well embarked upon her 
weltpolitik and so, unlike the British, she would not be content to share 
informal control and domination despite her industry being quite capable of 
competing and so delivering such a result.  The US had also decided that 
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she would expand, though not in areas which would directly threaten the 
British.  All the Great Powers, bar Britain, wanted to grow, which meant 
coming into conflict with Britain’s empire, formal or otherwise.  
Chamberlain’s and the presses urgings that Britain should expand were in 
essence a demand to bring under formal rule, areas which were informally 
under British domination, thus safe guarding them. 
There were really very few options which Britain could pursue.  One would 
be to simply acquiesce in these gains while trying to mitigate them, working 
hand to mouth reactively, but essentially to admit that Britain would not 
remain the sole global Power or the workshop of the world.  This did not 
mean that there could be no aggrandisement of territory but it did mean a 
reactive approach to foreign and imperial policy.  It also meant being 
prepared to grant ‘graceful concessions’ where conflicts arose over British 
Interests which were not deemed vital.  This was Salisbury’s policy of 
choice.  The second option would be to improve Britain’s ability to compete 
and thus also expand to protect her trade interests.  No concession could 
afford to be granted without an appropriate quid pro quo because even if 
they were not of vital importance the whittling away of such interests would 
amount to being vital eventually and would encourage ever more demands 
from the hungry Powers.  This would require a preparedness to raise extra 
funds to increase the military services as well as to develop stronger links 
with the Empire.  It would also require a preparedness to confront Imperial 
Rivals not in order to enlarge the Empire for its own sake but so as to bring 
markets under the British umbrella, defensively, to prevent them falling 
behind a tariff barrier.  This was Chamberlain’s policy of choice.413  The 
Colonial Secretary was aware that his plans for colonial development and 
support for a more aggressive foreign policy were likely to be continuously 
blocked by either the Treasury or the Cabinet.  Regardless of possessing the 
most powerful navy in the world, the British Cabinet had been repeatedly 
warned of the dangers of trying to use it.  The Straights, held by a 
supposedly crumbling power, could not be forced without a combined arms 
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operation beyond Britain’s capability.  This led to a second major deficiency, 
the British Army was proving impervious to reform, and yet remained 
unable to defend the Empire against either alliance block.  No professional 
advice was ever presented to Cabinet which suggested Britain was prepared 
for an actual confrontation with a first rate Power, especially if there were 
allies involved.  Under these conditions Chamberlain became aware that the 
only hope of bolstering Britain’s position would be some form of alliance in 
order to buy time while the Empire was reorganised into a tighter more 
efficient competitive entity.   
Chamberlain attempted to mix both these approaches.  The difference 
between his conception of ‘graceful concessions’ and Salisbury’s was that 
where the later was prepared to grant one, in order to avoid a war ‘over 
trifles’, the former would only permit an exchange of like claims.  The only 
time Chamberlain appeared willing to offer serious concessions, which were 
not to his mind perfectly balanced, was when he was attempting to find that 
elusive ‘general’ settlement with either France or Germany.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter One Chamberlain was quite prepared to offer 
concessions in West Africa if the deal could be widened to take in other 
trouble spots with the French.  Hanotaux was disinclined to be drawn into a 
final settlement.414  Likewise, as we shall see later, he offered a generous 
deal in settlement of the Samoa question with Germany, trying to tie most 
of their current colonial difficulties up.415  Deals of this kind were not likely 
to get very far until both contracting Powers felt they had more to gain by 
compromise than by confrontation.  While France, Germany and indeed 
Russia believed they would be in a position in the future to demand more, it 
was unlikely that they would settle until a common threat could be 
identified.   
Chamberlain had decided that Britain could no longer afford her position of 
isolation.  This should already be apparent from following the evidence to 
this point.  Chamberlain had always believed in the benefits of working 
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more closely with the US.  He had hoped a joint Naval Demonstration would 
impress the Sultan.  This was despite the Venezuelan dispute straining 
relations.416  In China he had suggested working with both Germany and 
the US to oppose exclusive rights, and to keep the ‘open door’, at least 
somewhat open.417  He had also held out an opinion that maybe Salisbury 
should consider whether Britain should not “draw closer to Japan”.418  In 
fact, Chamberlain had even told the Russian ambassador that he believed 
the best solution would be an entente with Russia and “par ricochet” with 
France too.419  While this appears to be disingenuous it should be noted that 
the Colonial Secretary would have welcomed a general settlement.  Back 
during the Armenian crisis, he had been clear that “if it was possible to 
come to some arrangement with Russia the course would be easy.”420  
Chamberlain was not always opposed to working with Russia however, it 
should be remembered that his comments to Staal were made before the 
arrival in Britain of the news that the Russians had sent their fleet to Port 
Arthur.421  Chamberlain’s distrust of Russia grew rapidly after that 
occupation and during the subsequent negotiations.  Even as the Cabinet 
edged closer to the decision to take Weihaiwei, the Colonial Secretary 
remained convinced that doing so would not add an iota of strength to the 
British position or prevent Russia from pushing on further.  While he may 
have admitted the occupations usefulness, from a propaganda point of 
view, he still felt that British interests in China were under threat and that 
Britain’s ability to protect them was still insufficient.   
Both Langer and Nish reference the memoirs of Kato Takaaki, the Japanese 
ambassador to Britain.  They claim Kato had a meal with Chamberlain on 
17th March 1898.422  This date is vital.  This was between the Cabinet 
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meeting of 14th and the Cabinet Committee meeting on 22nd.  The exact 
moment when Curzon and Bertie were preparing their memorandums on 
the Far Eastern Crisis and an unwell Salisbury had prepared his note.  
Chamberlain started the conversation by pointing out the danger of 
continued southward penetration by Russia and then discussed Weihaiwei; 
Britain would support the Japanese if they wished to stay on but if not 
would they mind Britain taking the port?  He then went on to ask, bluntly, 
what Japan proposed to do about the Russian occupation of Port Arthur.  
Kato replied that he did not know, but pointed out the danger presented to 
British trade that would result from the loss of political influence at Peking.  
The Japanese ambassador asked Chamberlain how far Britain would go to 
defend China’s integrity.  Chamberlain knew that he stood little chance of 
convincing the Cabinet to stand up to Russia at least not without a strong 
ally.  He replied truthfully that the British lacked the military force to oppose 
Russia in Manchuria; this broadened the discussion to further afield than the 
immediate Port Arthur crisis.  While Chamberlain had been candid about the 
need to oppose Russia’s penetration of China in general, and the difficulties 
involved given Britain’s position as a naval Power, Kato pushed him back on 
to more short term aims; Port Arthur was a Naval Base, Britain could apply 
force there.  Chamberlain stuck to the Cabinet position, with or without Port 
Arthur, they believed Russia was going to be able to apply enormous 
pressure on account of their congruous boundary; a purely naval action 
would not prevent their ultimate aim.423  The Colonial Secretary was looking 
to solve the main issue, not find some temporary solution.  He asked 
whether the two countries could not act together as Japan must desire 
Chinese integrity as well.  Kato replied in kind, suggesting that maybe the 
Japanese were waiting on the British.  Chamberlain again suggested that 
the Japanese should approach the British and assured Kato that such 
proposals would be welcome.424  The importance of the timing of this 
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conversation has already been noted.  The Cabinet were slowly moving 
toward their unhappy consolation policy of taking Weihaiwei.  There were 
plenty of members unconvinced of the wisdom of such a move.  In reality it 
was only acted upon as there was a lack of any other options save a 
confrontation with the Dual Alliance.  Had any proposals arrived from Japan 
they could have had serious implications for what remained an uneasy 
decision for the Cabinet.  There are no English documents supporting this 
account of their talks, except the brief mention of it in Hayashi’s memoires, 
however, Kato not only sent news of this conversation back to Japan, he 
also followed it up with a lengthy memoranda of his own.  In that he urged 
his government not to miss this opportunity and pressed his case for an 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.  When this was refused, he resigned his position in 
protest, although he was convinced to stay in post for awhile longer.425  The 
story of this affair is entirely in step with Chamberlain’s character, the brash 
blunt approach to diplomacy and even the growing habit of meeting 
diplomats for dinner.  It also seems unlikely that Kato would have 
threatened resignation if his suggestions had been based on a fabricated 
meeting.  His report of the conversation too closely matches what we know 
Chamberlain thought of this situation from other sources.  Chamberlain was 
also aware he was losing the argument in the Cabinet and while he could 
not induce Salisbury to approach the Japanese, or anyone else, an approach 
from Japan could have changed the trajectory the Cabinet deliberations 
were headed in. 
This was not the only iron Chamberlain would be involved with placing in 
the fire.  Chamberlain’s famous alliance talks were also about to take place.  
Having now laid out the lengths to which he and the Cabinet had already 
gone, in order to find some other solution to the China problem, it should be 
no surprise that having failed to convince the Cabinet to face up to Russia 
alone, or to convince the Americans to join in, or even the Japanese to 
make proposals, that he would turn to the last Power left with an interest in 
China; Germany.  The dates and details of these talks have been examined 
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frequently but it is necessary to attempt to pick over them again.  The exact 
origins of who suggested what to whom look likely to never be thoroughly 
resolved.  The only source to offer an opinion on this is Eckardstein’s own, 
untrustworthy memoirs.  Hermann Baron von Eckardstein was First 
Secretary at the German embassy to Britain.  His ‘role’ or ability to take 
part in these affairs does not stand solely on his official position amongst 
Germany’s diplomatic Corps.  He derived some additional access and thus 
influence, through his position in London society.426  His is the only source 
which discusses the origins of, what is often inaccurately referred to as, the 
Chamberlain-Hatzfeldt talks.  Eckardstein claims responsibility for the talks.  
His account suggests it was at a society dinner, attended by himself, 
Devonshire, Chaplin and Chamberlain.  Eckardstein gives some time in 
February for the meeting, but the context of discussions would suggest that 
a later date is more likely.427  It is unfortunate that the exact date cannot be 
established.  It is entirely possible that these three Cabinet Ministers, two 
very senior, one very minor, may have met Eckardstein sometime in 
February, where he first suggested that Germany and Britain should work 
more closely in China.  Otte claims that “[t]he initiative clearly came from 
Chamberlain and his clique.”428  Considering that clique contained senior 
Cabinet ministers, and German officials it is stretching the evidence to place 
responsibility solely with Chamberlain.  Later Eckardstein would outright lie 
to both the British and the Germans in order to try to bring about an 
alliance; it is more than possible that he was the prime or initial instigator 
and that his efforts started earlier.  Anglo-German relations also had the 
appearances of being warmer already.  Langer sums the position up this 
way; “England’s acceptance of the German occupation of Kiaochow was a 
striking contrast to the desperate opposition of Muraviev.  It helped to instil 
some cordiality in the relations of the two countries and at the same time 
served to make the German Emperor realize the futility of the continental 
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league.”429  They had also already co-operated unofficially in China, as it 
was an Anglo-German consortium (HSBC-DAB) which had managed to 
attract the lion’s share of China’s indemnity loans.  Otte believes this gave 
the appearance that “Germany had ranged herself alongside Britain in 
Chinese affairs”.430  While the taking of Kiaochow was only barely 
acceptable to the British, it did not auger the total domination of the 
Chinese Government, as did Port Arthur, and the Germans appeared happy 
to keep the port open to foreign trade.  The dinner in question was not 
uncommon in society; it is entirely possible that the Duchess or Rothschild, 
both of whom were inclined to see Anglo-German relations draw closer, 
brought this group of people together often.  Eckardstein could have first 
mentioned his suggestion in February while the British did not take it up 
until the situation was more acute in March.  It is therefore impossible to 
know exactly when Rothschild was asked to invite Hatzfeldt to breakfast for 
the 26th March. 
Hatzfeldt expected both Balfour and Chamberlain were to be present.431  As 
also only telegraphed for instructions on 24th this suggested that the 
breakfast had been arranged quickly upon the news that the Russians did 
not intend to leave Port Arthur.432  His instructions did not, in fact, arrive 
before his meeting with Balfour.  However, this first meeting actually took 
place on 25th March.  Balfour explained to Hatzfeldt that he was unable to 
meet him the next day and asked if he could met him that morning again at 
Rothschild’s.433  In his own account of these proceedings, in which Balfour 
puts his spin on them for Salisbury’s benefit, he suggested that there had 
been no other arrangement and that he had always planned on meeting 
Hatzfeldt alone.434  Having already accepted, in principal, the taking of 
Weihaiwei on 22nd, Balfour could have been merely concerned with how 
Germany would respond but there was no hint in his account or in 
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Hatzfeldt’s to suggest something of that sort took place.  Their conversation 
appeared to have been very general and there was no urgent reason to 
have a general conversation on 25th unless it would pertain to immediately 
subsequent events.   The Cabinet meeting later that evening was one 
possibility, but so was Salisbury’s departure for France, scheduled for 26th, 
but postponed due to the weather.  Balfour did visit Salisbury after meeting 
with Hatzfeldt and before the Cabinet meeting. 435  The 25th March was 
clearly a busy day for the acting Foreign Secretary.  Given that Balfour was 
unlikely to attempt anything dramatic in terms of diplomacy it is perhaps 
only due to Salisbury’s impending departure that the first meeting was 
moved forward; this would provide cover against the implication that the 
talks had waited on Salisbury’s absence.  Despite this Balfour’s letter of 14th 
April, informing Salisbury of what had taken place is disingenuous in the 
very least.  Balfour claimed that the origin of the ‘talks’ lay with “ a very 
motely ‘cast’” made up of Chaplin, Rothschild, Eckardstein, Chamberlain and 
Hatzfeldt.  He neglected to include Devonshire in the list.  Unable to extract 
his own involvement entirely he started weaving a tale that he expected 
“Uncle Robert” could happily choose to believe. 
The Drama opened by a suggestion much good might be done 
if there was a friendly, private, and quite unofficial 
conversation between Hatzfeldt and myself on strictly neutral 
territory. It was at a moment when things were approaching 
their hottest in connection with Prt. Arthur: & as I thought 
some good and no harm could come of it I accepted. 
This misrepresents events quite considerably.  There is no mention of 
Balfour’s rescheduling of the meeting or that it had been understood that 
others would also initially be present.  Balfour’s hurried rescheduling implied 
that he believed the meeting was urgent, but he reported his involvement in 
only the most ambivalent terms possible.  The mention that it took place, 
“[t]he day on which, at the afternoon cabinet the govt. [...] agreed on the 
Wei-Hai-Wei policy” also reinforces the already created impression that it 
was in the Chinese theatre that Balfour hoped “some good and no harm 
could come”.  Balfour’s aims and hopes are hard to discern but were almost 
certainly, like his Uncle’s hopes with Russia, much further ranging than 
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China.  It is possible that the Port Arthur/Weihaiwei Crisis was being used 
as cover for something with larger implications.  In 1902 at the signing of 
the Japanese alliance Balfour protested that the geographical range of 
operation was too small, he wanted a wider agreement, not one which 
simply enabled Britain to remain aloof from the European alliance blocs.436  
Whatever else was going on Balfour did not want Salisbury to suspect that 
he was among the provocateurs.437   
Balfour discussed very little of substance with Hatzfeldt.  In his own account 
“there was an infinity of talk, out of the nebulous friendliness of which I 
really gathered very little.”  Apparently the Germans disliked Chamberlain’s 
attitudes over Africa, presumably the way in which he would refuse to hand 
over concessions to Germany without a quid pro quo, and that Britain had 
protested the granting of exclusive railway rights in Shantung.  According to 
Balfour he offered no thoughts on these issues.  Hatzfeldt’s account differs 
only slightly but importantly.  Balfour commented that there were no 
conflicting interests between Germany and Britain and so hoped that a 
clearer understanding and rapprochement would be possible.  Hatzfeldt 
then underlined what had previously caused the problems; Chamberlain’s 
attitude in colonial matters, Britain’s protest at Germany’s concessions in 
Shantung and remarkably even Britain’s attitudes over Armenia which 
ignored that the Kaiser had pushed for unilateral British action.  Balfour 
countered each; public opinion drove the Armenian policy, yes no British 
interest was at stake in Shantung but then why did Germany protest about 
a proposed Railway to the Yangtze River as her interests were not involved 
and finally that he would talk to Chamberlain about being more 
accommodating.  Hatzfeldt summed up the meeting as limited; a general 
discussion of a desire for better relations with no formulas on how to 
proceed in China or elsewhere.  The German ambassador agreed better 
relations were desirable but thought that no serious proposals were in 
prospect.  He was left with the impression that Balfour wished to have 
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another meeting soon.438  Balfour’s involvement was essential; Hatzfeldt 
would never have discussed these matters with Chamberlain alone “because 
Salisbury and I[Hatzfeldt] had agreed—this being a precondition of our 
confidential relations—that I would establish contact on business matters 
with other ministers in special cases only and with his express approval”.439  
Balfour, with his position as acting Foreign Secretary but more importantly 
with his close familial ties to the Prime Minister, ended up representing 
Salisbury and implied his approval.  This, the timing of that first meeting on  
25th, as well as Garvin’s spin helped convinced Langer that Salisbury and the 
whole Cabinet were aware of the talks.440  Given what would follow in 
Cabinet simultaneously with the talks it seems highly likely that they were 
kept informed of the talks and their progress. However, Salisbury was 
almost certainly kept out of the loop until Balfour’s misdirection of April 14th.  
Hatzfeldt met Chamberlain on 29th again resulting in two differing accounts 
of the conversation. 441  In Chamberlain’s account Hatzfeldt requested the 
meeting and opened with a discussion on colonial matters.  This was hardly 
surprising; Hatzfeldt had attempted to leave Balfour with the impression 
that colonial obstinacy was a hindrance to better relations and this was in 
keeping with his instructions from home.  Bülow had essentially instructed 
Hatzfeldt to encourage the British to take regard for Germany’s junior 
partners in the Triple Alliance.  As Otte points out this amounted to inviting 
the British to make proposals beyond a simple colonial arrangement.442  
Chamberlain described the discussion of the colonial issues as “in the nature 
of a skirmish, and Count Hatzfeldt did not press the subject.”  Hatzfeldt had 
been instructed to try to bring the British to aid Italy in East Africa; this 
would naturally have widened the discussion into realms “where in the 
course of questions and answers [...] suggestions were evolved.”  These 
questions and answers revolved around Chamberlain’s analysis of not only 
Anglo-German relations but Britain’s strained geopolitical position.  In 
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Chamberlain’s account it is Hatzfeldt who replied “Certainly not. Before long 
it must be changed” when asked about British isolation.  Bülow’s long term 
plan, of holding the naval balance of power so as to extract maximum 
concessions from the British when the inevitable Anglo-Russian war arrived, 
was certainly based upon making Britain pay to exit isolation.  German 
policy was based on the assumption that Britain could not maintain forever 
her independence from the European blocs.  Hatzfeldt followed his 
instructions to draw the British into making proposals beyond a colonial 
agreement.  He did not have to try hard as this was both Chamberlain’s 
intention and his usual methodology; that is to close with the heart of the 
matter in a direct businesslike manner.  Chamberlain’s account claimed that 
in this to and fro the sketch of a mutual defense pact was outlined.  A 
defensive treaty or arrangement, ratified by parliament, to run for a number 
of years, “based upon a mutual understanding as to policy in China and 
elsewhere.”443  Hatzfeldt’s account differs only slightly; his was longer and 
suggested that much more was discussed touching on France and West 
Africa, and Japan in the Far East, all of which had little to do with 
Germany’s Triple Alliance partners.  He was clearly following his instructions 
to tease out proposals while also reminding Chamberlain of “England’s habit 
of exploiting her friends”.444  He also claimed that Chamberlain had 
suggested joining the Triple Alliance and that if the larger question could be 
settled it would be easy to settle colonial differences more generously.  It is 
clear that Chamberlain had a direct agreement with Germany alone in mind.  
As Hatzfeldt’s opening paragraph explained these proposals were not only 
motivated by the critical situation in China but also by the possibility of 
serious complications with France.  The rasion d’etre of the agreement, as 
conceptualised by Chamberlain, was based firmly outside Europe, although 
not exclusively on China.  It was therefore highly unlikely that he believed 
adherence to the Triple Alliance was the most advantageous option, he was 
hoping for a different constellations of Powers.  Bismarck may have thrived 
at the centre of a spider’s web of treaties and agreements, but Bülow would 
not; Hatzfeldt ‘converted’ Chamberlain’s suggestions into adherence to the 
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Triple Alliance.  How joining a bloc, the existence of which was based upon 
mutual European interests could be considered based upon a “mutual 
understanding” of interests outside of Europe is a mystery.  The 
Ambassador finished up by claiming that Chamberlain felt that there was no 
time to lose and that the whole thing needed to be decided in the next few 
days.445  Chamberlain had laid out his hopes with a directness which one 
would expect from a successful marketing director.  This was not the slow, 
deliberate, careful but also timid approach that diplomacy normally took.  
Chamberlain knew what he wanted and asked what it would cost, making it 
clear that he would be as accommodating in the colonial sphere as he could 
be.  Hatzfeldt, who had been tasked to see how serious the British were and 
to tease out details of a more limited agreement, must have been perplexed 
with the candour.  Even if the Germans had been prepared to negotiate for 
a mutual defence pact in good faith this would not have been the manner in 
which Hatzfeldt would have felt comfortable in doing so. 
Hatzfeldt met Balfour again later that afternoon and mentioned nothing of 
the morning’s discussions with Chamberlain.  While this “rather amused” 
Balfour it should not be surprising.  By his own admission the nature of the 
two meetings were entirely different; “Hatzfeldt who had thus spent the 
morning unofficially with Joe[Chamberlain] came to see me[Balfour] 
officially in the afternoon.”446  Therefore if Hatzfeldt was attempting to run 
his own ideas, as Grenville believed, then he was still not prepared to 
exceed his instructions in a formal setting.  He could not have discussed 
Chamberlain’s alliance proposals, which he had agreed to keep in strict 
confidence, at the Foreign Office, in an official meeting with the acting 
Foreign Secretary, without any instructions to do so; if the Ambassador had 
he would be in very serious danger of ending his career.  If he wished to 
pursue his own agenda then he would need to bring the Auswärtige Amt 
along with him at least some way before he could discuss it in anything like 
an official setting.  While Balfour’s approval for the meeting with 
Chamberlain was essential, Hatzfeldt did not assume that Chamberlain’s 
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ideas were widely shared by the Cabinet or Balfour.  Therefore, he kept 
quiet in the meeting with Balfour and hoped that by converting 
Chamberlain’s nebulous ideas into a request to join the Triple Alliance, he 
could tug the Auswärtige Amt and Bülow along the path to closer Anglo-
British relations.  In his second meeting with Chamberlain, Hatzfeldt had 
asked whether the Colonial Secretary thought his Cabinet colleagues shared 
his opinions “as he had seen rumours that we sometimes differed.”  By 
leaving the initiative on Balfour to mention anything of Chamberlain’s 
‘alliance’ proposals Hatzfeldt was testing whether support for the idea 
extended to the acting Foreign Secretary.  He was able to do so, without 
causing Chamberlain to doubt his interest in the idea by reporting “that he 
had not mentioned the fact of our previous interview to Mr. Balfour, as he 
did not know whether I[Chamberlain] considered it as entirely between 
ourselves.”  Chamberlain made it clear that what he said was not binding on 
the government, but that he had “reported the substance” to Balfour and 
the Committee of Defence. 447 
The second Chamberlain-Hatzfeldt talk took place on 1st April.  This was 
around the same time that Goschen, Devonshire and Chaplin, upon 
receiving disturbing news about Weihaiwei’s suitability as a naval base, had 
moved to either redirect the demands ordered of China, or recall the fleet 
completely.  Balfour explained that the distance made it impossible to 
reverse the orders.  He did offer Devonshire the option of an emergency 
meeting which also offered him responsibility for any change of policy; the 
Duke declined being unready to openly break with Salisbury, even in his 
absence.  Eckardstein, via Chaplin, had also given Balfour and almost 
certainly the Cabinet the impression that an alliance had been agreed in 
principal.448  While the chance of rescinding the Weihaiwei solution and 
replacing it with an Anglo-German alliance/China agreement had receded, in 
part thanks to Balfour’s timidity as much as the state of late Victorian 
telecommunications, Chamberlain must have been buoyed up by 
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Eckardstein’s ‘misrepresentation’ and subsequently had high hopes when he 
went into the second meeting.   
In accordance with his instructions, Hatzfeldt brought up the parliamentary 
problem.  While in reality the Germans were happy enough to trust 
diplomatic agreement with Britain, as testified by the various treaties signed 
over the course of the 1890s, the continued adherence to this excuse is 
telling.  Bülow was emphatic in his instructions; any alliance would be 
vulnerable to a parliamentary vote effectively opening a door for Britain to 
back out in any “psychological moment”.  He went on, there “is hardly a 
German statesman, how great may be his sympathy for England, and how 
much he may be convinced that the continued existence of England’s power 
is necessary” who would want “to take responsibility for the consequences” 
that may arise from an Anglo-German Alliance.449  If Bülow believed this 
then an Anglo-German alliance was impossible on any terms.  If German 
planners could have escaped from their preconceptions about the reliability 
of the British then very many eventualities could have been different.  The 
Kaiser’s shock at the news that Britain declared war in 1914 could only have 
been because he fully expected that Britain would ‘use the back door’ to exit 
her responsibilities to Belgium.  While Bülow’s comments on the wisdom of 
relying on an agreement based on a parliamentary system appear cogent 
enough, initiating a military strategy in part based upon the assumption of 
Albion’s perfidy must be considered equally irresponsible.450   
Bülow’s thinking continued on, and so in the meeting did Hatzfeldt, 
Germany could not have allowed Britain to be overcome, as then the 
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Franco-Russian alliance would then “focus on the revision of the Treaty of 
Frankfurt.” “Therefore, in no case would they[Germany] join a combination 
against us[Britain]. Treaty or no Treaty, the worst we had to anticipate from 
them was that they would remain neutral.”451  Hatzfeldt continued 
suggesting that perhaps Britain should come to some agreement with 
Russia in China and then settle her African differences with France in armed 
conflict.  Bülow was certain that Britain would win such a conflict.  German 
neutrality alone would guarantee that the French army would need to 
remain in France at the German/Italian border.  Chamberlain believed that 
the British would be able to deal with the French but he saw through 
Bülow’s attempts to push the world’s two strongest navies to war.  To his 
mind it was the Russians who were pushing dangerously upon what were 
vital interests, and the Russians who had demonstrated they were 
untrustworthy.  Chamberlain asked if such a war would destroy the Dual 
Alliance, Hatzfeldt believed not, France would “accept the crumbs from the 
Russian table”.  Chamberlain therefore pressed on, only a “clear 
understanding with Germany and a joint policy” would permit “a much 
stronger attitude [...] and [...] lay down the bases of a settlement in China 
which neither France nor Russia would be likely to resist.”452   
Chamberlain had just been offered the very war Salisbury could not decide 
was “part of Chamberlain’s objects or not.”  From France the Prime Minister 
went on: “The indications differ from month to month, as to France’s future 
conduct their elections will tell us a little more. But France certainly acts as 
if she meant to drive us into a German alliance”.453  This reference to being 
driven towards Germany indicates that Britain was not prepared to attempt 
to settle her differences in unilateral military action.  The British Cabinet 
would never have felt secure enough with only German neutrality holding 
the ring for Britain and France to go at it alone.  That course would have 
been riddled with danger.  Chamberlain’s offer then to come to some 
agreement with Germany over the defence of primarily Chinese interests 
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was an attempt to protect these interests without endangering global peace.  
What the Colonial Secretary offered was substantial; Germany would have 
Shantung and its hinterland, along with her rights there, she should have 
tax powers to fund a Chinese army under German officers, the British would 
do the same in the Yangtze region.  This was to offer the Russians 
recognition of their current gains, but to prevent their further penetration.  
Germany was concerned about the future in China, Chamberlain noted that 
Hatzfeldt commented that the Chinese capital should move further south.  
In his earlier meeting with Balfour it had been suggested that Germany and 
Britain could come to a formal understanding based on areas of railway 
interest in China.454  Any formal agreement concerned with where the 
respective parties could build what, would have been an informal or implied 
recognition of spheres of influence, or could certainly have become the 
basis of such an understanding.  These suggestions made by Chamberlain 
built upon the outlines of Balfour’s much more limited offer.  The two men 
were clearly sharing information and probably working together.455  Balfour 
offered the start of what he hoped would be a process of drawing the two 
nations together; Chamberlain offered a short cut as well as a glimpse at 
the final destination.  The similarities and timing of changes in direction up 
until this point strongly suggest that the two men were working together.   
Chamberlain clarified that what he hoped to achieve was defensive in 
nature, to prevent further Russian gains.  Judging by the space this was 
given in Hatzfeldt’s report this change was of great significance.456  This also 
suggests that Chamberlain was reacting with speed to any changes in the 
situation; as the Cabinet failed to recall the fleet from demanding 
Weihaiwei, so the aims of an arrangement changed from forcing Russia out 
of the north, to defending the rest of China.  As Balfour discussed railways 
so Chamberlain expanded upon those ideas into wider spheres of influence 
and administration.457  Despite Bülow’s message which suggested that he 
believed no deal done with Britain would be safe, Hatzfeldt gave ample 
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space to Chamberlain’s reassuring comments on the veracity of any 
agreement which had been ratified by parliament.  That rather suggested 
the Ambassador did not share Bülow’s beliefs that a treaty would always be 
threatened with repudiation.458  Essentially here was an opportunity for 
Germany to gain for herself, without war, quite a large ‘place in the sun’, 
but not only that, but also the control over an Asiatic Army.  This 
agreement would have given both Germany and Britain, especially working 
together, the ability to open a military front on Russia in East Asia during 
any future conflict.  In this situation Russia would find herself confronted by 
Germany and Austria in Europe, Britain in Central Asia and everywhere at 
sea, and Germany and Britain in the Far East.  In a war between the Dual 
Alliance and Germany, Britain would be able to provide naval protection, 
which would keep communications with Germany’s overseas territories open 
as well as protect their trade, and prevent Russia from concentrating her 
forces in Europe, while divesting France of not only support from her own 
Empire, but probably possession of it too.  However, aware of Bülow’s plans 
to extract as much as possible, as a colonial entrance fee to any alliance, 
Hatzfeldt did not communicate Chamberlain’s grander ideas to Berlin.  This 
prevented her from seeing the benefits of such an arrangement.  This would 
have rendered Tirpitz’s plans redundant and Germany could have switched 
her naval ambitions to building better support for her burgeoning 
international trade.  Given Chamberlain’s earlier promises of being generous 
in the small colonial matters if the larger one could be agreed first, here 
was Britain demonstrating she was prepared to treat with Germany both 
fairly and generously, thus admitting her into the small circle of truly global 
powers.  Here was Germany’s best chance of achieving many of her 
Weltpolitik aims without a major war.  Chamberlain kept Balfour and the 
Committee of Defence in the loop with his version of events.  Hatzfeldt had 
left him with the impression that Germany was still in favour of closer 
relations.  Chamberlain was being overly hopeful but it was also partly 
because Hatzfeldt was trying to avoid missing any genuine opportunity and 
also needed to break off negotiations without causing offence or alarm. 
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Bülow’s reply continued to focus on Britain’s parliamentary system, 
reminding Hatzfeldt of how Salisbury himself had used these same 
arguments to avoid alliance proposals in the early 1890s.  He no longer 
focused on the dangers of repudiation but on the consequences of a failure 
to ratify the Treaty.  He noted that public opinion in the two countries was 
not conducive to any large scale changes.  In the future things would be 
different, the British Public would come to understand the need, as Britain 
failed to disrupt the Franco-Russian alliance and thus realised they stood all 
alone.  Germany would also be warmer in the future, if obstinate British 
statesmen would stop being so rugged in defence of British colonial 
interests.459  Chamberlain needed to be convinced that he should be 
grateful for Germany neutrality and amenable in colonial disputes so that at 
some point in the future the conditions may be better.  This was 
disingenuous; in his last despatch Bülow had pointed out that while Russia’s 
strength was increasing Britain’s constitutional arrangements would still 
make any alliance impossible.  How then could there have ever been a more 
advantageous moment later?  Bülow’s plans could not afford to see Britain 
disappear as a Power, at least not yet, but his plans and attitudes were full 
of enmity; he wished to wait until the British were desperate and thus 
Germany could demand to be made the inheritor of Britain’s global mantle.    
Before Balfour met Hatzfeldt again on 5th April, he sent word of the talks via 
Salisbury’s son, Cranborne.  How much exactly Cranborne had been asked 
to reveal is impossible to know, but he left England on 4th before the acting 
Foreign Secretary had his last meeting with the German Ambassador and 
the talks arrived at a dead end.460  Balfour had chosen to stop proceedings 
at least those which may have had radical implications.  The Ambassador 
rehashed Bülow’s reasoning’s why attempts to negotiate an Anglo-German 
alliance were premature.  Balfour appeared to say little to persuade him 
otherwise and why should he as he was now trying to restrain the situation.  
He agreed that public opinion was not yet ready.  He also left Hatzfeldt with 
the impression that he was unsure that Parliament could be brought to 
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ratify such a treaty.  Despite the existence of calls for an Anglo-German 
Alliance made in the Commons’ debate on China earlier that day.461  Balfour 
also acted against Chamberlain; it was a peculiarity of the Colonial 
Secretary to want to go too fast, he also left Hatzfeldt with the impression 
neither he nor Salisbury would be sorry to see Chamberlain fail.  Balfour 
had decided to abandon Chamberlain, whether he hoped to actually cause 
him damage politically or not remains unclear, but by making it clear to 
Hatzfeldt that Chamberlain’s attempts no longer had his approval Balfour 
was bringing immediate control of the situation back to himself.  However, 
he did not inform Chamberlain that the talks had been broken off, nor that 
he had informed Salisbury of their existence.462 
The announcement of Britain’s lease of Weihaiwei was bound to strain 
German feeling.  Having just had discussions about how the two countries 
could work together in China and elsewhere, Britain picked up a naval 
station in Germany’s backyard.  Any hope that this possession would give 
Balfour any leverage railway concessions was largely dashed by Germany’s 
barely restrained anger.  Bülow demanded a pledge that Britain would not 
build any railways connecting their new territory with any treaty port or the 
Shantung interior.463  Balfour agreed quickly but used this to try to revive 
his idea of an agreement based on an understanding as to Railways.  In the 
end he gave the Germans a unilateral declaration along the line they had 
asked for, with only one change, that the line from Tientsin to Hankow 
could still be built.  Balfour thought it “rather absurd” to be giving pledges 
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against very remote actions without receiving anything in return.464  
However, he had learnt from his meetings with Hatzfeldt that Britain needed 
to be generous in these small disputes if there was ever to be any hope of a 
more formal arrangement. 
While Balfour was dealing with Germany’s railway paranoia the other anti-
isolationists were not idle either.  At another dinner, so Eckardstein claimed, 
Chamberlain reported the bad news that nothing could be done to further 
the alliance scheme.  Among those present were: Chamberlain, Devonshire, 
Chaplin, Rothschild and Eckardstein.  Here it was decided that Eckardstein 
would approach the Kaiser himself and see if the proposals could be pushed 
along from the German side.465  The earlier private diplomacy conducted by 
the Kaiser via Swaine, suggested that he could be approached in such a 
manner.  However, Wilhelm was not easily persuaded but despite that 
Eckardstein reported back that the Kaiser was thoroughly convinced.  
Balfour was kept informed of these proceedings by Chaplin and 
Rothschild.466  The dates Balfour wrote to Salisbury were important as they 
give some indication of what Balfour hoped to achieve.  He had put 
Hatzfeldt off as best he could; certainly Balfour was no longer hoping for 
any radical or quickly formed alliance.  However, by not informing 
Chamberlain he knew that the Colonial Secretary would continue on like a 
runaway train.  While he sent word of the talks to Salisbury it was not until 
he had both come to the end of his diplomacy with regards to Shantung 
railways on 13th and received word via Chaplin of Eckardstein’s reported 
success with the Kaiser at Homburg on 12th, that he put pen to paper on 
14th April and laid out his version of what took place for Salisbury’s 
consumption. 
Balfour now had a serious problem; if Chaplin’s reports of Eckardstein’s 
success proved true then Salisbury would be facing some serious difficulties 
when he got back and it was very likely that the ‘talks’ could still have been 
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ongoing by his return.  Balfour’s letter on 14th April was mainly an attempt 
to disguise his own involvement.  He described the opening moves, the 
dinner at Rothschild, as “a further development in the matter” he had 
previously asked Cranborne to inform his Uncle of.  As he went on, he laid 
the responsibility for what took place squarely on Chamberlain: “Joe is very 
impulsive and the Cabinet discussion of the preceding days had forced on 
his attention our isolated and occasionally therefore difficult diplomatic 
position.”  This implied that Balfour did discuss the possibilities which could 
rise from the discussions he had with Hatzfeldt on 25th March with the 
Cabinet of the same day.  He went on to succinctly and amusingly describe 
what had been discussed but he described Chamberlain’s ideas as being 
much more vague than they were and he implied that Chamberlain was 
much more desperate for the deal, noting that Hatzfeldt “had nothing to 
say” to the Colonial Secretary by 5th April.  The instructions sent from Berlin 
appeared to imply that a further discussion was expected; Hatzfeldt took 
the decision himself to limit his contact to Balfour only, detecting danger in 
continuing to discuss these matters with Chamberlain now that it was clear 
the talks no longer had Cecillian support.  Balfour continued his epistle 
obscuring not only his past involvement but, even more importantly, his 
intentions for the future, he “was much entertained by [Hatzfeldt’s] 
conclusion” that “those small concessions [...] which Joe (he said) was so 
reluctant to make” could “pave the way for a straight and more forward 
union!!”  However, he chose to “express no dissent from” that view and 
went on to explain that despite being “inclined to favour an Anglo-Germany 
agreement” he would prefer to be the party “that lent the cheek not that 
imparted the kiss.”  This was an attempt to throw his Uncle off his own 
scent.  Balfour would go on to pursue his own, independent, pro-German 
policy but knowing that Salisbury would need to reassert control upon his 
return it was vitally important that Balfour remained in a position to 
continue to be of influence.  He could not afford to be detected as one of 
the anti-isolationists in the Cabinet.  Earlier in the letter Balfour threw out 
to Salisbury a suggestion of ‘sharing’ the Foreign Office:  “As regards F.O. 
work do you not think that in the future it might be found possible for me or 
some other colleague to take it over for (say) a month each year when 
nothing very particular was going on?”  Crouched in concern for his Uncle’s 
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well being was the suggestion that Balfour should regularly be permitted to 
steer the country’s foreign policy.  The story which he then went on to 
unfold would hardly have convinced Salisbury he could trust the work to 
anyone else in the Cabinet.  By this method Balfour hoped to find enough 
room to continue to push his nascent pro-German policy. Balfour closed the 
letter by reporting on Eckardstein’s antics.  Playing on the German’s lack of 
‘real’ social standing, the proud cuirassier Baron von Eckardstein was 
reduced to “(You know the fat fellow who married Maple’s daughter?)” and 
was accused of attempting “(by his own account successfully)” to persuade 
Wilhelm of “the transcendent value of the English alliance” apparently 
“behind Hatzfeldt’s back”.  Any value that this personal diplomacy, a tactic 
that the Kaiser had tried to use himself previously, may have had was 
reduced by underlining that this operator was an interloper, a phoney and 
fake, his aristocratic and thus diplomatic credentials deemed threadbare.467   
Eckardstein saw Chamberlain upon his return to London on 22nd April.  The 
Kaiser was in favour of the alliance and of acting quickly, lest news of 
negotiations would leak.  The ideas with which Eckardstein tempted 
Chamberlain were different from those Hatzfeldt had discussed.  A 
defensive agreement to guarantee each Power’s possessions, arranged to 
be activated if attacked by either a single Power, or two Powers combined 
which ever was preferred.  Austria and Italy should be admitted at an early 
date.  The Kaiser would also recognise that Britain would require a freehand 
in Egypt and the Transvaal; Chamberlain wanted a deal which would settle 
more than just China.  Chamberlain noted that Eckardstein invited him to 
lunch with Hatzfeldt, the Colonial Secretary replied reminding him that 
“what we were doing was absolutely personal and unofficial” and noted that 
he still did not believe that Salisbury had been informed of the talks.468  
Chamberlain evidently discussed the content of this meeting with Balfour 
that day, as Balfour again put pen to paper in order to keep Salisbury up to 
date.  His letter is again misleading or at least trying to tug Salisbury in a 
certain direction.  The nephew reports that Eckardstein appeared to have 
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managed to convert the German Emperor who was “now ‘breast high’ for a 
defensive alliance on any terms”.  Balfour pretended to be inclined, as he 
predicted his uncle would be, to “be disposed to put it on one side as a 
political comedy without the least significance” due to Eckardstein’s lack of 
importance.  However, he believed this would have been a mistake, not 
least because “these impossible diplomats have raised the expectation in 
the Emperor’s mind which, if left unfulfilled, will, acting on so impulsive a 
being, throw him violently into the opposite camp.”  Balfour was playing on 
Salisbury’s deeply held concerns about the Kaiser and was effectively 
ensnaring the returning Foreign Secretary into pursuing the alliance, the 
merits of which Balfour believed “would take too many pages” to discuss in 
correspondence.  If the pros and cons of such an arrangement would 
require too much space to write about then it is evident that Balfour was 
taking the opportunity seriously rather than trying to treat it as the comedy 
of errors he had painted it as.  His closing comments on the subject 
revealed that Balfour secretly hoped an agreement could be had: “The real 
fact is that the E. Of Germany, in spite of his aim of European domination, 
is in a mortal fright of Russia; and especially of a maritime (as well as 
military) combination of France and Russia.  From the effects of the 
maritime combination we would save him- and he is prepared to buy us.  If 
we are not for sale, he will go elsewhere:- to our detriment.”469  Balfour was 
certainly attempting to make a strong political case in favour of the alliance 
and trying to head off his Uncle’s reluctance.  Taking this later letter and 
comparing it with the letter of 14th reveals some curious twist and turns in 
Balfour’s attempts to orchestrate Salisbury’s response.  The first letter was 
to distance himself from what he believed was going to be a train wreck, to 
get enough distance to be likely to retain his Uncle’s trust and so remain in 
a position to effect some of the ‘do-ut-des’ he believed the German’s 
required for a more direct arrangement later.  By the second letter, it looks 
like he found himself stuck, the radical sudden change then looked like it 
might, against all odds, come off and having distanced himself from the 
proceedings he was likely to be left behind.  But this was more than just 
political manoeuvrings against Chamberlain directly and more circumspectly 
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with regards to Salisbury.  The second letter clearly revealed that Balfour 
was actually in favour of the radical change he had just so amusingly 
decried.  He attempted to hide that opinion in ridicule but the tenor of the 
whole letter is that the situation had moved beyond his, and he also implied 
Salisbury’s, control.  The Kaiser was too dangerous to be let down in his 
expectations.  The only reason this did not explode into either a radical 
realignment or a serious blow to Anglo-German relations was because 
Eckardstein had either been thoroughly misled or had thoroughly lied about 
the Kaiser’s disposition towards an English Alliance; it is difficult to tell 
which.  A few months later Wilhelm would again get excited about a 
proposal Lascelles threw out, concerning how easily the two nations could 
compose their differences in a crises.  He even exclaimed to the 
Ambassador to be ignorant of any prior proposals for a defensive alliance, 
activated if either party was attacked by two other Powers, this would 
suggest Eckardstein really achieved nothing during his visit.  It also 
suggests that Wilhelm at least may have been more interested in 
Chamberlain’s proposals for a direct treaty rather than the request to join 
the Triple Alliance they had become by the time they reached Berlin.470  
Essentially Balfour was stuck between desperately wanting to control the 
situation while remaining in his Uncle’s good books but also to allow the 
radical change in British policy to occur if possible.  Balfour should have 
held off writing this second letter; if he had waited until Chamberlain met 
again with Hatzfeldt he would have realised that his fears and excitement 
were unfounded.  Instead by writing too soon, he unintentionally and 
needlessly revealed his position to Salisbury.   
Hatzfeldt wired back to Berlin that Chamberlain had requested another 
talk.471 Whether Chamberlain actually requested the meeting, or whether 
Eckardstein merely told Hatzfeldt this was the case hardly matters as the 
German Ambassador would never have approached Chamberlain without 
again clearing the action first with Balfour.  It was therefore necessary for 
Hatzfeldt to believe that the initiative came from Chamberlain.  It was also 
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quite in keeping with Chamberlain’s direct, or often called business like, 
approach to diplomacy to care little for such subtleties; to him what was 
important was the substance of the talks.  There was little new in Bülow’s 
reply: Britain was safe from France because German neutrality would keep 
the French “mesmerized before the Vosges”, in fact he even suggested 
France would renege on their obligations under the Dual Alliance out of fear 
of a neutral Germany, an odd proposition after having previously stressed 
how essential that alliance was to the French; Britain would gain little from 
an Anglo-German Alliance, as Russia could not yet bring her forces to bear 
on any British frontier but once her preparations were finished, along the 
Afghan border and in China, she would be much more dangerous, in the 
meantime therefore Germany would simply be a diversion for the Tsar’s 
army which could not yet act against Britain anyway; Austria and Italy may 
be drawn closer to Britain and help her.  Therefore Britain does not need to 
do a deal with France, it is much cheaper for her to purchase continued 
Germany neutrality with acts of ‘do-ut-des’ in the colonial sphere.  None of 
this suggested that the Kaiser had been convinced of anything, perhaps he 
had encouraged Eckardstein in an attempt to ensure the British did not 
entirely give up on the concept.  If so Bülow still had much to do to teach 
his master to act as the “tongue on the scales” between Britain and Russia 
rather than the “restlessly moving pendulum”.472   
Chamberlain met with Eckardstein and Hatzfeldt at Rothschild’s house on 
25th April.  As Hatzfeldt’s instructions suggested very little was likely to be 
achieved.  Chamberlain’s report of the meeting was to the point and 
brusque despite having had his expectations raised by Eckardstein’s 
misinformation.  From Chamberlain’s point of view the cardinal points were 
that the Germans remained entrenched in their fears about the difficulties 
of parliamentary ratification or of a secret agreement being reneged upon 
by a later government, that despite this an agreement may be possible in 
the future, but that it should be approached via the Triple Alliance’s 
secondary partners; an Anglo-German alliance was premature but not 
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impossible, and that Britain may find it possible to come to agreement with 
Austria now as her opinion with regards to Turkish integrity had changed.  
Chamberlain closed by warning the German Ambassador “le bon heur qui 
passé”.473  Hatzfeldt’s report was broadly similar but also much longer and 
more detailed.474  It reveals that the two men discussed the issues in more 
depth than Chamberlain implied.  The Colonial Secretary was probably 
aware that this would be his last chance to discuss the matter for some 
time; he dwelt on trying to convince the Germans of the usefulness of an 
Alliance and trying to focus on the Russian threat in China.  However, 
Hatzfeldt revealed Germany’s lack of concern; the Russians would not be 
prepared to make further moves in China for some time, “Decades” the 
Kaiser noted in the margins.  It was typical of Chamberlain to take a long 
term view of problems and solutions, after all his suggestion of raising 
Chinese armies would have taken years to prepare as well; the Colonial 
Sectary wanted to take action today to prevent a war later.475  Wilhelm’s 
notes on the report expose this even more deeply; he described 
Chamberlain’s suggestions as repaying the Tsar’s assistance in acquiring 
Kiaochow by demanding that Russia penetrates no further “because it does 
not suit England! A stroke of genius!”  Because Berlin and the Kaiser had 
not been fully informed of Chamberlain’s proposals, the Emperor may not 
have been aware of the huge strip of Chinese territory Chamberlain had 
offered them as the first basis of an agreement.476  Further Russian 
penetration did not suit Britain but then neither did it suit Germany if she 
hoped to extend her influence into the hinterland of her new territories.  
The Kaiser was also conveniently forgetting how tense Russo-German 
relations were during the seizure of Kiaochow.  Chamberlain had also 
pointed out that the German area of interest was already much closer to the 
Russian, that it was they who would encounter difficulties first, however, 
the Kaiser noted that Weihaiwei now placed Britain closer to the Russians.  
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This was geographically true, but Britain had already given such guarantees 
to the Germans that it should have been perfectly apparent that she had no 
interest in developing the area around the naval station.  Russian influence 
could utterly replace the German influence surrounding Weihaiwei without 
touching a single vital British interest, except for exposing Weihaiwei as 
merely a cosmetic solution.  Hatzfeldt also made note that Chamberlain had 
again reiterated that he could only be generous in the treatment of colonial 
differences if offered as part of a wider agreement or general alliance.  The 
main point of contention was based upon the different assumptions held 
concerning the inevitability of an Anglo-Russian war.  A series of pragmatic 
agreements combined with a stalwart defence of vital interests could have, 
and did, see them avoid such a conflagration.  Bülow and others in 
Germany, but not necessarily Haztfeldt, believed that it was impossible for 
Britain to avoid this fight.  Thus, an Anglo-German Alliance guaranteed their 
own participation in a war with Russia.  They simply could not believe that 
Russia would back down in the face of such overwhelming force.  In the 
British Cabinet’s mind, if the Dual Alliance hesitated now to attack either the 
Triple Alliance or Britain then how on earth could it have been expected that 
they would definitely attack both at once?  The other factor solidly missed 
by the Germans is that this would also represent a British acceptance that 
Alsace-Lorraine had been lost to France in perpetuity.  Holstein’s comments 
on a duplicate copy of Hatzfeldt’s reports also demonstrated incredulity that 
Britain could escape her fight with Russia.  Hatzfeldt did not bother passing 
on Chamberlain’s warning that time was passing, he probably believed this 
was a reference to Salisbury’s return, in part it was, but it was also a 
reference to the alternative that Chamberlain had always threatened, that 
he would find a way to settle with France if not Russia as well.  He, along 
with all the rest of the British Cabinet, was also misreading German 
intentions; the British had no idea how much the Germans believed they 
deserved, in fact the rejection of the Colonial Secretaries offer to agree to 
protect their territory, while also offering them a huge swathe of China and 
the settlement of outstanding Colonial matters in their favour, should have 
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started to ring alarm bells as to the size and nature of their eventual 
demands.477 
Balfour must have been relieved when Chamberlain informed him of the 
sorry contents of his last meeting.  Thus the first Alliance talks drew to a 
close.  Eckardstein visited Chamberlain in apparent confusion the next day, 
but the Colonial Secretary put him off, “it was for the Emperor to make the 
next move”, if there was ever a ball and thus a real game in play it was now 
firmly in the German court.478  Balfour had almost been tripped up, but his 
instincts had seen him through.  Not only had he learnt how the Germans 
preferred to move forward, with smaller concessions paving the way toward 
a wider scheme, he had also firmly placed himself as the best person for 
them to do business with.  By leaving Chamberlain out of the loop, on what 
he had said to Hatzfeldt, and by leaving the German with the impression 
that both he and Salisbury would like to see Chamberlain fail, Balfour had 
secured himself as the safe sensible person to do business with.  Both 
Bülow and the Kaiser preferred his practical gradual approach to 
Chamberlain’s fantastic ones.479  As for the alliance proposals themselves it 
is harder to judge.  Hatzfeldt always converted the suggestions Chamberlain 
made into concepts he believed were more likely to be acceptable to his 
superiors.  Therefore they were never in possession of some of the ideas 
that Chamberlain was contemplating.  What he suggested amounted to 
paying the Germans on account of their future interests.  While historians 
often interpreted this as an invitation for Germany to throw themselves 
across Russia’s path it was also an offer to control a much larger area in 
China than Germany could expect to secure for years to come.  Along with 
it were the promises of settling colonial matters favourably too.  This 
scheme was never considered properly on its merits; Chamberlain was 
offering them a deal based upon a presumed German desire to acquire the 
interests offered.  The continued German insistence that Britain work 
through Austria and Italy, was certainly designed to end the talks, such 
                                       
477 Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, 26/04/1898, GP, XIV pt.1, No.3793, pp.221-7 
478 Memo., Chamberlain, 26/04/1898, JC7/3/2a/7 
479 Wilhelm to Auswärtige Amt, 8/04/1898 and Bülow to Wilhelm, GP, XIV pt.1, 
Nos.3768 & 3769 
152 
 
agreements with the secondary central Powers could not have guaranteed 
Britain what she needed outside of Europe.  In essence despite weltpolitik 
the Germans were still unable to see beyond Europe with regards to their 
alliance obligations and interests.  Chamberlain was almost as blinkered 
with regard to only seeing the global position, but the Germans missed that 
his offers represented an acceptance of Germany onto the world stage.  The 
Germans desired ‘place in the sun’ had been offered, along with a guarantee 
of the territorial status quo in Europe, and almost summarily turned down.  
Perhaps if Chamberlain had approached this in a subtler, more traditionally 
diplomatic, fashion then perhaps the Germans would have looked at it more 
favourably.  His ‘cut to the chase’ style had provoked fear and suspicion, 
where he hoped they would have provided the opposite.  There did exist an 
opportunity here, but it was slight and would have required the Germans to 
have dramatically realigned their future policy. 
Salisbury returned to Britain at the start of May.  Chamberlain sent him 
copies of all of his memoranda; he pretended that the discussions were 
started by the Germans, rather than by agreement between the anti-
isolationists and Eckardstein over a society dinner.  Actually his writings and 
the letter he enclosed them with all failed to mention the role Balfour, 
Devonshire and Chaplain played.  The Colonial Secretary placed himself 
squarely in the centre of the narrative; “On every occasion I made it clear 
that I only expressed my personal opinions and could not speak for you or 
any of my colleagues.”480  This naturally played into Balfour’s hands who 
had already taken to steps to sideline his own involvement.481  The timing of 
the discussions, the aborted attempt to reverse the Weihaiwei decision and 
Balfour’s turn of phrase in his letters all suggest that Cabinet in fact 
discussed the talks themselves.  Chamberlain asked Salisbury to consider “a 
Treaty with Germany providing for reciprocal defence” as “recent 
experience” demonstrated that Britain was “powerless to resist the ultimate 
control of China by Russia and that we are at a great disadvantage in 
negotiating with France, as long as we maintain our present isolation”.  
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Believing that “such a Treaty would make for peace and might be 
negotiated at the present time” Chamberlain reserved the decision to 
Salisbury “to say whether the matter should be pressed or allowed to 
drop.”482 
Salisbury was facing difficult problems he had to balance the need to 
placate Chamberlain, thus keeping him in the government, while avoiding 
offending the Kaiser without making an alliance with him.  Hatzfeldt made 
this balancing act easier.  He met Salisbury on 2nd May 1898; Salisbury 
reported to Chamberlain that “[h]is business was evidently to throw cold 
water”, nothing could be hurried and Britain should ripen the situation by 
being amiable in other matters.  The Foreign Secretary also finished with a 
postscript agreeing that “a close relation with Germany would be very 
desirable, but can we get it?”483  This was almost certainly how Chamberlain 
felt about Salisbury’s own attempts to create a closer relationship with 
Russia.  Chamberlain replied commenting on how he was “very glad to see 
your[Salisbury’s] handwriting again”.  He agreed that it was clear that the 
German Government were not eager, if “anything [was] to be done it must 
be by a movement on the part of the Emperor himself.”  He also agreed 
that it would not “be wise for us to show ourselves too eager”.  Before 
moving on to the selection of the Governor-General of Canada, he did note 
that he thought it perfectly possible “to ascertain through Eckhardstein 
whether the Emperor is determined to press the matter,” naturally Salisbury 
was prepared to wait and hope that Wilhelm did not prevail to force the 
issue upon Bülow.484  The two men met on 3rd and discussed the matter; 
any further move had to come from the Germans, this essentially killed any 
chance of further talks unless Wilhelm was prepared to order Bülow to do so 
against the latter’s own advice.  Chamberlain was permitted to tell 
Eckardstein that the Government looked favourably upon the suggestion of 
an alliance, but no more than that.485  Otte points out that by posing as a 
friend of an Anglo-German alliance, Salisbury denies Chamberlain of a 
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pretext for disrupting the government.486  The evidence does not suggest 
that Chamberlain was seeking such a pretext.  It was also unlikely that the 
Colonial Secretary, or any other dissenting Cabinet minister, would be 
swayed by such an exchange.  Recalling Chamberlain’s final conversation 
with Eckardstein on 26th April he was certainly convinced that nothing more 
could be done from London, the Colonial Secretary had already accepted 
that all would now rest with the Germans.  If they had come forth with 
more definite proposals which Salisbury then rejected then perhaps a 
collision would have been unavoidable.  In such circumstances it would be 
difficult to imagine that Chamberlain would have had to act alone; how 
those in Cabinet, whose views were sympathetic to an Anglo-German 
agreement, would have responded is impossible to know, but it seems 
unlikely that they would have simply let Salisbury avoid a real opportunity.  
Thankfully for the unity of the Government nothing came forth from the 
Germans.   
There was no real threat posed by Chamberlain of disrupting the 
Government, whether over these talks or even over general Chinese policy.  
The Colonial Secretary was a canny political operator; the fact that he still 
had a political career was testimony to his ability to read politics and adapt 
himself to changing political situations.  Salisbury could not have been 
unseated without a serious break between the Prime Minister and a majority 
of his Cabinet.  If the Germans had responded favourably then perhaps the 
other malcontents would finally be prepared to move more openly against 
Salisbury.  Only in the context of general Cabinet revolt could Chamberlain 
have caused the Government an upset and hoped to come out with even his 
own office.  Chamberlain’s original choice of office was driven by a sensible 
reading of his political position.487  He could not have thought the conditions 
much more favourable in 1898 over 1895 for him to attempt to lead a 
Conservative dominated majority.  Neither could he have taken the Home 
Office or the Treasury without needing to deliver upon his old platform of 
social reform which again his Conservative colleagues would have blocked.  
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If Chamberlain had wished to disrupt Salisbury in 1898 he would have 
needed to have brought most of the Cabinet with him, Balfour especially, 
and that any replacement of Salisbury as Prime Minister or Foreign 
Secretary would have needed to be acceptable to the mass of Conservatives 
in the House, which Chamberlain was not.  While Chamberlain was popular 
with the public, and controlled a sizeable ‘Electoral Duchy’, as Marsh 
described it, he did not even command the loyalty of all the Liberal 
Unionists; he could not have led the Conservatives and he was sensible 
enough to know it.  Hatzfeldt may have attempted to explain away his 
motivation as being driven by personal ambition but this was certainly not 
among his prime motivations.488 
Instead Chamberlain had been filled with a growing fear over Britain’s 
seeming powerlessness to defend her interests, within which he included 
informal positions of power and trade dominance.  In West Africa he was 
successful at ‘enlarging’ Britain’s formal empire, but his motivation was 
defensive and the areas which eventually came under the flag, were to his 
mind already British.  His concerns were serious but something has to be 
given for his turn of phrase.  In December 1897 he wrote to Selbourne, 
which was a kin to writing almost directly to Salisbury himself, about the 
West African situation: 
“I thought he[Salisbury] was entirely with us and now he is 
prepared to give away everything and get nothing. 
I am more than sorry to differ from him, but I cannot stand it.  
I would rather give up office than allow French methods to 
triumph in this way. 
We shall pay for it sooner or later and I cannot be a party to 
such a surrender.”489 
The threat to resign was hardly implicit.  Salisbury would have to allow 
Chamberlain more direction of the Niger Negotiations and events on the 
ground or allow him to resign and attempt to ride out the waves this would 
cause.  What is more intriguing about this letter is how different 
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Chamberlain’s approach was when in regard to matters pertaining more 
exclusively to his own office.  In the next paragraph he accepted that Hicks-
Beach would not apply countervailing duties on sugar in order to support 
the Caribbean colonies in their trade dispute with the US: “I cannot force a 
policy which is open to so many political and party objections.”  Even as he 
was threatening to resign over West Africa he was reasonable and accepting 
in another sphere, paying more than differential respect to “political and 
party objections”.  This was not a man who was deluded as to what he 
could achieve as part of a Conservative dominated coalition.  Salisbury was 
no more prepared to lose his Colonial Secretary, with all that entailed, over 
West Africa than he was prepared to fight a war over it. 
As the China crisis progressed Chamberlain became no happier.  By 
February the crisis had developed into a serious problem.  The Colonial 
Secretary warned Balfour that he believed “grave trouble” was “impending 
on the Gov. if we do not adopt a more decided attitude in regards to China.”  
This was the letter in which Chamberlain had reiterated his ideas to try to 
approach the US and Germany in order to preserve the ‘Open Door’.  It is 
also the evidence presented by Otte as suggesting that Chamberlain was 
threatening to resign.490  While the letter does criticise Salisbury it also 
clearly acknowledged the Foreign Secretary’s acumen; “If only Lord 
Salisbury sees the peril and is prepared to meet it I would rather leave to 
him the methods than rush in with what may be impossible suggestions.”  
Otte believed this rhetoric could only suggest Chamberlain was threatening 
his own resignation unless the Cabinet’s indecision was overcome, however 
the critical phrase, “I would not give a year’s life to the Government”, did 
not follow up on the demand for action but upon Chamberlain’s feared 
results of inaction: “If matters remain as they are our prestige will be gone 
and our trade will follow.  I would not give a year’s life to the Government 
under such conditions.”  It is only once Britain’s prestige and trade were 
damaged that Chamberlain expected the Government to be disrupted, again 
he was taking the longer view.  Whether Chamberlain intended to threaten 
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his resignation was not as straight forward as Otte suggests, given his work 
on the importance of foreign policy in by-elections, it seems somewhat 
disingenuous to suggest that only a parliamentary disruption created by the 
Colonial Secretary himself, could be the threat Chamberlain had referred 
to.491  If, in 1898, the Unionists were losing by-elections, and their foreign 
policy was playing a large part, electorate and public indignation could only 
have been worse once the China trade collapsed.  This letter underlined how 
serious Chamberlain believed the situation was and how much more serious 
he believed it would become unless Salisbury could be pushed to take 
action. It does not suggest that the Colonial Secretary intended to 
precipitate action himself. 
Chamberlain had requested that the Committee of Defence meet to discuss 
how to deal with the threat of war with France, Russia or both on 12th 
March just as the discussions over Weihaiwei really started to get heated.492  
This was indicative of how seriously he was concerned.  After a meeting of 
the full Cabinet, just two days later, Bertie and Curzon were working 
together on their own memoranda supporting the desirability of taking 
Weihaiwei.  Chamberlain’s actions and concern were shared widely enough 
to cause a burst of action throughout the government.  His burning 
motivation, which had pushed him to attempt to find a general settlement 
with France, convinced the Cabinet to approach the US, made a small 
approach to Japan and encouraged Salisbury to do so more meaningfully 
and finally to engage in the German alliance talks, was to solve a problem 
he felt was real and not simply to enhance his own political standing; 
though he would hardly have found that a disappointing side effect.  In all 
of these actions he was supported by doubt filled and uncertain Cabinet 
ministers, who preferred to let the Colonial Secretary push his own agenda 
than meet Salisbury’s apparently negative and pessimistic foreign policy 
head on.  The disaffected members of the Cabinet were prepared to allow 
Chamberlain his head, in order to both see if a better solution might 
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materialise and in the very least allow warning shots to be fired across 
Salisbury’s bow while still flying friendly colours themselves. 
Chamberlain’s interventions and “rush[ing] in with what may be impossible 
suggestions” all had another factor in common.  In 1895 he was in favour of 
forcible action against the Sultan: “public opinion is moving steadily in 
favour of strong measures with Turkey”.  In West Africa public opinion was 
also agitated and compared the growing hostilities there to eighteenth 
century India.493  A while later Chamberlain would be commenting that "fifty 
years hence our descendants will talk of our pusillanimous surrender", with 
regards to the Niger question.494  He was aware of how strong public 
opinion was and how dangerous it could be.  His concern over the public’s 
response to events in China was just as strong and clearly demonstrated.  
The Colonial Secretary thought that “public opinion is a very bad guide” but 
still it could not be simply ignored.495  He was also not as canny at reading 
the mood of the nation as he thought he was but, like Palmerstone and 
Disraeli before him, he was able to communicate well with the general 
public.496  Salisbury’s negativity and disdain at having to respond to the 
masses helped fuel Chamberlain’s concerns.  If he was worried about the 
future of the Government and was not prepared to be the force that 
disturbed it, then he was most probably concerned that Salisbury, whose 
participation in politics was not subject to the whim of the electorate, would 
not react with sufficient force to democratic pressures. 
Salisbury did not choose to leave the situation as it was.  He was shrewd 
enough to realise that there was more support for Chamberlain’s position 
both in Cabinet and in the Country.  He chose to meet these multiple 
threats with the famous ‘Dying Nations’ speech, delivered 4th May 1898 at 
the Primrose League.497  Historians have noted that Salisbury used this 
speech to reassert his control over foreign policy.  Many of these historians 
have also noted that Chamberlain’s response, ‘The Long Spoon’ speech 
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given on the 13th May at Birmingham, was misjudged.498  It was hardly 
surprising though that Chamberlain could not resist speaking out in 
response.  The foreign policy content of Salisbury’s speech has been written 
about extensively and while it remains necessary to revisit some of it, the 
rest of the speech is often ignored completely.  The Prime Minister was 
speaking at “The Primrose League” an organisation founded in part by his 
onetime leadership rival Randolph Churchill.  Its purpose was to obtain the 
support of the people for conservative policies and thus was to be a 
foundational plank in Churchill’s dreams of a Tory democracy.  It was 
founded in 1884, which was a year that is rather important in Chamberlain’s 
life.  It was the time of the Third Reform Act which extended the franchise 
to almost all adult males; it was also around the time when Chamberlain 
made his “Jack Cade” speeches: accusing Salisbury of being merely a 
“spokesman of a class – a class to which he himself belongs, who toil not 
neither do they spin.”  A time when Salisbury threatened that if 
“he[Chamberlain] would head” a reform march on London the result would 
be “that his head would get broken.”499  Early in 1885 Chamberlain 
launched his Radical Program and asked “What ransom will property pay for 
the security which it enjoys?”500  This was the context in which the Primrose 
League was born.   
Salisbury opened his speech by congratulating the League on a long list of 
achievements.  These included having helped to prove that the “fatalist 
doctrine that Radical proposals once made must eventually succeed has 
been contradicted by the test of actual experience.”  Chamberlain’s had 
been a Radical Programme.  “Fifteen years ago it was believed that any 
resistance on the part of the House of Lords was quite illusory, [...] [t]he 
battle has been fought the attempt has been tested. [...] The effects of that 
result have not terminated; its influence has not terminated [...] the 
resistance of the House of Lords can be calculated upon as a secure political 
force, and that no political force exists in the country which can overwhelm 
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it.”  Chamberlain had contributed to a charge against the Lords as it 
appeared to oppose the 1884 Reform Act.  Salisbury went on to 
congratulate the League for its efforts to prevent the disestablishment of 
the Church, a cause very dear to Chamberlain’s non-conformist heart.  The 
opening also congratulated the League on its work to maintain the Empire: 
“We have tried issues with those who would break the Empire in pieces, and 
not only have they failed, but they have failed so completely that they have 
shattered the political party which in a moment of madness allied itself to 
them.”  Chamberlain could at least be glad to hear this part, though his own 
actions in defence of the Union did more to shatter the Liberal Party in 
1885/6 than the work of the fledgling League.  “I think the Primrose League 
has every right to congratulate itself.  So large a body [...] must have had, 
and has had, an enormous influence in shaping opinion to the salutary ends 
which I have named.”  The whole introduction of the speech was calculated 
to be insulting to Chamberlain and his previous, currently on ice, radicalism.  
While this sort of rhetoric had to be endured, as part of the price of working 
with the Conservatives, when it was also coupled with a direct attack on the 
criticisms laid at the feet of Salisbury’s foreign policy it acted as a red rag to 
a bull; as it was almost certainly designed to do.   
When Salisbury moved on to foreign policy he first congratulated the league 
on having “done so much to popularize and to strengthen” the spirit upon 
which it was founded.  The spirit which also animated the likes of Rhodes, 
Portal, Kitchener, Lockhart, Cromer and MacDonald.  It motivated these 
men to build the Empire and by stretching forth “the sword of England” had 
put a stop to “terrible evils”.  The glories for these acts, which were “in the 
highest sense a supreme blessing to the dearest interests of mankind”, 
were to be attributed not only to the individuals on the ground but also to 
“the work of the league”.  Given the specific reference to Ashanti and Benin, 
in West Africa, this was claiming victory for matters which were very much 
within Chamberlain’s remit as Colonial Secretary and for which he was 
responsible.  It would be difficult to imagine a more provocative start, and 
the Foreign Secretary had not yet even got to China. 
Salisbury asked his listeners to judge the Far Eastern crisis by its results.  
He then went on to discuss public opinion on the matter, and did so in 
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terms which revealed how far removed from even parliamentary practice he 
wished diplomacy to be.  He refused to be drawn into responding to 
“anonymous critics”, a reference to the many articles appearing in the 
national journals, but instead “looked with some anxiety to see what would 
be the kind of complaint made by responsible” commentators, namely in 
Parliament.  Parliamentary debate was reduced to simply being an attempt 
to “score off the persons sitting on the other bench to the utmost extent 
[...] and they naturally expect, I suppose, that what they do with Minsters 
in the House of Commons we should do with Ministers of another kind when 
we meet them in diplomatic debate.”  The whole critique of government 
vacillation, with all its concerns over the suitability of Weihaiwei, the effect 
of Russia being able to penetrate further into China, the removal of 
engineers and what this may presage, all of these concerns were ignored in 
the speech.  The only cogent criticism worthy of response from the great 
aristocrat was about whether he had “not given a piece of his mind to 
foreign Governments when they said certain things to which entire 
confidence was not to be given or which were falsified by the event.”  
Considerable space was given over to a defence of discrete polite 
diplomacy, based more around the etiquette of private discourse, than the 
‘argy-bargy’ of parliamentary debate.  While this was clearly advantageous 
for the smooth running of diplomacy it did nothing to answer the real 
concerns members of the public had.  In fact it did not even answer the 
criticisms then being offered at the annual meeting of the City of London 
Liberal Association.  The two speeches were printed adjacent to each other 
on the same page of The Times.501  Public opinion was still not content with 
how the Government had proceeded in China.  Salisbury’s speech also 
demonstrated that he was not particularly worried about satisfying these 
concerns either.  This speech, as well as being provocative to Chamberlain, 
was a piece of nineteenth century Conservative spin; it obscured the real 
concerns offered by some writers by deliberately and explicitly ignoring 
them as irresponsible observers, while also offering a defence against one 
of the more baseless concerns under the pretence that this was the only 
“responsible” opinion Salisbury could find to answer.  This demonstrated 
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that Salisbury had little or no time for public/press opinion and wished to 
remove diplomacy and foreign affairs as far away from public scrutiny as he 
could.   
Salisbury’s final word on China was to ask how it was that Britain could 
have lost her prestige, in the eyes of the Chinese, and still gain the 
concessions that she had: “Three years ago, one year ago, such a result 
would have been held to be impossible, and that we should have been able 
to obtain this appears to me to be a sufficient, conclusive, final answer to 
those who tell us that [...] we have lost influence or prestige with the 
Chinese.”  Remarkable given that Salisbury had considered a loss of soft 
power in China to have been one of his disastrous inheritances from 
Kimberly.  In reality it is difficult to pinpoint why the Chinese gave way on 
these issues, the opening of more ports, the opening of the internal 
waterways and securing a British successor to the Head of Chinese customs, 
but if it had merely been a case of British prestige and these objects were 
unobtainable even just one year ago, then this implied a substantial 
increase in prestige over that time.  What seems more likely is that the 
Chinese were desperate to avoid the ‘scramble for China’ and acquiesced in 
fear that Britain would follow with territorial demands if she did not 
capitulate.  Sadly for China, Britain followed on with territorial demands 
anyway.  Without this fear, generated by the violent actions of Germany 
and Russia, the Chinese would still have refused to accept these 
concessions.  They were accepted as a bribe to keep Britain in check and 
the lease of Weihaiwei was reluctantly accepted, in the face of the Royal 
Navy Far Eastern squadron, because it was hoped to set the Europeans 
against each other.  These actions were taken not in awe of Britain, or from 
a desire to meet her needs, but in response to the very real threat posed by 
Russia.  Also Salisbury had also forgotten the ‘most favoured nation’ clauses 
China had with almost all Europeans by this time.  Britain had demanded 
that more ports and that the rivers were to be opened to trade, but all the 
other European states would be able to attempt to use these advantages 
also.  However, Russia and Germany had obtained exclusive rights, which 
were technically, therefore, breaches of Britain’s own most favoured 
nation’s clause.  Britain actually lacked the means to maintain her treaty 
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rights.  Salisbury rounded off this section with an interesting point.  He 
warned his listeners not to imagine the situation in China to be exceptional, 
similar problems would probably recur therefore he continued on to make a 
point which Chamberlain could not have left unanswered.  Salisbury 
negatively connected a patriotic exhortation that “in spite of the jargon 
about isolation” Britain was “amply competent” to “maintain against all 
comers that which we possess”, but he added the clause that this would 
“not secure the peace of the world.”  Salisbury had implied, almost explicitly 
said, that to maintain the peace Britain could not expect to maintain what 
she possessed. 
Having just made this startling admission, Salisbury went on to discuss the 
“Living and Dying Nations”.  The living nations he described as “growing in 
power”, “wealth”, “dominion” and “organisation”.  He feared that nothing 
could diminish these nations’ forces and that future rival claims may only be 
settled “by a bloody arbitrament”.  Given his immediately prior warning, 
that Britain could not expect to hold her own and live in peace, it becomes 
difficult to see where Salisbury ultimately thought Britain belonged, among 
the living or the dying nations.  Certainly she had been growing in all the 
attributes he had mentioned but, as many thought, Britain could not afford 
to fight over trifling issues either.  Perhaps Salisbury believed that Britain’s 
power was possibly near its zenith.  His description of the dying nations was 
simply a binary of the living: “Decade after decade they are weaker, poorer, 
and less provided with leading men or institutions in which they can trust, 
apparently drawing nearer and nearer to their fate and yet clinging with 
strange tenacity to the life which they have got.”  This process would 
continue on and eventually the living nations would devour the dying and 
“the seeds and causes of conflict amongst civilized nations will speedily 
appear.”  Britain would not allow herself to “be at a disadvantage in any re-
arrangement” but she should “not be jealous if desolation and sterility are 
removed by the aggrandisement of a rival in regions to which our arms 
cannot extend.”  To someone inclined to trust Salisbury’s judgement this is 
solid rhetoric.  Britain was capable of ‘holding her own’ and she would do so 
where she had an interest and could project power.  However, to those who 
were disinclined to trust Salisbury this all sounded like an argument to 
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appease Britain’s rivals, to withdraw from parts of the world where “our 
arms cannot extend.”  The loss of informal dominion, such as feared in 
China, was side stepped by this argument about where British arms could 
reach.  After all even the Liberal Imperialist Rosebery had admitted that:  
because our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that 
scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without 
involving British interests.  This consideration instead of 
widening rather circumscribes the field of our actions.  For did 
we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should 
always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars.502 
Sanderson described the situation less flatteringly the Empire was a “huge 
giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretched in 
every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.” 
And earlier Chamberlain had admitted she was like “the weary Titan, 
staggering under the too vast orb of his fate”.503  Informal British interests 
were already global and due to the lack of any real competition had become 
used to being able to settle questions mostly in their favour regardless of 
the reach of British arms.  The picture Salisbury painted necessitated the 
giving up of informal control and even suggested that the British should not 
feel jealous doing so.  Salisbury’s speech, while full of patriotic rhetoric, still 
left plenty of room for those concerned about Britain’s relative decline, and 
the emergence of real trade competition from the US and Germany, to feel 
insecure as the man at the helm of British policy may consider selling their 
interests as a cheap price for peace.   
Chamberlain’s was a deep concern for the future of British prosperity.  Any 
area that fell behind the tariff barriers of other Great Powers were markets 
lost to the British.  The Colonial Secretary had always been quick to link the 
Empire with prosperity at home: “Is there any man in his senses who 
believes that the crowded population of these islands could exist for a single 
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day if we were to cut adrift from the great dependencies which now look to 
us for protection and assistance?”504  It was this link that resulted in his 
sensitivity toward foreign encroachments.  Lord Salisbury, and the class 
Chamberlain had not forgotten he represented, had never had to worry 
about their existence.  No foreign policy decision was likely to leave many, if 
any, member of the British aristocracy hungry and in search of shelter.  
Those whose livelihoods depended upon manufactories finding sufficient 
demand where far more likely to feel drastic ill effects if large existing 
markets were closed to their employers.  Chamberlain responded in his 
‘Long Spoon’ speech at Birmingham 13th May 1898.  He opened by wishing 
the ailing Gladstone and his family well, and then moved on to celebrate the 
achievements of the Liberal Unionists and to emphasis the necessity of 
remaining a separate political entity, safeguarding his own independent 
political power base.  Turning to foreign policy Chamberlain immediately 
made reference to Salisbury’s “powerful and [...] eloquent speech”.  Noting 
Salisbury’s desire that foreign policy should be tested by results 
Chamberlain moved on to his principal concern: 
I am inclined to think that it is [...] rather on foreign than on 
domestic policy that the attention [...] fixed [...].  I am glad 
that the people of the country are turning their attention to 
this question of foreign policy, which in the past they have 
sometimes thought had nothing to do with them.  It would be 
a great mistake to suppose so, because you must all recognise 
that there is, and there has been for some time past, a 
combined assault by the nations of the world upon the 
commercial supremacy of this country, and if that assault were 
successful our existence would be menaced in a way in which it 
never has been threatened since the time [...] when the great 
Napoleon attempted to lay an interdict upon British trade505 
It is apparent from this section that Chamberlain’s concerns were still 
rooted in the potential economic fallout of any serious foreign policy 
disaster, or even the cumulative effect of many small gracious concessions.  
For this reason the Colonial Secretary believed ordinary people should take 
great interest in foreign policy; an explicit encouragement in counterpoise 
to Salisbury’s subtle suggestions that responding to public concerns was 
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beneath him and unnecessary if only people would await upon the results of 
such crises.  Chamberlain went on to suggest that the issues at stake were 
too important to be subject to partisan politics, to describe Salisbury and 
the Government as “discredited and defeated” or as “weak and vacillating” 
was in error and if that error was “believed in foreign countries, if they were 
acted upon by foreign Governments, they would make a great mistake.”  
Chamberlain went on to point out that: 
courteous diplomacy, and moderate language, and even 
graceful concession are not incompatible with a firm 
maintenance of the honour and the essential interest of the 
country.  (Cheers) And if they were to presume upon this false 
interpretation [...] the difficulty of preserving peace would be 
very much increased. 
Having said that he moved straight on to support his ‘New Diplomacy’ in 
which he believed that: 
[o]urs is a democratic Government [...] there is no longer any 
room for the mysteries and reticencies of the diplomacy of 50 
years ago. [...] [T]he plain issue and the main principles and 
the particulars of the problems with which we have to deal – 
those might be stated in language to be understanded[sic] of 
the people. 
Here he explicitly staked out his claim against the implications in Salisbury’s 
speech, where the Foreign Secretary asked to be left alone to run his office 
and only be judged by the results, Chamberlain explicitly claimed that there 
was “no longer any room for” such behaviour.  He went on to tell his 
listeners in plain language exactly what the problem, to his mind, was.  
Isolation had been good, but now that the European Powers were aligned in 
blocs it was a weakness as Britain was “liable to be confronted at any 
moment with a combination of Great Powers so powerful that not even the 
most extreme, the most hot-headed politician would be able to contemplate 
it without a certain sense of uneasiness.” Therefore Britain must as “the 
first duty [...] under these circumstances [...] draw all parts of the Empire 
closer together”, the next duty was to continue to improve relations with 
the US because “terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply 
purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union 
Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance.”  Chamberlain 
then moved from the general geo-political situation, to the specifics in East 
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Asia.  China had proved too weak and so Russia had made the foreseen 
descent to Port Arthur.  While doing so she made promises and gave 
representations which were speedily broken, of this he felt he “had better 
perhaps say nothing except I have always thought that is was a very wise 
proverb, "Who sups with the Devil must have a long spoon."”  This was far 
from being within the bounds of diplomatically acceptable language.  What 
followed was worse, Britain had tried to make a deal and had failed.  
Despite offering an understanding based around Russia’s “Commercial 
objects”, ”the development of her trade”, and “the expansion of her 
legitimate authority.”  Having failed Britain took Weihaiwei, which was the 
only alternative to an understanding with Russia: “Some of our critics say, 
‘Oh you might have come to an understanding with Russia.’  It is easy to 
say that, but an understanding takes two parties to the bargain, and Russia 
wanted what we did not want, and we had nothing to offer her to induce her 
to desist from her plan.”  Anyone criticising the Government, for taking 
Weihaiwei and their failure to secure a deal with Russia, was advocating 
“the policy of war”.  This Chamberlain described as impossible, while he 
believed there were worse things to befall a nation than war, he would not 
give voice to one “unless I can see at the commencement [...] a fair 
probability that at the end [...] the objects of the war will have been 
obtained. (Cheers.) Now, what does history show us? It shows us that 
unless we are allied to some great military power, as we were in the 
Crimean war, [...] we cannot seriously injure Russia”.  This made the 
situation very serious indeed, because unless Russia could be stopped she 
would threaten British interests in China, which were already “so enormous, 
and the potentialities of the trade are so gigantic that I feel that no more 
vital question has even been presented”.  Again Chamberlain was looking to 
the future, not just at how important the China market was in 1898, but 
also how important developing that trade would be in the future.  Given the 
strong economic links Chamberlain believed existed between the Empire 
and prosperity at home, he was certainly being consistent.  Also in 
reference back to Salisbury’s speech, any loss of this enormous trade, or 
even the capturing of new emerging Chinese markets behind rival tariff 
barriers, would constitute a loss of informal dominion; the areas the 
tentacles of British trade could reach into would have been curtailed.  
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Chamberlain finished on a stern warning and with a veiled reference to the 
desirability of an Anglo-German alliance: 
“If the policy of isolation [...] is to be maintained [...], then the 
fate of the Chinese Empire may be, probably will be, hereafter 
decided without reference to our wishes and in defiance of our 
interests. [...] we must not reject the idea of an alliance with 
those Powers whose interests most nearly approximate to our 
own.” 
The Germans were considered to have “nearly approximate” interests to 
Britain’s because of her position as the ‘late starter’ in the imperial race.  
Germany lacked the naval capacity to project power at any great distance, 
and while she was embarked on acquiring the balance of naval power in the 
North Sea, she still lacked the world wide network of coaling stations and 
bases required to fight at a distance and to protect her trade during any 
war.  Therefore it appeared to Chamberlain that she would prefer areas to 
remain open to trade than for them to be cut off thus allowing her to benefit 
from the trade, without needing the power to enforce her own formal 
control.  He also assumed that as Germany was becoming a serious 
competitor in terms of trade, she would want to preserve her own access to 
as many markets as possible.  He assumed his beliefs about the links 
between Empire and trade with British prosperity were also understood by 
the Germans.  If the British population and polity was dependent on trade 
with the Empire, formal and informal, then so too Germany must be 
dependent on their own trade.  The point he missed was how powerful a 
fear Germany held of that long European frontier with Russia.  However 
important her international trade became it was always likely to be easier to 
give up a part of it than fight a war across that border.  The Kaiser also 
noted that “the further the Russians engaged in Asia, the quieter they are 
sitting in Europe.”506  While it was certainly in Germany’s interests to 
encourage the diversion of her European rivals into concentrating on their 
colonial rather than European interests, there was again a short sightedness 
in German thinking.  Diverting other European powers onto colonial 
ventures may seem to secure the European peace but it also encouraged 
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the planting of the very “seeds and causes of conflict amongst civilized 
nations” that Salisbury had warned about.507  Britain and Russia and Britain 
and France, came close to open breaches in 1898; all due to colonial 
quarrels.  While Germany had few colonies there was little danger of a 
colonial issue producing a European war involving her.  However, she was 
desperate to acquire more of these liabilities, and her attempts to do so 
were alarming to the other European Powers.  She could not expect to have 
encouraged Russia and France in the colonial arena for ever without 
eventually arriving at a collision with one or the other. 
In all Chamberlain had laid out a straight forward assessment of Britain’s 
position in 1898.  There was nothing in it that was glaringly erroneous.  
Britain was isolated and she was incapable of defending all her interests, 
even Salisbury had admitted so much.  The main differences between the 
two speeches can be summed up thus: Chamberlain was prepared to admit 
Britain’s over extension and that the quickest remedy to that was an 
alliance; Salisbury was not prepared to admit that weakness but believed 
that the best remedy was Imperial retreat through the granting of graceful 
concessions and the swallowing of jealousies as areas fell into the influence 
of other Powers.  Both were reactive but one offered the appearance of a 
way out, the other the slow acceptance of relative decline.  Chamberlain 
had every reason to expect that the public would respond well to his 
candour.  There was nothing in his speech which had not already been 
commented on in the press over the previous couple of months.  However, 
Chamberlain was not seer like in reading public opinion.  What was 
acceptable criticism from observers outside of government was always likely 
to be treated differently when coming from the mouth of a senior Cabinet 
Minister.   
Public responses were widely different some welcomed Chamberlain’s plain 
speaking while others eschewed his rudeness.508  Parliamentary opinion was 
                                       
507 Langer, p.516; "The Primrose League." The Times, 5/05/1898, p.7 
508 “Mr Chamberlain As Foreign Minister.”, FR, Aug 1898, Vol 64, pp.317-25 for a 
positive response and Stead. W.T., “Russian and Mr. Chamberlain’s Long Spoon”, 
CR, Jun 1898, Vol 73, pp.761-777 for a decidedly negative one, though coupled 
with wider criticism for the Government’s response to the China Crisis. 
170 
 
more damning but also revealed how blinkered many opinions were to the 
nature of British Power.  Asquith asked in Parliament “what have we done or 
suffered that we are now to go touting for allies in the highways and 
byways of Europe?”509  Asquith, either deliberately or worse ignorantly, 
ignored that there are other agencies in the world.  It was not what the 
British had or had not done; it was the growth of Germany, it was the 
forming of the Franco-Russian Alliance which appeared to threaten Britain’s 
interests, in other words it was the actions of others that had produced the 
need.  Asquith’s quip suggested that the actions of other Powers were 
irrelevant thus demonstrating a blindness to both relative decline and the 
dangers of a nonchalant attitude to the formation of foreign power blocs.  
Many of these responses were as much to the nature of Chamberlain’s 
action as to his assessment of Britain’s geopolitical position.  “A more abject 
confession of weakness never was made by a British statesman than this 
confession made by the Colonial Secretary”, who was “a strange and 
wonderful statesman, with his new diplomacy, his new departures, and his 
unauthorised programmes.”510  Harcourt added his own attack “Of all the 
humiliations which [...] we have been subjected to, I think this seeking in 
forma pauperis for allies on the ground of our feebleness is the greatest”.511  
Even the Kaiser “doubted whether it was judicious to proclaim so openly the 
necessity of an alliance”.512  But while the Parliamentarians made much of 
how the ‘Long Spoon’ speech had little of substance on how to remedy 
these problems, and while they embarrassed the Unionists by demanding 
whether this was settled policy, they ignored the wider point.  Chamberlain 
was not advertising his wears to the global audience, though he certainly 
conducted himself under their watchful eyes, but to the people of Britain.  It 
was British attitudes towards isolation that he hoped to address and not the 
great Powers.  This did not change the fact that he compared Russia to the 
devil or that he had admitted Britain, alone, was powerless to prevent 
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Russian designs in China.  What he hoped for was to start preparing opinion 
for an alliance, and to rally calls for one.   
The reaction to the speech certainly curtailed Chamberlain’s freedom of 
action.  Liberal opinion in Parliament must have only underlined Bülow’s 
fears concerning ratification of any treaty.513  Lascelles reported the German 
Emperor as viewing “with the greatest pleasure a thoroughly good 
understanding with England” even though “Germany did not intend to go to 
war with Russia for the purpose of driving her out of China.”514  
Chamberlain’s proposals had ultimately been aimed at containing the 
spread of Russian influence not to drive her out of China completely.  He 
also hoped that the threat of a more serious war would constrain the 
Russian Bear rather than actually having to fight her.  Otte suggests that 
Salisbury had this dispatch printed up for the Cabinet in an attempt to 
embarrass Chamberlain.515  Otte has a tendency, despite his over arching 
theme of a wide breakdown of the foreign policy consensus, if one had 
existed in the first place, to focus too exclusively on Salisbury and 
Chamberlain.  The sharing of this despatch would also chasten those who 
had allowed the Colonial Secretary his head.  It was not simply to 
embarrass one strong willed Cabinet Minister, but to act as a warning to 
those who dealt with and supported him, which included Balfour.  It would 
have been remarkable that a man of Salisbury’s perceptive nature had not 
seen through Balfour’s smoke and mirrors.  Whether the dispatch 
embarrassed Chamberlain is difficult to say, the man was so full of energy 
and a desire to keep moving forwards that it is doubtful it acted as a direct 
check to him at all.  His political position was relatively secure he could hurt 
Salisbury and the Government but just as Balfour was to discover, he would 
be much more dangerous once freed from office.  He needed to be kept 
close.  The German despatch also contained a hint that a “good 
understanding” was desirable.  If he was embarrassed it certainly did not 
stop Chamberlain from trying to act on it in any way he could.  While the 
‘Dying Nations/Long Spoon’ spat had constrained his actions, he continued 
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unabated to chaff against his cage in order to find space to continue to push 
his ideas.  Therefore Chamberlain arranged to meet Lascelles when he was 
next home, and induced Goschen, Hamilton and Chaplin to join him.  
Lascelles was asked to continue to probe the Kaiser in order to discover how 
far the Emperor was committed to forming an eventual alliance.516  That 
this group lacked both Devonshire and Balfour, whom had both been party 
to the Chamberlain/Hatzfeldt talks, demonstrated how, temporarily at least, 
Chamberlain had lost the essential support required for furthering any of his 
plans.  It is in this embarrassment of other Cabinet colleagues that deprived 
Chamberlain of much of the room to manoeuvre.  However, it also 
demonstrated that he was unwilling to sit still or to be contained.  Having 
let Chamberlain have his head the other dissenting and concerned members 
of Cabinet found it hard to restrain him again.   
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5: The Triumvirate Dance: Salisbury, Chamberlain, Balfour and Anglo-
German negotiations. 
 
The dust eventually settled on Chamberlain’s and Salisbury’s public spat.  
The Colonial Secretary had lost the initiative over the German alliance and 
as the most senior of his Cabinet colleagues had withdrawn their support, 
there was little he could do about it.  During this time the Niger negotiations 
were entering their final stage and while Chamberlain had managed to 
prevent Salisbury from offering the French another ‘graceful concession’, 
relations between the two men remained strained.  The situation in China 
had begun to normalise and Salisbury settled into a long negotiation with 
Russia over a proposed extension of the Teintsin-Shanhaikuan rail line right 
up to Newchwang at Russia’s doorstep in Manchuria.  Salisbury and later, 
while he was once again away in France, Balfour would both try to use 
British interest in this somewhat provocative line, as a bartering tool to 
push the Russians into accepting a delineation of spheres of concessionary 
interest.  Britain would respect and support Russia’s right to seek 
concessions in Manchuria in return for a like commitment with regards to 
the Yangtze on the British side.  The resultant Scott-Muravev agreement, 
finalised on 20th April 1899, was somewhat broader, extending the Russian 
sphere to anywhere north of the Great Wall but vitally omitted the British 
stipulation that trade would be permitted unhindered in each sphere.517  
Chamberlain’s influence can be detected in the earliest phase of the 
negotiations while Balfour still had the Foreign Office.  In mid August 1898 
Balfour and the Cabinet considered violent means and strong language to 
intimidate the Russians into agreeing with their terms; this was certainly 
indicative of Chamberlain’s opinions. 518  Confidence was running high after 
the demonstration of British resolve at Fashoda had appeared to hold the 
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day.  The agreement also recognised Britain’s interests in the Yangtze which 
compliment the informal understanding already reached with the 
Germans.519  Witte had also offered an agreement to bind both parties “on 
any occasion of a question arising in any part of the world ... involving a 
possible conflict between their respective interests.”    This agreement bore 
many similarities to Salisbury’s own ideas made prior to the leasing of Port 
Arthur.  Now Salisbury commented on how such a deal “would be a good 
deal laughed at” and Balfour agreed that it was “derisory”.520  The threat of 
military force and Salisbury’s refusal to compromise at Fashoda, had not 
just cowed the French and demonstrated that Britain was prepared to 
defend her interests, but it had also strengthened Salisbury’s resolve.  
Nothing had actually changed in the geo-strategic position between Russia 
and Britain but Salisbury was no longer prepared to agree to such 
compromises.  This position rather lends weight to Chamberlain’s much 
earlier suggestion that Britain “ought to defy someone.”521 
In the immediate aftermath of the ‘Dying Nations’/’Long Spoon’ fiasco 
Chamberlain’s attention had focused on the settlement of the Niger 
question.  However, he soon found himself negotiating with the Portuguese 
over a loan secured on some of her Africa possessions, including Delagoa 
Bay which had come to be described as the key to peaceably solving 
Britain’s problems with the Transvaal.  The origins of the negotiations 
rested with a group of British financiers in 1897, this led to the Portuguese 
government opening negotiations in the hope of securing a loan based on 
the customs of Lourenco Marques and the railway as security.  Chamberlain 
was the negotiator and was prepared to offer a guarantee of Portugal’s 
African possessions.  However, the Portuguese Government were afraid that 
France or Germany would object and take action.  Sensitive to the 
perception of weakness that any agreement which appeared to diminish 
their sovereignty entailed, they allowed the proposals to drop.  Chamberlain 
summed up two options as the negotiations broke off in June 1897:  “The 
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alternatives were a guarantee of territory in exchange for the control of the 
railway and port or assistance to a loan in return for a full and complete 
assurance of the maintenance of the status quo with no concessions of any 
kind.” 522  It was not until the German seizure of Kiaochow that Portugal 
would again approach the British.  Fearing they may be made the object of 
German aggression, on the grounds of diminishing interest on Portugal’s 
German bonds, Soveral again called upon Bertie.  The Assistant Under-
secretary was left with the impression that Soveral was agitated by a fear 
that Wilhelm “appeared to prefer some slight advantage to Germany, rather 
than the preservation of a monarchy in Portugal”.  The Portuguese minister 
hoped this fear would move the Cortés in Lisbon to agree to a British loan in 
order to help preserve the monarchy.  Bertie was not prepared to calm 
Soveral’s fears. The Kaiser, after the Kruger Telegram fiasco, was unlikely 
to try anything at Delagoa Bay but Germany “might try to obtain Tiger Bay” 
in Angola. Britain would have no reason to object as the Portuguese 
Government had not accepted the “very liberal offers” made previously.523  
Before Soveral returned to Lisbon to discuss the situation with his 
Government, Bertie wrote a memorandum on the subject. 
Bertie discussed five different ways to provide support to Portugal, but the 
salient point was fear of foreign intervention.  Any “ordinary commercial 
loan” could not be floated without Portugal negotiating for debt 
consolidation.  Germany could then use this to place Portugal’s African 
possessions under her own control.524  While Bertie had not imagined that 
Germany would “burst in upon the Anglo-Portuguese discussions” as 
Kennedy put it, intervention had been anticipated and so it should have 
come as no surprise when Hatzfeldt, on 14th June 1898, visited Salisbury to 
do just that.525  Chamberlain and Soveral had been making smooth progress 
over the terms of a loan. This was based upon the British reaffirming the 
ancient Treaties of Alliance with Portugal, and the maintenance of the status 
quo in Africa, in return for a loan secured against the duties of Mozambique.  
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Salisbury told Hatzfeldt that he “would not fail to inform him in due time of 
any steps that we might take which might concern the rights or legitimate 
interests of Germany in the Portuguese Colonies.”526  It appears that British 
statesmen heartily felt qualified to decide for others what their “legitimate 
interests” were.527  Despite Salisbury repeatedly explaining to Hatzfeldt that 
he was unable to discuss financial matters concerning Portugal and Britain, 
the Germans remained determined to “not have it though!” 528  Salisbury 
went so far as to send a clear warning of the depth of Britain’s commitment 
to Portugal; “the Cabinet were fully alive to the importance of the ancient 
Treaties between Portugal and Great Britain, [...] the Treaties contained 
stipulations which, in substance, were still binding upon Great Britain.”  
Naturally this warning was ignored, as the Germans could not entertain the 
thought that Britain would ever make an honourable ally.  Hatzfeldt insisted 
that Germany be consulted immediately despite Salisbury having plainly 
agreed that such consultation would be necessary if control of territory was 
concerned.529  Bülow also had the German Ambassador in Lisbon threaten 
the Portuguese king.  Salisbury’s reassurances that the discussion did not 
anticipate any territorial concessions were undermined by the Monarch’s 
response that Britain’s conditions were unacceptable.  This was far from the 
case; the Portuguese king was merely attempting to find language which 
allowed him to back away from the British proposal in the face of the 
German Ambassador who was in full military uniform.530  As it was fear that 
had driven the Portuguese into re-approaching Britain, this further 
intimidation was highly effective.  Soveral met with Salisbury and the crux 
of the matter was discussed.  Salisbury would not accept that a loan 
secured against the customs of any territory constituted an alienation of 
sovereignty or territory and pointed out several ludicrous examples.  
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Soveral enquired about the ancient treaties again, which again Salisbury 
confirmed were still enforce, except where the passage of time had 
invalidated interests.531  Had Portugal remained steadfast this could have 
caused a very serious problem.  It would be wrong to criticise the Germans 
too strongly, though their actions were certainly well beyond what was 
usually acceptable behaviour.  Their demands were driven by two concerns, 
firstly a desperate need, verging on greed, for territorial expansion, as 
much due to domestic pressure as their own imperialist goals and secondly, 
a near pathological suspicion of British diplomatic methods. 532  Salisbury 
was quite right that there was no legal reason why Germany should be 
interested in financial arrangements between two parties but he was being 
stubborn about dealing sensitively with German interests.  At the Cabinet 
on 22nd June Salisbury had wished to bring an end to discussions with 
Germany; he was overruled.  Chamberlain and Balfour both thought that 
the Foreign Secretary was not responsive enough to German overtures.533  
Sometime in June Chamberlain sketched out several points of a plan for a 
seven year defensive Anglo-German Alliance, to be activated by an attack 
from any two Powers upon either of the contracting parties.  The Colonial 
Secretary believed the plan would also have needed to; provide a solution 
for China based upon his suggestions made to Hatzfeldt but never 
communicated to Berlin; a free hand for Britain in Egypt and the Transvaal; 
Delagoa Bay to Britain from Portugal and Tiger bay to Germany; for 
Germany a free hand in the Philippines and the settlement of outstanding 
colonial issues, including Samoa, the Neutral Zone and arrangements for a 
Cape to Cairo railway.534  Chamberlain was hopeful but cautious.  Only after 
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“carefully considering the conversation you[Salisbury] had with Hatzfeldt” 
did he find “in it the foundation for an arrangement.”  He considered it 
sensible to come to some agreement about “division of spheres on both the 
east & western side.”  Typical of the Colonial Secretary he hoped to meet 
some of Germany’s more extravagant demands by widening the scope of 
any agreement into a general settlement: “But I wish we could do 
something bigger still & bring Togoland into the bargain.”535  Langer 
comments that the Germans “would not for a moment entertain” giving up 
Togoland or her right to extraterritoriality in Zanzibar.536  Langer fails, 
however, to consider the German demand for Walfish Bay, which was part 
of the self governing Cape Colony.  Similarly, the demand for Blantyre in 
Nyassaland was also out of the question, as they were British territories and 
they could not have been given up to Germany in exchange for Britain being 
‘permitted’ to lend money to Portugal.537  Chamberlain had only attempted 
to include the German territories in an effort to meet Germany’s wishes; a 
trade of territories and rights could be contemplated but he could not 
exchange territory and receive nothing in return.  He was applying to the 
Germans the same rules he had developed with which to deal with French 
demands in West Africa, namely that concessions should only be of like 
value.  Salisbury and Chamberlain worked closely together throughout July 
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1898.538  On 23rd Chamberlain sent Salisbury a memorandum on the 
progress of the negotiations. In it Chamberlain noted that: 
“The present position of Portugal [...] affords an opportunity 
for testing the possibility of untied action by the two 
Powers[Britain and Germany], and, if an arrangement could be 
arrived at [...], it might lead to an agreement on other still 
more important questions. 
But hither to every attempt to arrive at a common base of 
action has been frustrated by extravagant and irrelevant 
demands put forward on behalf of the German Government 
and of such a character as to give rise to the suspicion that 
there is no real desire on their part to come to any 
understanding.” 
These were not idle words.  Chamberlain had been disposed to offer a 
favourable solution to all colonial issues with the Germans, as part of a 
general alliance; he had always warned that without the alliance each 
colonial issue would have to be looked at on its individual merits.  
Chamberlain was not pro-German and did not wish to appease Germany 
with one sided agreements.  He would do so only in return for an 
agreement which would also substantially aid Britain; the Colonial Secretary 
was always pro-British in every attitude.  It was Balfour who had taken on 
the message of do et des from the failed Hatzfeldt/Chamberlain talks.  The 
memorandum continued to state in damning terms that Germany had 
demanded to be admitted to any Anglo-Portuguese arrangement on equal if 
not better terms than the British, “but also that Great Britain, without any 
compensation whatever, should surrender two important positions in her 
undoubted possession.”  The Anglo-Portuguese agreement was: 
[I]ntended to maintain the status quo and to guarantee the 
territorial rights of Portugal [...].  To suppose that Gt. Britain 
would give up important & valuable positions, [...] in order to 
secure the assent of Germany to such an arrangement as this, 
is so preposterous that it leads inevitably to the conclusion that 
the proposal was only made in order to bring the negotiations 
to a close. 
H.M. Government are sincerely desirous of an understanding 
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with Germany, but such an understanding can only be arrived 
at on equal terms. 539 
These were hardly the words of a man prepared to offer much by the way of 
blackmail for German neutrality.  Salisbury responded, enclosing a despatch 
from Lascelles: “It looks to me as if the Germans were quite sincere in 
desiring a rapprochement between the two powers: but that their view of 
their just claims differs so very widely from ours that the desired end is yet 
a long way off.”  Chamberlain agreed: “Unless they are able to modify the 
opinion they have formed of the value of their neutrality, we must certainly 
look elsewhere for allies.”540  By this stage Portugal had already withdrawn 
her request for a loan.541  Salisbury struggled on and before leaving for 
France had successfully convinced the Germans to drop the requests for 
British territory.542  Early in August Balfour was again left to deputise for his 
uncle.543  
Balfour moved quickly to complete the negotiations.  Immediately upon 
taking them up Hatzfeldt reinserted a demand that Britain assign the 
Portuguese part of Timor to Germany as security for any future loan.544  
Balfour pressed on with drafting the declarations of an agreement.  
Chamberlain was highly critical of the arrangement.  He started off by 
warning Balfour that the Germans may reveal the content of the discussions 
to a third party and that he agreed with Salisbury that Timor should be left 
out.  The Colonial Secretary immediately moved on to items of more serious 
concern. “I do not think we should admit the contention that we should 
never realise our security in Delagoa Bay unless at the same time the 
Germans entered into possession of their spheres”.  He also steadfastly 
stuck to maintaining the British right of pre-emption to Delagoa Bay.545  The 
next day Chamberlain was trying to underline what the two men had in 
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common, while the negotiations were heading on to “rather dangerous 
grounds” he did not think there was a difference in principal between 
himself and the deputised Foreign Secretary: “We both want (1) control of 
Deliagoa[sic] Bay & Railway (2) good relations, and if possible an alliance 
and understanding, with Germany.”  With regards to Delagoa Bay the 
Colonial Secretary felt that the proposed agreement would not give Britain 
anything she did not already have under her pre-emptive rights.  In fact, he 
had started to fear that the agreement would result in making the “exercise 
of this right [...] conditional on the assent of Germany, or on her getting 
some other advantage which she has not got at present.”  Only if Balfour 
was “clear” that this agreement did not “in any way weaken our existing 
position” would he be prepared to let negotiations continue and even then, 
only if they could secure the second objective of a “better understanding 
with Germany.”  On this note Chamberlain was also unhappy, Hatzfeldt 
spoke like “an injured man who is being fleeced by usurers. [...] Unless he 
recognises that the advantage is very much on his side I should say it is not 
worth while going on”.  Unless Germany would widen the deal to include, 
the Neutral Zone, Zanzibar and China, Chamberlain would insist that Balfour 
“would not yield another inch”.  On receiving this letter Balfour asked 
Chamberlain to come to see him and “talk the matter over”.546  It is clear 
that at this stage Chamberlain was very much opposed to continuing the 
talks and would certainly have preferred them to end rather than granting 
any other further concessions.  His priority was to prevent any foreign 
interference at Delagoa Bay and to put his country’s pre-emptive rights on 
an even stronger footing, if not to take immediate control of the railway.  
These rights were rapidly becoming derogated into requiring a third Power’s 
assent before they could be exercised.   
Hatzfeldt and Balfour next met on 18th August and Balfour gave the 
Ambassador copies of the proposed declarations which were to form the 
final agreement.547  He also wrote immediately to the Colonial Secretary to 
outline Hatzfeldt’s renewed demand for Timor which Balfour took an 
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ambivalent attitude towards: “Personally I should not regard the question of 
the slightest importance one way or the other excepting in so far as it may 
hurt the feelings of Portugal.”  The nephew had none of Salisbury’s disdain 
for German greed or methods.  While Balfour had “altered the Draft 
Agreements so that the question of our pre-emptive rights over Delagoa 
Bay were not raised” he was “not quite sure that on this particular point I 
am wholly at one with you.”  Where Chamberlain wished to break off 
negotiations, Balfour believed that the right of pre-emption would be 
useless because Portugal would mortgage Lourenço Marques long before 
selling it.  If the agreement was in force at the time of a subsequent 
default, then the area would fall to Britain anyway, if it did not, an 
argument could ensue between Portugal’s various creditors.  As the whole 
tenor of the agreement was to maintain the status quo in South Africa until 
such a default then the pre-emptive right was inconsistent with it.  When 
asked what Hatzfeldt believed Britain was getting in return for all this, he 
replied “that this arrangement would be a public advertisement to the 
Transvaal Government that they had nothing more to hope for from 
Germany”. 548  Chamberlain was not impressed: 
The only advantage to us is the assurance of Germany’s 
abstention from further interference in Delagoa Bay and the 
Transvaal – in other words, we pay blackmail to Germany to 
induce her not to interfere where she has no right of 
interference.  Well! It is worthwhile to pay Blackmail 
sometimes.549 
His comments about blackmail were made less in agreement with lines of 
Balfour’s policy and more in the nature of trying to be optimistic. The initial 
hope of solving Britain’s problems with the Transvaal peacefully, by gaining 
control of her communications with the sea, had become much less likely.  
There was to be no way to do so unless Portugal defaulted on her debts and 
effectively became subject to a retreat from her empire.  His consolation 
was that if it became necessary to subdue the South African Republic, 
Germany would not interfere. 
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Hatzfeldt again saw Balfour and the declarations were amended.  Timor was 
to be included and return for Germany would surrender her right of 
extraterritoriality in Zanzibar when the agreement came into effect.  A 
provision was added to ensure the rate of interest to be offered would be as 
low as possible “to conciliate Portuguese opinion”.  It is difficult to imagine 
that Portugal would be so conciliated if she discovered how her colonial 
empire had been tidied up as security for a loan she did not even want.  
Balfour felt it important to draw attention to Hatzfeldt’s parting comments, 
the impression that Germany was not behaving cordially, with her threats of 
going to other powers and even of causing trouble in Egypt, was “in the 
strongest language [...] mistaken, and that his Government [...] was 
prepared to regard this agreement about South Africa as a new departure of 
the happiest augury for future relations of the two Empires.”  This informed 
Balfour, who was still very much in favour of an eventual Anglo-German 
alliance, that his conciliatory response to Bülow’s concept of do et des was 
bearing fruit.550  However, word reached Balfour that the Kaiser was 
“evidently annoyed at the prospect of the negotiations breaking down,” and 
felt “that he had been treated with scant consideration”.551  The pressure 
was on to conclude an agreement after having come so far. 
After a conversation with Hatzfeldt that same day, Balfour wrote in haste to 
Chamberlain, he was struggling to reconcile the British right of pre-emption 
with the German demand that only simultaneous gains were acceptable.  
Balfour also pointed out that if Britain exercised her right of pre-emption 
and then Germany demanded something similar from Portugal, the ancient 
treaties between Britain and Portugal would require Britain to “come to 
Portugal’s assistance.”  All of this was an attempt to force Chamberlain to 
accept giving up pre-emption.552  Balfour had included some draft verbiage 
as a suggestion to meet Chamberlain’s desire to retain some right of pre-
emption; the solution was that if one power gained a privilege not specified 
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by the agreement but in the geographical area it covers, the party 
concerned would not object to the other Power doing similarly.553  In a 
longer letter of the next day it appeared that Balfour was prepared to 
indulge in some creative thinking in order to persuade himself that the deal 
was a good one.  The acting Foreign Secretary had come around to “the 
view that” his verbiage of the previous day “might be accepted.”  As an 
example Balfour suggested that if Britain, acting due to some complication 
with the Transvaal, concluded a temporary concession from Portugal over 
Delagoa Bay, then Germany would gain the right to demand a similar 
temporary arrangement in their sphere.  Balfour believed Germany would 
not bother to exercise this right and even if she did, it would do no 
permanent damage to Portugal as both arrangements would be temporary.  
This rather ignored how sensitive the Portuguese Government was to the 
pressure of domestic opinion.  To believe that no permanent damage would 
be done to Portugal belittles what it was that Balfour was expecting Portugal 
to do without any consultation.  If Britain were to need a temporary 
arrangement with her oldest ally it would have been very odd to have that 
arrangement refused. However, the Portuguese public would be surprised 
and angered if they were subsequently presented with a similar temporary 
demand on behalf of Germany, whose government would be acting under 
the pressure of their own public opinion.  Portuguese anger would have 
likely deepened to fury when her oldest ally, Britain, whom she had just 
assisted, announced that she would do nothing to support them against this 
German demand.  How this loss of face for the Portuguese monarchy and 
the nation, which considered her imperial dominions as her last saving 
grace, “would not do any permanent injury” Balfour does not answer.  
Balfour had also agreed to drop the requirement for Germany to give up her 
extraterritoriality in Zanzibar in return for Timor as this would suggest the 
British hoped or at least expected that Portugal would eventually fail and 
the agreement would come into force.554 
                                       
553 Balfour to Chamberlain, 22/08/1898, JC5/5/34 
554 Balfour to Chamberlain, 22/08/1898, JC5/5/35; for German opinion on the 
agreement as another sell out to the British see Kennedy, Antagonism, p.236; for 
185 
 
Chamberlain’s earlier note that “it is worthwhile to pay Blackmail 
sometimes”, is often quoted to exemplify his concurrence with Balfour’s 
actions.555  This implies that the Colonial Secretary was happy with the deal 
and willing to meet German demands.  Sufficient attention is rarely paid to 
his later comments in reply to Balfour.  Chamberlain had become “much 
less eager than I was for any arrangement, and I should not break my heart 
if the negotiations came to an end.”  He had “never anticipate[d] that the 
Germans would be so greedy”.  The arrangement as it stood would not be 
acceptable to public opinion; all it did was give Britain permission to do 
what she a legal right to do anyway, just without German interference.  In 
fact, Portugal may have extended Britain’s pre-emptive rights to all her 
African possessions if they had not been scared off, and while Germany 
would have been angry, she would certainly not have gone to war and 
would have had no “legal grounds of objection.”  He went on to reconsider 
the hope that the agreement may lead to a warming of Anglo-German 
relations: 
Of course if this agreement could be assumed to be the 
beginning of a cordial understanding with Germany I should 
think the price paid was not too high, but I fear that the whole 
tone of the negotiation shows that Germany feels no particular 
gratitude to us for our sacrifices, and accordingly on all 
questions which still remain unsettled we are likely to find 
them as unreasonable in the future as they have been in the 
past.  On these grounds I cannot be enthusiastic about the 
agreement, although, I recognise that having gone so far we 
must loyally do our best to carry it through. 
Chamberlain then laid out his thoughts on the issues still in question.  
Balfour’s solution to the pre-emption problem was acceptable to 
Chamberlain only if it was limited to offering no objection to Germany 
gaining a like privilege by diplomatic means: “the Germans would not be 
able to compel her to do this by force without coming into conflict with us 
[...].  In other words, by your draft we do not insist that the surrender of 
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right by Portugal should be equal & simultaneous, but merely promise not 
to take objection if they are.”  This was a dangerous interpretation; 
Germany had inserted this demand to ensure that this exact occurrence 
never happened.  While still keeping to the exact letter of the agreements 
acting in this way would have breached the spirit of them in a manner that 
Germans most feared.  Chamberlain wanted to underline this interpretation 
by adding “by agreement” into Balfour’s proposed wording.  The Colonial 
Secretary also closed with a plea to try to keep Zanzibar in the agreement, 
because if that extraterritoriality was dropped, Britain could refuse it to the 
French.556  Chamberlain was aware of the potential problems that would be 
caused if the agreement should fail to materialise, but his objections here 
are strong.  He did not want this agreement and accurately predicted that it 
would not help Britain in South Africa, or improve Anglo-German relations.   
Chamberlain’s strong objections were overruled.  The convention ultimately 
gave up Britain’s right of pre-emption and omitted any reference to 
Zanzibar.557  Balfour confessed to the absent Salisbury that the deal had 
been done.  Worried that “you[Salisbury] & my colleagues will have to take 
the responsibility for my handiwork” he went on to explain that the right of 
pre-emption was originally used to try to keep Germany out of South Africa, 
but under the convention she “keeps herself out, and is pledged to help us 
to keep out third powers.”  He went on to suggest that the right had not 
been given up, only prevented from being acted upon unless Germany 
gained a like concession: “E.G. of course, Tiger Bay”.558  The acting Foreign 
Secretary failed to realise that this pre-emptive right had also been used to 
prevent Portugal from allowing the bay to be developed by foreign private 
concerns, he thus failed to recognise the threat that commercial 
development presented to the British.559  Balfour was only permitted to 
include a stipulation for allowing “occasional privileges” so Britain could 
theoretically use the railway, with Portugal’s permission, if at war with the 
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Transvaal.  The acting Foreign Secretary was not permitted to use the word 
temporary as the Germans feared “a temporary privilege might last 30 
years!!”  While this may seem a bit churlish it should be remembered that 
Britain was still in ‘temporary’ occupation of Egypt and had been for sixteen 
years.  Balfour explained to Salisbury that Chamberlain had desired to 
remain “absolutely unfettered over pre-emption rights. But this I feel quite 
sure was impracticable we had to choose between some such agreement as 
I have made and breaking off the whole thing.  This last alternative, when 
the matter had gone so far, would in my judgement have been very 
unfortunate.”560  Balfour was not prepared to sacrifice the deal for the sake 
of Chamberlain’s desire to gain control of Delagoa Bay.  The right of pre-
emption had not been specifically aimed at Germany either; Britain would 
have been able to exercise that right if any other Power had tried to 
alienate the territory from Portugal.  With this agreement the hope of 
settling the South African difficulties by controlling the Transvaal’s 
communications and trade with the outside world, which had worked 
tolerable well when the Transvaal had been dependent on the Cape Colony’s 
rail network, was lost.  Balfour signed, “for good or ill” the final agreement 
on 30th August 1898.561  In fact Britain had previously managed to prevent 
the port from competing with British ports in South Africa by using her pre-
emptive rights to convince Portugal to grant no foreign concessions to 
develop it.  However Article 4 in the Secret Convention withdrew Britain’s 
objections to exactly this kind of concession.562  Until the port had been 
developed, the threat posed by the shortest railway link between the 
Transvaal and the sea was hypothetical.  The Anglo German Convention 
opened the door to just such development exposing the British self 
governing colonies to potential bankruptcy.563  This made finding some final 
settlement with the Transvaal more urgent.  Balfour’s dismissal of 
Chamberlain’s concerns and the speed with which he signed the Convention 
frustrated the Colonial Secretary.  In a matter which heavily concerned his 
own ministerial office Chamberlain had been constrained.   
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From a close reading of the evidence available, it is apparent that Balfour 
and Chamberlain had been in close communication throughout the 
negotiations.  Before the reins were handed over to Balfour, Salisbury had 
also been in constant contact with Chamberlain.  The Colonial Office had 
thus been consulted at its highest level and Chamberlain was well versed in 
the concerns his office entertained.564  The Anglo-German negotiations had 
moved through several phases.  The story began with Salisbury’s reluctance 
to negotiate with Hatzfeldt.  Balfour and Chamberlain then worked together 
to ensure that the Cabinet forced Salisbury to do so.  Salisbury and 
Chamberlain then worked together during the early negotiations.  It was 
during this phase that Chamberlain began to believe that the deal would be 
of no use.  Salisbury then handed over negotiations to Balfour, who rushed 
to complete it.  He did so for a number of reasons, firstly in an attempt to 
improve Anglo-German relations and secondly, to ensure that the 
agreement happened at all.  He knew his uncle’s objections and as he 
became aware that Chamberlain had grown adverse, he realised that if he 
had handed the negotiations back to Salisbury on his return, they may 
never have been completed. 
Balfour also appeared to enjoy his brief moments at the Foreign Office and 
even asked if he could take over regularly.  When he announced the signing 
of the Convention he promised not “to trouble you, until after you resume 
the reins of office, with anything but accomplished facts”.565  Salisbury’s 
reply was telling, he was “very much obliged for your[Balfour’s] kind offer 
to stay on at the F.O. for ten days.  But I[Salisbury] cannot accept it 
because it would be imposing on you a perfectly supererogatory burden.”  
While the Prime Minister admitted there was “nothing really urgent”, he 
used the excuse of a small disagreement with Spain, which only in the most 
extreme circumstances could have led to military action, as the reason for 
why he needed to regain control of his own office.  He could not “devolve 
upon any other member of the Cabinet the responsibilities” of such 
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events.566  Salisbury would never have rescinded what his nephew had done 
while in his office, and so he would have to live with the Convention, as 
would Chamberlain, but he acted to ensure that he could regain control of 
foreign policy from Balfour as quickly as possible.  Historians have been 
quick to examine the threat that Chamberlain represented to Salisbury’s 
running of foreign policy, but it is apparent here that Balfour posed a subtler 
and, due to his actual deputising for his uncle, more dangerous 
derangement of the Prime Minister’s control.  If Chamberlain’s interference 
lead to the British Government being described as double-headed, it is only 
because he chose to make his position known publicly and later, during the 
Samoan negations, to deliberately make play upon the supposed differences 
between himself and Salisbury.  Meanwhile the third head, Balfour, 
attempted to enhance his own influence on policy by manipulating the 
differences between the Colonial Secretary and the Prime Minister, while 
relying on the familial link with Salisbury to smooth over or obscure the 
differences between them.   
Immediately upon his return Salisbury did all that he could to ensure that 
the Anglo-German Convention never came into force.  No sooner than it 
was signed, then the Germans went to work trying to convince the 
Portuguese to approach only themselves for a loan.  Salisbury minuted that 
he had “expected this.  They are not content to wait for events to give them 
their share of Portuguese territory, but wish to force the pace of destiny.”567  
Much later MacDonell, British Ambassador to Portugal, would be informing 
Salisbury that his German counterpart “understood his instructions [...] 
[were] to induce the Portuguese Government to contract a loan in order 
that, when its proceeds had been extravagantly wasted, we should remain 
with a claim on the control of the Portuguese Colonial Customs.”568  
Salisbury would not assist in that adventure, the Prime Minister was 
determined to render Balfour’s handiwork irrelevant.  The German attempts 
to speed up destiny merely deepened the Foreign Secretary’s detestation of 
them and made Balfour’s hope of better Anglo-German relations, developed 
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by the granting of advantageous concessions, illusionary.  Salisbury also 
appeared to become somewhat buoyed up by his success at Fashoda.  As 
seen above, this affected his attitude towards the Russians in China and his 
foreign policy more generally.  Brodrick reported early in 1899 that 
Salisbury was “in splendid spirits just now & thinks he has done first rate 
business with Cambon & Fr[ench] agreement.”569  In the immediate 
aftermath of that confrontation with France, the Germans hopefully awaited 
the outbreak of an Anglo-French war.  Even when the crisis was over, the 
Kaiser could not imagine that Britain would not force a war upon France.570  
This underlined the serious differences of outlook between the Germans and 
the British.  Salisbury was happy to defend what he thought essential from 
the French but, unlike Germany, he was not prepared to use war in order to 
settle other outstanding issues.  Lascelles had explicitly explained to the 
Kaiser that Britain had no desire to force war upon France yet the German 
Emperor refused to accept this.571   
Even before Salisbury had returned, Hatzfeldt had been instructed to 
enquire from Balfour the likely British response to a proposed partition of 
the Samoan Islands.  Before even meeting him, Hatzfeldt had warned the 
Auswärtige Amt that public opinion in Australia would restrain the British.572  
In his second interview with Balfour, Hatzfeldt offered to swap the Samoans 
for the Tongans (Britain to retain Tonga) and offered to drop German 
extraterritoriality in Zanzibar.  Hatzfeldt tried to tempt Balfour by reminding 
him that it was only the conclusion of the Samoan issues that stood in the 
way of creating “a lasting favourable impression in both countries”.  Balfour 
promised to write to Salisbury upon the subject as he vacated the Foreign 
Office.573  Salisbury’s reply to Hatzfeldt was simple: nothing could be 
arranged because of Australian opinion.  The German ambassador warned 
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his superiors that he believed it was “hopeless” to continue at that time.574  
At this point the Fashoda confrontation was about to enter the most acute 
phase, while Kitchener would not meet Marchand until 18th September the 
meeting had been anticipated by both the French and the British.  Monson 
in Paris had telegrammed back home with news that Delcasse was 
concerned that the victorious British would soon encounter the French.575  
This left Salisbury in a serious position and his reluctance to discuss German 
demands over the islands was well founded.  The Germans would not allow 
the matter to rest and continued to push Salisbury.  The situation was 
further clouded by various arguments between the Kaiser and the British 
Royal family, these rested upon his feelings of being treated without due 
consideration in the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha succession and with regard to 
invitations to Victoria’s eightieth birthday celebrations.  As Kennedy put it, 
“[u]sing his own peculiar logic, Wilhelm blamed everything upon Salisbury”.  
This almost made the mere continuation of the Prime Minister in office a 
stumbling block to better Anglo-German relations.576  Kennedy offers a 
highly detailed and well reasoned account of the negotiations for the 
partition of the island group, how the issue became of such great 
importance to the Germans and how Salisbury was either unable or 
unwilling to understand these pressures.  The Prime Minister was well aware 
of the internal problems Wilhelm faced and the difficulties that Hatzfeldt and 
Bülow had in operating under him: “You[Hatzfeldt] want to please your 
Kaiser and I[Salisbury] am to help you.”  Salisbury’s logic was implacable: 
how could the British Prime Minister be expected to ease the wounded pride 
of the German Emperor?  However, he wilfully ignored the signs that this 
could have resulted in very serious trouble, even when Hatzfeldt made it 
clear that he may even be withdrawn if a satisfactory settlement was not 
forthcoming.577  As the Germans feared that Salisbury was a stumbling 
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block to any solution, they decided to try to circumvent the Foreign 
Secretary and to contact Chamberlain whom they believed would be more 
amenable.   
In April 1899 the Colonial Secretary dined at Eckardstein’s house and 
Hatzfeldt reported home that Eckardstein “found him in his whole attitude 
and language greatly changed towards Germany, Chamberlain used 
expressions like the following: ‘Last year we offered you everything and you 
would not have it, now it is too late.’  You see that we have not much to 
expect from this so-called friend.”578  Hatzfeldt attempted to continue on 
with Salisbury and suggested that perhaps arbitration could settle the 
dispute.579  Chamberlain came out strongly against the idea agreeing with 
his department that “[w]e should discourage any idea of partition as it is 
obvious that the German plan would take the oyster, leaving us the 
shell.”580  An appeal to the Colonial Secretary was not likely to yield the kind 
of results the Germans were looking for.  In fact there is nothing in 
Chamberlain’s writings that indicated any desire to meet German demands.  
However, neither Bülow nor the Kaiser believed that Chamberlain had 
changed his mind.  Bülow even commented that he did not understand the 
objection as Chamberlain had described the Samoan group as “trumpery 
affairs not worth twopence to either of us”.581  The message Chamberlain 
was trying to communicate was that the Germans should expect no 
preferential treatment.  He would, and later did, entertain ideas of a 
transaction, but only on what he considered to be fair or advantageous 
terms.  The Colonial Secretary had been considering what he would want to 
include in a full settlement for some time.  Back in May, perhaps prompted 
by the discussion with Eckardstein over dinner in late April, he had written 
up some notes concerning how to divide up the various Pacific territories in 
question and pondered whether settling African disputes at the same time 
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could resolve the problem.582  Before he had even been contacted by the 
Germans, Chamberlain had also enquired about the thoughts of his 
department on the value of various Africa possessions, including the Volta 
Triangle, the Neutral Zone, Walfisch Bay and Togoland.  Selborne even 
considered throwing Gambia into the mix.583  Before his first meeting with 
Eckardstein in September, he had noted that Australia and New Zealand 
“would be bitterly offended if an arrangement was made which they 
consider unsatisfactory.”584   
Chamberlain put his ideas to Salisbury on 18th September before even 
meeting with Eckardstein.  Salisbury had enquired after his thoughts having 
finally started to take German threats seriously.  As tension rose in the 
Transvaal the Foreign Secretary could “not see my way ‘out’ quite clearly” 
he was unsure what to recommend, as it was difficult to steer between the 
opinions of the Kaiser who had decided, in desperation, to connect Samoa 
with his already promised neutrality in South Africa, and of the 
Dominions.585  Chamberlain’s response was emphatic and hardly suggests 
he was happy to try to help the Germans: “The policy of the German Empire 
since Bismarck has always been one of undisguised blackmail.”  He 
informed Salisbury that Eckardstein wanted a meeting and that it was 
scheduled for Wednesday (21st September) in his usual grandiose style the 
Colonial Secretary reminded Salisbury of his duty to the colonies and thus 
also the Dominions, he also attached a warning.  It was his “conviction [...] 
that before the first half of the 20th Century is past Germany and France will 
find themselves ousted from any possessions that they may have in the 
Pacific by the forces of Australasia- whether they will then be Colonial forces 
I do not know.”  Chamberlain had an overly inflated sense of the future 
power of Australia, but his real warning was that offending the sub-
imperialism of the Antipodean Dominions could cause the kind of splitting 
away that the Colonial Secretary devoted most of his energies into 
preventing.  Such concerns were foremost in his mind as the British were 
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about to be plunged into war to prevent South Africa from drifting out of the 
British orbit.  Having given this warning he went on to accept whatever 
Salisbury decided to do; if Britain needed to purchase Germany’s neutrality 
then the Cabinet would have to “face the Colonial indignation as best we 
can.”  He then put forward one of his ‘impossible suggestions’, offering to 
Germany the Volta Triangle, in return for the largest island in Samoa and 
the division of the Neutral Zone along the lines he had requested.  
Chamberlain would prefer to face “the indignant protests of Manchester and 
Liverpool”, than Australia and New Zealand.586  Kennedy erroneously 
thought that this idea originated with Salisbury, however the Prime Minister 
did not agree with Chamberlain’s reasoning.  He asked his Colonial 
Secretary what he thought of a German offer claiming that if Britain were 
“to make a bargain, I should prefer it[the German offer] to Volta against 
Upola[the largest Samoan Island] and Neutral zone.  This would be rather 
sacrificing Manchester and Liverpool to the Australians.  Now as Manchester 
and Liverpool will certainly never seek their independence – I prefer 
them.”587  Chamberlain’s preference for offending the interests of British 
commerce was based upon exactly the same logic.  Chamberlain was 
content to cause domestic offence in order to keep the colonies happy with 
their British connection.  However, it is impossible to know whether the two 
men were in full agreement or not, as they may have met that afternoon to 
discuss the issue.588  During his first meeting with Eckardstein, Chamberlain 
made it clear that he was very unhappy that Germany would try to make 
use of Britain’s current embarrassment in South Africa, but that he would 
do what he could.  He offered his Volta scheme to Eckardstein adding that 
the Tongan group and the Savage Island would be shared.  The German 
replied that he felt it unlikely that Germany could withdraw from the largest 
of the Samoan Islands and that he did not think sharing the islands was 
practicable.  Chamberlain replied that he could possibly yield on the island 
groups but not on the Samoan Islands.  He also explained that these ideas 
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were his own and that he had not taken any ministers’ advice.589  This claim 
was not true; he had consulted his own department extensively about the 
territories involved and had discussed his scheme with Salisbury the day 
before.  Chamberlain had chosen to play up to the belief that he and 
Salisbury were not in agreement.  By widening the prospective range of 
territories involved in the discussions, the Colonial Secretary had put 
together everything he needed to eventually lay a trap before the Germans.   
The Germans preferred to leave the Volta out of any deal, believing their 
demand for Tonga, the Savage Island and the Neutral Zone were 
reasonable compensation for giving up on Upola, the largest Samoan 
Island.590  Hatzfeldt then met with Salisbury.  Salisbury suggested a scheme 
of different compensations, which depended on who should receive the 
smaller of the two Samoan Islands in question.  He also put forward the 
idea that Germany should leave the whole of Samoa, withdraw from the 
Neutral zone and receive the Volta Triangle instead.591  Hatzfeldt mentioned 
in his telegram that this Volta-Samoa swap deal was a proposal of 
Chamberlain’s.  He also noted that the Tongan group and the Savage Island 
were not in the agreement.592  This suggested that Chamberlain and 
Salisbury had agreed to disturb Manchester and Liverpool in order to 
appease Australia and New Zealand.  It also demonstrated that the two 
British statesmen were working together or at least were in very close 
contact.  Throughout out the discussions they could almost be described as 
playing a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine.  While contemplating those proposals, 
the Germans felt that their hand was getting stronger as Britain moved 
closer to war in the Transvaal.  This was to become a serious obstacle; 
Bülow had already commented that a conciliatory solution of the Samoan 
problem was a “precondition for a truly friendly relationship” and that this 
had been pointed out “months before the escalation of the situation in 
South Africa”.593  The British probably considered that since the Anglo-
German convention on Portugal’s colonies had promised a free hand to 
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Britain in the Transvaal, these demands were not friendly at all.  Every time 
Britain settled a dispute, which the Germans invariable described as the last 
issue before real friendship could begin, another issue arose.  Bülow’s price 
for a visit from the Kaiser and German neutrality in South Africa, which had 
already been promised several times, had grown higher. Whomever 
received Savaii, the smaller island in Samoa, would also get the Tongan 
group, Savage Island, and if this were Germany the Gilberts too.  Also an 
African settlement would additionally need to be agreed with this, Germany 
would receive the Volta, and Yendi in the Neutral zone, Britain would 
receive the remnant of that zone, and then Germany would waive her 
extraterritoriality in Zanzibar.  In other words, Britain would be required to 
offend all her concerned interests; Manchester and Liverpool were to suffer 
along with Australia and New Zealand.  Germany’s price for neutrality was 
very high indeed; these demands would not prove acceptable to either of 
the two British Statesmen.594  Eckardstein meet Chamberlain again to put 
Germany’s increased demands to Britain.  While he gave Hatzfeldt to 
believe that Chamberlain was “quite inclined” to their proposals, there was 
evidence that the Colonial Secretary anticipated the objections which 
Salisbury would later offer.  On the long list of Pacific archipelagos’ 
demanded by the Germans, Chamberlain merely confirmed that he wished 
to do his utmost to meet German desires but that he could give “no 
definitive answer”. He left it to Salisbury to later definitively decline these 
ideas.  Chamberlain was also careful to retain the banks of the Volta 
triangle to Britain.  In closing, Eckardstein said that Chamberlain wanted to 
talk with Salisbury about the proposals but that the Germans should be 
“prepared for an uphill battle”.595 
While it appeared that Salisbury had agreed to some of what was discussed 
between the Colonial Secretary and Eckardstein, he was adamant about the 
areas Chamberlain had deliberately demurred over.  The Germans believed 
the two men were acting against each other and so they ordered 
Eckardstein to inform Chamberlain that Salisbury’s obstructions over Tonga 
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would ruin the whole agreement.596  However Chamberlain’s “heads of 
agreement”, penned to Salisbury on the same day of his meeting with 
Eckardstein, had Tonga to go to Britain as did his preliminary ideas sent to 
Selborne even earlier.  Salisbury commented that this newly added demand 
for Tonga was the only difference between Hatzfeldt’s and Eckardstein’s 
schemes and his Colonial Secretary agreed it was “only a try on of Ct. 
H[atzfeldt].”  He “would not give them Tonga under any circumstances” and 
that it had been Eckardstein’s suggestion that it go to Britain anyway.597  
Chamberlain then discouraged Eckardstein from seeing him again which the 
latter thought may have been down to concerns that Salisbury would 
become offended.598  It appears Chamberlain and Salisbury were effectively 
in agreement on most of Germany’s demands, the only difference being 
that Chamberlain continued to dress his objections in honey or rather to 
leave them for Salisbury to put to the Germans.  While he desired a better 
working relationship with Germany he was not prepared to actually sell 
British interests cheaply even if “it would certainly be an advantage if we 
could clear the slate of all matters of controversy at the same time.”599  
However, his relationship with Eckardstein was complex and one which 
Chamberlain managed to exploit in the Samoan dispute to Britain’s 
advantage.  Given the delicate situation with the Transvaal, Hatzfeldt should 
have been able to play his hand strongly, but due to the self imposed time 
constraints, of settling before both the Kaiser’s visit to Windsor and even 
the Tsar’s visit to Germany, the Germans were in a serious fix.  As 
Eckardstein begged Chamberlain for a meeting, Salisbury met with 
Hatzfeldt, where the ambassador insisted that If Germany gave up Upola 
and the Neutral zone she would require Tonga, another five pacific island 
groups and the Volta triangle; the future friendship of Germany required it.  
Salisbury insisted that he needed time to examine the relative values of 
these groups.  He then commented that he was “not myself able to judge” 
how Germany had demonstrated her past friendship or what their intentions 
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for the future were, should negotiations fail.  In the end he insisted that 
because Britain was not requesting any change and that as there was no 
danger in Samoa itself, the matter was not pressing and he would reserve 
the necessary time to look into it in detail.600  It must be kept in mind that 
these two correspondences, Eckardstein with Chamberlain and Hatzfeldt 
with Salisbury, were taking place simultaneously and that Chamberlain and 
Salisbury were corresponding closely, certainly immediately before 
Salisbury’s 6th October meeting with Hatzfeldt.  Salisbury was originally 
disinclined to agree to consider including the Volta triangle in the scheme, 
however, in his “provisional judgement” he believed “the balance would only 
be approximately restored if [...] Tonga were left out of the negotiation.”601  
This indicated that Chamberlain had either convinced him to accept the 
sacrificing of Manchester and Liverpool on the altar of Dominion opinion or 
to assist in potentially laying a more elaborate trap.  Kennedy ponders 
whether “the German government ever forgave the prime minister for this 
icy rejection of all their arguments and his absolute indifference to their 
haste” and while Salisbury was perfectly ‘correct’ in his judgements upon 
German haste; his utter indifference can perhaps not be taken at face 
value.602  As already seen back in late September he was concerned that 
the Samoan dispute could result in an unpleasant intervention by Germany 
in South Africa, there is nothing to suggest that this risk had vanished in 
the following short weeks.603  While German methods had surely been a 
great irritation it is hard to imagine that Salisbury would have felt safe 
given the threats that had been made.  His response on 6th October 
heightened and extenuated German sensitivity and desperation. 
As Salisbury was applying extreme levels of pressure based upon an 
indifference that bordered on diplomatic impropriety, Chamberlain finally 
agreed to meet with Eckardstein again and thus offered, to the beleaguered 
members of the German Embassy, some rays of hope.  Hatzfeldt had not 
offered any new departures in his last discussion with Salisbury this should 
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have revealed to the British statesmen that regardless of the actual material 
value of Upola the Germans were absolutely desperate to have it.  When he 
met with Eckardstein, Chamberlain proposed a new basis for the settlement 
as no formula appeared to be possible in which the two Samoan Islands in 
question could be partitioned.  He offered that Germany should retire from 
Samoa in entirety and would receive the Solomon group and Savage Island, 
as Pacific compensation.  In return Britain would give up the whole Volta 
triangle, in return for the Neutral Zone, and Germany’s right of 
extraterritoriality in Zanzibar.  This was a very astute suggestion and 
importantly Tonga was reserved to Britain.  Chamberlain warned 
Eckardstein that so far Germany had quite underestimated the value of the 
Volta Triangle and that he required a little time before he could be held to 
the new offer.  He also played upon the supposed differences between 
himself and Salisbury, explaining that he had discussed their previous ideas 
but had “encountered insurmountable difficulties”.  In reality the Colonial 
Secretary had been entirely in agreement with Salisbury’s objections to 
include Tonga and the seemingly ever increasing list of small island 
groups.604  Chamberlain had just removed the very thing Germany most 
wanted from the deal.  Given the direction of their previous conversations, 
Eckardstein had almost walked out of this meeting, this was a bold move.  
The deal itself would have been highly favourable to Germany, but 
Chamberlain was almost certainly aware that a total German withdrawal 
from Samoa was unlikely to be accepted.   
That day two other important events took place, firstly the Transvaal issued 
its ultimatum to the British which ensured the outbreak of the South African 
War, increasing Britain’s desire to clear the diplomatic decks. Secondly, the 
Admiralty passed its judgement, only requested on 6th October, on the 
value of the various groups in question.  It is remarkable that this advice 
had not been sought earlier.  Goschen had already given the Admiralty’s 
informal response as early as 7th October; The Samoan group was useless 
from a naval perspective, except for the island everyone agreed was to be 
American.  Tonga was of vital importance and had a good harbour; the 
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other small islands were only useful for landing the Pacific cable.605  
Certainly Chamberlain acted as though he were also aware of this 
information but on 9th October the official and more detailed response 
arrived and allowed him to complete his understanding of what was at 
stake.  Effectively, as Kennedy describes, the value of the Samoan Group 
versus the Tongan Group underwent an immediate reversal.606  The next 
day Chamberlain met with Eckardstein and finally felt confident enough to 
trap the Germans.  He made two different suggestions; the first was based 
upon the proposal made just the day before, but with a couple of options 
upon how best to divide up the Solomans and Gilbert islands; the second 
option was that Germany would retain the whole of Samoa but would leave 
the Soloman Islands, Tonga, the Neutral Zone (apart from Yendi) and her 
extraterritoriality in Zanzibar.  The first was more favourable to Germany 
but required her to totally give up Samoa, the second was more favourable 
to Britain and, given the new information on Tonga, could possibly be 
squared with the Dominions.  Chamberlain even drew attention to this in his 
meeting, stating that the first proposal was “more businesslike” and 
appropriate to Germany’s real interests; the second was in sympathy with 
Germany’s “sentimental interest” in Samoa.  While he went on to say that 
he preferred the first option, it is clear that Chamberlain was well aware of 
how important that sentimental interest was.  In either option, Tonga would 
remain British while the Colonial Secretary had certainly made a strong 
offer as part of his trap; the most important concession to Britain in either 
case.607   
Salisbury and Chamberlain had also discussed the matter on 10th whether 
Chamberlain had told Salisbury of his second plan or not is difficult to 
discern.  However Salisbury had noted upon the first option that he thought 
it “impossible” that Germany would give up both Samoa and Tonga.608  It 
was unlikely that Chamberlain had failed to see that his first and reportedly 
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preferred option was impossible.  Salisbury wanted to attempt to negotiate 
on the first proposal but Hatzfeldt put off seeing him.  Kennedy also felt that 
Salisbury would have disapproved of the second proposal.609  This only 
becomes likely in light of the misreading of the Prime Minister’s desire not 
to offend Manchester and Liverpool.  At the start of discussions in October 
Salisbury had preferred not to give up the Volta however, the threat that 
the ‘bad cop’ was about to take over discussions again increased the 
pressure on the Germans to arrange a deal with Chamberlain.  Eckardstein 
certainly preferred Chamberlain’s mode of procedure “to lay everything 
open on the table and discuss matters openly in a business-like way” over 
“the old principles of diplomacy that is to say the game of hide and seek”.610  
The Germans asked for some more time, which Chamberlain, being in no 
real hurry, was happy to accept, but he played upon German fears they 
should accept his first option.  Hinting that if they wanted the second it may 
fall to Hatzfeldt to force it upon Salisbury warning that they would not be 
able to rely upon support from the Cabinet as they only supported a 
decision in which Germany left Samoa.611  The Germans were left with the 
distinct impression that the second option was, in Chamberlain’s view, less 
favourable to them and harder to achieve in London.  Chamberlains trap 
was set; he was certain that he got what he wanted whichever option the 
Germans chose.  With Option A, New Zealand and Australia would be 
indebted to London, Tonga would remain British and all other points of 
contention would be wrapped up to the detriment of Manchester and 
Liverpool, although he had insisted that British Merchants would be subject 
only to the same tariff conditions as German ones.  With Option B, he 
obtained the withdrawal of Germany from Tonga and the Solomon Islands 
which could appease Antipodean opinion, while securing the best parts of 
West Africa.  Materially the second option was much in Britain’s favour. 
The Germans opted for the second proposal.  Tirptiz made a case to support 
retention of Samoa, he did so clearly on political grounds rather than 
economic or even strategic ones.  Bülow believed that the group meant too 
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much to the German people, that he was too committed by his record in the 
Reichstag to give the group up and finally because of what it meant to the 
Emperor.  Tirpitz’s opinions had only strengthened Bülow in his views.  Even 
though the Kolonialrat, hastily convened to discuss the matter, admitted the 
first proposal was superior it still opted for Samoa on prestige and idealistic 
grounds.  The London Embassy was instructed to approach Chamberlain 
with a view to accepting an amended version of his second option.  They 
wanted to retain a small apart of the Solomon group, so as to recruit labour 
for plantations in Samoa, and offered the Savage Island and 
Extraterritoriality in Zanzibar as compensation.612  Chamberlain accepted 
this agreement but warned against any more concessions and finally 
Hatzfeldt met with Salisbury and discussed it.613  The Cabinet met three 
days later and approved the scheme, so long as some small changes to the 
verbiage could be arranged.  All the prior concerns that this solution would 
be unacceptable to Salisbury proved quite unfounded.614  Salisbury did drag 
out the negotiations, ensuring that all the details were in order and to 
Britain’s satisfaction.  He knew that even in these little details Britain had a 
strong bargaining position as he was almost certainly aware that the Tsar 
and his foreign minister were arriving in Germany on 8th November.  The 
Germans were horrified at what they assumed were Salisbury’s delaying 
tactics; the Kaiser bombarded the British Military Attaché with his 
displeasure: 
Your Government in England appears to have two heads, Lord 
Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, and the one will not do what 
the other wants. With Mr. Chamberlain the negotiations 
proceed smoothly and quickly and an agreement could be 
come to with him very rapidly, but what he agrees to Lord 
Salisbury refuses to sanction, and so the affair is dragged out 
for months and months. [...] Does England not want my 
friendship, about the only one left her on the Continent? Some 
day when she is in trouble she will find that German patience 
had been tried too long.615 
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However it had been Chamberlain in Cabinet and from the Colonial Office 
who had insisted on waiting for US and Australian approval.  Many of 
Salisbury’s ‘quibbles over trifles’, based upon details in West Africa and in 
Samoa, had also originated from Chamberlain’s department.616  If the 
Germans had noticed that the British Government had two heads, they 
failed to see that they had been working for the same goal, essentially a 
settlement that was in Britain’s interests.  The Admiralty memoranda which 
rated Tonga so highly and Samoa so poorly, was decisive only in that it 
confirmed Chamberlain and Salisbury in the desirability of the group and 
provided them both with the means to appease Dominion opinion and 
confidence that Britain was not left without a strategic point.617  It is a pity 
that this had not be requested earlier as Hatzfeldt’s original suggestion was 
based upon Germany leaving Tonga in exchange for Britain leaving Samoa. 
This was offered to Balfour back in 1898 before Salisbury had even returned 
to the Foreign Office.618  It is also clear that between them Chamberlain and 
Salisbury, with their ‘bad cop/good cop’ routine, extracted far more from 
the Germans than they could have achieved alone.  While the surviving 
documentary evidence is not conclusive, it appears quite reasonable to 
assume that the two British statesmen worked together and were in near 
constant communication.  Chamberlain does not appear particularly pro-
German, he was prepared to pay highly to defend the sub-Imperial 
pretentions of the Dominons, but he offered his second proposal 
unprompted and seems to have understood that Samoa held much more 
importance to the Germans than the value of the islands truly warranted.  
He thus trapped the Germans in two important respects. Firstly, either 
option held important concession to Britain, and secondly, he had managed 
to clear up almost all outstanding colonial issues between the two 
governments.  This meant that it was very unlikely that he or any other 
British statesmen would be prepared to offer any more concessions, on 
account, for better relations later.  By choosing the Samoa option Germany 
had used up her leverage, and at a time when it was at a premium, just as 
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the South African War was starting. Eckardstein acknowledged this when he 
wrote to Chamberlain.  Bülow and Hatzfeldt wished to thank the Colonial 
Secretary for the arrangement “which does not only settle the Samoa 
question, but abolishes every colonial antagonism between the two 
countries.  They are both fully alive to the fact that without your 
intervention this settlement would have been utterly impossible”.619  It 
should be carefully noted that if this settlement did abolish every 
reasonable colonial antagonism and if Chamberlain did not expect to be able 
to ‘help’ the Germans again later, then the currency for purchasing an 
alliance had run out.  Even Balfour’s careful approach had very little he 
could give way on now, except perhaps more agreements of the type of the 
Anglo-German convention on Portugal’s Colonies, where he had effectively 
given away someone else’s territory.  Given that the British did not 
anticipate major concessions being granted at the ‘psychological moment’ 
as the supposedly inevitable Anglo-Russian war began, any Anglo-German 
alliance needed to be bought immediately or at least very soon; they had 
used up all the available currency.  Also Chamberlain’s ‘new diplomacy’ had 
actually found a solution and quickly.  Whatever criticisms had been levelled 
at him as a diplomatist in the previous year his negotiation tactics, including 
making himself unavailable at certain times, had been fully vindicated in the 
Samoan dispute.  Kennedy claims that Chamberlain’s real aim became clear 
due to the number of times he broached the idea of an Anglo-German 
alliance with Eckardstein. However just the page before it had been 
admitted that Eckardstein “was often guilty himself of the grossest 
exaggeration and of reporting what he wished to believe”, and his 
references to support such a claim rely on a single telegram and 
Eckardstein’s memoirs. A wish “to maintain the friendliest relations possible 
with Germany for the future” should not be construed into an all 
encompassing desire to enter an alliance.620  Garvin also references the 
same section of Eckardsetin’s memoirs but he noted that while Chamberlain 
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still wanted German friendship, the Colonial Secretary had warned that a 
“settlement with France and Russia” was possible.621  Chamberlain was still 
certainly in favour of an alliance, which the Prime Minister never was, but 
his enthusiasm had started to wane.  Eckardstein was also an advocate and 
had already filled Chamberlain’s head with the notion that the Kaiser was 
more sympathetic to an Anglo-German agreement than his ministers.  The 
two men were more than prepared to stretch the truth to gain what they 
wanted; it is uncertain whether Chamberlain genuinely believed the Samoan 
settlement would pave the way for an Alliance.  However, it is certain that 
he would have taken one if it were offered.  Therefore, the Kaiser’s visit to 
England and Chamberlain’s meetings with both him and Bülow, would give 
the Colonial Secretary an opportunity to test both men personally, and their 
supposed feelings towards Britain. 
The solution of the Samoan dispute came in time for the Kaisers visit to 
Windsor.  This greatly pleased the German Emperor who very much enjoyed 
his visit.  The visit was welcomed by the British too, with the Daily Mail 
going so far as to exclaim that “A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed”.622  
Bülow travelled with his august master in the hopes of preventing him from 
getting carried away by any talk of an Anglo-German alliance.  The Kaiser 
was to meet all three heads of British policy, Balfour, Chamberlain and 
Salisbury but the death of Lady Salisbury prevented the Prime Minister from 
attending.  Whatever Chamberlain had hoped may be achieved by sounding 
out the visitors and architects of German policy, Bülow, having got what he 
wanted in Samoa, had already reverted to his free hand policy. Despite 
Hatzfeldt’s desire that they do what they could for Chamberlain, Bülow 
replied coolly that the Colonial Secretary could ask for no more, the Kaiser’s 
visit was enough to ensure no continental coalition would form.623  
Essentially there would be no change from Germany’s policy of strict 
neutrality.  Chamberlain either made no note of his own about his meetings 
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with the Kaiser and Bülow, or they have been destroyed or lost and so we 
must rely upon the German records.624   
Chamberlain and Bülow discussed the future of Anglo-German relations only 
vaguely.  This was in line with Holstein’s instructions to avoid any hint of an 
alliance.  Chamberlain discussed his desires to see an Anglo-German-
American arrangement come into being; a scheme which he believed would 
secure the peace of the world by bringing together the forces of the world’s 
biggest economies.  Bülow warned that this could not, to begin with, be 
directed against Russia, but if Chamberlain wanted such common action 
then he should try to remove any causes of friction between Germany and 
the US.  Chamberlain was happy to support German aspirations to build the 
Baghdad Railway.  As the Kaiser expounded to Balfour that he would rather 
see the Russians damned than let them into Asia-Minor augured well.  
Chamberlain admitted again his concerns about Russian penetration in 
China, but was told seemingly emphatically that Germany could do nothing 
against Russia, that she wished to live in peace with her, that Germany did 
not need the British and so an alliance was unnecessary.  Chamberlain and 
Balfour were told that continuing on a case-by-case basis, such as on 
Samoa and the Portuguese colonies, was the best way to proceed.  
Chamberlain was left with the clear indication that Germany knew that an 
Alliance was “impossible; but an understanding yes.  Then when a question 
arises which only interests England, Germany would not interfere and vice 
versa- but so soon as the question involved common interest we should 
stand and act together.”625  Chamberlain suggested an agreement on 
Morocco may be possible, this idea had originally been Hatzfeldt’s, but the 
German astutely suggested negotiations should wait until Chamberlain was 
ready, but that Chamberlain could not do anything that would rouse 
                                       
624 Bülow to Auswärtigen Amtes, 24/11/1899, GP, XV, Nr.4398, pp.413-20; 
Garvin, Life, III, pp.503-5 contains a translation of part of the original document.  
However, Garvin rearranged the document into the form of a conversation but this 
still remains an easily accessible English language version of the document; for the 
‘Windsor talks’ in general see Grenville, pp.277-281; Langer, pp.656-8; Charmley, 
P.274; Bülow B., Voigt F. A. (trans.) Memoirs of Prince Von Bülow, I, (4 vols, 
London,1931) pp.357-85,  
625 Bülow to Auswärtigen Amtes, 24/11/1899, GP, XV, Nr.4398, pp.413-20; ; 
Bülow, Memoirs, I, pp.360-67;  Memo., Bigge, 20/11/1899 quoted in Grenville, 
p.281 
207 
 
Salisbury’s ire.  Earlier in the month the Colonial Secretary reinforced the 
good cop/bad cop image that the Germans, with his encouragement, had 
developed with regard to himself and Salisbury.  It would be better to 
negotiate these issues, such as Morocco, with him first rather than make 
any premature approaches to Salisbury.626  In Windsor the Germans 
seemed prepared to discuss the matter with Chamberlain via the Embassy 
as they had over Samoa, but Hatzfeldt noted later in the New Year that the 
situation had remained still because he had not received any instructions to 
discuss it.  Bülow put a question mark next to this in the marginalia.627   
The most important point was that Chamberlain came away believing that 
the time was not right for a full alliance; that until Russian interests collided 
with German interests, Germany would do nothing to offend her.  However, 
this must have frustrated the Colonial Secretary who clearly saw that 
Russian penetration in China would adversely affect German interests as 
well as the British. However, the Germans believed this problem was 
“decades!” away. 628  Chamberlain also looked forward to an anti-German 
response in Russia as the former began to penetrate Asia-Minor with her 
railway projects, which he had encouraged during the ‘Windsor Talks’.  
Chamberlain was left with the impression that so long as he could maintain 
good Anglo-German relations all he needed to do was wait for German 
interests, in the Orient or the Far East, to collide with the Russians and then 
an alliance would have become possible on reasonable terms.  It is entirely 
reasonable to consider that Balfour came away from the ‘Windsor Talks’ 
with a similar conclusion. 
That Chamberlain and Salisbury were on closer terms is evident by their 
public speeches.  After the Hatzfeldt/Chamberlain talks the two had 
indulged in a very public display of their differences.  After the Samoan 
agreement and even the commencement of the South-African war, 
Salisbury felt no need for a repeat.  His speech at the Lord’s Mayor’s 
Banquet, focused on the advantages of the Samoan agreement, the 
                                       
626 Hatzfeldt to Auswärtigen Amtes, 3/11/1899, GP, XVII, Nr.5153, p.297 
627 Hatzfeldt to Auswärtigen Amtes, 21/05/1900, Ibid., Nr.5159, pp.303-307 
628 Wilhelm’s note on Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, 26 Apr., 1898, GP, XIV pt.1, 
Nr.3793, quote on p.226 which referenced the content on p.222 
208 
 
unlikelihood of foreign interference in South Africa and the exceptionally 
warm relations between Britain and the US. The most significant points 
made, were based upon his incomprehension of why the Germans were so 
attached to Samoa and another disparaging reference to the power of public 
opinion, as expressed in newspapers, and his “great confidence that I do 
not believe that that trend of opinion affects the peoples of foreign 
countries, and I am quite certain that it does not affect their Governments.” 
629  Perhaps if the Prime Minister had less confidence in foreign 
Governments being invulnerable to the pressure of their own publics he 
could have understood the German Government’s attachment to Samoa 
somewhat more fully.  More importantly however, there was nothing in this 
speech which implied or directly criticised Chamberlain, a marked difference 
from the ‘Dying Nations’ speech the year or so before.   
Chamberlain also gave a speech in November 1899 and this ranks among 
his greatest mistakes.  Garvin stresses that Chamberlain had been unwell 
prior to giving the speech but nothing can really forgive his inability to 
anticipate the response.630  As in his great ‘Ransom’ speech, during his ‘Jack 
Cade’ period, where the use of the word ransom was unfortunate, so too in 
this speech did he mis-use the term ‘alliance’ when he claimed that between 
the US and Britain there was already a “union- the alliance, if you please–
the understanding between these two great nations is indeed a guarantee 
for the peace of the world.”  He then espoused the birth of a “new Triple 
Alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the 
Anglo-Saxon race.”  An alliance with Germany was the “natural” one, 
because there were few real conflicts of interests between the two nations.  
He also went on to describe common cultural similarities; a similarity in the 
system of justice, literature and even the basis of language.  However, in 
his private diplomacy and while he searched to find a solution of the Port 
Arthur crisis, Germany had been Chamberlain’s last port of call.  Had Japan 
been perhaps more forthcoming, his Leicester speech may have been full of 
references to the communal interests of two island nations, which thus 
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formed a ‘natural’ identification with one another.  Whether Chamberlain 
believed in the racial ideas of his time is hard to discern, he only mentioned 
such concepts directly when speaking to the public, which often harboured 
racist concepts and ideas.  Whether he too believed these concepts or just 
attempted to exploit a popular notion cannot be answered here.631  He 
finished his section on foreign policy with an attempt to contain the fallout 
that the use of the word alliance would cause.  This demonstrates that 
regardless of whether he was ill or not he had anticipated the public’s 
reaction to his choice of words.   
I have used the word ‘alliance’ sometimes in the course of 
what I have said but again I desire to make it clear that to me 
it seems to matter little whether you have an alliance which is 
committed to paper or whether you have an understanding 
which exists in the minds of the statesmen of the respective 
countries.  An understanding, perhaps, is better than an 
alliance, which may stereotype arrangements which cannot be 
accepted as permanent in view of the changing circumstances 
from day to day.  An understanding, a determination to look 
favourably upon the motives of those with we desire to be on 
terms of friendship-a feeling of that kind, cultivated, existing 
and confirmed by all these three countries will, I am certain, 
be to their enormous advantage, and I believe, whether they 
think it themselves or not, will also be to the advantage of the 
other nations.632 
Naturally no official in the US could acknowledge that deep cultural 
similarities existed between America and Britain, whether described as such 
or as a racial affinity.  It is relatively clear that Chamberlain was expecting 
his comments to be taken in the full context of his speech, which strongly 
curtailed his meaning when he had mentioned an alliance.  However, 
American and German complaints, made in response to excerpts wired 
ahead of the full text of the speech, were easily foreseeable.633  In the 
speech itself, the Colonial Secretary had commented that he wanted a deal 
with the people, and the Governments, of the two nations and not with 
press opinion; he expected his intended audience to forgive the use of the 
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term once they had dwelt upon how he had defined it.  The only plausible 
reason why he would have run such a risk was hinted at in Hatzfeldt’s initial 
thoughts on it.634  Chamberlain was attempting to build upon his ‘Long-
Spoon’ speech by continuing a public discourse on alliances, and thus he 
believed he was helping to prepare the British public for such commitments.  
The German situation and therefore response was more complex; Bülow 
would now be accused by sections of the German public of having said and 
done more at Windsor than he had.  He also still needed to exploit 
Anglophobia to ensure the passage of the Second Navy Bill while trying not 
to offend Chamberlain.635  Chamberlain also believed that Bülow had asked 
him to speak upon Anglo-American-German relations.  This he expressed to 
Eckardstein and Lascelles and so he waited for Bülow to respond; he hoped 
this would recover something of the mess his own ill judged utterances had 
caused.636  Chamberlain had plenty of reasons to expect aid from this 
quarter, not only because of his expectations arising out of the talks at 
Windsor, but also because Eckardstein wrote to him ensuring him that both 
the Kaiser and Bülow welcomed his Leicester speech.637  The German 
Foreign Minister did not do this however, on 11th December Bülow spoke in 
the Reichstag and dwelt upon how Germany was on friendly terms with 
everyone, but when he spoke of England he also interjected a call for 
building a stronger fleet.  If Chamberlain had made an embarrassing 
blunder, Bülow’s reaction was inexcusable.  Not only did he abandon the 
one Cabinet member who the Germans believed was warmest toward 
Germany, but he also revealed to anyone paying close enough attention 
that the Second Naval Bill was primarily aimed at curbing the influence of 
British naval power.638  Chamberlain responded coolly, he told Eckardstein 
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and latter Metternich that as things stood, and regardless of his personal 
feelings, the chances of better Anglo-German relations were dwindling.639   
Chamberlain’s own words had stalled the progress, if any could have been 
made anyway, of his plans.  No conversations on Morocco commenced, 
Anglo-German relations slowly became more embittered over the preceding 
months and years of the South African War.  Whether the Colonial 
Secretary had been operating against Salisbury, or alongside him, during 
the Samoan dispute, his ability to manoeuvre at all subsequently dried up.  
Both the embarrassment caused by the reception to the Leicester speech 
and the response in both Germany and Britain to the taking, by the Royal 
Navy, of German mail packets headed for Delagoa Bay, constricted the 
opportunities for any kind of improvement in relations between the two 
countries.  Bülow could not ignore German public opinion and indeed 
needed to exploit it to pass the Kaiser’s Second Navy Bill.  Eckardstein tried 
to mollify Chamberlain that Bülow still held to a much warmer personal 
opinion on the future of Anglo-German relations but effectively the Colonial 
Secretary had damaged his own stock by overestimating how well he could 
qualify his statements.640  With the general and acute Anglophobia 
generated by the South Africa War dominating public opinion in both the US 
and Germany, there was nothing that could be done even if all the 
statesmen involved had wanted to sign a treaty at that time.  Chamberlain 
would have to wait and hope that future events would assist in bringing 
about better circumstances.   
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6: When dreaming ends: Chamberlain and the turn to Empire. 
 
Chamberlain’s public folly at Leicester had left the Colonial Secretary at low 
ebb.  His ability to manoeuvre in foreign policy was suddenly curtailed.  
While public humiliation would not have worried him particularly, the polite 
but serious concern his Cabinet colleagues had shown, under pressure from 
the Germans, during the Samoan Crisis dried up.641  Germany had been 
appeased and her neutrality was supposedly now ensured.  While these 
simple truths would have reduced Chamberlain’s freedom of action, there 
were two other factors making further ‘dining room’ pourparlers, over 
Morocco or any subject, practically impossible.  The South African War, 
which would become known as ‘Joe’s War’, not only filled his time with 
departmental work, but also tied up his reputation and his standing.  
December 1899 was therefore a vital month, while it is well documented 
that Milner and Chamberlain had foreseen the military problems 
encountered in South Africa, and thus had come to understand that a long 
war was a certainty, ‘Black Week’ brought this home to a shocked nation.642  
Right at the very end of the month discussions of any kind which dealt with 
the Germans would have been absurd given the storm blown up over the 
taking of German mail packets headed for Delagoa Bay.  during the Windsor 
talks Chamberlain had also been plainly told that Germany was not 
prepared for an alliance and would not risk her Russian relations in order to 
achieve one.  The Colonial Secretary held out hope that either in China or in 
Turkey, the Germans and the Russians would eventually cross each other.  
This perhaps would change German resistance to offending the colossus.  
This was a misreading of German interests; Chamberlain approached these 
concepts as a British politician and had accepted German officials’ personal 
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exclamations of friendship with Britain at face value.  The result was a 
misunderstanding; he expected Germany to respond to threats against her 
Chinese or Ottoman interests in a similar manner to how Britain would 
respond to pressures on her own interests.  Maintaining Britain’s interests in 
China was vital.  If Britain was thrown out or her trade driven off this would 
have caused considerable economic damage and dislocation all over the 
Empire.  Germany’s interests were more speculative, her power and 
economy would not have been vastly reduced if she had been contained in 
Shantung, or thrown out of China completely however, there was still much 
she hoped to gain there.  If she sided with the British, in order to defend 
their interests in the Yangtze, and received support in the areas 
Chamberlain had offered back in 1898, she would indeed have achieved a 
great expansion of the Emperor’s domain, but only at the cost of her 
relations with the Tsar.  Given that ultimately siding with Tsar could have 
allowed her to expand His Imperial Majesty’s possessions at Britain’s 
expense, without running the risk of a two front war in Europe, it is not 
difficult to see why Chamberlain’s expectations were almost bound to be 
disappointed.  Likewise in Turkey, if Germany had to give way before Russia 
she would only have lost potential interests and certainly nothing vital, 
unlike the British who had always valued the land connection to the Indian 
sub continent.  Chamberlain was not entirely blinkered to this he just hoped 
that as these interests developed, then, as with Samoa, Germany may have 
been forced for domestic and prestige reasons to resist the Russian Bear.  
All this made for keeping a low profile and waiting upon events, with the 
war in South Africa taking up so much of his time, for once, he was able to 
sit upon his hands. 
It was not until September 1900 that Chamberlain  once again engaged 
meaningfully with foreign policy.  His experience during that period and 
after it  started to colour his determination to avoid isolation.  There were 
issues despite the obvious South African War, which kept Chamberlain busy 
during this time.  The Australian Colonies were preparing for federation and 
in West Africa colonial forces were stuck fighting the War of the Golden 
Stool.  However, it was the Colonial Secretary’s experience of the Boer 
imbroglio that accelerated the development of his ideas on how to solve the 
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problems of Britain’s overextension.  Even before ‘Black Week’, Canada and 
the Australian colonies had arranged to send troops to support the British in 
South Africa.  They had many reasons for doing so, some out of loyalty to 
the Empire, others were of a more nationalistic bent; a demonstration of 
nations coming of age and a quid pro quo for the ongoing protection that 
the British tax payer supplied to the mostly independent states.643  After the 
reverses in December 1899 even more help was forthcoming. Canada could 
not wrangle effectively with the US over their borders if Britain’s power was 
perceptively diminished.  Australia cound not secure her trade links if a 
permanent threat to the Cape persisted.  Therefore even more effort was 
expended after ‘Black Week’ demonstrated that the struggle to secure the 
Empire was real rather than merely symbolic.644  Significantly Canada and 
Australia, with their own ‘frontiersmen’ provided mounted infantry by 
instinct and thus helped ease, while also aping, one of the British army’s 
biggest deficiencies.  .  By February 1900 Chamberlain’s opinions on the 
future of British security were shifting, while an escape from isolation was 
still preferred, he started to return to his ideas of Imperial Federation but 
upon an accelerated timeline.  In the House of Commons he started to give 
utterance to these forming conceptions: 
Sir, we shall have in this war before it is over an army of 
colonials called to the aid of Her Majesty who will outnumber 
the British army at Waterloo, and who will be nearly equal to 
the total British force in the Crimea [...] and these people 
shortly [...] about to become great and populous nations, now 
for the first time claim their share in the duties and 
responsibilities as well as the privileges of Empire.  Accordingly 
you have the opportunity, now that you are the trustees, not 
merely of a Kingdom, but of a federation [...] which exists 
already in spirit at any rate.  [...] Meanwhile, we are finding 
out the weak spots in our armour and trying to remedy them; 
we are finding out the infinite potential resources of the 
Empire; and we are advancing steadily, if slowly, to the 
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realisation of that great federation of our race which will 
inevitably make for peace and liberty and justice.645 
While Chamberlain was ‘distracted’ with his duties, foreign affairs were not 
quiet.  While Salisbury endured the rumours of continental coalitions with 
magnanimity, other members of the Cabinet were not so impervious to 
these perils.646  More serious were rumours of Russian manoeuvres in 
central Asia, which Britain had no means of opposing even if she were not 
bogged down in South Africa.647  At the same time the British press also 
managed to stir up a French invasion scare.648  It was in this atmosphere 
that news of the Boxer rebellion in China arrived in London.649  Salisbury 
tended to treat this news only in so far as it might affect the relations of the 
Powers, including a disturbed attitude to the landing of troops in response 
to the legations requesting support.  His response was somewhat hampered 
by MacDonald’s own lack of concern with the seriousness of the developing 
situation.  By early July 1900 communications with Peking were cut off and 
British policy making was “living on rumours and conjecture”.650  Salisbury 
failed to perceive that there was any real threat from China herself, just ten 
days before the legations came under siege, he telegrammed the Queen to 
confirm that “Russia, not China, seems to me the greatest danger of the 
moment.”651  While Salisbury had anticipated the dangers that were to 
follow the re-establishment of order, he had failed to realise the seriousness 
of the Chinese threat  itself.  He continually tried to ignore the problem, 
prevent military co-ordination with the other Powers and even preferred to 
avoid sending more troops.  Salisbury was very much the main obstacle to 
Britain forming a response.  Chamberlain, who had shown such a keen 
interest in China during the previous crisis, remained quiet.  Why this 
should be is easily apparent, not only was he busy with South Africa and his 
own besieged legation in West Africa, but the Cabinet were highly active in 
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trying to form a response.  Troops from India were arranged and dispatched 
but this was mostly the work of Hamilton at the India office rather than 
Salisbury.652  By July senior ministers’ opinions of Salisbury’s response and 
position were telling.  Curzon described him as “A strange powerful, 
inscrutable, brilliant, obstructive dead-weight at the top”.  Hamilton also 
informed the Indian Viceroy that: “We are all most unhappy about China. 
We cannot get the Prime Minster either to state a policy, or to adopt a 
definite line.  He seems disposed to let things settle themselves, [...] 
heaven knows where we shall finally drift.”653   
Salisbury’s undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Brodrick, continued 
throughout June to try and push Salisbury into working with the Russians 
and Japanese.  Eventually he managed to convince the Foreign Secretary to 
send more troops, but fearing the results of any military co-operation with 
Russia, Salisbury refused to any agreement on organisation or overall 
command.  Brodrick had even enlisted Balfour and Goschen to assist and 
reported his failures to his more senior colleagues: “Arthur[Balfour] & 
Goschen threw up their hands ... practically saying, either Ld S must be 
upset wh[ich] none of us will do, or nothing will be done.”  The Japanese 
also refused to take independent action without knowing that Britain and/or 
Germany would have her back as this would be “resented by Russia and 
probably lead to a collision”.654  Salisbury retired to Hatfield and only 
emerged once it became known that the legations were still alive but 
remained besieged.   
The details of each movement, whether diplomatic or military, are 
interesting but not necessary to understanding Chamberlain’s reactions to 
them.  Essentially busy with his own wars, and aware that other members 
of the Government were hounding Salisbury, he was content to stay quiet 
and let exasperation with Salisbury grow.  With several thousand soldiers, 
of various nationalities, on route to China there still remained the problem 
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of who was to be in command.  First the Russians proposed that command 
of the allied forces in Chili should be brought together under one person 
while reserving Russian freedom of action to secure her railway and 
interests in Manchuria.  They did also admit that others would do likewise in 
their own areas of interest in China. Here was an invitation to extend the 
Scott-Muravev Railway agreement into unofficial spheres of influence, with 
the essential capital province of Chili under international control.  At the 
same time, the Germans decided to make their own bid for control, 
Eckardstein let the Foreign Office know that Germany would be gratified if 
Britain proposed a German general for overall command.  According to the 
erstwhile German official both proposals were discussed in the same 
Cabinet, though if so, Salisbury made no mention of it to the Queen, 
probably to forestall further pro-German pressure being thrust his way.  The 
Russian initiative fell apart as Salisbury and the Cabinet demanded that the 
objectives, military and political, together with the rules of engagement 
would have to be worked out in advance., This caused Lamsdorff, then in 
temporary charge of Russian Foreign Affairs after Muravev’s death, to back 
down.  Russia was not ready for any large and expensive engagements in 
China.655   
The German manoeuvres were more interesting.  Hatzfeltd’s telegram 
home, after the Cabinet meeting, demonstrated that only Balfour and 
Chaplin had been in favour of meeting the German proposal.656  Lascelles 
also reported that Britain was unlikely to propose a German commander.  
The Germans were disappointed and specifically mentioned Chamberlain’s 
lack of intervention.657  This should have warned Berlin that the Colonial 
Secretary’s affection was waning.  Salisbury and Lascelles both explained to 
the Germans that after the Kaiser’s bombastic speech in which he had 
dubbed his troops the new ‘huns’, it would now be unlikely that they could 
put British troops under German command.658  Sanderson also thought 
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public opinion “would not have understood our initiating the proposal”, due 
to recently strained Anglo-German relations, if “any Power was to make the 
proposal the Russians were much the best.”659  The Kaiser sent a telegram 
to the Tsar asking for his agreement, which was duly received the next day 
and so the Germans did get their Field Marshall in command.660  Salisbury’s 
lack of policy was causing ever more serious dissention and Balfour, 
Goschen and Chamberlain’s seeming inaction was exacerbating the 
problem.  Hamilton believed the administration “wants badly new blood, 
and the Prime Minister is tired and absolutely ... out of touch with public 
opinion”.661  It was hardly surprising these concerns were becoming more 
frantic and were starting to be directed at a wider target than simply the 
Foreign Sectary.  At the Cabinet meeting of the 9th August, called to discuss 
whether to place British troops under German command given that Russia, 
France and Japan had appeared prepared to do so, Salisbury was opposed 
by all the senior ministers present.  Brodrick reported that Devonshire, 
Chamberlain, Lansdowne, Balfour, Goschen and Hamilton were in favour of 
accepting German command.  Yet still they agreed to a compromise solution 
where British troops were placed under German ‘supreme direction’ rather 
than command.662  Even when the whole senior Cabinet was arrayed against 
Salisbury he still managed to avoid having to give a straight answer. 
The international force, managing quite well without a German supreme 
commander, entered Peking on 14th August and relieved the legations.  As 
already noted Russia was not fiscally prepared for a prolonged engagement 
and so they withdrew within two weeks.  The Kaiser was furious, despite 
having been warned in advance, having helped the Tsar to put Manchuria in 
his pocket, the German Emperor felt he had been left in the lurch; this 
“outrageous impertinence” was Germany’s “reward for loyal behaviour”.663  
Therefore the Germans turned to Britain to rescue them from the potential 
embarrassment of having a Field Marshall arrive to lead a force that no 
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longer existed, and to prevent the Powers from settling with China too 
quickly and individually.  Whilst the embarrassment of the former requires 
no explanation, the later is worth discussing briefly.  As Kennedy notes the 
Germans wanted to prevent the early disintegration of China.  If the 
Celestial Empire was carved up even into spheres of influence in 1900, then 
Germany would end up shut into Shantung.664  In response the Kaiser 
attempted to open negotiations on what would eventually become the 
Yangtze Valley agreement.  He dropped some hints to Lascelles and the 
Prince of Wales in a meeting on 22nd August.  The Emperor revealed his 
concerns that Britain may drop the ‘Open Door’ policy, not only in the 
Yangtze but also in general, in favour of Imperial Preference as 
demonstrated by Canada’s small preference.  As “German commercial 
interests were second and not far inferior to those of England in the valley 
of the Yang-tsze” he hoped the British Government would make a “formal 
undertaking” to “maintain the policy of the open door, they would find the 
German Government on their side.”665  However, the British did not respond 
quickly, firstly Salisbury was out of the country, and secondly the 
vagueness of what was requested allowed those with concerns over 
Germany’s ultimate aims to ignore the suggestion.  This second reason was 
disingenuous, Lascelles report, as quoted above, clearly states that the 
Germans were asking for a formal undertaking to maintain the open door in 
the Yangtze River valley, where German interests were apparently not far 
behind Britain’s.  This should also have alarmed the British, as it revealed 
that the Germans were more concerned with securing their rights and 
access to what Britain considered its most important informal sphere of 
interest in the world. 
In Salisbury’s absence decision making had been delegated to a Cabinet 
Committee, made up of Hamilton, Lansdowne and Goshen.  Goschen and 
Hamilton were both in favour of working more closely with the Germans 
generally, Hamilton had previously admitted that he would “prefer to be 
allied; if allies are necessary, which I think they are”, with the Germans 
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whereas Goschen was more cautious but still preferred to work with 
them.666  Salisbury remained obdurate, explaining that he did “not see what 
he[The Kaiser] has to do with it, and his observations look very much like 
an attempt to make a quarrel between France and us.”667  Goschen 
attempted to dispel what had always been of one Salisbury’s firmest held 
beliefs “as we certainly mean to keep an open door, we might as well say 
so, & I did not see how this particular step would embroil us with the 
French, as you believe is the object of the German Emperor.”668  If the 
formal undertaking was merely a promise to maintain the open door in the 
whole Yangtze region then Goschen’s analysis that France would not object 
seems logical.  However, if in any agreement on the Yangtze or any part of 
China, formally recognised exclusive rights for either party then as Bertie 
argued, France would very possibly start to make trouble for Britain in the 
southern most regions.669  Salisbury’s memorandums remained powerfully 
insightful all the way up to his eventual retirement from politics, however, 
the discontents in Cabinet would probably have interpreted such 
intransigence as more evidence of how “Grandpa Smallweed” was becoming 
set in his ways.670   
Salisbury was unconvinced and replied to Goschen that a much more 
detailed proposition was required, what did the ‘open door’ mean to the 
Germans, and what exactly did having ‘Germany on our side’ mean?671  
Bertie too, was convinced that “mere ‘open door’ or ‘open port’ and tariff 
declarations are not likely to satisfy her.”672  Goschen appealed to both 
Balfour and Chamberlain for help to move Salisbury into at least discussing 
the matter further with the Germans.  This had been encouraged by Bülow 
who had asked Lascelles when Germany could expect a response.673  
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Chamberlain was presented with some very serious criticism of Salisbury, 
Goschen’s was pretty damning:  
I enclose his[Salisbury’s] reply to the letter. It makes one 
despair. A non-possumus in every direction. It is quite possible 
the Emperor has some designs that are not clear: but we shall 
not thwart them by standing aloof.  I do not know that more 
can be done.  If some policy is forced on Salisbury, which he 
disapproves of, it breaks down in the execution. [...] If I see 
any opening that may be utilized I would ask you and Balfour 
to come to London to meet Lansdowne and G. Hamilton, who 
like myself, are in despair of our present attitude.674 
The Cabinet were in despair; the next day Goschen wrote that Salisbury’s 
response to Bülow, which asked for more information, was “worse than 
silence [...] whatever might come from pourparles at Berlin our present 
attitude does more harm [...] I cannot help expressing myself strongly [...] 
Absolute isolation is playing the devil.”  Brodrick also concurred that 
“Salisbury’s reply is characteristic and I think unlucky.  We do what is 
needed and get nothing for it.”  He also noted that “Arthur[Balfour] 
generally concurs with you[Chamberlain] re Peking and Germany.”675  Once 
again the Cabinet ministers who were unhappy with Salisbury’s handling of 
foreign affairs, were still unprepared to take action to ‘upset him’.  They 
turned to Chamberlain and thus he regained the support required to exert 
himself against Salisbury, had he wanted to.  Apart from simply wishing to 
enlist Chamberlain’s support the two service chiefs, Lansdowne and 
Goschen had little traction on the Prime Minister.  Salisbury had recently 
declined Lansdowne’s offer of resignation over delayed army reform, while 
Goschen had announced that he would retire at the next election which was 
merely weeks away; neither could therefore apply much pressure no matter 
how much they wished to.676  Once again the ‘strong man’ of the Cabinet 
was being given his head as the others despaired of the situation.  
Chamberlain’s response was not, perhaps, quite what one would have 
expected.   
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Chamberlain did not arrange to meet Eckardstein to discuss a solution as 
had been done over Samoa; in fact he did not meet him at all, and so there 
was no repetition of the Hatzfeldt/Chamberlain talks, at least not then.  
When Salisbury appeared to have been at his weakest, Chamberlain chose 
to do no more than merely write a memorandum. He had little choice as 
Salisbury had just asked the Queen to dissolve Parliament and the ‘Khaki’ 
election was about to begin.  While this did not prevent some discussions or 
foreign policy business, it was hardly the time for the leading Liberal 
Unionist to be seen or even suspected of acting against the wishes of the 
Prime Minister.  Also Chamberlain would take a highly active role in 
defending the Government’s record during the election.677  Anything of the 
sort would have stirred up issues between the two coalition partners.  This 
must have somewhat frustrated Chamberlain; here was everything he 
needed, the most important Cabinet ministers had asked him to intervene 
and the Germans had made the approach apparently because their relations 
with Russia had become tense.  Chamberlain summed up the position in 
China and what may come of it.  Britain’s most important interest was the 
maintenance of “absolute equity of opportunity for trade” which “would, 
necessarily, preclude any kind of indirect preference, such as more 
favourable rates on railways”.  Salisbury’s policy which continued “to allow 
matters to settle themselves” was counterpoised with Russia’s underhanded 
attempt to pose as China’s friend, while strengthening her hold on 
Manchuria and remaining in a menacing position with regards to Peking, 
through her choice of troop movements.  The US should haven be prepared 
to support Britain in her aims at maintaining the “Open Door” but would not 
lend material aid for what Chamberlain, who was well connected in 
American politics, believed were electoral reasons.  Japan wished to 
maintain the status quo but would demand compensation if Russia 
aggrandized herself.  France would follow Russia’s lead and had some 
ambitions in the south.  Britain could not simply acquiesce in the Russian 
suggestion that they allies should withdraw to the coast; public opinion 
would not understand it, it would not accelerate negotiations with the 
Chinese Government and further outrages, perhaps extended to the 
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viceroys who had been “friendly to foreigners”, could occur.  The majority of 
the memorandum was dedicated to the position Germany had assumed.  
Germany was out on a limb, the “idiosyncrasy of the Emperor” had left her 
with a mission to avenge the death of their Minister (shot dead as the siege 
of the legations began), a German Field Marshal en route to lead an 
international force in a war which some members of that international 
community believed was over, coupled with an ambition to carve out “a 
second India” for the Reich.  Russia’s actions were “a poor reward for the 
diplomacy which snubbed us[Britain] [...] to please Russia.  But, if he[the 
Kaiser] is to escape from his humiliation, he must largely rely on us to save 
him.”  If Britain agreed to reject the Russian proposal to withdraw, it was 
likely Japan and the US would follow suit.  He concluded that as an alliance 
between Germany and Russia was “the one thing we have to dread” 
therefore “the clash of German and Russian interests, whether in China or 
Asia Minor, would be a guarantee for our safety.”  Ultimately it was in 
Britain’s “interest that Germany throw herself across the path of Russia.”  
This rather ignored that either directly, or via her allies, Germany already 
lay across Russia’s path in Eastern Europe.  The Colonial Secretary’s closing 
paragraph called for encouraging better Anglo-German relations and to 
capitalise upon the current tension between Russia and Germany on one 
hand, and Russia and Japan on the other.  In return for letting these two 
Powers know that Britain would not oppose German expansion in Shantung 
and Japanese in Korea, he hoped they would be prepared to formally 
recognise Britain’s claim to predominance in the Yangtze Valley.  
“We[Britain] are not likely ever to want to take possession of any territory 
in the interior ourselves; but we ought to try to for some understanding 
which will keep off all others, and make it easy to maintain the ‘Open Door’ 
in at least this, the most important, portion of the Chinese Empire.”678   
Otte believes there is an implicit contradiction between the desire to 
maintain the “absolute equity of opportunity for trade” and the desire, in 
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the case of the Yangtze at least, to “keep off all others”.679  Chamberlain 
assumed that Britain’s industrial and commercial power was such that she 
would be able to maintain her impressive lead in the share of the commerce 
of the Yangtze valley without the need for artificial measures.  His proposal 
clearly related to preventing the spread of rival European power, or their 
possession of Chinese territory, than “shutting the door to the Yangtze to all 
but British commerce.”  Otte also thought that this implication, of shutting 
out rival trade, “adumbrated Chamberlain’s later imperial preference 
arguments.”680  This seems to miss that the Colonial Secretary’s later ideas 
for imperial preference did not start as an attempt to close Britain’s export 
markets to rival competition.  This would stand against the evidence of 
every agreement he negotiated with the French and the Germans where 
ensuring reciprocal tariff treatment for contracting parties’ nationals was an 
essential concern in the negotiations.  Such concerns were included in the 
West Africa agreement with France, the Anglo-German Agreement on 
Portugal’s colonies and the Samoan agreement.  Chamberlain’s imperial 
preference scheme would entail the closing of the British home market, the 
only free trade market in the British Empire, in order to encourage trade 
with her dependencies by offering them a preference and thus drawing 
them into closer political as well as economic union.  This also envisaged 
the reciprocal relaxing of the tariffs on British goods imported into colonial 
markets.  He would no more have considered the Yangtze an area suitable 
to be drawn into a closer political union with Britain as he would have 
considered it suitable for annexation.  Similarly he had no plans to include 
other areas where Britain’s interests were merely commercial, such as 
South America.  Chamberlain’s Yangtze plans cannot be seen as a harbinger 
of his scheme for imperial preference as the aims of that scheme were 
political in essence, where his concern in China was commercially driven 
and only ever political in the negative sense of preventing other Europeans 
from gain and then exerting political control as a means of damaging 
Britain’s commercial interests.  
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The memorandum appeared to break the impasse, or rather Salisbury 
finally had to face direct criticism from an important member of the Cabinet, 
who could do irreparable damage to the Government, owed the Prime 
Minister no favours, was quite capable of airing his differences in public and 
was certainly not ready to retire.  Balfour could prod the Foreign Secretary 
but he would not force an issue upon his Uncle.  It is doubtful that 
Chamberlain’s memorandum convinced anyone, except perhaps himself, but 
it did enable other Cabinet ministers to strengthen their opposition to 
‘allowing things to settle themselves’ while hiding, again, behind the 
Colonial Secretary.   
Despite Bertie’s best efforts, Salisbury was forced to open negotiations for 
the ill fated Yangtze agreement.681  Given how Germany needed an 
agreement quickly and urgently, Britain should have been able to get a 
better deal than they did.682  This advantage may have been lost when 
Salisbury committed a serious, though understandable blunder.  This 
accident occurred when the Germans objected to the Foreign Secretary’s 
counter proposal to defend the ‘open door’ in the whole of China. Salisbury 
offered to remedy this suggesting that the offending article should be 
limited to south of the 38th Parallel.  This actually drew a line around 120 
miles south of even Peking.  Lascelles gently chided him that he hoped the 
“line you draw will include Shantung”.683  However, the Liaodong Peninsula, 
upon which Port Arthur sat, comes down reasonably close to the 38th 
Parallel, though it is still some 45 miles north of it.  It is clear that Salisbury 
intended to exclude the area covered by the Scott-Muravev agreement, as 
otherwise he could have simply referred to Manchuria specifically in answer 
to the German objection.  In the end the ruinously vague language of 
“uphold the same[the Open Door] for all Chinese territory as far as they can 
exercise influence” was agreed.  Both Governments refrained from using the 
present crisis to “obtain for themselves any territorial advantages” and 
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“reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the 
eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China” 
if any other Power did.  The other Powers were to be asked to agree with 
these principles.684  The agreement was clearly of little use; the evolution of 
the phrase “as far as they can exercise influence” clearly demonstrated that 
the Germans wanted nothing to do with opening doors in Manchuria.  
Furthermore, all that was promised to be done in the event that another 
Power, say Russia, took territorial advantages, for example by demanding 
the right to militarily occupy the whole of Manchuria while also occupying a 
railway line mortgaged to British bond holders, was to merely have a good 
‘preliminary’ chinwag about how to protect their own interests, which in the 
situation just briefly described, were on the German side negligible.685  John 
Hay, Secretary of State in the United States, an anglophile, upon reading 
the agreement and then making discreet enquiries derogatorily describes it 
as “a horrible practical joke on England.”686  Chamberlain appeared to be 
pleased and welcomed the agreement: “I think that events are slowly 
tending to draw us closer together & to separate Germany from Russia”.687  
However, Chamberlain was by nature an optimist and had not been privy to 
the exact details of the negotiations and thus was unaware of how the 
territorial limits had been agreed.  The Colonial Secretary had greeted all 
the Anglo-German agreements with hope, even the Convention upon 
Portugal’s colonies which he would have preferred to have never been 
concluded. 
Just as the agreement was being signed, Russia continued to occupy more 
parts of the Newchwang railway in the Chinese capital province of Chili, and 
claimed it by right of conquest.688  On 3rd November the British formally 
protested and Anglo-Russian relations entered a dangerous phase.  Over 
the next few weeks the Russians strengthened their hold on Manchuria 
while the British maintained their protests.  Also, Salisbury had been forced 
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to relinquish the seals of the Foreign Office and Lansdowne now took the 
helm of British foreign policy; given his timid anti-isolationist stance over 
the previous few years this augured well for Chamberlain’s desire to see 
Anglo-German rapprochement.  Lansdowne protested Russian actions over 
the railway, however, shortly after desiring to “return to the charge” he 
found the situation further complicated.689  On 3rd January 1901 The Times 
reported that Russia and local Chinese officials had signed an agreement 
which allowed “the resumption of Chinese civil administration under Russian 
protection” in the southern most province of Manchuria.  Once similar 
agreements, governing the other two Manchurian provinces, were signed 
the whole area would “be a de facto Russian protectorate”.690  What 
followed was a ‘war in sight’ crisis, at the exact moment when the vast 
majority of Britain’s forces were engaged in South Africa, and her finances 
were becoming extremely strained, both Neilson and Otte are right to 
emphasise that British diplomacy was caught between two crises, Boxer and 
Boer.691 
At this point Chamberlain started to become more active, since writing his 
memo, he had kept abreast of what was happening but had remained 
relatively still, trusting to the new head of the Foreign Office.  However, 
several events in January concerned him and he chose to intervene again.  
On 12 January, alarmed by Russian actions in Manchuria, Hayashi asked 
Lansdowne whether he would join Japan in making a joint request for 
information as a first step towards formally protesting; Lansdowne declined.  
The main reason for not acting against the Manchurian agreement 
immediately was due to the situation on the spot.  Waldersee was, at the 
time, negotiating for the return of the occupied rail line to British control 
and as the Russians were still occupying parts of Tientsin and raiding the 
rolling stock, Lansdowne feared that protesting too much would provoke 
them to break off negotiations with the German Field Marshal and 
encourage further acts of ‘brigandage’ upon the stocks of a company 
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mortgaged to British bondholders.692  While Lansdowne had good reason to 
respond carefully to Russia, who apart from Japan was able to project the 
greatest power into China, having to wait upon Waldersee had the 
appearance of allowing the matter to drift.  After all, delayed action could 
result in simply allowing Russia to denude the Chinese Northern Railways 
(CNR) at her leisure.  Lansdowne had been determined, back in November, 
that he could not “allow matters to drift indefinitely”.693  To other observers, 
such as Chamberlain, that determination had become difficult to spot as the 
situation got materially worse, not only in Manchuria but also over the 
railway issue.  Two months of Lansdowne’s ‘determination’ had merely 
resulted in more rolling stock being sent to Manchuria, new strategically 
important areas of Tientsin being occupied and then an agreement 
harbinging an informal Russian protectorate of the whole of Manchuria.  
This inaction appeared no more masterly than Salisbury’s had.  
Chamberlain, in consultation with Devonshire again took action and on the 
16th January informally met with Eckardstein at Devonshire’s seat; 
Chatsworth House.  According to the German report back to Berlin, again 
the only surviving account of the meeting, Chamberlain had acknowledged 
that ‘splendid isolation’ was over and that Britain would have to choose 
between the Dual and Triple Alliances.  Chamberlain and other Cabinet 
ministers were in favour of the German connection but if that proved 
impossible then an agreement with Russia would have to be reached, 
regardless of the potential cost in China and Persia.  Chamberlain offered to 
move towards this slowly, starting with a secret agreement dealing with 
Morocco once Salisbury left for the south.694  The Colonial Secretary’s 
ultimate aim was “that Germany should throw herself across the path of 
Russia” but this time rather than lay out all that he wanted openly, as he 
had during the Hatzfeldt/Chamberlain talks, he did not mention his ultimate 
aim at all and neither did he appear hurried.695  The Colonial Secretary also 
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made play on the alleged friction between Salisbury and himself.  While still 
Prime Minster, Salisbury would continue to exercise great influence on 
foreign policy, however it was by no means guaranteed that he would 
prevail against Lansdowne if the new Foreign Secretary was prepared to 
pursue an agreement with Germany.  Chamberlain was continuing to defend 
his position as the person Germany should go to for a fair hearing.  
Hatzfeldt read his message right, Chamberlain was willing to work slowly 
towards an alliance but he also thought that the Colonial Secretary was 
offering to take the initiative once Salisbury had left.696  The note that he 
was willing to join the Triple Alliance remains dubious, Eckardstein and 
Hatzfeldt worked on these reports before sending them back to Berlin, and, 
as on previous occasions, they adapted what the Colonial Secretary had 
offered, in order to be more tolerable to Bülow and the German Foreign 
Ministry.  A few months later Rothschild would remind Eckardstein that 
Chamberlain had been after “quite a new grouping of the world”.697  This 
was in line with the Colonial Secretary’s view, espoused in the ‘Long Spoon’ 
and Leicester speeches, that ultimately he wanted an Anglo-American-
German Alliance.  Finally the timing was all important, this meeting took 
place, just as Lansdowne had rejected the Japanese initiative over 
Manchuria but before the German interpretation of the ‘Open Door’ 
agreement had been tested.  Chamberlain was hoping that the prospect of 
Britain’s benevolence in other matters, such as Morocco, could help warm 
the Germans to taking a stronger line based upon that agreement. 
There was little enough prospect of this initiative achieving anything.  Bülow 
decided to leave the ball in Chamberlain’s court.  Citing slights over Samoa, 
the South African war, and even Britain’s decision to support Portugal, he 
explained that distrust of Britain had grown.  Germany must wait until all 
British hopes of both American assistance and improved relations with the 
Dual Alliance had died, only then would Britain be prepared to pay 
Germany’s price.  Germany must listen without granting anything and 
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without revealing her friendly words disguised an ill intent.698  However, 
Bülow failed to account for growing distrust on the part of the British.  He 
was also unaware that Salisbury’s sentiment that the “you[Germany] 
demand too much for your friendship” was shared by Chamberlain who 
agreed that “unless they[Germany] are able to modify the opinion they 
have formed of the value of their neutrality, we must certainly look 
elsewhere for allies.”699  Whatever Chamberlain hoped to achieve it was 
interrupted by the death of the Queen.  The Kaiser made his moving 
pilgrimage to her bedside but did not see Chamberlain at all despite being in 
Britain for a full two weeks.700  While he was in Britain the German Emperor 
did meet Lansdowne and gave him an odd lecture in which he described a 
future where Russia and the US combined to force the Europeans out of 
Asia, and in which the Europeans banded together to thwart this grouping.  
Thus England would have to choose which grouping to side with and help 
detach France from her unsatisfactory alliance and win her back for 
Europe.701  This grandiose scheme revealed to Lansdowne and probably by 
proxy to Chamberlain, made it clear that Germany was not interested in any 
Moroccan deal, and that she looked forward to an Anglo-America split, 
which no member of the Cabinet would countenance.   
This was Chamberlain’s last attempt to personally affect Anglo-German 
relations, at least in a positive way.  He was not done with foreign policy 
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and his concerns over Britain’s geo-strategic position had not been 
resolved.  Britain still had an extensive Empire, and even wider sprawling 
interests, which needed to be defended if she were to hold her own in the 
world.  Germany was proving difficult; her constant hot and cold attitude 
was bound to eventually put the Colonial Secretary off working with her.  
After each agreement professions of friendship abounded, claims that all 
points of difference had been cleared up were common, and assertions that 
brighter Anglo-German relations were about to begin were made, but each 
time they did not materialise.   
Three forces thus pulled British Far Eastern policy into a vortex.  Firstly that 
the “South African entanglements make it impossible for us to commit 
ourselves to any obligation which might involve us in war, unless we can 
assure ourselves that any obligation which we might incur would be shared 
by another Power”.702  This ensured that Britain could make no firm 
commitments or take independent action to resolve her Far Eastern 
quarrels.  She would not even approach the Manchurian issue until an end 
to the occupation of the CNR was resolved.  This was the main stream 
which brought the remaining two forces to act upon British Policy.  Out of all 
the Powers involved in China, only two were capable of sharing any of those 
obligations; Germany and Japan.  Lansdowne would attempt to work with 
both.  Germany acted as a brake on proceedings, wishing to avoid any sign 
of a quarrel with Russia her replies to the other two Powers, Britain and 
Japan, were occasionally contradictory and often tried to avoid a plain 
statement of their lack of intent to take any action over Manchuria.  This 
was because German policy would have been happy to see a Russo-
Japanese War, especially if it was supported by Britain but could not afford 
to endanger her relations with her eastern European neighbour.   The 
Anglo-German Convention acted as an anchor too, for while it remained 
untested it was left to each Power to imagine how far Germany would 
adhere to it.  Therefore, it implied German opposition to Russian actions in 
Manchuria.  The British were well aware that they “may be able to work 
with Germany to our advantage in China so long as we do not expect her to 
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run her head against the Manchurian wall”, but this was in essence what 
Lansdowne would actually do.703  Whereas Germany was the brake, Japan 
acted as an accelerator.  The British were sensitive to Japanese feelings and 
did not wish to “drive her to a policy of despair, in which she may come to 
some sort of terms with Russia [...] and our interests would greatly suffer if 
she did.”704   
Japan repeatedly asked Britain to join her in joint diplomatic action, firstly 
to make enquires at St. Petersburg about Russian intentions, then in 
demanding that China make no unilateral agreements, then again towards 
China in order to encourage her to resist Russian demands.705  Lansdowne 
wished to encourage Germany to join with the two other naval Powers.  He 
side stepped the initial Japanese request though he asked Berlin for their 
opinion, with the second request Berlin concurred, and with the third 
request Britain advised Japan to wait until China requested mediation.706 
The third Japanese equiry suggested that Britain and Japan should promise 
China material aid in order to defend her territory from Russian 
encroachment.707  Otte describes the details of what followed.708  During the 
discussions on how to respond to this Japanese demarche Salisbury penned 
a memorandum which encouraged the idea of Japan and Britain offering a 
guarantee of China’s coastline.709  Some historians have seen in this 
memorandum the seeds of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance.710  However, 
Otte, draws a comparison with the Second Mediterranean Agreement of 
1887, which he believes “provided for cooperation in defence of a 
geographically delimited status quo, without incurring any binding 
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commitments for Britain in anticipation of a stipulated situation.”711  While 
the Mediterranean agreements lacked any precisely stipulated situations 
they certainly described general ones.  Article five made it clear that the 
agreement forced Turkey to refrain from and resist certain incursions and 
article 8 added the stipulation that she could not become complicit or 
connive to allow such encroachments.  Article 7 and 8 required the 
signatory Powers to “immediately come to an agreement as to the 
measures to be taken” if Turkey was resisting and would be justified in a 
“provisional occupation by their forces, military or naval, of such points of 
Ottoman territory as they may agree to consider it necessary” in the case 
that she was not.712  In the preamble to the second agreement it was 
agreed that this “intended to confirm the principles established by the 
aforementioned exchange of Notes[The First Mediterranean Agreement] and 
to define the common attitude of the three Powers in prospect of the 
eventualities which might occur in the Orient”.713  The Second Agreement 
did not ignore the Articles of the first, which where vaguer than the second 
but still called upon the contracting Powers to “promise one another mutual 
support in the Mediterranean in every difference which may arise between 
one of them and a third Power” and “to prevent any change, which, under 
form of annexation, occupation, protectorate, or in any other manner 
whatsoever”.714  While the Mediterranean agreements may not have bound 
Britain to any specific action, it certainly placed upon the British 
Government, grave commitments to act in specific circumstances.  As the 
British, at the time, believed their interests would require them to intervene 
in Turkey anyway, the extra obligations were less onerous.  However, at the 
time, they did believe they were capable of acting decisively, even if they 
had to act alone.  In the Far East and while still at war in South Africa at the 
very least, this was certainly not true.  The Mediterranean Agreements 
ensured Britain would have allies if she had to intervene in the Ottoman 
Empire; the proposed Anglo-Japanese Agreement was designed to threaten 
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Russia without Britain having to take military action, which she certainly 
could not do.  It was a proposal for a highly geographically limited 
agreement which anticipated the joint defence of the area it covered.715  
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 actually had more in common with the 
Mediterranean Agreements than with a general alliance.  It was limited to a 
large, but specific geographical area: China and Korea.  It permitted them 
to take action if their interests were threatened by the aggressive action of 
another Power or from disturbances arising from within China or Korea 
themselves.  It promised support if either Power was involved with more 
than one other Power, the Mediterranean Agreements had stipulated 
“mutual support” if there were differences with even just one other Power, 
but did not explicitly mention war.716  The Anglo-Japanese Alliance required 
frank consultation upon any action to be taken, as the earlier agreements 
required and both announced that the contracting parties had no aggressive 
tendencies in the areas the contracts covered.  The principal difference was 
that war was explicitly mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance while the 
Mediterranean Agreements only implied it, with descriptions of certain 
military actions given as examples of what it permitted.717  That Alliance 
was still some distance away when Salisbury suggested his North China 
coast agreement.  Salisbury more than any other member of the Cabinet 
was aware of how the negotiations for the Anglo-German Yangtze 
agreement had gone, he knew full well that Germany considered Manchuria 
to be outside of its remit.  The proposed Anglo-Japanese Agreement would 
have covered some of the area missing from the earlier one.  Certainly 
Salisbury was taking the situation very seriously and envisaged agreements 
with potentially heavy commitments.718  Lansdowne still hoped to convince 
the Germans to interpret the Yangtze agreement in a boarder sense and so 
rejected both Salisbury’s ideas and Japan’s request for a vague pledge to 
give China material support.719  Lansdowne advised the Japanese to wait for 
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the Chinese to ask for assistance.  This the Chinese did on 1st March 1901. 
720   
Lansdowne immediately started to prepare an initiative which began by 
applying diplomatic pressure on the Russians.  He asked Germany and 
Japan to agree to jointly request the terms of the Manchurian Agreement as 
the first step towards mediating the Sino-Russian disagreement.721  Before 
waiting to hear from Tokyo and Berlin Lansdowne made his request of 
Russia, the Russians refused with: 
considerable warmth [...] even if terms had been definitely 
fixed and he[Lamsdorff] had them in his portfolio before him, 
he would consider it incompatible with the character of an 
independent State in negotiation with another to communicate 
the details to a third party [...] and he feared that the 
Emperor[the Tsar] might finally lose patience.722 
Berlin also made the situation even more awkward; Germany left the 
initiative to Britain and Japan, whose interests were more directly involved, 
which Lansdowne recognised “obliges us to proceed with extreme 
caution”.723  British diplomacy was then directed to try and illicit from the 
Germans whether they would be prepared to, in the event of a Russo-
Japanese war, declare neutrality so long as France remained neutral.  The 
Germans were annoyed, “[t]he English should finally say what they 
themselves intend to do, instead of repeatedly asking others.”  Naturally, 
Bülow and Hatzfeldt expected the mere promise of German neutrality to 
paralyse the French even in the event of a Japanese-Anglo-Russian conflict, 
French neutrality would be preserved due to “Germany holding a rifle” to 
her in Europe. 724  German irritation with British reticence to commit 
themselves rather ignored that they were already deeply committed 
elsewhere in the world.  Britain would end up irritating the Germans even 
more.  On 9th March 1901 the Japanese handed the British copies of two 
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telegrams, the first suggested that Germany had offered Japan “benevolent 
neutrality” and promised that “this attitude of Germany will keep French 
fleet in check, while England will probably support Japan.”  The second 
telegram contained Hayashi’s instructions to discover if Britain had 
consulted with Germany, whether the British thought the Germans were in 
earnest and how far could they rely on British support in the case that 
“Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia?”725   
Lansdowne needed to discover whether the Japanese impression of 
Germany’s position was accurate in a climate where the Germans were 
getting rather testy about being asked their intentions without Britain 
offering the same openness.726  The Foreign Secretary decided to attempt to 
give a lead to the stalled situation and proposed to the Cabinet that Britain 
ask Germany to join her in a statement of intentions should Japan and 
Russia come to blows.  This declaration contained the promise of naval 
assistance to the Japanese should any Power join Russia, and neutrality if 
they did not, while reserving freedom of action to rescue Japan should she 
be overwhelmed by Russia.  Lansdowne hoped that in the very least it 
should “elicit from Germany a distinct statement of her intentions”.727  This 
draft declaration has been heralded as the first serious step away from the 
supposed British policy of no alliances during peace time.728  However, while 
this most certainly was an agreement to make joint war-like action in a 
stipulated situation, by this stage, it should be apparent that the subtleties 
of such a test were great.  The Mediterranean agreements were not 
considered as a departure from the policy of avoiding entangling alliances 
and neither were Salisbury’s suggestions of an Anglo-Japanese regional 
agreement to be considered an alliance.  However, this draft declaration is 
to be considered as “a decisive breach with Britain’s traditional 
diplomacy”.729  Otte’s corrective that this “was not a draft alliance with 
Germany”, does not fully explain why not.730  While it certainly was of 
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limited geographical scope it was also disingenuous; Otte is right to point 
out that Germany joining the declaration “was of largely political value.”731  
After all the nascent German navy could not be expected to provide much 
naval assistance to Japan in the event of a third Power joining Russia.  
However, Germany’s inclusion in the scheme was therefore at odds with the 
proposed aim of ensuring the conflict remained localised as the only 
material aid she would bring to the table was in Europe, perhaps that threat 
was designed to raise the stakes so far as to expect Russia to capitulate; 
Russia did also share that European border with Germany.  Britain was 
quite capable of lending the required naval force to counter balance France 
in the Far East but it cannot be admitted that this intervention would remain 
localised; if Britain joined Japan against the Dual Alliance the conflict could 
not have been contained.  Russia would have had to attempt to force the 
straights and the French would have been engaging the British in the 
Channel and the Mediterranean.  If the declaration was intended to be 
taken up, the inclusion of Germany ensured the stakes were so high that 
France could not come to Russia’s aid.  The attempt to include Germany 
was, as Lansdowne said at the time, to discover the limits to which she 
would go, to bind her own hands with regards to joining Russia should 
Japan be getting the worse of it, and to guarantee, as far as possible that 
France remain neutral by threatening the possibility of a global conflagration 
if she did intervene.  To say nothing of how the situation would escalate if 
Japan needed to be rescued by the British, the inclusion of Germany in that 
situation makes more sense.  Whether this did or did not represent an 
alliance, is not the most pertinent point, it certainly contained obligations 
which could have acted remarkably like an alliance.  Otte, sketches the 
ways this idea had evolved from “Salisburian precepts” but there comes a 
point where evolutionary processes result in something new.732  Either, this 
departure must be seen as some form of alliance, or it should be considered 
a bluff; a promise made with the expectation of never having to fulfil it.  
The declaration was also to be secret, how a secret agreement could then 
have deterred France from coming to Japan’s aid is even harder to imagine.  
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Lansdowne must have expected the Germans to refuse.  It is not hard to 
imagine why the Cabinet rejected it.  Monger believes the pro-German 
component of the Cabinet could only have rejected this declaration as they 
were only asked to consider “the tactical question of how best to negotiate 
with the Germans.”733  However, Chamberlain would never have taken his 
eye off the wider goal, of closer relations with the Germans.  The problem 
from his point of view would have been that this document ran the risks of 
an Alliance with none of the benefits.  It would constitute a tool against 
Russia in China, but it did not defend any of Britain’s other interests and left 
it to Japan to wield such a tool.  Also Salisbury was reported as being “very 
much ag[ain]st getting tied to Germany”.734  The Prime Minister certainly 
saw this declaration as going much further than his own suggestion of an 
Anglo-Japanese agreement, not as a simple evolution of it, he also saw 
danger in German adhesion.  Cranborne, Salisbury’s heir, believed Japan 
was not strong enough to win.735  In that situation Britain would have to 
rescue them, which in turn would probably have activated the Dual Alliance.  
In that situation Germany could renege on the secret agreement or gleefully 
demand whatever price she wished as the psychological moment she had 
been waiting for had arrived.  This was too much for the Cabinet and 
according to Salisbury they deferred making a decision until they could hear 
from Germany about her likelihood to adhere to such an agreement.736  
Given that Germany had already told the British that they were unlikely to 
reveal any intentions unless the British did this, too, was bound to return a 
negative. 
The Germans were not slow to reply, Lascelles wired home that the 
Germans would show the “strictest and most correct neutrality towards all 
parties”.737  Of course in the German mind this automatically ensured the 
strictest and most correct neutrality of the French too, regardless of the fact 
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that France could deploy her navy without denuding her borders with 
Germany.  If this was not enough Bülow gave a speech in the Reichstag in 
which he announced that the Anglo-German Agreement of October 1900 did 
not concern Manchuria, and that “the fate of that province was a matter of 
absolute indifference to Germany.”738   
This public knock back, delivered in an almost nonchalant manner, had wide 
ranging effects.  It immediately destroyed the appearance that there was an 
Anglo-German-Japanese triplice in the Far East, opposed to Russian 
pretentions in Manchuria.  Lansdowne had to inform Japan, that if they did 
end up in a war with Russia, the British, like “Germany, would probably 
remain neutral”.739  Lansdowne believed British actions had been justified as 
“our South African entanglements make it impossible for us to commit 
ourselves [...] unless we can assure ourselves that any obligation which we 
might incur would be shared by another Power”.740  It had been essential to 
test the Anglo-German agreement in order to honestly inform Japan of what 
was likely to happen if she had proceeded to challenge Russia.  More 
indirectly, as Monger suggests, “it was from this moment that the pro-
German sentiment of the Cabinet [...] began to decline.”741  Lansdowne had 
to find a new Far Eastern policy and Lamsdorff was not slow to try to take 
advantage of the breakdown of the triplice.  He assured Scott that that 
Russian demands in Manchuria did not violate existing British treaty rights, 
and he argued that the Chinese Government should not grant any new 
concessions to any Power in Manchuria.742  These modifications gave the 
appearance of a way out and Lansdowne decided to try to resolve the 
matter directly with the Russians.  Suddenly, having previously escalated 
the crisis, and increased the tensions in the region, the Foreign Secretary 
did not wish to be needlessly provocative about Manchuria, having “already 
recognized its “gravitation” [towards Russia] for Railway purposes” the 
British would not be adverse to “any reasonable arrangement of the 
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conditions under which the Russian troops might be withdrawn.”743  The 
issue ultimately came to nothing; Lansdowne gave a speech in the Lords, 
which Otte describes as constructing “a golden bridge for Lamsdorff over 
which to retreat” and over the next few weeks, tensions dissipated as the 
Russians gave up on their Manchurian agreement.  As Neilson puts it: 
“Unable to bribe the Chinese into signing, faced with Japan’s unrelenting 
opposition and Germany’s meddling, uncertain of Britain’s position and in 
need of a foreign loan, the Russians had decided to adopt a new course.”744  
Anglo-German relations were a different matter.  Just after Bülow had 
destroyed the basis of Lansdowne’s Far Eastern Policy, Eckardstein met with 
Chamberlain and the British Foreign Minister in separate meetings on 18th 
March 1901.  The case with the Colonial Secretary is suspect; again there 
are no records on the British side, and only a copy of a telegram in 
Eckardstein’s memoirs on the German.  Chamberlain told Eckardstein that 
his views had not changed since the Windsor Talks, but that as everything 
that the British said to the Germans was repeated to St. Petersburg, Britain 
had to hang back and that “he ha[d] no desire to burn his fingers again” 
with regards to taking part in any alliance talks.745  Eckardstein was about 
to embark on his own clandestine attempt to bring about an Anglo-German 
alliance by use of, as Kennedy puts it “the simple device of confidentially 
assuring both sides that the other was eager for one.”746  As Eckardstein’s 
record of these meetings is the only one surviving, it is possible that he 
played up Chamberlain’s last bid for an alliance, made at Chatsworth back 
in January 1901, and hence the Colonial Secretary’s change of heart 
appears more abrupt than it truly was.  Even according to Eckardstein’s 
retelling of those Chatsworth talks, Chamberlain’s proposals seemed much 
more limited than they had before.  It seems likely that between Bülow’s 
rebuff in response to Chamberlain’s Leicestershire speech, in December 
1900, and his nonchalant dropping of joint action in China, in March 1901, 
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the Colonial Secretary had decided that nothing useful would come from 
continued hope in Germany.  As a man who often paid close attention to 
public opinion at home, and had been mired in personal attack all through 
the Khaki election and the reopening of parliament, it is certain that he was 
aware, and increasingly so, of the intense anti-British feeling demonstrated 
in Germany.747  He was also a busy man, both supporting the inexperienced 
Brodrick at the War Office and in directing the political side of the South 
African War.748  To give a simple example, on the 19th March, the day after 
he had met Eckardstein, he presented the Cabinet with a memorandum on 
the negotiations with Botha which had attempted to find acceptable peace 
terms to end the guerrilla phase of the South African war.749  The 
circumstances in which Chamberlain had initiated his own talks back in 
January appeared far more favourable than they did in March when 
Eckardstein made his attempt.  Chamberlain acted when it appeared that 
perhaps Germany wanted better terms before committing to resisting 
Russia in Northern China and was probably supported by Balfour and 
Lansdowne.750  Eckardstein made his attempt at the worse possible 
moment, just as the British had received a shock over the Anglo-German 
agreement and Monger describes how there “grew up the feeling that 
Germany had encourage Britain and then [...] left her in the lurch.”751  
Eckardstein’s attempt therefore met with little enthusiasm from 
Chamberlain but not yet hostility.  In his meeting with Lansdowne the 
German stand in ambassador, talking only for himself in an unofficial voice, 
suggested that Germany would be more responsive to a broader and more 
general agreement, even suggesting a “defensive alliance, directed solely 
against France and Russia.”  Lansdowne worried that Germany’s long border 
with Russia would make her an unreliable ally, and that to join in such a 
way would have entailed ”the adoption of an identic foreign policy by both 
Powers in all their external relations”.752  The example of the Franco-
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Russian alliance was certainly illustrative, at Fashoda, France had been 
unable to rely on Russian aid, and at Port Arthur Russia received scant 
support from France; a similar situation could have been the result unless 
the alliance was very carefully worded, and that did not even consider the 
difficulties arising out of Germany going to war due to her Triple Alliance 
obligations.  Lansdowne only took the proposal seriously because he 
believed it may have originated from the Kaiser.753  Eckardstein’s demarche 
was unlikely to succeed for several important reasons.  Firstly, having 
suggested to both parties that the other was very eager both were waiting 
on the other for proposals.  Secondly, Bülow’s immediate response was to 
suggest that Britain should join the Triple Alliance and to demand 
exceptions including the defence of India from the Russians and Alsace-
Lorraine from the French, although it appeared he envisioned help if those 
conflicts widened to include the opponents’ alliance partners.754  Thirdly, the 
immediate need for an alliance dropped away in early April 1901 as matters 
cooled with Russia in the Far East.  Fourthly, Chamberlain had refused to 
engage in another round of his new diplomacy.  Eckardstein’s plot depended 
on being able to have frank unofficial discussions, in order to construct a 
proposal that one side could offer the other as a starting point to official 
discussions, as had happened in the Samoan settlement.  He had also 
waited until Salisbury, who the Germans assumed was a major obstacle, 
had left the country before he made his attempt.  However, Chamberlain 
was not prepared to do so again, whether he was motivated solely by his 
stated concerns that anything that was sent back to Berlin was immediately 
wired to St Petersburg seems unlikely.  During the Hatzfeldt/Chamberlain 
talks it had been suggested that if Russia thought an Anglo-German alliance 
was being negotiated then she would launch a pre-emptive war before its 
conclusion.755  Chamberlain could not simply assume this was bluff to put 
off the discussion and so had to consider that it would not be in German 
interests to leak such suggestions.  More important was the suggestion that 
he had burnt his fingers enough.  It implied that he expected he would be 
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burned again if he tired.  The Colonial Secretary no longer thought the 
arrangement he had preferred was possible.  Without someone prepared to 
go out on a limb Eckardstein’s plan was bound to eventually stall.  However, 
because Eckardstein was the acting Ambassador when he made his 
approach and as Lansdowne wanted to work with Germany where he could, 
and so wanted to avoid giving Germany any snub, the spectre of 
negotiations lingered on.756  In May 1901 they became more serious, 
Hatzfeldt had returned to his post and emphatically gave Lansdowne to 
understand that Britain would be expected to join the Triple Alliance and 
started to suspect that Eckardstein had been exceeding his instructions.757  
Lansdowne was awaiting a document from Eckardstein and in his meeting 
with Hatzfeldt requested the terms of the Triple Alliance.758  This was 
exactly what Holstein had wanted to avoid, it was also what Chamberlain’s 
refusal to assist Eckardstein had all but guaranteed.759  Sanderson and 
Lansdowne drew up a draft convention, in order that the Cabinet could have 
something “to cut about”, but Sanderson had already noticed serious issues 
with any alliance: 
There must be a certain amount of qualifying words to prevent 
either Party from being dragged into a quarrel of which it 
disapproves, and in which it would not have the necessary 
amount of popular support. 
These qualifications are likely to be the cause of serious 
dispute – and the Germans will be much less scrupulous in 
making use of them to throw us over than we can be in leaving 
them in the lurch.  Our public opinion would not allow it- theirs 
would.760 
Worse, the Permanent Under Secretary noted that while Britain would have 
to guarantee Alsace-Lorraine, it was unclear what Germany would 
guarantee in return, this was especially true as not even Chamberlain could 
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any longer harbour hopes that Germany would help contain Russia in the 
Far East. 
Salisbury also wrote a memorandum for Cabinet, which stands as one of the 
most important documents with regards to understanding his realpolitik 
view of foreign policy.  He chose to take aim at the proposition that Britain 
would join the Triple Alliance.  While Sanderson, Lansdowne and certainly 
Chamberlain had preferred a direct agreement with Germany this appeared 
a little disingenuous except that it was probably the only alliance Britain 
stood any chance of concluding with the Germans.  The Prime Minister’s key 
criticism was that “[t]he liability of having to defend the German and 
Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of having to defend 
the British Isles against France.”  He went on to talk about how British 
isolation was presented “as constituting a serious danger for us.  Have we 
ever felt that danger practically?”  Ignoring every French invasion scare of 
the nineteenth century, the most recent during the South African War, he 
focused on how Britain was not isolated during the Napoleonic wars and so 
had she failed then it would not have been due to her isolation.  Ultimately 
he warned against undertaking “most onerous obligations, in order to guard 
against a danger in whose existence we have no historical reason for 
believing.”761  All of this seemed cogent enough, and certainly such 
arguments helped persuade the Cabinet, but it contained glaring omissions 
which ignored grave concerns outside of Europe.  While it was true that 
Britain had not faced the prospect of invasion throughout most of the last 
century, a reliance on the Navy as a ‘Wooden Wall’ or even what had by 
then become an ‘Iron Clad Wall’, ignored other effects of advances in naval 
technology.  The advent of ships able to move at speed in almost all 
weathers made the short line that is the English Channel a very small 
barrier.  And the advent of the submarine and torpedo boats would 
eventually revolutionise naval defence in coastal waters.  Though without 
defeating the Royal Navy, any invasion would be hard to supply and 
reinforce.  Even leaving aside the wisdom of ignoring the threat of invasion 
on the grounds that it historically had not existed or happened, Salisbury 
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also ignored two other major problems.  The British Cabinet were also 
struggling to answer two vitally important strategic questions.  The first of 
these was how to defend India from a Russian advance through Afghanistan 
and Persia.762  The second was how to maintain naval supremacy while 
many of the Powers developed their own sea power.763  Six months later, 
Selborne at the Admiralty would be arguing for interpreting the “Two Power 
Standard” as requiring making “such provision as will offer us the 
reasonable certainty of success in a war with France and Russia”.764  By May 
1901 Hicks Beach had already started to show concern for the spiralling 
costs of the service departments, pursuing every saving he could while still 
being prepared to meet requests for the South African War.765  By 
September it was the Chancellor of the Exchequer that was causing serious 
concerns as he started to demand immediate retrenchment when the South 
African War ended, not just of war time expenditure but of the normal 
service estimates.766  Certainly isolation was steadily becoming much more 
expensive and it is worth considering that the draft agreement Sanderson 
drew up for an Anglo-German alliance also considered it important to create 
a supplementary naval and military arms control agreement to prevent 
Germany demanding Britain increase her military forces.767 
Chamberlain’s various thoughts on alliances, which he freely shared in his 
public speeches and private conversations, often included the phrase, 
“would be a guarantee of peace.”768  He placed great store on the value of 
such a connection as a deterring factor.  To his mind a defensive 
arrangement could have ensured peace by deterring war from ever breaking 
                                       
762 Neilson, pp.110-143; Friedberg, pp.209-278; Grenville, pp.291-318; 
763 Friedberg, pp.135-208; Langer, pp.420-428 
764 Selborne, “The navy Estimates and the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
Memorandum on the Growth of Expenditure”, 16/11/1901, CAB37/59/118 
765 Hicks Beach to Lansdowne, 9/05/1901, Balfour MSS Add.MS49727; hicks Beach 
to Chamberlain, 27/06/1901, JC11/18/8; Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 10 & 14/05/and 
9/09/1901, Salisbury MSS 3M/E/Hicks Beach/1899-02 
766 Hicks Beach to Chamberlain, 10 & 16/09/1901 & 2 Oct 1901 JC11/18/9,11 & 14 
and Chamberlain To Hicks Beach, 12 & 30 Sept, & 4 Oct 1901, JC11/18/10,13 & 15 
see also Hicks Beach, “Growth of expenditure”, 12/09/1901, CAB 37/58/85 
767 Otte, China, pp.279-80 
768 Memo.,Chamberlain, 29/03/1898, JC7/2/2a/3; see also "Mr. Chamberlain At 
Leicester." 1/12/1899, The Times, p.7; and for further examples his memoranda on 
discussions with Hatzfeldt, Eckardstein, the Kaiser and Bülow at Windsor and 
various correspondence with Salisbury. 
246 
 
out.  By contrast it seems Salisbury never admitted or discussed the value 
of alliances in deterring the actions of others, though he must have 
understood this while offering to renew Britain’s commitments to Portugal.  
Salisbury focused exclusively on what may or may not happen if the casus 
foederis arose.  He also lingered at length on the difficulty the British 
parliamentary system brought to the table.  The matter of war or peace 
would be decided ultimately by “the humour of our people in circumstances 
which cannot be foreseen” and while this issue affected the German side 
slightly less than Britain it still existed; “neither we nor the Germans are 
competent to make the suggested promises.”769  As Langer notes while 
Salisbury always disdained the role public opinion played on foreign policy 
he never considered that it could be moulded or led.770  Whether this 
memorandum was decisive in convincing the Cabinet to reject the Anglo-
German alliance proposal is impossible to discern.  It was certainly 
influential but Lansdowne was not prepared to do much of anything until he 
received some written form of German ideas and the terms of the Triple 
Alliance.  Given that the Germans had no intention of furnishing those 
unless Britain made the first move there was in reality no decision to be 
made.  Without those documents and as Hatzfeldt was being recalled due to 
his prolonged illness, Lansdowne was in no hurry, he expected that the 
matter would be “dropped for the moment” and that he was “quite content 
to mark time for a while”.771  Ultimately Lansdowne attempted to divert the 
stalled Anglo-German alliance negotiations onto discussing more limited 
regional agreements; this was unacceptable to the Germans who insisted 
that any agreement needed to be “the whole or none”.772 Bülow rather 
cynically wrote “R.I.P” on the Auswärtige Amt’s final memorandum on the 
subject.773 
Chamberlain had already abandoned Germany and had moved on to 
attempt to find a settlement with France.  When the French had approached 
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with an initiate for a discussion on Morocco Chamberlain had been cautious 
but interested but Lansdowne had shut it down as premature, as he did 
Chamberlain’s attempts to broaden discussions on an exchange of colonial 
territories.  Chamberlain had never hesitated to broaden the range of 
discussions in order to find that most reclusive of things, a general 
settlement.  Lansdowne “deprecated any attempt at a transaction on so 
vast a scale, and would rather avoid discussing it.”774  These Anglo-French 
pourparlers were taking place in March 1901 just as the Manchurian crisis 
reached its summit and merely days after Bülow had announced Germany’s 
indifference there.  Chamberlain had wasted no time in making good his 
repeated intentions to Hatzfeldt and Eckardstein that he would turn towards 
the Dual Alliance if Germany proved unfriendly.  Langer and Kennedy both 
note that from around the turn of 1901 onwards the British press and thus 
public opinion started to pay more attention to both the Anglophobia 
prevalent in Germany and the increasing tensions caused by economic 
competition.  By 1902 this situation had deteriorated to the point where the 
British press could be described as openly Germanaphobic.775  Chamberlain 
always paid close attention to the mood of the British public.  Therefore this 
change of opinion in the British press confirmed him in his belief that le bon 
heure qu'elle passe, with which he had warned the Germans as long ago as 
1898.   
The Russian climb down over Manchuria, back in April 1901, had not 
resolved many problems.  While it dissipated the sense of urgency and 
ended the ‘war in sight’ crisis the actual issues had remained unresolved.  
Various provinces of China were under European occupation, Chili, 
Manchuria and even in the Yangtze delta around Shanghai.  Lansdowne 
initially took a two pronged approach; he tried to find some kind of 
agreement with Russia while also pursuing the Anglo-German alliance offers 
he believed Eckardstein had initiated.  Therefore he had responded 
somewhat coolly to Hayashi’s early suggestion that Britain and Japan come 
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to “some permanent understanding for the protection of their interests in 
that part of the world”.776  As Lansdowne and Sanderson continued to 
believe that “in the long run the policy of trying to work comfortably with 
Russia [was] the only sound one” the Japanese overture was not yet taken 
up.777  Negotiations over how to settle China’s affairs lumbered on in 
Peking.  In a series of meetings between the Foreign Secretary and 
Hayashi, at the end of July 1901, Lansdowne told the Ambassador that “If 
the Japanese Government desired it, he (Baron Hayashi) would find 
me[Lansdowne] ready to discuss [...] the possible establishment of an 
understanding between our two countries.”  This was to be based around a 
commonality of interests in regards to the eventual fate of Korea and the 
“balance of power in the waters of the Far East”.778  Otte argues that this 
demonstrated an evolution of ideas based upon Salisbury’s suggestion in 
February for an Anglo-Japanese entente to defend the northern coastlines of 
China, through a set of memoranda written by Bertie over the summer, to 
arrive at encouraging Japan to provide a “statement of their requirements” 
by mid August.779  Monger places the conversation of 14th August as the 
point at which alliance talks were decided upon.780  This was certainly not 
the case as the Anglo-Japanese agreement was referred to the Cabinet 
several times to empower Lansdowne to continue.  The Cabinet decision in 
late August to allow Lansdowne to continue was revisited on 5th November, 
13th December and on 19th December.781  However, during the Lansdowne-
Hayashi interview on the 14th August, the Japanese ambassador dropped 
hints about an alliance while “he did not for a moment suppose that there 
could be any question of an offensive or defensive alliance between us [...] 
his country would go to war rather than see Corea[sic] fall into the hands of 
Russia”.782  Whether the eventual agreement Lansdowne and Hayashi 
envisaged was to be called, alliance or entente, in the Ambassador’s mind, 
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and made quite clear to Lansdowne, it was based upon needs arising from a 
stipulated situation with which his country was already prepared to commit 
to warlike actions.  Lansdowne did inform his colleagues on 16th August and 
Salisbury informed the king that while “[t]he negotiation has hardly yet 
proceeded further than the stage of asking for information at to our mutual 
assistance – but it will be pursued.”783  On 25th Lansdowne informed Satow, 
in Peking, of the “interesting conversations with Hayashi [...] I think it not 
at all improbable that we may succeed in arriving at this”.784  While cautious 
Lansdowne certainly expected some agreement to come into being that 
would be based upon the “balance of power in the waters of the Far East“ 
with a view to enabling Japan to defend her interests, and by proxy 
Britain’s, by using war if necessary.   
Hicks Beach’s concerns about the growth of military expenditure not 
associated with the South African War exploded across policymakers’ desks.  
Chamberlain, Selborne and Brodrick robustly attempted to defend 
departmental spending.785  Regardless of how successful they were, this led 
to financial concerns being taken into consideration with regard to foreign 
policy.  The Chancellor had been unofficially complaining about this and 
officially pressing for the immediate withdrawal of at least some troops from 
China for some time.786  Bertie had already started to allow financial 
concerns to be considered in his memorandum over the summer.787  This 
resulted in Selborne being able to argue in favour of the Anglo-Japanese 
connection on the grounds of fiscal expediency.788  While Parliament was in 
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recess the matter rested but Lansdowne had Bertie rewrite his 22nd July 
memo and sketched his own ideas of an agreement in the marginalia before 
he met with Hayashi again on 16th October.789  Lansdowne had completed a 
draft for the Cabinet to consider, which Salisbury approved of being laid 
before them, for the meeting on 28th.790  Both Nish and Otte suggest that 
Salisbury’s approval of presenting the draft to Cabinet was significant.  Nish 
suggests that his remark that he agreed “generally with the despatch and 
draft treaty”, invalidates any the idea that the Prime Minister opposed the 
alliance right from the start.791  Otte suggests that this demonstrates that 
Salisbury recognised that the draft “did not differ substantively from 
his[Salibury’s] own suggestion of an Anglo-Japanese entente”.792  However, 
to suggest that Salisbury approved of the proposed agreement at this time 
but not the final agreement stretches the evidence.  Articles II, III, IV and V 
in this draft remained almost untouched.  Only article I, which contained the 
description of the interests which could give rise to the casus foederis 
required much debate and Salisbury was involved in drafting it.  Lansdowne 
had asked Salisbury to “suggest a formula which would secure for us the 
requisite measure of discretion & for the Japanese the certainty of our 
cooperation where their quarrel was a justifiable one”.793  Lansdowne 
believed that if Salisbury retained an objection it was that the disclaimer of 
aggressive intentions in article I would “[g]ive us no security” while the 
Foreign Secretary felt that “it is worth something” as it would “enable either 
Power to disavow the other in a case where the quarrel was a wanton and 
gratuitous one”.794  If the Prime Minister did harbour strong doubts about 
the agreement he did not exert himself sufficiently in order to disrupt its 
conclusion. 
The first draft was not actually discussed by the Cabinet until the 5th 
November.  Otte and Neilson both argue that this date is significant as it 
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comes after Lamsdorff, meeting with Hardinge in St. Petersburg, rejected a 
British overture to offer a joint loan to Persia.795  However, Nish notes that 
Lansdowne had wanted to discuss the proposed agreement in Cabinet on 
the 28th Oct, which is highly suggestive that the two diplomatic incidents 
were not linked.796  On 1st November Lansdowne wrote to MacDonald, in 
Japan, that he had told Hayashi that he “regarded it[proposed alliance] as 
extremely hopeful”.797  This does not suggest that Lansdowne believed the 
Anglo-Japanese arrangements were dependent on the failure of coming to 
terms with the Russians, although he anticipated that the Anglo-Russia joint 
loan to Persia would collapse.798  The draft was approved and then passed 
over to Hayashi along with a remark that the British wanted the Japanese to 
consider whether they could include India.799  The Japanese did not reply 
with their counter draft until the 12th December.  The delay was partly 
caused by illness, a desire to exhaust their options with Russia and their 
constitutional arrangements which revered the opinions of the Genrō.800 
It was Balfour who put up the strongest resistance to the alliance.  The 
Prime Minister in waiting put his objections down in a lengthy note to 
Lansdowne.  He started by claiming that the Cabinet had come to the 
“rather hasty decision” to “have offered to enter into an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Japan”, on 5th November.  Balfour complained that 
no papers had been circulated before the meeting and that as he arrived 
late he found the debate in full swing, that the Cabinet was “not very 
anxious to hear any views on the general aspects” and that they were 
treating the proposed agreement “as one confined to the far east”.801  
Balfour would very soon have to take charge of such meetings and if he 
could not insist that he be heard then this did not bode well for the future.  
He did not expand upon his complaint that the agreement appeared to be 
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offensive and defensive in nature but Salisbury did in a memorandum on 7th 
January.   
The famous memorandum of 7th January 1902 demonstrated that Salisbury 
was very much aware that the agreement in question was an alliance and 
not a regional entente.  He had fixed upon two problems, the problem of 
Japan taking aggressive action in defence of her Korean interests which the 
British could not support, and the tried and tested parliamentary objection.  
Salisbury was commenting on the draft of 5th January and found that in 
terms of Britain’s liability “There is no limit and no escape.  We are pledge 
to war, though the conduct of our ally may have been followed in spite of 
our strongest remonstrances, and may be avowedly regarded by us with 
clear disapprobation.”802  This was a very strong objection but it was not 
directed at the Japanese.  Salisbury could not “think that Japan will 
definitively refuse us some discretion on the question whether the casus 
belli [...] is one on which we can properly draw the sword.”  The Prime 
Minsters ire fell upon Lansdowne’s interpretation of Japanese intentions, 
and even quoted the Foreign Secretary in his memorandum.   
“Japan will, in my belief, never accept a stipulation that she is 
not to be allowed to take without our permission measures 
which we might regard as provocative but which she would 
defend upon the ground that they were forced upon her by the 
conduct of Russia.  If we were to tell her that should she 
become involved in a quarrel with Russia in such circumstances 
without our concurrence, the casus foederis would not be held 
by us to have arisen, she will, I am convinced tell us that it is 
impossible for her to accept our terms.”803 
Salisbury’s actions were to prevent his Foreign Secretary from handing over 
complete discretion to the Japanese without having actually attempted to 
retain some measure of discretion.  Whatever the stipulations and 
sentiments of various parts of the agreement were, Salisbury did not want 
the British to enter the agreement having already come to the conclusion 
that they were required to act as Japan’s second regardless of the 
circumstance.  His intervention did secure a change to the draft wording 
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handed to the British on the 31st December, which read that “Great Britain 
recognises the right of Japan to take such measures as she may find 
necessary to safeguard and promote those interests[in Korea].” 804  This 
would indeed have handed Japan absolute discretion over when the treaty 
was to become activated in both an offensive and defensive fashion.  The 
British counter draft removed the independent reference to Japan together 
with the reference to promoting those interests, the final text read “the 
High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of 
them to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive 
action of any other Power, or by disturbance arising in China or 
Corea[sic]”.805  Salisbury’s objection was designed to ensure that 
Lansdowne more robustly defend Britain’s freedom of action by removing 
any implication that the treaty provided for more than just defensive 
situations but it also acknowledged that the agreement promised war-like 
action in stipulated situations. 
Balfour’s main concern was with how this would affect relations with 
Germany and it should be remembered that while the Anglo-German 
alliance negotiations were all but closed, they had not yet been officially 
dropped.  However, Balfour exposed how wedded he was to the German 
connection.  The majority of his complaint compared and contrasted what 
Britain would get from an Anglo-Japanese alliance, against joining the Triple 
Alliance.  His criticisms seemed cogent enough, the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
risks Britain finding “ourselves fighting for our existence in every part of the 
globe against Russia and France [...] over some obscure Russian-Japanese 
quarrel in Corea[sic].”  But again, he failed to consider the alliance as a 
deterrent; would France really choose to find herself fighting for her 
existence in every part of the globe over an obscure Russian-Japanese 
quarrel?  Certainly, the Russians had declined to fight over obscure Anglo-
French Sudanese quarrels.  The Triple Alliance would make superior allies as 
they were better able to assist the British who would have to fight the same 
combination of Powers.  The Central Powers having to come to Britain’s aid 
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would prevent France from “throwing in her lot with Russia.”  However, he 
ignored the political problems of joining the Triple Alliance.  Lansdowne’s 
main concern was that in doing so Britain and Germany would have to 
agree on a joint foreign policy.  This consideration barely existed in the case 
of the geographically limited agreement with Japan.  Balfour had also 
ignored the difficulties in concluding an Anglo-German agreement; so far it 
had not been possible to even start official negotiations.  Balfour went on to 
use Salisbury’s arguments about how the British could not agree to go to 
war without knowing the state of public and parliamentary opinion at the 
time: “We have offered in favour of Japan, to abandon our traditional policy, 
and we have proved in your own persons that a ministry can promise to go 
to war in remote contingencies and over quarrels at present unforeseen.”  
Balfour also believed that defending the central Powers was in Britain’s 
interests.  His argument was also based on a false equivalence, he argued 
as though the question being asked was not whether the Japanese 
connection held sufficient advantages for Britain but whether it was a better 
deal than membership of the Triple Alliance.  The question posed as an 
either/or choice, which it was not, in fact there was no reason, on the 
British side, why she could not pursue both a Japanese Alliance and 
adhesion to the Triple Alliance, although the later may have been even 
harder to achieve after the conclusion of the former.806   
Lansdowne’s reply was calmer, firstly, he reaffirmed that “the chances of 
the ‘casus foederis’ arising are much fewer in the case of the Anglo-
Japanese agreement than they would be in that of an Anglo-German 
agreement.”  The area was much more limited and so this “diminishes the 
difficulty of explaining to the Germans why we are prepared to face the one 
but not the other liability.”  The Foreign Secretary closed by reminding 
Balfour that Britain could not afford to allow Japan to be crushed between 
Russia and France either and thus why not get something for it by admitting 
as much.807  Ultimately Lansdowne had already decided that British 
membership in the Triple Alliance was simply not possible, and Metternich, 
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whom he saw that week and had considered sharing news of the Anglo-
Japanese talks with, ruled out any chance of working towards such a project 
piecemeal.808  Balfour clung to a rapprochement with Germany for far longer 
than any other member of the Cabinet.  Chamberlain remained unhappy 
with the deal, though he did not try to prevent it taking place.  His objection 
was obvious, the text of the treaty gives the appearance that it is unequal; 
Korea was mentioned specifically, while Britain’s interests in the Yangtze 
were only implicitly mentioned.809  Salisbury’s memorandum of 7th January 
also had strong criticism of the Japanese draft, which included language 
that gave the agreement a limited offensive remit.  However, this had 
already crossed with Lansdowne’s proposed counter draft and the Foreign 
Secretary asked for Salisbury to strengthen the British position if he 
could.810 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded on 30th January 1902.  It is 
often viewed as marking the end of Britain’s ‘Splendid Isolation’ which 
strictly speaking it did.811  However, it is now well accepted that the 
arrangement prolonged British isolation from the Europe alliance blocs.812  
The financial pressures of attempting to compete with the world had already 
been proved too much and the British Empire had retreated from the 
western hemisphere.813  The Anglo-Japanese alliance therefore, had two 
important effects.  The first of these was to enable the British to ‘co-opt’ the 
Japanese fleet into her thinking with regards to naval estimates.  This had 
been stressed by both Selborne and Bertie in the discussions leading up to 
the alliance.814  This allowed the Cabinet to convince itself that the 
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agreement improved British security however, this was a somewhat 
dangerous idea; the casus foederis of the alliance could only arise due to 
events in the Far East and an Anglo-French-Russian conflict, growing out of 
a collision somewhere else in the world, would not automatically bring 
Japan into the fight.  Under those circumstances the British Far-Eastern 
squadron would still have had to face the combined Franco-Russian 
squadrons alone.  That is not to say that Japan would have remained aloof 
as her ally’s usefulness was destroyed.  This was the principal reason 
Balfour and Chamberlain were never enthusiastic about the agreement 
although it did safeguard Britain’s Far Eastern interests, while constructing 
a clear field for Japan to potentially give Russia a second ‘Sebastopol’, it did 
nothing to relieve pressures outside of China.  The second effect was upon 
international relations.  France and Russia quickly issued their own counter 
declaration but Germany remained neutral, “convinced that the great Krach 
(which would enhance her own position) had come a little closer.”815  
However, as both France and Britain were now the respective seconds for 
Russia and Japan in the Far East they had even more reason to improve 
relations to safeguard against fighting in the Channel or the Mediterranean 
over their respective allies’ obscure Korean interests.816  This merely 
accelerated the French trend towards trying to find colonial agreements with 
Britain.  It also lessened the immediate need for good relations with 
Germany, Lansdowne had convinced the Japanese to throw themselves 
across the path of Russia in Germany’s stead, a suggestion Chamberlain 
had often made himself.817  The alliance itself had evolved from Salisbury’s 
earlier suggestion of an Anglo-Japanese entente similar in scope to the 
Mediterranean Agreements of 1887.  However, during that evolution, it had 
most certainly become an alliance for the mutual defence of regional 
interests.  Salisbury was well aware of the agreements nature and had he 
chosen to he could have encouraged further resistance to it but he did not, 
it appeared that the chief exponent of isolation was content to sign an 
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agreement which bound Britain to war-like actions in stipulated 
situations.818   
Chamberlain’s desires to form an alliance with Germany had always been 
based upon a grand strategic vision.  The Anglo-Japanese alliance was 
much too localised to be considered a substitute and he gave proof that he 
did not consider it one.  Just before the alliance was concluded, amid a 
stormy press war with Germany of his own making, he gave a speech in 
which he remarked upon Britain’s isolated position “[w]e have the feeling, 
unfortunately, that we have to count upon ourselves alone, [...] I say alone, 
yes, in a splendid isolation, surrounded and supported by our kinsfolk.”819  
This revealed something of Chamberlain’s adapting attitudes to Britain’s 
security problem and potentially how he viewed the forthcoming Anglo-
Japanese alliance; namely that it did not meaningfully affect the nature of 
British isolation and that he was starting to view the Empire as Britain’s best 
form of security.  His spat with Bülow, over the honour of British arms, also 
revealed that he was no longer concerned about offending the Germans.820  
Throughout 1902 and into 1903 Chamberlain became convinced that 
Germany had no part to play in Britain’s future.  This was accelerated in 
April 1902 when the Admiralty finally admitted “that Germany is building 
against us.”821  Laying to one side the tension which would eventually 
develop into a full blown naval arms race; Anglo-German relations were still 
damaged at other points too.  The situation in China had still not been 
normalised and on 30th July 1902 the Chinese asked the Europeans to 
withdraw the troops they had stationed at Shanghai.822  The British were 
inclined to agree and set about arranging for all the Europeans to do so at 
the same time.  French and German agreement had been delayed but in 
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October Eckardstein announced that Germany would leave only after China 
agreed not to grant special concessions in the area of the Yangtze.  This had 
been Britain’s area of interest and revealed that the Germans wished to 
ensure that the British would be powerless to take action to prevent her 
own penetration of that rich commercial market.823  This demand was in 
keeping with the nature of the ‘Open-Door’ policy but it ignored that Britain 
had not reserved an area of China solely to herself, as Russia had in the 
north, Germany in Shantung, and France in the provinces immediately 
contiguous with French Indo-China, had; it was therefore a positively anti-
British move.  Chamberlain had been consistently concerned about 
reserving the Yangtze as a de facto British sphere of influence and his 
objections to the Anglo-Japanese alliance were based upon its weakness 
with this regard.  Ultimately Satow in Peking managed to turn the tables by 
convincing the Chinese to extend the guarantees, which the Germans had 
sought for the Yangtze, to cover the whole of China thus making it harder 
for Germany to acquire further concessions in Shantung.824  To compound 
the problem Metternich also attempted to lie to Lansdowne about German 
intentions, which the Foreign Secretary responded to in very strong 
terms.825  In mid November the Kaiser and Lansdowne met during the 
formers visit to Britain, their discussion touched on Shanghai and was not 
reassuring; the Kaiser had only desired “that the conditions of withdrawal 
should be such as to render it unnecessary for them to return.”  The 
conversation finished with the Kaiser reminding Lansdowne that with 
regards to Kiaochow “He had, therefore, been obliged to help himself. It 
was absolutely necessary for the development of Germany that she should 
have coaling stations.”826  By then Germany had already started to pose a 
rising naval threat to the British, the Kaiser’s words could not have soothed 
Lansdowne’s fears.  Chamberlain was well aware of what had taken place in 
China, although already busy with his developing ideas for imperial 
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preference, as the matter had been before the Cabinet.827  Germany’s 
unfriendly actions in China only hardened Chamberlain’s attitude towards 
them; while previously he may not have treated them as an unfriendly 
Power, even though he had come realise that as an alliance partner they 
would not bring the British Empire the security he hoped, he now became 
almost a foe to them.  Chamberlain had no opportunity to demonstrate this 
hardening towards Germany before he headed to South Africa for his tour in 
late November 1902.  However, on his return it would not be long before he 
did have an opportunity to do so. 
Back on 16th May 1902, Chamberlain had given a speech to the Liberal 
Unionist Association in Birmingham.  In it he described the position of the 
country as a cause of anxiety due to “[t]he political jealousy [...], the 
commercial rivalry [...], the pressure of hostile tariffs, the pressure of 
bounties, the pressure of subsidies, it is all becoming more weighty and 
more apparent.”  Mentioning Germany specifically but not exclusively, the 
Colonial Secretary went on to elaborate that this system of economic 
intervention was set up with “the intention [...] to shut out this country as 
far as possible from all profitable trade with those foreign States and at the 
same time to enable those foreign States to undersell us in British 
markets.”  Reliance on the “old and antiquated methods”, a reference to 
free trade, could not meet this new threat.  Chamberlain laid out his 
prescription for the disease of unfair competition: 
At the present moment the Empire is being attacked on all 
sides and in our isolation we must look to ourselves. (Cheers.) 
We must draw closer our internal relations, the ties of 
sentiment, the ties of sympathy, yes, and the ties of interest. 
(Cheers.) If by adherence to economic pedantry, to old 
shibboleths, we are to lose opportunities of closer union which 
are offered us by our colonies, if we are to put aside occasions 
now within our grasp, if we do not take every chance in our 
power to keep British trade in British hands, I am certain that 
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we shall deserve the disasters which will infallibly come upon 
us.828 
Chamberlain was drawing links as well as parallels between economic and 
diplomatic isolation.  Three months after the formation of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance Chamberlain was still referring to Britain as suffering in 
her isolation and, where as once he demanded a strong, natural alliance, to 
cover this weakness, he now talked of strengthening the bonds of 
Empire.829  At the Colonial Conference in July the Colonial Premiers had 
decided to offer Britain a unilateral preference in their tariffs, they did not 
demand a reciprocal preference, but they reserved their rights to act 
differently if one was not forth coming.830  Over the summer Chamberlain 
had been distracted by numerous issues, the Boer Generals attempts to 
negotiate better terms in South Africa, the fallout from the Education Bill 
and his own plans for a colonial tour starting in South Africa itself.  During 
this the Canadians applied pressure on Chamberlain to press the Cabinet to 
offer reciprocation in the duty on corn, a duty which Hicks Beach had only 
reluctantly applied in desperation to raise revenue.831  In October, as the 
news concerning the German attempt to prise the Yangtze open to their 
trade became apparent, Chamberlain brought his proposal for imperial 
preference generally and Canadian reciprocation specifically, to the 
Cabinet.832  Ritchie, who replaced Hicks Beach as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in August, fought against the proposal, he laid memoranda 
before the Cabinet in October and November.833  However, he failed to 
prevent the Cabinet from agreeing to Chamberlain’s proposal in principle 
though Chamberlain also failed in convincing the Cabinet to make binding 
communications on the subject to Canada.  Balfour informed the king that 
“as at present advised” the Cabinet would retain the corn duty but would 
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offer “a preferential remission of it [...] in favour of the British Empire.”834  
Chamberlain left for South Africa believing that the Canadian preference 
was as good as sown up.  While he was abroad his own ideas on how far 
reaching preference could become and the potential of the Empire started to 
firm up.835  
Ritchie, back in Britain, was not idle either and did all that he could with the 
budget to demonstrate that the country’s finances no longer required the 
revenue raising duty on corn at all.  This he lay before the Cabinet and 
convinced them that no preference was necessary as the duty was not 
necessary.  It had not been an easy fight; Ritchie had to threaten 
resignation, which would have left the Budget in a shambles, in order to get 
his way.836  Word reached Chamberlain while he was on his return journey 
from South Africa.837  Chamberlain had insisted that the duty be repealed if 
it could not be amended but he was furious.  He had hoped to use the corn 
duty to start a slow gentle process towards imperial preference but Ritchie 
had destroyed this hope.  Worse, in the debates over the budget, Ritchie 
discussed the Corn Duty in such a manner as to make its re-imposition as 
politically difficult as possible.838   
Chamberlain was far from finished though.  Later in the year Balfour would 
defend what he described as Chamberlain’s somewhat understandable and 
even justifiable ill temper: 
On his arrival[from South Africa] he found the bye-elections 
going against us; he found a Land Bill[Wyndham’s Irish Land 
Bill] about to be introduced [... h]e found Brodrick and 
Brodrick’s army schemes the topic of universal criticism, [... 
h]e found our Education Bill in its most unpopular phase and 
daily alienating valuable supporters belonging to the left wing 
of the Unionist Party in Birmingham and elsewhere[, ... a]bove 
all, he found that his scheme for employing the shilling duty on 
Corn as a means of obtaining preferential treatment for 
Canada was rendered impossible by the Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer’s unexpected refusal to embody it in his budget, 
and this after he had just reason to suppose that in November 
the Cabinet, as a whole, were in its favour. 
It must be acknowledged that all the causes, taken together, 
made him by no means an agreeable colleague during the first 
months after his return to England.  Sensitive, indeed over-
sensitive, as he is to temporary movements of public opinion, 
he hated the political situation and wanted a new cry; and, 
quite unconsciously to himself, he was perhaps influenced by 
the notion that his counsels had not all the weight, which his 
public position justified, in determining the legislative policy of 
his colleagues.839 
Balfour wrote this a mere month before Chamberlain’s departure from his 
government, the relatively inexperienced Prime Minister quite clearly 
understood why his Colonial Secretary was so embittered.  The Germans 
were also made to feel his wrath.  Back in April, Chamberlain’s implacable 
opposition to British participation in the Baghdad Railway caused Lansdowne 
to have to back away from the negotiations just as Chamberlain’s 
opposition to the suggestion of a joint Anglo-German naval demonstration 
in Venezuela had succeeded in forcing the matter to be dropped.840  These 
were not simply the actions of an ill tempered and overly ambitious man, he 
had serious concerns about both situations; one would offend American 
sensibilities, just when Anglo-American relations were good, and were about 
to be tested by the Alaskan boundary dispute.  The other would open an 
international port on the British dominated Persian Gulf; which would have 
resulted in British diplomacy being entangled in a never-ending round of 
concession and counter concession hunting while vital interests in the area 
became dependent upon on the dubious trustworthiness of the Germans.  
At around the same time the Germans also increased their pressure on the 
British self governing dominions in their ongoing trade war with Canada, the 
Germans had threatened to retaliate against any other colony that offered 
Britain a preference, this was seen in the British press as an attempt by 
Germany to prevent the drawing together of the Empire.841 
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Chamberlain had made up his mind as to what to do.  His feeling of isolation 
and of being disregarded by the newer members of Cabinet reinforced his 
decision to stake his future and the future of the British Empire, on Tariff 
Reform.  Back in South Africa he seemed “as though a period or stage in his 
career had been reached. ... Position, safety, administration, do not attract, 
he seemed to say; there was something great to be done for the Empire, 
and he was willing to risk a fall.”842  This dissatisfaction had been with him 
for some time.  Back in September 1902 he lambasted Devonshire with his 
ire, as the second leading Liberal Unionist, Chamberlain should have 
expected to have more in common with ‘the Duke’ but his relationship with 
the Whig grandee was one of frustration:  
I never can get any real support from you or anyone else in 
the Cabinet, in support of my own convinced opinion that we 
ought not to give way to the bluffing of any Foreign Power & 
that if the worse come to the worse we could hold out, as our 
ancestors did, against the lot of them.843 
That frustration had grown through subsequent Cabinet reshuffles, as 
Salisbury left the Foreign Office and then resigned as Prime Minister, people 
with whom Chamberlain had had long standing relationships, such as 
Goschen, Chaplin and even Hicks Beach were replaced by younger members 
less impressed with what they owed the Liberal Unionist.  Balfour also failed 
to realise what Salisbury had always understood, the sheer power 
Chamberlain could wield and thus the danger he posed once freed from the 
Cabinet.  In his usual style Chamberlain responded to Ritchie’s Budget with 
a public speech of his own, back in Birmingham.  In it he would survey the 
great problem of strength and security that faced the British Empire and the 
German commercial threat.  Calling for the opening of a debate upon the 
issues of imperial preference and tariff retaliation he made the purpose of 
such a policy crystal clear and echoed Lord Salisbury’s ‘Dying Nations’ 
speech to drive his point home: 
“Our[British] Imperial Policy is vital to them[the Colonies] and 
vital to us.  Upon that Imperial Policy and what you do in the 
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next few years depends that enormous issues whether this 
great Empire of ours it to stand together, one free nation, if 
necessary, against all the world (hear, hear), or whether it is 
to fall apart into separate States, each selfishly seeking its own 
interest alone, losing sight of the commonweal, and losing also 
the advantages which union alone can give. [...] 
In my opinion the germs of a federal union that will make the 
British Empire powerful and influential for good beyond the 
dreams of any one now living- the germs of that union are in 
the soil; but it is a tender and delicate plant and requires 
careful handling. [...] 
We also have our chance, and it depends upon what we do 
now whether this great idea is to find fruition or whether we 
will for ever and ever dismiss it from our consideration and 
accept our fate as one of the dying Empires of the world”.844 
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Conclusion 
 
Chamberlain’s concerns over foreign policy were shared by many members 
of the Cabinet.  Both Britain’s geo-strategic position and perceptions of 
Salisbury’s conservative foreign policy fuelled discontent.  However, it would 
be a mistake to assume that Salisbury was solidly opposed strong 
measures.  During the Armenian Massacres he lamented that the navy was 
unprepared to seize the straights and, having been forced away from a 
policy of unilateral militarism by the Cabinet, became frustrated while trying 
to find a diplomatic solution with Russia.  The Committee of Defence was 
organised in order to provide some kind of overview to Britain’s sprawling 
and somewhat haphazard defence arrangements.  Salisbury absolutely 
believed that Britain’s military needed to be able to project power or at least 
threaten force otherwise British foreign policy must become one huge bluff, 
or need to be reoriented.  This was sometime before the South African War 
would stretch Britain’s resources and temporarily hamstring her freedom of 
action.  Salisbury also appeared to be much more supportive of 
Chamberlain’s chequer board posturing in West Africa than his reputation 
suggests.  Certainly, the Prime Minister was caught between managing the 
potentially explosive crisis with the French and keeping his Cabinet whole as 
Chamberlain forced an aggressive policy.  But, Salisbury managed the task 
admirably and both men eventually got the essentials of what they wanted.   
It was during the Port Arthur crisis that differences started to become a 
serious problem.  The public outcry to the emerging crisis drove 
Chamberlain to action.  Chamberlain was not merely acting upon Public 
opinion; he also tried to give lead to it.  However, Salisbury was somewhat 
blind to the risk of ignoring the papers.  He would much have preferred to 
reserve foreign policy to a closed, aristocratic, grouping and what he 
considered rational methodology.  By contrast Chamberlain believed that 
the public needed to be heard and feel their concerns were represented; 
ignoring their complaints would be electorally dangerous. 
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The Cabinet as a whole was faced immediately with the reality of British 
overextension, again long before the British were tied up in South Africa.  
Salisbury, for all his private disdain of talk of prestige, lamented the loss of 
soft power he imagined he laboured under due to his predecessors decisions 
over the Sino-Japanese war.  Thus Britain was powerless to prevent the 
concession hunting that took place in China and had to content themselves 
with their own acquisition of Weihaiwei, which the Cabinet was aware, 
presented no safety at all.  In fact Salisbury had encouraged the taking of 
Weihaiwei which was certainly only a manoeuvre for prestige.  Salisbury’s 
policy had become concerned with maintaining a bluff.  While historians 
have identified that British freedom of action would be circumscribed by the 
joint crises of Boxer and Boer, this earlier situation presented the similar 
problems to the Cabinet albeit in a more nebulous and less defined form.  In 
1898 the British were presented with dangerous situations in Africa and 
China, and lacked the materials, military or diplomatic to deal with both.   
Chamberlain’s response was to attempt to find a diplomatic agreement 
which would strengthen Britain’s position in the world.  He was convinced 
that hand to mouth agreements with Russia could secure Britain’s interests 
and it was not until Russia’s lack of power was demonstrated in the Russia-
Japanese war that she was prepared to.  He looked in several directions 
before latching onto Germany as potentially the way out for the British.  
Several of his senior Cabinet colleagues felt similarly.  The 
Chamberlain/Balfour/Hatzfeldt talks were the result of not only the Colonial 
Secretary’s concerns but because they were shared by Balfour, Devonshire, 
Goschen, Lansdowne and Chaplin.  Salisbury and Chamberlain were both 
convinced that Britain needed some form of international agreement.  
Chamberlain sought one that would enable the British to continue to defend 
her interests in the face of Franco-Russian encroachments; Salisbury sought 
a series of them that would convince the Dual Alliance partners to restrain 
themselves from such encroachments.  Chamberlain was unable to accept 
that Russia would content herself with a deal that was also acceptable to 
the British, Salisbury felt similarly about the Germans.  This goes to the 
heart of the issues surrounding isolation.  On one hand it brought a freedom 
of action that no binding agreement could, but on the other hand it left 
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Britain in a ‘hand to mouth’ situation, finding small diplomatic solutions to 
skip over the current crisis while providing nothing to avoid the next.  The 
Cabinet faced a constant stream of crises, which made Salisbury’s 
preference for subsistence diplomacy seem even more dangerous.  
Salisbury hoped to defuse each crisis as they arose; Chamberlain wanted an 
alliance powerful enough to deter such challenges from being made at all.  
Both were essentially struggling to solve the same problem, British 
overextension, but from entirely different points of view.   
Chamberlain’s approach to the Hatzfeldt talks, his ‘new diplomacy’, was 
symptomatic of his businesslike approach to problems, and his desire to get 
results quickly.  Salisbury’s preference for a more circumspect diplomatic 
dialogue was built not only on tradition but pragmatism; he was not 
prepared to trust Powers with an entirely open dialogue.  This caused him 
problems, just as Chamberlain’s approach caused him embarrassment.  
Both German and Russian policy was driven by a deep distrust of ‘stand 
aloof’ Britain.  Salisbury’s and Lansdowne’s pragmatically tight lipped 
diplomacy did nothing to reduce that distrust.  Had the Salisbury been able 
to discuss his proposals during the Armenian Crisis as forthrightly as 
Chamberlain discussed his alliance proposals he may have been able to 
dispel some of the distrust of Britain, which dominated Russian and German 
policymakers.  Certainly Hatzfeldt would not have had to try to spell out 
that his suggesting included a most ample provision for Russia.845   
Dissention in the Cabinet enabled Chamberlain to make his overtures to 
Hatzfeldt and Eckardstein.  These were not independent actions and any 
suggestion that they were ignores recent scholarly work presented here and 
by Otte.846  Most certainly the whole Cabinet knew about, and were 
consulted upon the talks as they were happening.  Chamberlain’s character 
equipped the Cabinet with a powerful but double edged tool.  One 
contemporary observation rings partially true: 
Chamberlain doesn’t deserve all the bad things that are said of 
him, but he is essentially a dangerous man, because being 
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very masterful, impulsive and sanguine he always believes he 
can get through a tight place by pushing.  He is like an engine 
driver, who running at speed finds that parts of his engine get 
hot, & who instead of slowing down to let them cool & oiling 
them, crams on more speed in the hope of reaching the end of 
the journey before anything gives way.847 
This was not entirely accurate; Chamberlain was capable of ‘slowing down’ 
if his goal appeared to him a long way off.  His desire for imperial federation 
or union had been ardent since the 1880s, but he was prepared to wait until 
an opportunity would arise.  That was partially why he was so embittered 
over Ritchie’s handling of the Corn Duty; he destroyed the first real 
opportunity to start a piecemeal journey to Imperial Federation.  Also while 
Chamberlain would ‘push’ to get through a tight place, he would also do all 
he could to limit the likely fallout.  To complete Grey’s analogy, if 
Chamberlain believed the end was in sight, he would indeed ‘cram on more 
speed’ but he would also do all he could to cool and oil the heating parts as 
well.  This aspect of his character was useful to the Cabinet, it allowed them 
to pursue or investigate policies at variance with Salisbury’s views.  
Chamberlain was therefore used by his colleagues; he would be encouraged 
by them when they were unhappy with Salisbury but unprepared to 
challenge him themselves.  They most certainly did not give the Colonial 
Secretary any blank cheque or blanket support and so he found himself 
constrained by their timidity more often than he was empowered by their 
shared concerns.  In early 1898 they gave him his head over the talks with 
Hatzfeldt, assisted in forcing Salisbury to open talks on the future of 
Portugal’s territories, then again on Samoa and supported Chamberlain’s 
interventions in those negotiations, later during the Boxer crisis senior 
Cabinet ministers encouraged him to meet Eckardstein and as they could 
get nowhere with Salisbury themselves and convinced him to intervene to 
force the negotiation of the Anglo-German Convention on China.  The 
Cabinet therefore ‘deployed’ Chamberlain against Salisbury.  Contrastingly 
by the time Chamberlain was preparing to leave the government Balfour 
was perfectly aware of how often the Cabinet had also frustrated him.  
However, essentially Salisbury had the better appreciation of the Colonial 
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Secretary; this was why he would often give way before him if he could do 
so safely.  Salisbury believed that whatever threat Chamberlain posed to his 
foreign policy, he would pose a much greater threat, on a much broader 
range of subjects, outside of the government.  Balfour failed to understand 
this to his ultimate detriment.   
Balfour’s role in the undermining of Salisbury’s position is not emphasised 
sufficiently enough in the current historiography.  Balfour had his own ideas 
on how British foreign policy should develop and as prime minister in 
waiting, certainly felt justified in his more subtle interventions.  He was the 
last member of the Cabinet to still consider working with the Germans to be 
worthwhile.  His inability to have his opinions on the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance heard was a bad omen for his future leadership.  Balfour had been 
involved in each demarche that forced Salisbury to negotiate with the 
Germans when the Foreign Secretary did not wish to.  He had wilfully 
rushed through the completion of the convention on Portugal’s colonies to 
avoid his Uncle’s intervention upon his return.  The Dying Nations speech 
was not only aimed at Chamberlain.  Salisbury never lost his suspicion of 
Balfour, over the debate about when to call the Khaki Election, Salisbury 
commented to his nephew, “[y]ou are like Joe[Chamberlain], who again is 
like Randolph[Churchill]. You don’t care the least for character.”848  This 
rather reminded Balfour of where his earlier political loyalties lay and that 
Salisbury probably remembered.  Historians often attribute a closer political 
relationship between Balfour and Salisbury than probably existed.   
Chamberlain’s view of foreign policy was entirely pro-British, he was not 
pro-German, and he wanted an alliance with them only in order to better 
defend British interests though he was prepared to admit that the alliance 
could not be one sided.  This was to bring about the end of the hand to 
mouth diplomacy that typified Salisbury and later Lansdowne’s approach.  
His interest in the various Anglo-German diplomatic agreements negotiated 
at this time was based upon the continually diminishing hope that they 
would lead to eventually to an alliance.  Once Germany had exhausted even 
Chamberlain’s patience he turned to other means to secure Britain’s future.  
                                       
848 Quoted in Roberts, p.774 
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Chamberlain’s comments that he wanted Germany to throw herself across 
Russia path in China appeared on the surface to ignore Germany’s strategic 
position in Europe.849  German officials always had Europe in mind when 
considering the various alliance proposals.  However, Chamberlain’s 
conception of global interests was insightful; he essentially invited the 
Germans to join the very small number of potentially global Powers; a short 
cut to their desired world power.  By inviting the Germans to take a large 
swathe of Chinese territory under their control and even raise a Chinese 
army under German officers, Chamberlain had invited them to share at a 
very exclusive table.850  These proposals never made it back to Berlin.  
Germany, despite all her talk of weltpolitik was not ready for such a 
suggestion and would have dismissed it angrily; even more convinced that 
the British wished only to see the rest of the world at war.  Chamberlain 
was asking the Germans to weigh extra-European interests against 
European ones.  If Germany ever hoped to become a global Power and 
retain that position she would need to learn how to do that, but by this 
stage she had not.  She could assess how important extra-European mattes 
were to the British, but she could not conceptualise that they may be so to 
her.  Although Germany was restless for growth, and unlikely to be happy 
with merely becoming an economic colossus, her concepts of how to obtain 
her place as arbiter of the world were entirely European in focus.  The 
Kaiser’s discussion with Lansdowne demonstrated the understandable 
centrality of Europe to the Germans.851  Chamberlain may as well have 
offered them the moon.  The Colonial Secretary did misread German 
interests, but only because, as he did with many issues, he looked to the far 
future than the immediate situation.  He expected her to defend her 
developing interests in China or Asia-Minor as Britain would defend her 
already existing interests.  This ignored that in the German case those 
interests were not yet vital while in the British case they were.  Salisbury is 
considered to have better read German interests: 
                                       
849 Memo. Chamberlain, “The Chinese Problem.” 10/09/1900, CAB37/53/65 or 
Chamberlain Papers JC14/4/1/1 
850 Memo. Chamberlain, 1/04/1898, Chamberlain Papers, JC7/2/2A/4 
851 Wilhelm to Bulow, 29 Jan 1901, GP, XVII. No.4987, pp.24-9 
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She[Germany] is in mortal terror on account of that long 
frontier of hers on the Russian side. She will therefore never 
stand by us against Russia; but is always rather inclined to 
curry favour with Russia by throwing us over. I have no wish to 
quarrel with her; but my faith is infinitesimal.852 
As ever this is cogent enough, but it missed a singular point which it 
appeared the Germans also missed.  Germany was most likely to find 
herself in a conflict with Russia because of an issue arising out of Russian 
and Austrian ambitions in Eastern Europe.  This was the rationale for why 
the Germans wished to keep the Russians as deeply involved in the Far East 
as they could.853  Germany never considered whether the British connection 
would lessen their dependency upon Austria and thus increase their own 
influence over Austrian policy.  The Austrian ambassador in Berlin had noted 
in 1900 that if Germany persisted in her aim to supplant Britain as the 
world’s dominate Power then she would eventually encounter serious 
problems outside of Europe and thus become even more dependent on 
Austria inside within it.  The Ambassador also realised that Russia was 
unlikely to watch her neighbour become such a power with equanimity.854  A 
British alliance could have helped create the opportunity to escape from a 
two front war arising out of Eastern Europe, if only because it could 
strengthen Germany’s hand in controlling Austrian ambition.  However, this 
would have added another level to the house of cards which rested on the 
perceived balance of power in Europe.  Chamberlain’s alliance proposals 
need to be read in this light, he did not wish to join the Triple alliance, he 
hoped to pull Germany out of her European mindset and add her strength to 
Britain’s in the geo-strategic competition.  There was also a serious 
misreading of British imperialism which was essentially, even in 
Chamberlain, defensive in nature.  The Kaiser and Bulow failed to realise 
that for most of this period the British flag was somewhat following the 
trade, or more often, safeguarding vital strategic routes and interests.  The 
Germans considered the actions of others from their own perspective; they 
did not consider how a mature state would act to defend her established 
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Monger, p.17 
853 Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, 26/04/1898, GP, XIV, Pt.1, No. 3793, pp.221-7 
854 Kennedy, Antagonism, p.241 
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interests which were often geographically outside of her direct control.  The 
Germans did not understand informal empire, though they often used their 
increasing trade concerns as a right to interfere in areas still dominated by 
the British. 
Ultimately Germany alienated Chamberlain; the constant Anglophobia in the 
German press as well as the ever grasping, never content, nature of her 
diplomacy drove him to other ends.  The German behaviour over Shanghai 
was the last straw and he started to try to settle differences with France.  
While Chamberlain probably never entertained anything like an alliance with 
either of the Dual Alliance partners, he did start to work upon solving the 
outstanding issues.  Removing them could, despite decades of hostility, 
normalise Anglo-French relations.  The signing of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance made this even more important; neither France nor Britain would 
be eager to join a Russo-Japanese war, if there was nothing they wanted 
from each other.  Chamberlain was just not excited by the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, it appeared to him to be one sided and as it was limited to specific 
area only partly acted to cover the British overextension.  As the list of 
potential alliance partners dwindled, Chamberlain became increasingly 
convinced that the future safety of the Empire could rest only on its own 
shoulders.  While the Tariff Reform campaign would rather quickly embrace 
protection, its beginnings are to be found routed firmly in the problem of 
defending sprawling interests.  As colonial forces proved so useful and so 
forthcoming in the South African War, Chamberlain set about creating ties 
of interest to keep the British Empire from flying apart.  While the majority 
of the arguments were rightly based on economics, what Chamberlain was 
most actuated by were concerns of the relative diminishing of British Power.  
The foreign policy crises which fell upon the Unionists were all complicated 
in part by the realisation of the disparity between the vastnesses of British 
interests, “thrust like gouty fingers into every corner of the globe”, and her 
power to protect them.855  If Germany could not be bought to assist in 
                                       
855 Memorandum, Sanderson 21/02/1907, BD, III , Appendix B pp. 421-31 quote on 
p. 430  
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protecting them, by offering to share some of them, then the gout must be 
fought and the “weary titan” reinvigorated and strengthened.856 
Otte suggests that Salisbury’s approach was more nuanced than simply that 
of an isolationist and even an adherent to the Conservative Country Party 
line, as suggested by Charmley.  This study suggests that Salisbury was 
indeed more nuanced than his historiography offers.  Otte concludes that 
“there was no ‘end of isolation’, the latter defined as selective engagement 
in international politics on the basis of limited agreements that provided for 
geographically clearly defined cooperation, whilst maintaining the maximum 
amount of freedom of manoeuvre possible.”857  However, the definition 
offered for ‘isolation’ is not isolation at all; merely the continuation of 
caution with regards to formal far reaching commitments, but this did not 
prevent the conclusion of diplomatic agreements which called for action in 
stipulated situations the traditional test of isolation.858  This rather suggests 
that there was actually no policy of isolation at all, even if Britain, from time 
to time, lacked even regional agreements and was de facto isolated 
diplomatically or rather unaligned.  This is implied in Howard’s work on 
Splendid Isolation.859  While Portugal was on the periphery of Europe, 
Salisbury’s willingness to renew binding treaties with her, when he knew 
other Powers were circling like vultures, cannot hold hands with a policy of 
isolation.  Salisbury’s approach was nuanced, it was not dictated by a 
predisposed policy and thus, even before Lansdowne took over it was 
evolving in response to the geopolitical realities Britain face.  It just was not 
changing fast enough for many members of the Cabinet.  Lansdowne’s 
stewardship continued in Salisbury’s footsteps.   
If Charmley’s summation of the Country Party line as a “school of Economy, 
Peace [and] Sound and strict Finance” then Salisbury’s lamentations of the 
                                       
856 Often attributed to Chamberlain at the Colonial Conference 1902, Amery, Life, 
Vol. 4, p.421; 
857 Otte, China, p.338 
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effects of the Gladstonian garrison at the Treasury were at odds with this.860  
Salisbury certainly eschewed a European war, but neither was he for peace 
at any price and appeared comfortable with the application of force outside 
of Europe and right at the edge of it with regards to the Ottoman Empire.  
He was definitely no simple isolationist, nor ‘Little Englander’: he was 
prepared to offer treaties where Britain’s interests were at stake and the 
treaty was limited to a specific area and set of circumstances.  However, he 
was not prepared to under write another country’s aggressive plans and his 
experience of German diplomacy suggested they would make domineering 
and selfish allies; Chamberlain eventually agreed.  Salisbury’s was a policy 
which attempted to adapt the sound peaceful tenants of the traditional 
conservative line to suit a world full of dangerous competition in an age 
where British arms no longer commanded the same confidence they once 
did.   
However, Otte is even more circumspect with where to place Chamberlain.  
Charmley, firmly connects Chamberlain’s precepts with Disraeli’s vision of a 
cosmopolitan military Empire independent of Europe.  Ultimately this is very 
close to where ultimately Chamberlain found himself but only because 
Germany and the U.S. refused to fall in with his plans.  Chamberlain’s was a 
vision of Britain which sat uncomfortably somewhere between the 
Gladstonian Concert of Europe, and Disraeli’s independent prestige driven 
artifice.  Chamberlain wanted to create a new concert, one which included 
Germany and the U.S. which could then dictate the tune to which the world 
would dance.  He wanted to reform the Empire, within that system, bringing 
together its constituent parts.  Chamberlain cared about prestige but only 
as a tool to build sentiment and thus a tie between the public and the 
Empire.  His then was an evolution derived in part from Gladstone and 
Disraeli into something of his own, a precursor to Roosevelt’s ‘Big 4’, when 
that proved unattainable he accelerated his plan for binding the Empire 
together so that Britain could face the world even alone.  The emphasis was 
in covering or removing weakness, Britain needed to be stronger; Disraeli 
did not have to deal with the effects of overextension in the same way.  
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Disraeli attempted to use Britain’s strength in order to attach public 
sentiment to a vision of Empire associated with a particular party, 
essentially to co-opt Palerstonian principles for Conservative electoral 
benefit.  Chamberlain attempted to attach, lead and create public sentiment 
towards the Empire in an attempt to ensure that the security, well being 
and development of the Empire transcended party politics. 
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